In re LIQUIDNET
Liquidnet, Inc. agreed to settle SEC charges for violating multiple securities laws and regulations, including failing to establish adequate risk management controls and supervisory procedures, and making material misrepresentations to customers, resulting in a $5 million civil penalty.
Liquidnet, Inc. violated SEC rules by failing to comply with Rule 15c3-5's market access requirements and breaching Regulation ATS through inadequate data safeguards. The firm set unassessed $1 billion credit thresholds for non-broker-dealer customers and made material misrepresentations to customers and regulators about its data protection measures. As a result, Liquidnet agreed to pay a $5 million civil penalty and implement comprehensive remedial compliance measures.
Liquidnet, Inc., a registered broker-dealer and operator of three alternative trading systems (ATSs), agreed to settle SEC charges for violating the market access rule (Rule 15c3-5) and Regulation ATS. The firm failed to implement adequate risk controls, misrepresenting its compliance, and improperly granted internal access to confidential subscriber trading data. Liquidnet set default $1 billion credit thresholds for non-broker-dealer customers without assessing creditworthiness, failed to aggregate orders to prevent threshold breaches, and submitted false CEO certifications and inaccurate Form ATS-N/ATS disclosures from 2019 to 2024. The firm also allowed unauthorized employee access to sensitive trading information and falsely assured subscribers of robust data safeguards. As part of the resolution, Liquidnet consented to a cease-and-desist order, a $5 million civil penalty, and mandatory undertakings, including filing amended forms and submitting a written report to the Commission. The firm will also implement comprehensive remedial compliance measures within specified deadlines.
Extracted insights
- $1.00B $1 billion ≥$1B
- $900.00M $900 million $100M–$1B
- $125.00M $125 million $100M–$1B
- $5.00M $5,000,000 $1M–$10M
- $800 $800 <$10K
- company fixed income securities
- person liquidnet fixed income ats
- company liquidnet, inc.
- person liquidnet negotiation ats
- person material misrepresentations
- person national market system stocks
- agency Securities and Exchange Commission
- company three alternative trading systems
- Securities And Exchange Commission instituted Administrative And Cease-And-Desist Proceedings
- Liquidnet, Inc. violated Section 15(c)(3) Of The Exchange Act
- Liquidnet, Inc. failed To Have Adequate Risk Management Controls
- Liquidnet, Inc. failed To Establish Adequate Written Safeguards
- Liquidnet, Inc. made Material Misrepresentations
- Liquidnet, Inc. submitted Offer Of Settlement
- Securities And Exchange Commission accepted Offer Of Settlement
- Liquidnet, Inc. consented Entry Of Order Instituting Administrative And Cease-And-Desist Proceedings
- Liquidnet, Inc. operates Three Alternative Trading Systems
- Liquidnet Negotiation ATS trades National Market System Stocks
- Liquidnet H20 ATS trades National Market System Stocks
- Liquidnet Fixed Income ATS trades Fixed Income Securities
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Release No. 11351 / January 10, 2025
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 102147 / January 10, 2025
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-22394
In the Matter of
LIQUIDNET, INC.,
Respondent.
ORDER INSTITUTING ADMINISTRATIVE
AND CEASE-AND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8A OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECTIONS
15(b) AND 21C OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING
FINDINGS AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL
SANCTIONS AND A CEASE-AND-DESIST
ORDER
I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate and in the
public interest that public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are,
instituted pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and Sections
15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) against Liquidnet, Inc.
(“Liquidnet” or “Respondent”).
II.
In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer
of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose
of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to
which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as
to the Commission’s jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, which are
admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-
Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 15(b) and
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21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions
and a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set forth below.
III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds
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that:
SUMMARY
1. This matter involves violations of the federal securities laws in two regulatory areas
by Liquidnet, a registered broker-dealer that operates three alternative trading systems (“ATSs”):
two ATSs that trade National Market System (“NMS”) stocks, Liquidnet Negotiation ATS and
Liquidnet H20 ATS (the “NMS Stock ATSs”), and one ATS that trades fixed income securities,
Liquidnet Fixed Income ATS (the “Fixed Income ATS” and together with the NMS Stock ATSs,
the “Liquidnet ATSs”). First, Liquidnet violated Section 15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act and Rule
15c3-5 thereunder (the “market access rule”) by failing to have adequate risk management controls
and supervisory procedures in place related to market access for its ATSs. Second, Liquidnet failed
to establish adequate written safeguards and written procedures to protect confidential subscriber
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trading information and failed to amend its Forms ATS-N and ATS, as required by Regulation
ATS. Liquidnet also made material misrepresentations about the firm’s compliance with both
Regulation ATS and the market access rule.
2. As a broker-dealer operator of an ATS that provides market access to non-broker-
dealers, Liquidnet is subject to the market access rule, which requires subject broker-dealers to
have, among other things, a system of financial risk management controls and supervisory
procedures to prevent the entry of orders that would exceed appropriate credit thresholds for its non-
broker-dealer customers and to establish, document, and maintain a system for regularly reviewing
the effectiveness of these controls and procedures, among other things. The market access rule is
designed to ensure that broker-dealers “appropriately control the risks associated with market
access, so as not to jeopardize their own financial condition, that of other market participants, the
integrity of trading on the securities markets, and the stability of the financial system.” Risk
Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, Exch. Act Rel. No. 63241
(Nov. 10, 2010), 75 Fed. Reg. 69792 (Nov. 15, 2010).
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The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent’s Offer of Settlement and are not binding on
any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.
2
“Subscriber” is defined in Rule 300(b) of Regulation ATS as “any person that has entered into a
contractual agreement with an [ATS] to access such [ATS] for the purpose of effecting transactions in
securities or submitting, disseminating, or displaying orders on such [ATS], including a customer, member,
user, or participant in an [ATS].” Accordingly, “subscriber” is used throughout the discussion of Liquidnet’s
Regulation ATS violations below. The market access rule uses the term “customer” instead, and is therefore
used throughout the discussion of Liquidnet’s market access rule violations below.
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3. From approximately 2019 through 2023, Liquidnet violated the market access rule
by setting credit thresholds for non-broker-dealer customers without first performing adequate due
diligence on their creditworthiness and frequently setting customer credit thresholds at a default of
$1 billion – regardless of the customer’s financial standing. Liquidnet also failed to implement
systems to prevent these thresholds from being breached within the NMS Stock ATSs, and, until
2023, failed to regularly review and certify its compliance with the market access rule. Liquidnet
further made material misrepresentations to certain customers about the firm’s compliance with the
market access rule.
4. As the registered broker-dealer operator of an ATS, which operates pursuant to an
exemption from exchange registration,
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Liquidnet must comply with certain conditions to the
exemption, including Rule 301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS, which requires an ATS operator to
establish adequate written safeguards and written procedures to limit access to confidential
subscriber trading information to employees of the ATS who operate the system or are responsible
for its compliance with applicable rules and regulations. The rule is designed to, among other
things, minimize “information leakage of subscribers’ confidential trading information to other
business units of the broker-dealer and their affiliates,” where there may be increased potential for
misuse of that information. See Regulation of NMS Stock Alternative Trading Systems, Exch. Act
Rel. No. 83663 (Jul. 18, 2018), 83 Fed. Reg. 38768, 38775-76 (Aug. 7, 2018) (the “NMS Stock
ATS Adopting Release”). Liquidnet must also comply with Rules 301(b)(2) and 304 of Regulation
ATS. Rule 304 requires Liquidnet to make public disclosures on Form ATS-N about the operations
of the NMS Stock ATSs and the activities of the broker-dealer operator and its affiliates. Rule
301(b)(2) requires Liquidnet to make disclosures to the Commission about the operations of the
Fixed Income ATS.
