United States v. Vikas Sagar, Southern District of New York (Dec. 5, 2024)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

- V. - 

VIKAS SAGAR, 

Defendant; 

SEALED 
INFORMATION 

22 Cr. ( ) 

COUNT ONE  
(Conspiracy to Violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) 

The United States charges: 

At all times relevant to this Information, unless otherwise 

stated: 

Relevant Entities and Individuals 

1. Company-1, the identity of which is known to the 

United States, was an international consulting firm, 

headquartered in New York, New York, that operated worldwide as 

a single global partnership, with an office in Johannesburg, 

South Africa. Company-1 was a "domestic concern" as that term 

is used in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), Title 15, 

United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(1)(B). 



2. VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, was a citizen of India, a 

lawful permanent resident of the United States, a resident of 

South Africa, and a stockholder, employee, and agent of 

Company-1. SAGAR was a "domestic concern" and an employee, 

agent, and stockholder of a "domestic concern," as those terms 

are used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 

78dd-2(a). 

3. Company-2, the identity of which is known to the 

United States, was a consulting firm incorporated in South 

Africa, with its principal place of business in South Africa. 

Company-2 and its officers, directors, and employees were agents 

of a domestic concern, Company-1, as that term is used in the 

FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(a). 

4. Company-3, the identity of which is known to the 

United States, was a consulting firm incorporated in South 

Africa, with its principal place of business in South Africa. 

Company-3 and its officers, directors, and employees were agents 

of a domestic concern, Company-1, as that term is used in the 

FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(a). 

5. Transnet SOC Ltd. ("Transnet"), was a South African 

state-owned and state-controlled company headquartered in 

Johannesburg, South Africa, that operated as the custodian of 

2 



South Africa's ports, rails, and pipelines. Transnet was 

controlled by South Africa and performed government functions. 

Transnet was an "instrumentality" of the South African 

government and Transnet's officers and employees were "foreign 

officials," as those terms are used in the FCPA, Title 15, 

United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(2)(A). 

6. Foreign Official-1, an individual whose identity is 

known to the United States, was an official at Transnet with 

responsibility over procurement and contracting during the 

relevant time. Foreign Official-1 was a "foreign official" as 

that term in used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, 

Section 78dd-2(h)(2). 

7. Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd. ("Eskom"), was a South African 

state-owned and state-controlled company headquartered in 

Sandton, South Africa, that operated as South Africa's public 

power utility. Eskom was controlled by South Africa and 

performed government functions. Eskom was an "instrumentality" 

of the South African government and Eskom's officers and 

employees were "foreign officials," as those terms are used in 

the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(2)(A). 

3 



8. Foreign Official-2, an individual whose identity is 

known to the United States, was an official at Eskom with 

responsibility over procurement and contracting during the 

relevant time. Foreign Official-2 was a "foreign official" as 

that term in used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, 

Section 78dd-2(h)(2). 

9. Co-conspirator-1 ("CC-1"), an individual whose 

identity is known to the United States, was a South African 

national and business-person who worked in South Africa. 

10. Co-conspirator-2 ("CC-2"), an individual whose 

identity is known to the United States, was a South African 

national and business-person who worked in South Africa at 

Company-2 and Company-3. 

Overview of the Bribery Scheme 

11. VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, while acting within the 

course of his employment with Company-1, and as an agent and 

stockholder thereof, with the intent, at least in part, to 

benefit Company-1, agreed with others to bribe foreign officials 

in South Africa to steer business and award consulting contracts 

to Company-1 and its partner firms, Company-2 and Company-3. In 

furtherance of the scheme, SAGAR and his co-conspirators, among 

other things: (a) obtained confidential and non-public 

4 



information from Transnet and Eskom through CC-1, CC-2, and 

others, regarding the award of consulting contracts; 

(b)submitted proposals for multi-million-dollar consulting 

contracts to Transnet and Eskom on behalf of Company-1 and its 

partner firms, Company-2, and Company-3, knowing that a portion 

of the proposed consulting fees from the contracts would be used 

to pay bribes to Foreign Official-1 and Foreign Official-2; 

(c)drafted portions of Transnet's and Eskom's requests for 

consulting bids and internal memoranda justifying the non-use of 

public tenders in an effort to exclude Company-l's competitors 

and improperly influence the award of contracts to Company-1 and 

its partner firms; and (d) deleted emails and files to destroy 

evidence of the scheme. 

Statutory Allegations 

12. From at least in or around 2012, up to and including 

in or around 2016, in the Southern District of New York and 

elsewhere, VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, and others known and 

unknown, willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, 

confederated, and agreed together and with each other to commit 

an offense against the United States, to wit, to violate the 

FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2. 