5. From approximately 2019 through 2024, Liquidnet failed to adequately limit
internal access to specific systems and tools containing certain confidential subscriber trading
information in two ways. First, Liquidnet did not have appropriate access controls for certain ATS
data used by technology personnel for testing purposes. Second, Liquidnet permitted internal
access to certain confidential subscriber trading information by certain employees who had no
operational or compliance responsibilities for the Liquidnet ATSs. This information primarily
included match and execution data, but generally did not include subscribers’ unmatched
indications of interest
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other than on an aggregate, non-symbol specific basis. The access granted
to these employees was at times inconsistent with Liquidnet’s public disclosures.
3
As explained below, Rule 3a1-1(a)(2) under the Exchange Act exempts an ATS from the definition
of “exchange” under Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, and thus, the requirement to register as a national
securities exchange pursuant to Section 5 of the Exchange Act, if the ATS complies with the conditions of
Regulation ATS.
4
An indication of interest generally refers to a subscriber’s non-firm willingness to buy or sell a
security. The Liquidnet ATSs accepted and matched indications of interest of subscribers and allowed
them to agree to terms of a trade on the ATS.
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6. Liquidnet also made material misrepresentations to subscribers and potential
subscribers in response to due diligence inquiries about the safeguards it maintained over
confidential subscriber trading information, the employees who had access to the Liquidnet ATSs,
and the scope of that access. In addition, Liquidnet failed to disclose certain information on its
Form ATS-N and Form ATS to accurately reflect who had access to confidential subscriber trading
information and the nature of that access.
RESPONDENT
7. Liquidnet is based in New York, New York and has been registered with the
Commission as a broker-dealer since October 2000. In March 2021, Liquidnet was acquired by TP
ICAP plc (“TP ICAP” and the “TP ICAP Acquisition”), a London-based financial services firm
listed on the London Stock Exchange. Liquidnet is an agency-only broker that operates three ATSs:
two NMS Stock ATSs and the Fixed Income ATS.
BACKGROUND
A. Liquidnet Violated the Market Access Rule
8. Liquidnet provides market access through the Liquidnet ATSs to non-broker-dealer
customers
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and is therefore required to comply with the market access rule with respect to the
market access it provides to those customers. As described in more detail below, from
approximately 2019 through 2023, Liquidnet violated three different subsections of the market
access rule and made certain misrepresentations to customers about its compliance with the rule.
Liquidnet Set Credit Thresholds Without Adequately Assessing
Customer Creditworthiness and Did Not Have Controls for its NMS Stock ATSs in Place to
Prevent Certain Orders Exceeding Those Thresholds
9. Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5(b) requires broker-dealers with market access to
“establish, document, and maintain a system of risk management controls and supervisory
procedures reasonably designed to manage the financial, regulatory, and other risks” of having
market access. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5(b).
10. Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5(c), among other things, requires that a broker-dealer’s
risk management controls and supervisory procedures be reasonably designed to (i) “[p]revent the
entry of orders that exceed appropriate pre-set credit or capital thresholds in the aggregate for each
customer ... by rejecting orders if such orders would exceed the applicable credit or capital
thresholds” and (ii) “[p]revent the entry of erroneous orders, by rejecting orders that exceed
appropriate price or size parameters.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-5(c)(1)(i)-(ii). This provision of the
5
The market access rule only applies to a broker-dealer operator of an ATS when providing market
access to non-broker-dealer customers. See Rule 15c3-5(a)(1)(ii); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5(a)(1)(ii).
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market access rule requires Liquidnet to set appropriate pre-trade credit thresholds for each non-
broker-dealer customer, and to have in place controls that will prevent the entry of orders – on a
pre-trade basis – that exceed those thresholds or are erroneously entered.
11. From at least 2019 until 2023, Liquidnet set pre-trade credit risk thresholds for
certain non-broker-dealer customers of its NMS Stock ATSs without performing appropriate
reviews of customer creditworthiness . Instead, Liquidnet nearly always set pre-trade thresholds at a
default aggregate notional value of $1 billion for these customers, without regard for the credit
ratings or financial standing of each individual non-broker-dealer customer.
12. As a result, certain pre-trade alerts, which were intended to flag that customers were
close to reaching their credit thresholds, would only be triggered after a customer placed orders
totaling an extremely high notional value. These pre-trade alerts were set at 80% of a customer’s
credit threshold in the NMS Stock ATSs. Therefore, a non-broker-dealer customer with a $1 billion
credit threshold would be able to successfully place orders in the NMS Stock ATSs totaling $800
million in notional value without triggering those alerts.
13. Because these pre-trade credit thresholds were set at arbitrary levels without
appropriate reviews of customer creditworthiness, and the related pre-trade alerts were based on
these arbitrary thresholds, these risk management controls were not reasonably designed, as the
market access rule requires.
14. In addition, from at least 2019, Liquidnet did not have a system in place to prevent
the entry of orders by non-broker-dealer customers that exceeded these arbitrary pre-set credit
thresholds when aggregated with all orders placed by that customer with the firm. Orders placed by
a customer into one of the Liquidnet ATSs would trigger a pre-trade alert if they breached the
applicable alert threshold, but if the customer placed a subsequent order that in the aggregate
exceeded the customer’s credit threshold, that order could be successfully executed, regardless of its
size.
15. Therefore, if a non-broker-dealer customer in one of the NMS Stock ATSs with a
credit threshold of $1 billion executed orders totaling $900 million, the firm’s pre-trade alerts would
be triggered because the non-broker-dealer customer had reached 80% of its credit threshold, but if
that customer placed another order of $125 million, the order would be executed without any alert
being generated, even though the notional value of that order when aggregated with earlier orders
exceeded the firm’s $1 billion credit threshold for the customer.
16. Liquidnet was aware by at least 2020 that the firm’s existing systems did not
aggregate customer orders and therefore could not prevent the entry of a subsequent order
exceeding a non-broker-dealer customer’s credit threshold. Liquidnet remedied the issue in early
2023, under TP ICAP’s supervision. Trading and other documentation relating to credit thresholds
in the NMS Stock ATSs indicate that these credit thresholds were not breached.
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17. As a result, Liquidnet did not have a reasonably designed system to prevent the entry
of orders that exceeded credit thresholds in the aggregate for each non-broker-dealer customer, as
required by the market access rule.
Liquidnet Violated the Market Access Rule by Failing to
Consistently Conduct Annual Reviews and Issue CEO Certifications
18. Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5(e) requires a broker-dealer to establish, document, and
maintain a system for regularly reviewing the effectiveness of the risk management controls and
supervisory procedures and for promptly addressing any issues. More specifically, broker-dealers
must perform a review at least annually to assure the overall effectiveness of these risk management
controls and supervisory procedures ( “15c3-5 review”) and the broker-dealer’s Chief Executive
Officer must certify compliance on an annual basis (“15c3-5 certification”). 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-
5(e).
19. Despite its awareness by at least 2020 that its systems could not aggregate non-
broker-dealer customer orders and therefore could not prevent the entry of a subsequent order
exceeding a non-broker-dealer customer’s credit threshold, Liquidnet did not perform a 15c3-5
review covering the entire calendar year in 2021. Specifically, Liquidnet did not review its
compliance with the market access rule for the period September 1 through December 31, 2020.
Moreover, until 2022, the firm’s 15c3-5 reviews did not adequately test to determine whether the
firm’s risk management controls would prevent orders exceeding non-broker-dealer customers’
credit thresholds, as required by the market access rule. In 2022, the firm began to conduct
adequate testing and identified various deficiencies in its controls, including those described in
paragraphs 14 and 15 above.
20. Despite Liquidnet’s knowledge beginning in at least 2020 that its controls were
deficient because its systems could not aggregate non-broker-dealer customer orders, Liquidnet’s
CEO signed 15c3-5 certifications in 2020 and 2023 attesting compliance with the requirements of
the market access rule. The CEO did not sign certifications in 2021 or 2022.
Liquidnet Made Material Misrepresentations
to Customers about its Market Access Controls
21. Liquidnet also made misrepresentations about its market access controls to certain
customers and potential customers in response to due diligence questionnaires, stating that
Liquidnet was compliant with all regulatory requirements applicable to market access through the
firm, that it had aggregate exposure limits in place, and that it had controls that would prevent the
entry of orders that exceed appropriate credit thresholds, during a time when the firm was aware that
it could not aggregate customer orders or prevent the entry of certain orders that exceeded a
customer’s credit threshold.
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22. These misrepresentations resulted from the firm’s negligence. The firm did not take
reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of its representations, and as a result, made misstatements to
customers and potential customers about its market access controls. These misrepresentations were
material because these customers and potential customers were considering Liquidnet’s
representations about its market access controls in determining whether to select the firm as a
trading venue, and there was a substantial likelihood that a reasonable customer or potential
customer would have considered the disclosures important to their decision.
B. Liquidnet Failed to Comply with Regulation ATS
23. Section 5 of the Exchange Act requires an organization, association, or group of
persons that meets the definition of “exchange” under section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, unless
otherwise exempt, to register with the Commission as a national securities exchange. Exchange
Act Rule 3a1–1(a)(2) exempts from the definition of “exchange,” and thus exchange registration,
an organization, association, or group of persons that complies with Regulation ATS. As the
registered broker-dealer of an ATS that operated pursuant to the Rule 3a1-1(a)(2) exemption,
Liquidnet is required to comply with the applicable conditions of Regulation ATS set forth under
Rules 300-304. As described in more detail below, from approximately 2019 through 2024,
Liquidnet failed to comply with three different conditions of Regulation ATS, thus violating Section
5 of the Exchange Act, and made misrepresentations to certain customers about access to
confidential subscriber trading information.
Liquidnet Failed to Establish Adequate Written Safeguards
and Written Procedures to Protect Confidential Subscriber Trading Information
24. Among other conditions to the Regulation ATS exemption, an ATS must, pursuant
to Rule 301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS, establish adequate written safeguards and written
procedures to protect the confidential trading information of subscribers, including by limiting
access to employees who operate the system or are responsible for the ATS’s compliance with
Regulation ATS and other applicable rules. Furthermore, an ATS must adopt and implement
adequate written oversight procedures to ensure that its written safeguards and written procedures
are followed.
25. Liquidnet disclosed one such written safeguard and written procedure in its public
Forms ATS-N for the NMS Stock ATSs: a requirement that an employee requesting access to “an
application that contains confidential participant data” must receive their manager’s approval in
advance, and the manager must provide an explanation affirming both that the employee’s access
will not adversely impact ATS subscribers and that the particular type of access has been disclosed
to the firm’s customers. Liquidnet also disclosed that supervisory personnel must make monthly
certifications that the use of customer data in their business unit complies with firm policy.
Liquidnet failed to establish adequate written safeguards and written procedures, however, because
Liquidnet managers and supervisory personnel did not in fact provide these explanations or make
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these certifications. In addition, Liquidnet did not have adequate oversight procedures to ensure
that these safeguards and procedures were followed.
26. Liquidnet also had written safeguards and written procedures that related to its
Transparency Working Group. Liquidnet stated in sales materials provided to subscribers and
potential subscribers and in response to subscriber due diligence inquiries that the Transparency
Working Group advised the firm on issues relating to the protection and usage of customer data.
The group’s charter stated, among other things, that the Transparency Working Group sought to
ensure that Liquidnet was disclosing to subscribers the firm’s processes relating to employee
access to confidential subscriber trading information. Several of Liquidnet’s policies and
procedures, including its trading rules governing the systems and operations of the Liquidnet ATSs
(the “Trading Rules”),
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required review by the Transparency Working Group before any changes
to those policies and procedures could be made.
27. However, in approximately September 2021, the Transparency Working Group
disbanded due to employee turnover following the TP ICAP Acquisition. Liquidnet only
reconstituted the Transparency Working Group in Summer 2023 at the earliest, after a TP ICAP
internal audit team discovered that the working group no longer existed but that the firm was
continuing to make inaccurate representations about the group to firm customers. From September
2021 until Summer 2023, the Transparency Working Group was not performing any of the
functions Liquidnet described in its sales materials, responses to certain due diligence inquiries, or
in the group’s charter.
28. Liquidnet also failed to adequately limit internal access to systems containing
confidential subscriber trading information. While communications and other documentation do
not indicate that confidential subscriber trading information was improperly shared outside the
firm, Liquidnet did not comply with Rule 301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS by permitting employees’
internal access to certain systems and data as described in paragraphs 29 through 33 below.
29. Until Spring 2024, Liquidnet allowed access to ATS replications of indication,
order, and execution data (“replications”) from the previous trading day, which were used by
certain technology personnel for testing purposes, via generic log-in credentials that were shared
among certain technology employees. Liquidnet intended that only technology personnel with a
need to perform troubleshooting and other technical work would access these replications, but
because the log-in credentials were generic and not user-specific, the firm could not control which
employees accessed the replications. In addition, Liquidnet technology personnel saved certain
logs containing confidential subscriber trading information in a shared file without any kind of
6
Liquidnet’s Form ATS filings included a copy of the Trading Rules for the Fixed Income ATS.
Liquidnet’s Forms ATS-N refer to the Trading Rules for the NMS Stock ATSs for a description of the
types of access employees were given to confidential subscriber trading information and state that
employees must comply with restrictions on access set forth in the Trading Rules. Liquidnet also
provided the Trading Rules to ATS subscribers.
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password protection. While the shared file location was generally only provided to Liquidnet
technology personnel, any Liquidnet employee with access to the shared file location could also
access confidential subscriber trading information even if that employee did not have a basis for
accessing such data. The lack of access controls over the replications and logs was inconsistent
with statements by Liquidnet on its public Forms ATS-N that the firm was responsible for
maintaining the security of customer trading information and that it “instituted technological
controls on access to trading information, including username and password controls... and access
control lists on systems and networks.”
30. Until October 2023, when the firm removed their access, Liquidnet granted non-
U.S. sales coverage employees access to confidential subscriber trading information in the NMS
Stock ATSs that was inconsistent with Liquidnet’s Trading Rules. The Trading Rules generally
provided that trade coverage personnel were given access to ATS match information only for
equities in the region in which the employee was located and for all equities traded by subscribers
whom each employee was specifically assigned to cover, but non-U.S. employees in some cases
also received confidential subscriber trading information relating to trades in U.S. securities for
subscribers they did not cover. These non-U.S. employees did not hold any U.S. securities licenses
and did not receive training on applicable U.S. rules and regulations. In some cases, these
employees also received access to ATS order and execution information, which they did not need
to perform their jobs and to which the firm did not disclose they had access. Documentation
relating to employee ATS access indicates that these employees received unmatched indication
data only on an aggregate, non-symbol specific basis.