5 



13. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that 

VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, being a domestic concern and an 

employee and agent of a domestic concern, and a stockholder 

thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern, would and did 

willfully and corruptly make use of the mails and a means and 

instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of an 

offer, payment, promise to pay, and authorization of the payment 

of any money, offer, gift, promise to give, and authorization of 

the giving of a thing of value to a foreign official, and to a 

person, while knowing that all and a portion of such money and 

thing of value would be and had been offered, given, and 

promised, directly and indirectly, to a foreign official, for 

purposes of: (A)(i) influencing an act and decision of such 

foreign official in that foreign official's official capacity; 

(ii)inducing such foreign official to do and omit to do an act 

in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official; and 

(iii)securing an improper advantage; and (B) inducing such 

foreign official to use that foreign official's influence with a 

foreign government and agencies and instrumentalities thereof to 

affect and influence an act and decision of such government and 

agencies and instrumentalities, in order to assist SAGAR, 

Company-1, and others in obtaining and retaining business for 

6 



and with, and directing business to, a person, in violation of 

Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2, to wit, SAGAR, and 

others known and unknown, agreed to pay and offer money and 

other things of value to foreign officials in South Africa, and 

elsewhere, to assist SAGAR, Company-1 and others in obtaining 

and retaining business for, and directing business to, SAGAR, 

Company-1, Company-2, Company-3, and others. 

Overt Acts  

14. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the 

illegal objects thereof, the following overt acts, among others, 

were committed in the Southern District of New York and 

elsewhere: 

a. In or about 2014, VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, and 

Company-1 submitted and caused to be submitted proposals for 

multi-million dollar consulting contracts relating to Transnet's 

management of coal, manganese, iron ore, and a new multi-product 

pipeline, on behalf of Company-1 and its partner firm, Company-

2, to Transnet, understanding that a portion of the consulting 

fees from the contracts would be used for the purpose of paying 

bribes to a foreign official. 

b. On or about February 10, 2014, SAGAR sent an 

email to CC-1, attaching an internal Company-1 document related 

7 



to the proposed split of Transnet consulting fees between 

Company-1 and Company-2. 

c. On or about November 18, 2015, SAGAR sent an 

email to CC-1 and a business associate of CC-2, attaching an 

internal Company-1 document related to the proposed split of 

Eskom consulting fees between Company-1 and Company-2. 

d. In or about February 2016, SAGAR and other 

employees of Company-1 discussed concerns related to a potential 

impending audit of Company-l's contracts with Transnet and Eskom 

and the risk that the audit would reveal Company-1's practice of 

drafting portions of Transnet's and Eskom's requests for 

consulting bids and internal memoranda. SAGAR and Company-1 

personnel discussed, in substance and part, the need to delete 

documents in advance of the audit. In response, between in or 

about May 2016 and in or about July 2016, SAGAR deleted emails 

and files on his Company-1 computer. 

On or about October 5, 2016, SAGAR met in New 

York, New York with others, including an employee of Company-1 

and an employee of Eskom, to discuss the performance of a 

contract that Company-1 had obtained through the payment of 

bribes to a South African official. 

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.) 

8 



FORFEITURE ALLEGATIONS  

15. As a result of committing the offense alleged in Count 

One of this Information, VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, shall 

forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United 

States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C) and Title 28, United States 

Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, 

which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the 

commission of said offese, including but not limited to a sum of 

money in United States currency representing the amount of 

proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense. 

Substitute Assets Provision  

16. If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as 

a result of any act or omission of the defendant: 

a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due 

diligence; 

b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited 

with, a third person; 

c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the 

Court; 

d. has been substantially diminished in value; or 

e. has been commingled with other property which 

cannot be subdivided without difficulty; 

9 



it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to Title 21, 

United States Code, Section 853(p) and Title 28, United States 

Code, Section 2461(c), to seek forfeiture of any other property 

of the defendant up to the value of the above forfeitable 

. property. 

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 981; 
Title 21, United States Code, Section 853; and 
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461.) 

Li 
GLENN S. LEON 
Chief, Fraud Section 
Criminal Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 

 

DAMIAN WILLIAMS 
United States Attorney 

10 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

- v. - 

VIKAS SAGAR, 

Defendant. 

SEALED INFORMATION 

22 Cr.  ) 

(18 U.S.C. § 371.) 