31. From at least 2019 through 2024, Liquidnet also permitted access to confidential
subscriber trading information in the NMS Stock ATSs and the Fixed Income ATS that was
inconsistent with the firm’s disclosures on Forms ATS-N and ATS and in its Trading Rules and
with the requirements of Rule 301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS.
32. For example, Liquidnet granted access to intraday match and execution information
in the NMS Stock ATSs to numerous employees working in business development and on the
firm’s agency-only high-touch equities trading desk, when the firm’s disclosures represented that
these employees had more limited access to confidential subscriber trading information.
33. Liquidnet also granted access to confidential subscriber trading information in the
Fixed Income ATS to employees who serviced subscribers of the Fixed Income ATS at the same
time as they serviced customers of ReBalance, a fixed income trading platform operated by TP
ICAP Global Markets America, LLC, a Liquidnet and TP ICAP affiliate. This was not disclosed
on Form ATS or otherwise to subscribers before access was granted. Liquidnet also permitted
undisclosed access to confidential subscriber trading information by employees performing jobs in
marketing and investor relations, roles that did not include operational or compliance
responsibilities for the Liquidnet ATSs. Documentation relating to employee ATS access indicates
that these employees did not receive access to unmatched indication data.
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Liquidnet Failed to File Accurate Disclosures on its Forms ATS-N and ATS
34. NMS Stock ATSs, as defined in Regulation ATS Rule 300(k), must file a public
report on Form ATS-N in accordance with Rule 304 of Regulation ATS to disclose the activities of
the broker-dealer operator and the operations of the NMS Stock ATSs. See NMS Stock ATS
Adopting Release, 83 Fed. Reg. at 38768. NMS Stock ATSs are required by Rule 304(a)(2)(i) to
publicly file certain amendments to the NMS Stock ATSs’ Forms ATS-N, in accordance with
certain conditions, including: at least 30 calendar days prior to the implementation of a material
change to the operation of the ATS or the activities of the broker-dealer operator or its affiliates
subject to disclosure on Form ATS-N, and promptly to correct information in any previous Form
ATS-N after discovery that such information was materially inaccurate or incomplete when filed.
In the NMS Stock ATS Adopting Release, the Commission stated that a change to the operations of
an NMS Stock ATS, or the disclosures regarding the activities of the broker-dealer operator and its
affiliates, would be material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable market participant
would consider the change important when evaluating the NMS Stock ATS as a potential trading
venue. See NMS Stock ATS Adopting Release, 83 Fed. Reg. at 38803. The Commission also
stated that, among others, one scenario that is particularly likely to implicate a material change is a
change to the broker-dealer operator’s policies and procedures governing the written safeguards
and written procedures to protect the confidential trading information of subscribers pursuant to
Rule 301(b)(10)(i) of Regulation ATS. See id.
35. Liquidnet’s Fixed Income ATS trades fixed income securities, primarily corporate
bonds, and does not trade NMS stocks. As such, the Fixed Income ATS files a Form ATS with the
Commission pursuant to Rule 301(b)(2). Unlike Form ATS-N, Form ATS is not a public report.
A non-NMS Stock ATS, such as the Liquidnet Fixed Income ATS, must amend its Form ATS at
least 20 calendar days prior to implementing a material change to the operation of the ATS, within
30 calendar days after the end of a quarter when information contained in an initial operation report
filed on Form ATS becomes inaccurate, and promptly upon discovering that an initial operation
report filed on Form ATS or an amendment on Form ATS was inaccurate when filed.
36. As detailed above in paragraphs 26 through 33, from at least 2019 until 2024,
material information in Liquidnet’s public Forms ATS-N, which relate to the NMS Stock ATSs,
was inaccurate. The firm’s practices with regard to which employees had access to subscriber
confidential trading information in the NMS Stock ATSs, the nature of that access, the type of
supervisory reviews that were performed with respect to that access, and the security of
subscribers’ trading data differed from the disclosures in the Forms ATS-N. Subscribers
evaluating whether to enter orders or continue to enter orders to trade in the NMS Stock ATSs
frequently asked the firm about how it protected their confidential trading information. These
questions show that the firm’s written safeguards and written procedures were material to
subscribers and potential subscribers.
37. As a result, after discovering that its Forms ATS were materially inaccurate,
Liquidnet was obligated to promptly file correcting amendments to its public Form ATS-N
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disclosures for both NMS Stock ATSs to accurately reflect information concerning access to
subscribers’ confidential trading information and file material amendments to Form ATS-N at least
30 calendar days before granting access to subscriber confidential trading information that differed
from its disclosures in its Forms ATS-N. Liquidnet, however, did not do so in these instances.
38. In addition, as described above in paragraph 33, Liquidnet’s disclosures about
access to confidential subscriber trading information in the Fixed Income ATS’s Form ATS were
also inaccurate. Accordingly, after discovering that its Forms ATS were materially inaccurate,
Liquidnet was required to amend those filings to correct any information that became inaccurate
within 30 calendar days after the end of the calendar quarter, but it did not do so in the instances
described above.
Liquidnet Made Material Misrepresentations to Certain Subscribers
and Potential Subscribers about Access to Confidential Subscriber Trading Information
39. Liquidnet held itself out in its disclosures on Forms ATS-N and ATS, as well as in
marketing materials and other materials, as providing anonymity for subscriber trades, minimizing
data leakage, and maintaining security over customer data. The lack of adequate access controls
over daily ATS replications and logs, described above in paragraph 29, for example, was
inconsistent with these representations.
40. The firm was also regularly asked by subscribers and potential subscribers about
the general type and scope of access the firm granted to confidential subscriber trading data. In
response to these inquiries, Liquidnet often directed subscribers and potential subscribers to the
firm’s disclosures in its Trading Rules, which, as described in paragraphs 30 through 33 above,
were in certain instances inaccurate.
41. Liquidnet also made misrepresentations in response to questions from subscribers
and potential subscribers about specific safeguards over confidential subscriber trading
information. For example, during a period when the Transparency Working Group had been
disbanded, Liquidnet provided subscribers and/or potential subscribers conducting due diligence
on the firm copies of its security policy, which stated that all proposed new uses of customer
trading information not specifically permitted by the Trading Rules would be reviewed by the
Transparency Working Group. Several other subscribers asked about access by non-U.S. persons
to trading data; the firm referred them to the Trading Rules, which inaccurately described the
nature and extent of access the firm gave to non-U.S. employees.
42. These misrepresentations resulted from the firm’s negligence. The firm did not take
reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of its representations, and as a result, made misstatements to
customers about access to and safeguards over confidential subscriber trading information. These
misrepresentations were material in light of Liquidnet’s representations about anonymity and the
minimization of data leakage and the fact that subscribers and potential subscribers specifically
inquired about such as part of their due diligence on the firm.
12
VIOLATIONS
43. As a result of the conduct described above, Liquidnet willfully
7
violated:
a. Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, which prohibit, directly or
indirectly, in the offer or sale of securities obtaining money or property by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading and engaging in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser.
b. Section 15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act and Rules 15c3-5(b), (c) and (e) thereunder.
Liquidnet violated Rule 15c3-5(b) by failing to establish, document, and maintain a
system of risk management controls and supervisory procedures reasonably
designed to manage the financial, regulatory, and other risks of having market
access, Rule 15c3-5(c)(1) because its risk management controls and supervisory
procedures were not reasonably designed to systematically limit the financial
exposure of the broker or dealer, including preventing the entry of orders that
exceed appropriate pre-set credit or capital thresholds in the aggregate for each
customer and preventing the entry of erroneous orders, and Rule 15c3-5(e) because
it did not establish, document, and maintain a system for regularly reviewing the
effectiveness of the risk management controls and supervisory procedures required
by Rules 15c3-5(b) and (c) and promptly address any issues or properly certify for
2021 that such risk management controls and supervisory procedures comply with
the rule.
c. Section 5 of the Exchange Act by failing to either register as a national
securities exchange or operate pursuant to an exemption from such registration,
despite meeting the criteria of “exchange” under Exchange Act Section 3(a)(1) and
Rule 3b-16(a). Specifically, Liquidnet failed to comply with the following
conditions of the Regulation ATS exemption: (1) Rule 301(b)(2), which requires an
ATS that does not trade NMS stocks to amend its Form ATS at least 20 calendar
days prior to implementing a material change to the operation of the ATS, within 30
calendar days after the end of a calendar quarter when information contained in an
initial operation report filed on Form ATS becomes inaccurate, and promptly upon
discovering that an initial operation report filed on Form ATS or an amendment on
Form ATS was inaccurate when filed; (2) Rule 301(b)(10), which requires an ATS
7
“Willfully” for purposes of imposing relief under Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act means “‘no
more than that the person charged with the duty knows what he is doing.’” Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d
408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1949)). There is no
requirement that the actor “also be aware that he is violating one of the Rules or Acts.” Tager v. SEC,
344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965).
13
to establish adequate written safeguards and written procedures to protect
subscribers’ confidential trading information, including by limiting access to
confidential trading information of subscribers to those employees of the ATS who
are operating the system or responsible for its compliance with applicable rules, and
to adopt and implement adequate written oversight procedures to ensure that the
written safeguards and procedures for protecting subscribers’ confidential trading
information are followed; and (3) Rule 304, which requires an NMS Stock ATS to
file an amendment on Form ATS-N at least 30 calendar days prior to the
implementation of a material change to the operations of the ATS or the activities of
the broker-dealer operator or its affiliates that are subject to disclosure on Form
ATS-N, and promptly to correct information in any previous Form ATS-N after
discovery that such information was materially inaccurate or incomplete when filed.
REMEDIAL EFFORTS
44. In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered remedial acts
promptly undertaken by Respondent and cooperation afforded the Commission staff, including
engaging a compliance consultant tasked with assisting Liquidnet in remediating the compliance
deficiencies identified herein and self-reporting the conduct relating to access controls over ATS
replications described in paragraph 29 above.
UNDERTAKINGS
45. Respondent Liquidnet has undertaken to do the following:
a. Liquidnet shall complete a review of the firm’s compliance with the market access
rule and Regulation ATS (the “Review”), which shall involve assessments of:
i. Liquidnet’s risk management controls and supervisory procedures relating
to market access to determine whether they are reasonably designed to (i)
prevent the entry of orders that exceed appropriate pre-set credit or capital
thresholds in the aggregate for each customer and (ii) prevent the entry of
erroneous orders, by rejecting orders that exceed appropriate price or size
parameters, as required by Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5(c)(1)(i)-(ii);
ii. Liquidnet’s procedures for conducting 15c3-5 reviews and causing 15c3-5
certifications to be made, as required by Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5(e);
iii. the adequacy of Liquidnet’s written safeguards and written procedures to
protect the confidential trading information of subscribers to the Liquidnet
ATSs and the adequacy of written oversight procedures to ensure that the
written safeguards and written procedures are followed, as required by Rule
301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS; and
14
iv. Liquidnet’s procedures for confirming that its marketing materials,
responses to customer due diligence inquiries, and Forms ATS-N and ATS
disclosures are accurate.
b. Liquidnet shall promptly file with the Commission any amendments to Form ATS-
N and Form ATS to accurately disclose its written safeguards and written
procedures to protect confidential trading information, including its written
oversight procedures to ensure that its safeguards and procedures are implemented
and followed.
c. Within 60 days of the entry of the Order, Liquidnet shall complete the Review.
d. Within 90 days of the entry of the Order, Liquidnet shall submit to the Commission
staff a written report (the “Report”) that includes:
i. an assessment of the matters described in subparagraphs a. and b. above and
ii. any remediation measures to be taken by Liquidnet to confirm that the
firm’s policies and procedures are reasonably designed to achieve
compliance with the market access rule and Regulation ATS (the
“Remediation Measures”).
e. Within 120 days of the entry of the Order, Liquidnet shall complete the
Remediation Measures.
46. Liquidnet shall certify, in writing, compliance with the undertakings set forth
above. The certification shall identify the undertakings, provide written evidence of compliance in
the form of a narrative, and be supported by exhibits sufficient to demonstrate compliance. The
Commission staff may make reasonable requests for further evidence of compliance, and
Respondent agrees to provide such evidence. The certification and supporting material shall be
submitted to Joseph G. Sansone, Chief, Market Abuse Unit, Division of Enforcement, or such
other person as the Commission staff may request, with a copy to the Office of Chief Counsel of
the Enforcement Division, no later than sixty (60) days from the date of the completion of the
undertakings. The Commission staff may make reasonable requests for further evidence of
compliance, and Respondent agrees to provide such evidence.
47. For good cause shown, the Commission Staff may extend any of the deadlines set
forth above.
48. The Report submitted by Liquidnet will likely include confidential financial,
proprietary, competitive business or commercial information. Public disclosure of the Report
could discourage cooperation, impede pending or potential government investigations or
15
undermine the objectives of the reporting requirement. For these reasons, among others, the
Report and the contents thereof are intended to remain and shall remain non-public, except (1)
pursuant to court order, (2) as agreed to by the parties in writing, (3) to the extent that the
Commission determines in its sole discretion that disclosure would be in furtherance of the
Commission’s discharge of its duties and responsibilities, or (4) is otherwise required by law.
IV.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate, and in the public interest to
impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent Liquidnet’s Offer.
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act and Sections 15(b) and 21C of
the Exchange Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:
A. Respondent Liquidnet cease and desist from committing or causing any violations
and any future violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act; Section 15(c)(3) of
the Exchange Act and Rules 15c3-5(b), (c), and (e) thereunder; and Section 5 of the Exchange Act
by failing to comply with Rules 301(b)(2), 301(b)(10), and 304 of Regulation ATS promulgated
under the Exchange Act.
B. Respondent Liquidnet shall comply with the undertakings enumerated in
paragraphs 45 through 48 above.
C. Respondent Liquidnet is censured.
D. Respondent Liquidnet shall, within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order, pay a
civil money penalty in the amount of $5,000,000 to the Securities and Exchange Commission for
transfer to the general fund of the United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section
21F(g)(3). If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C.
§ 3717.