DAMIAN WILLIAMS 
United States Attorney 

GLENN S. LEON 
Chief, Fraud Section 
Criminal Division 

U.S. Department of Justice

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

- V. - 

VIKAS SAGAR, 

Defendant; 

SEALED 
INFORMATION 

22 Cr. ( ) 

COUNT ONE  
(Conspiracy to Violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) 

The United States charges: 

At all times relevant to this Information, unless otherwise 

stated: 

Relevant Entities and Individuals 

1. Company-1, the identity of which is known to the 

United States, was an international consulting firm, 

headquartered in New York, New York, that operated worldwide as 

a single global partnership, with an office in Johannesburg, 

South Africa. Company-1 was a "domestic concern" as that term 

is used in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), Title 15, 

United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(1)(B). 



2. VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, was a citizen of India, a 

lawful permanent resident of the United States, a resident of 

South Africa, and a stockholder, employee, and agent of 

Company-1. SAGAR was a "domestic concern" and an employee, 

agent, and stockholder of a "domestic concern," as those terms 

are used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 

78dd-2(a). 

3. Company-2, the identity of which is known to the 

United States, was a consulting firm incorporated in South 

Africa, with its principal place of business in South Africa. 

Company-2 and its officers, directors, and employees were agents 

of a domestic concern, Company-1, as that term is used in the 

FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(a). 

4. Company-3, the identity of which is known to the 

United States, was a consulting firm incorporated in South 

Africa, with its principal place of business in South Africa. 

Company-3 and its officers, directors, and employees were agents 

of a domestic concern, Company-1, as that term is used in the 

FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(a). 

5. Transnet SOC Ltd. ("Transnet"), was a South African 

state-owned and state-controlled company headquartered in 

Johannesburg, South Africa, that operated as the custodian of 

2 



South Africa's ports, rails, and pipelines. Transnet was 

controlled by South Africa and performed government functions. 

Transnet was an "instrumentality" of the South African 

government and Transnet's officers and employees were "foreign 

officials," as those terms are used in the FCPA, Title 15, 

United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(2)(A). 

6. Foreign Official-1, an individual whose identity is 

known to the United States, was an official at Transnet with 

responsibility over procurement and contracting during the 

relevant time. Foreign Official-1 was a "foreign official" as 

that term in used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, 

Section 78dd-2(h)(2). 

7. Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd. ("Eskom"), was a South African 

state-owned and state-controlled company headquartered in 

Sandton, South Africa, that operated as South Africa's public 

power utility. Eskom was controlled by South Africa and 

performed government functions. Eskom was an "instrumentality" 

of the South African government and Eskom's officers and 

employees were "foreign officials," as those terms are used in 

the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(2)(A). 

3 



8. Foreign Official-2, an individual whose identity is 

known to the United States, was an official at Eskom with 

responsibility over procurement and contracting during the 

relevant time. Foreign Official-2 was a "foreign official" as 

that term in used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, 

Section 78dd-2(h)(2). 

9. Co-conspirator-1 ("CC-1"), an individual whose 

identity is known to the United States, was a South African 

national and business-person who worked in South Africa. 

10. Co-conspirator-2 ("CC-2"), an individual whose 

identity is known to the United States, was a South African 

national and business-person who worked in South Africa at 

Company-2 and Company-3. 

Overview of the Bribery Scheme 

11. VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, while acting within the 

course of his employment with Company-1, and as an agent and 

stockholder thereof, with the intent, at least in part, to 

benefit Company-1, agreed with others to bribe foreign officials 

in South Africa to steer business and award consulting contracts 

to Company-1 and its partner firms, Company-2 and Company-3. In 

furtherance of the scheme, SAGAR and his co-conspirators, among 

other things: (a) obtained confidential and non-public 

4 



information from Transnet and Eskom through CC-1, CC-2, and 

others, regarding the award of consulting contracts; 

(b)submitted proposals for multi-million-dollar consulting 

contracts to Transnet and Eskom on behalf of Company-1 and its 

partner firms, Company-2, and Company-3, knowing that a portion 

of the proposed consulting fees from the contracts would be used 

to pay bribes to Foreign Official-1 and Foreign Official-2; 

(c)drafted portions of Transnet's and Eskom's requests for 

consulting bids and internal memoranda justifying the non-use of 

public tenders in an effort to exclude Company-l's competitors 

and improperly influence the award of contracts to Company-1 and 

its partner firms; and (d) deleted emails and files to destroy 

evidence of the scheme. 

Statutory Allegations 

12. From at least in or around 2012, up to and including 

in or around 2016, in the Southern District of New York and 

elsewhere, VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, and others known and 

unknown, willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, 

confederated, and agreed together and with each other to commit 

an offense against the United States, to wit, to violate the 

FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2. 