Payment must be made in one of the following ways:
(1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which
will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;
(2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov
through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
(3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United
States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange
Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:
16
Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169
Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying
Liquidnet as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy
of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Joseph G. Sansone, Chief, Market
Abuse Unit, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 Pearl Street,
Suite 20-100, New York, NY 10004-2616.
Amounts ordered to be paid as civil money penalties pursuant to this Order shall be treated
as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the
deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Respondent agrees that in any Related Investor Action, it shall
not argue that it is entitled to, nor shall it benefit by, offset or reduction of any award of
compensatory damages by the amount of any part of Respondent’s payment of a civil penalty in
this action (“Penalty Offset”). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty
Offset, Respondent agrees that it shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the
Penalty Offset, notify the Commission’s counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty
Offset to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Such a payment shall not be deemed an
additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed
in this proceeding. For purposes of this paragraph, a “Related Investor Action” means a private
damages action brought against Respondent by or on behalf of one or more investors based on
substantially the same facts as alleged in the Order instituted by the Commission in this
proceeding.
By the Commission.
Vanessa A. Countryman
Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Release No. 11351 / January 10, 2025
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 102147 / January 10, 2025
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-22394
In the Matter of
LIQUIDNET, INC.,
Respondent.
ORDER INSTITUTING ADMINISTRATIVE
AND CEASE-AND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8A OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECTIONS
15(b) AND 21C OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING
FINDINGS AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL
SANCTIONS AND A CEASE-AND-DESIST
ORDER
I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate and in the
public interest that public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are,
instituted pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and Sections
15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) against Liquidnet, Inc.
(“Liquidnet” or “Respondent”).
II.
In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer
of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose
of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to
which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as
to the Commission’s jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, which are
admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-
Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 15(b) and
2
21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions
and a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set forth below.
III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds1 that:
SUMMARY
1. This matter involves violations of the federal securities laws in two regulatory areas
by Liquidnet, a registered broker-dealer that operates three alternative trading systems (“ATSs”):
two ATSs that trade National Market System (“NMS”) stocks, Liquidnet Negotiation ATS and
Liquidnet H20 ATS (the “NMS Stock ATSs”), and one ATS that trades fixed income securities,
Liquidnet Fixed Income ATS (the “Fixed Income ATS” and together with the NMS Stock ATSs,
the “Liquidnet ATSs”). First, Liquidnet violated Section 15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act and Rule
15c3-5 thereunder (the “market access rule”) by failing to have adequate risk management controls
and supervisory procedures in place related to market access for its ATSs. Second, Liquidnet failed
to establish adequate written safeguards and written procedures to protect confidential subscriber2
trading information and failed to amend its Forms ATS-N and ATS, as required by Regulation
ATS. Liquidnet also made material misrepresentations about the firm’s compliance with both
Regulation ATS and the market access rule.
2. As a broker-dealer operator of an ATS that provides market access to non-broker-
dealers, Liquidnet is subject to the market access rule, which requires subject broker-dealers to
have, among other things, a system of financial risk management controls and supervisory
procedures to prevent the entry of orders that would exceed appropriate credit thresholds for its non-
broker-dealer customers and to establish, document, and maintain a system for regularly reviewing
the effectiveness of these controls and procedures, among other things. The market access rule is
designed to ensure that broker-dealers “appropriately control the risks associated with market
access, so as not to jeopardize their own financial condition, that of other market participants, the
integrity of trading on the securities markets, and the stability of the financial system.” Risk
Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, Exch. Act Rel. No. 63241
(Nov. 10, 2010), 75 Fed. Reg. 69792 (Nov. 15, 2010).
1 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent’s Offer of Settlement and are not binding on
any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.
2 “Subscriber” is defined in Rule 300(b) of Regulation ATS as “any person that has entered into a
contractual agreement with an [ATS] to access such [ATS] for the purpose of effecting transactions in
securities or submitting, disseminating, or displaying orders on such [ATS], including a customer, member,
user, or participant in an [ATS].” Accordingly, “subscriber” is used throughout the discussion of Liquidnet’s
Regulation ATS violations below. The market access rule uses the term “customer” instead, and is therefore
used throughout the discussion of Liquidnet’s market access rule violations below.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=9c12da86854e96c46dc95ff993598e0a&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:17:Chapter:II:Part:242:242.300
https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=9a940bb194d36e6df059c94ded4aaa07&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:17:Chapter:II:Part:242:242.300
https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=2ca76e9763f094a5df4ecb426162e301&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:17:Chapter:II:Part:242:242.300
https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=c2edd8acdbcb2c4db14f380cf18ee61f&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:17:Chapter:II:Part:242:242.300
3
3. From approximately 2019 through 2023, Liquidnet violated the market access rule
by setting credit thresholds for non-broker-dealer customers without first performing adequate due
diligence on their creditworthiness and frequently setting customer credit thresholds at a default of
$1 billion – regardless of the customer’s financial standing. Liquidnet also failed to implement
systems to prevent these thresholds from being breached within the NMS Stock ATSs, and, until
2023, failed to regularly review and certify its compliance with the market access rule. Liquidnet
further made material misrepresentations to certain customers about the firm’s compliance with the
market access rule.
4. As the registered broker-dealer operator of an ATS, which operates pursuant to an
exemption from exchange registration,3 Liquidnet must comply with certain conditions to the
exemption, including Rule 301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS, which requires an ATS operator to
establish adequate written safeguards and written procedures to limit access to confidential
subscriber trading information to employees of the ATS who operate the system or are responsible
for its compliance with applicable rules and regulations. The rule is designed to, among other
things, minimize “information leakage of subscribers’ confidential trading information to other
business units of the broker-dealer and their affiliates,” where there may be increased potential for
misuse of that information. See Regulation of NMS Stock Alternative Trading Systems, Exch. Act
Rel. No. 83663 (Jul. 18, 2018), 83 Fed. Reg. 38768, 38775-76 (Aug. 7, 2018) (the “NMS Stock
ATS Adopting Release”). Liquidnet must also comply with Rules 301(b)(2) and 304 of Regulation
ATS. Rule 304 requires Liquidnet to make public disclosures on Form ATS-N about the operations
of the NMS Stock ATSs and the activities of the broker-dealer operator and its affiliates. Rule
301(b)(2) requires Liquidnet to make disclosures to the Commission about the operations of the
Fixed Income ATS.
5. From approximately 2019 through 2024, Liquidnet failed to adequately limit
internal access to specific systems and tools containing certain confidential subscriber trading
information in two ways. First, Liquidnet did not have appropriate access controls for certain ATS
data used by technology personnel for testing purposes. Second, Liquidnet permitted internal
access to certain confidential subscriber trading information by certain employees who had no
operational or compliance responsibilities for the Liquidnet ATSs. This information primarily
included match and execution data, but generally did not include subscribers’ unmatched
indications of interest4 other than on an aggregate, non-symbol specific basis. The access granted
to these employees was at times inconsistent with Liquidnet’s public disclosures.
3 As explained below, Rule 3a1-1(a)(2) under the Exchange Act exempts an ATS from the definition
of “exchange” under Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, and thus, the requirement to register as a national
securities exchange pursuant to Section 5 of the Exchange Act, if the ATS complies with the conditions of
Regulation ATS.
4 An indication of interest generally refers to a subscriber’s non-firm willingness to buy or sell a
security. The Liquidnet ATSs accepted and matched indications of interest of subscribers and allowed
them to agree to terms of a trade on the ATS.
4
6. Liquidnet also made material misrepresentations to subscribers and potential
subscribers in response to due diligence inquiries about the safeguards it maintained over
confidential subscriber trading information, the employees who had access to the Liquidnet ATSs,
and the scope of that access. In addition, Liquidnet failed to disclose certain information on its
Form ATS-N and Form ATS to accurately reflect who had access to confidential subscriber trading
information and the nature of that access.
RESPONDENT
7. Liquidnet is based in New York, New York and has been registered with the
Commission as a broker-dealer since October 2000. In March 2021, Liquidnet was acquired by TP
ICAP plc (“TP ICAP” and the “TP ICAP Acquisition”), a London-based financial services firm
listed on the London Stock Exchange. Liquidnet is an agency-only broker that operates three ATSs:
two NMS Stock ATSs and the Fixed Income ATS.
BACKGROUND
A. Liquidnet Violated the Market Access Rule
8. Liquidnet provides market access through the Liquidnet ATSs to non-broker-dealer
customers5 and is therefore required to comply with the market access rule with respect to the
market access it provides to those customers. As described in more detail below, from
approximately 2019 through 2023, Liquidnet violated three different subsections of the market
access rule and made certain misrepresentations to customers about its compliance with the rule.
Liquidnet Set Credit Thresholds Without Adequately Assessing
Customer Creditworthiness and Did Not Have Controls for its NMS Stock ATSs in Place to
Prevent Certain Orders Exceeding Those Thresholds
9. Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5(b) requires broker-dealers with market access to
“establish, document, and maintain a system of risk management controls and supervisory
procedures reasonably designed to manage the financial, regulatory, and other risks” of having
market access. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5(b).
10. Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5(c), among other things, requires that a broker-dealer’s
risk management controls and supervisory procedures be reasonably designed to (i) “[p]revent the
entry of orders that exceed appropriate pre-set credit or capital thresholds in the aggregate for each
customer … by rejecting orders if such orders would exceed the applicable credit or capital
thresholds” and (ii) “[p]revent the entry of erroneous orders, by rejecting orders that exceed
appropriate price or size parameters.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-5(c)(1)(i)-(ii). This provision of the
5 The market access rule only applies to a broker-dealer operator of an ATS when providing market
access to non-broker-dealer customers. See Rule 15c3-5(a)(1)(ii); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5(a)(1)(ii).
5
market access rule requires Liquidnet to set appropriate pre-trade credit thresholds for each non-
broker-dealer customer, and to have in place controls that will prevent the entry of orders – on a
pre-trade basis – that exceed those thresholds or are erroneously entered.
11. From at least 2019 until 2023, Liquidnet set pre-trade credit risk thresholds for
certain non-broker-dealer customers of its NMS Stock ATSs without performing appropriate
reviews of customer creditworthiness . Instead, Liquidnet nearly always set pre-trade thresholds at a
default aggregate notional value of $1 billion for these customers, without regard for the credit
ratings or financial standing of each individual non-broker-dealer customer.
12. As a result, certain pre-trade alerts, which were intended to flag that customers were
close to reaching their credit thresholds, would only be triggered after a customer placed orders
totaling an extremely high notional value. These pre-trade alerts were set at 80% of a customer’s
credit threshold in the NMS Stock ATSs. Therefore, a non-broker-dealer customer with a $1 billion
credit threshold would be able to successfully place orders in the NMS Stock ATSs totaling $800
million in notional value without triggering those alerts.
13. Because these pre-trade credit thresholds were set at arbitrary levels without
appropriate reviews of customer creditworthiness, and the related pre-trade alerts were based on
these arbitrary thresholds, these risk management controls were not reasonably designed, as the
market access rule requires.
14. In addition, from at least 2019, Liquidnet did not have a system in place to prevent
the entry of orders by non-broker-dealer customers that exceeded these arbitrary pre-set credit
thresholds when aggregated with all orders placed by that customer with the firm. Orders placed by
a customer into one of the Liquidnet ATSs would trigger a pre-trade alert if they breached the
applicable alert threshold, but if the customer placed a subsequent order that in the aggregate
exceeded the customer’s credit threshold, that order could be successfully executed, regardless of its
size.
15. Therefore, if a non-broker-dealer customer in one of the NMS Stock ATSs with a
credit threshold of $1 billion executed orders totaling $900 million, the firm’s pre-trade alerts would
be triggered because the non-broker-dealer customer had reached 80% of its credit threshold, but if
that customer placed another order of $125 million, the order would be executed without any alert
being generated, even though the notional value of that order when aggregated with earlier orders
exceeded the firm’s $1 billion credit threshold for the customer.
16. Liquidnet was aware by at least 2020 that the firm’s existing systems did not
aggregate customer orders and therefore could not prevent the entry of a subsequent order
exceeding a non-broker-dealer customer’s credit threshold. Liquidnet remedied the issue in early
2023, under TP ICAP’s supervision. Trading and other documentation relating to credit thresholds
in the NMS Stock ATSs indicate that these credit thresholds were not breached.
6
17. As a result, Liquidnet did not have a reasonably designed system to prevent the entry
of orders that exceeded credit thresholds in the aggregate for each non-broker-dealer customer, as
required by the market access rule.
Liquidnet Violated the Market Access Rule by Failing to
Consistently Conduct Annual Reviews and Issue CEO Certifications
18. Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5(e) requires a broker-dealer to establish, document, and
maintain a system for regularly reviewing the effectiveness of the risk management controls and
supervisory procedures and for promptly addressing any issues. More specifically, broker-dealers
must perform a review at least annually to assure the overall effectiveness of these risk management
controls and supervisory procedures ( “15c3-5 review”) and the broker-dealer’s Chief Executive
Officer must certify compliance on an annual basis (“15c3-5 certification”). 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-
5(e).
19. Despite its awareness by at least 2020 that its systems could not aggregate non-
broker-dealer customer orders and therefore could not prevent the entry of a subsequent order
exceeding a non-broker-dealer customer’s credit threshold, Liquidnet did not perform a 15c3-5
review covering the entire calendar year in 2021. Specifically, Liquidnet did not review its
compliance with the market access rule for the period September 1 through December 31, 2020.
Moreover, until 2022, the firm’s 15c3-5 reviews did not adequately test to determine whether the
firm’s risk management controls would prevent orders exceeding non-broker-dealer customers’
credit thresholds, as required by the market access rule. In 2022, the firm began to conduct
adequate testing and identified various deficiencies in its controls, including those described in
paragraphs 14 and 15 above.
20. Despite Liquidnet’s knowledge beginning in at least 2020 that its controls were
deficient because its systems could not aggregate non-broker-dealer customer orders, Liquidnet’s
CEO signed 15c3-5 certifications in 2020 and 2023 attesting compliance with the requirements of
the market access rule. The CEO did not sign certifications in 2021 or 2022.
Liquidnet Made Material Misrepresentations
to Customers about its Market Access Controls
21. Liquidnet also made misrepresentations about its market access controls to certain
customers and potential customers in response to due diligence questionnaires, stating that
Liquidnet was compliant with all regulatory requirements applicable to market access through the
firm, that it had aggregate exposure limits in place, and that it had controls that would prevent the
entry of orders that exceed appropriate credit thresholds, during a time when the firm was aware that
it could not aggregate customer orders or prevent the entry of certain orders that exceeded a
customer’s credit threshold.