5 



13. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that 

VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, being a domestic concern and an 

employee and agent of a domestic concern, and a stockholder 

thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern, would and did 

willfully and corruptly make use of the mails and a means and 

instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of an 

offer, payment, promise to pay, and authorization of the payment 

of any money, offer, gift, promise to give, and authorization of 

the giving of a thing of value to a foreign official, and to a 

person, while knowing that all and a portion of such money and 

thing of value would be and had been offered, given, and 

promised, directly and indirectly, to a foreign official, for 

purposes of: (A)(i) influencing an act and decision of such 

foreign official in that foreign official's official capacity; 

(ii)inducing such foreign official to do and omit to do an act 

in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official; and 

(iii)securing an improper advantage; and (B) inducing such 

foreign official to use that foreign official's influence with a 

foreign government and agencies and instrumentalities thereof to 

affect and influence an act and decision of such government and 

agencies and instrumentalities, in order to assist SAGAR, 

Company-1, and others in obtaining and retaining business for 

6 



and with, and directing business to, a person, in violation of 

Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2, to wit, SAGAR, and 

others known and unknown, agreed to pay and offer money and 

other things of value to foreign officials in South Africa, and 

elsewhere, to assist SAGAR, Company-1 and others in obtaining 

and retaining business for, and directing business to, SAGAR, 

Company-1, Company-2, Company-3, and others. 

Overt Acts  

14. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the 

illegal objects thereof, the following overt acts, among others, 

were committed in the Southern District of New York and 

elsewhere: 

a. In or about 2014, VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, and 

Company-1 submitted and caused to be submitted proposals for 

multi-million dollar consulting contracts relating to Transnet's 

management of coal, manganese, iron ore, and a new multi-product 

pipeline, on behalf of Company-1 and its partner firm, Company-

2, to Transnet, understanding that a portion of the consulting 

fees from the contracts would be used for the purpose of paying 

bribes to a foreign official. 

b. On or about February 10, 2014, SAGAR sent an 

email to CC-1, attaching an internal Company-1 document related 

7 



to the proposed split of Transnet consulting fees between 

Company-1 and Company-2. 

c. On or about November 18, 2015, SAGAR sent an 

email to CC-1 and a business associate of CC-2, attaching an 

internal Company-1 document related to the proposed split of 

Eskom consulting fees between Company-1 and Company-2. 

d. In or about February 2016, SAGAR and other 

employees of Company-1 discussed concerns related to a potential 

impending audit of Company-l's contracts with Transnet and Eskom 

and the risk that the audit would reveal Company-1's practice of 

drafting portions of Transnet's and Eskom's requests for 

consulting bids and internal memoranda. SAGAR and Company-1 

personnel discussed, in substance and part, the need to delete 

documents in advance of the audit. In response, between in or 

about May 2016 and in or about July 2016, SAGAR deleted emails 

and files on his Company-1 computer. 

On or about October 5, 2016, SAGAR met in New 

York, New York with others, including an employee of Company-1 

and an employee of Eskom, to discuss the performance of a 

contract that Company-1 had obtained through the payment of 

bribes to a South African official. 

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.) 

8 



FORFEITURE ALLEGATIONS  

15. As a result of committing the offense alleged in Count 

One of this Information, VIKAS SAGAR, the defendant, shall 

forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United 

States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C) and Title 28, United States 

Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, 

which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the 

commission of said offese, including but not limited to a sum of 

money in United States currency representing the amount of 

proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense. 

Substitute Assets Provision  

16. If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as 

a result of any act or omission of the defendant: 

a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due 

diligence; 

b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited 

with, a third person; 

c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the 

Court; 

d. has been substantially diminished in value; or 

e. has been commingled with other property which 

cannot be subdivided without difficulty; 

9 



it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to Title 21, 

United States Code, Section 853(p) and Title 28, United States 

Code, Section 2461(c), to seek forfeiture of any other property 

of the defendant up to the value of the above forfeitable 

. property. 

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 981; 
Title 21, United States Code, Section 853; and 
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461.) 

Li 
GLENN S. LEON 
Chief, Fraud Section 
Criminal Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 

 

DAMIAN WILLIAMS 
United States Attorney 

10 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

- v. - 

VIKAS SAGAR, 

Defendant. 

SEALED INFORMATION 

22 Cr.  ) 

(18 U.S.C. § 371.) 

DAMIAN WILLIAMS 
United States Attorney 

GLENN S. LEON 
Chief, Fraud Section 
Criminal Division 

U.S. Department of Justice