7
22. These misrepresentations resulted from the firm’s negligence. The firm did not take
reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of its representations, and as a result, made misstatements to
customers and potential customers about its market access controls. These misrepresentations were
material because these customers and potential customers were considering Liquidnet’s
representations about its market access controls in determining whether to select the firm as a
trading venue, and there was a substantial likelihood that a reasonable customer or potential
customer would have considered the disclosures important to their decision.
B. Liquidnet Failed to Comply with Regulation ATS
23. Section 5 of the Exchange Act requires an organization, association, or group of
persons that meets the definition of “exchange” under section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, unless
otherwise exempt, to register with the Commission as a national securities exchange. Exchange
Act Rule 3a1–1(a)(2) exempts from the definition of “exchange,” and thus exchange registration,
an organization, association, or group of persons that complies with Regulation ATS. As the
registered broker-dealer of an ATS that operated pursuant to the Rule 3a1-1(a)(2) exemption,
Liquidnet is required to comply with the applicable conditions of Regulation ATS set forth under
Rules 300-304. As described in more detail below, from approximately 2019 through 2024,
Liquidnet failed to comply with three different conditions of Regulation ATS, thus violating Section
5 of the Exchange Act, and made misrepresentations to certain customers about access to
confidential subscriber trading information.
Liquidnet Failed to Establish Adequate Written Safeguards
and Written Procedures to Protect Confidential Subscriber Trading Information
24. Among other conditions to the Regulation ATS exemption, an ATS must, pursuant
to Rule 301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS, establish adequate written safeguards and written
procedures to protect the confidential trading information of subscribers, including by limiting
access to employees who operate the system or are responsible for the ATS’s compliance with
Regulation ATS and other applicable rules. Furthermore, an ATS must adopt and implement
adequate written oversight procedures to ensure that its written safeguards and written procedures
are followed.
25. Liquidnet disclosed one such written safeguard and written procedure in its public
Forms ATS-N for the NMS Stock ATSs: a requirement that an employee requesting access to “an
application that contains confidential participant data” must receive their manager’s approval in
advance, and the manager must provide an explanation affirming both that the employee’s access
will not adversely impact ATS subscribers and that the particular type of access has been disclosed
to the firm’s customers. Liquidnet also disclosed that supervisory personnel must make monthly
certifications that the use of customer data in their business unit complies with firm policy.
Liquidnet failed to establish adequate written safeguards and written procedures, however, because
Liquidnet managers and supervisory personnel did not in fact provide these explanations or make
8
these certifications. In addition, Liquidnet did not have adequate oversight procedures to ensure
that these safeguards and procedures were followed.
26. Liquidnet also had written safeguards and written procedures that related to its
Transparency Working Group. Liquidnet stated in sales materials provided to subscribers and
potential subscribers and in response to subscriber due diligence inquiries that the Transparency
Working Group advised the firm on issues relating to the protection and usage of customer data.
The group’s charter stated, among other things, that the Transparency Working Group sought to
ensure that Liquidnet was disclosing to subscribers the firm’s processes relating to employee
access to confidential subscriber trading information. Several of Liquidnet’s policies and
procedures, including its trading rules governing the systems and operations of the Liquidnet ATSs
(the “Trading Rules”),6 required review by the Transparency Working Group before any changes
to those policies and procedures could be made.
27. However, in approximately September 2021, the Transparency Working Group
disbanded due to employee turnover following the TP ICAP Acquisition. Liquidnet only
reconstituted the Transparency Working Group in Summer 2023 at the earliest, after a TP ICAP
internal audit team discovered that the working group no longer existed but that the firm was
continuing to make inaccurate representations about the group to firm customers. From September
2021 until Summer 2023, the Transparency Working Group was not performing any of the
functions Liquidnet described in its sales materials, responses to certain due diligence inquiries, or
in the group’s charter.
28. Liquidnet also failed to adequately limit internal access to systems containing
confidential subscriber trading information. While communications and other documentation do
not indicate that confidential subscriber trading information was improperly shared outside the
firm, Liquidnet did not comply with Rule 301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS by permitting employees’
internal access to certain systems and data as described in paragraphs 29 through 33 below.
29. Until Spring 2024, Liquidnet allowed access to ATS replications of indication,
order, and execution data (“replications”) from the previous trading day, which were used by
certain technology personnel for testing purposes, via generic log-in credentials that were shared
among certain technology employees. Liquidnet intended that only technology personnel with a
need to perform troubleshooting and other technical work would access these replications, but
because the log-in credentials were generic and not user-specific, the firm could not control which
employees accessed the replications. In addition, Liquidnet technology personnel saved certain
logs containing confidential subscriber trading information in a shared file without any kind of
6 Liquidnet’s Form ATS filings included a copy of the Trading Rules for the Fixed Income ATS.
Liquidnet’s Forms ATS-N refer to the Trading Rules for the NMS Stock ATSs for a description of the
types of access employees were given to confidential subscriber trading information and state that
employees must comply with restrictions on access set forth in the Trading Rules. Liquidnet also
provided the Trading Rules to ATS subscribers.
9
password protection. While the shared file location was generally only provided to Liquidnet
technology personnel, any Liquidnet employee with access to the shared file location could also
access confidential subscriber trading information even if that employee did not have a basis for
accessing such data. The lack of access controls over the replications and logs was inconsistent
with statements by Liquidnet on its public Forms ATS-N that the firm was responsible for
maintaining the security of customer trading information and that it “instituted technological
controls on access to trading information, including username and password controls… and access
control lists on systems and networks.”
30. Until October 2023, when the firm removed their access, Liquidnet granted non-
U.S. sales coverage employees access to confidential subscriber trading information in the NMS
Stock ATSs that was inconsistent with Liquidnet’s Trading Rules. The Trading Rules generally
provided that trade coverage personnel were given access to ATS match information only for
equities in the region in which the employee was located and for all equities traded by subscribers
whom each employee was specifically assigned to cover, but non-U.S. employees in some cases
also received confidential subscriber trading information relating to trades in U.S. securities for
subscribers they did not cover. These non-U.S. employees did not hold any U.S. securities licenses
and did not receive training on applicable U.S. rules and regulations. In some cases, these
employees also received access to ATS order and execution information, which they did not need
to perform their jobs and to which the firm did not disclose they had access. Documentation
relating to employee ATS access indicates that these employees received unmatched indication
data only on an aggregate, non-symbol specific basis.
31. From at least 2019 through 2024, Liquidnet also permitted access to confidential
subscriber trading information in the NMS Stock ATSs and the Fixed Income ATS that was
inconsistent with the firm’s disclosures on Forms ATS-N and ATS and in its Trading Rules and
with the requirements of Rule 301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS.
32. For example, Liquidnet granted access to intraday match and execution information
in the NMS Stock ATSs to numerous employees working in business development and on the
firm’s agency-only high-touch equities trading desk, when the firm’s disclosures represented that
these employees had more limited access to confidential subscriber trading information.
33. Liquidnet also granted access to confidential subscriber trading information in the
Fixed Income ATS to employees who serviced subscribers of the Fixed Income ATS at the same
time as they serviced customers of ReBalance, a fixed income trading platform operated by TP
ICAP Global Markets America, LLC, a Liquidnet and TP ICAP affiliate. This was not disclosed
on Form ATS or otherwise to subscribers before access was granted. Liquidnet also permitted
undisclosed access to confidential subscriber trading information by employees performing jobs in
marketing and investor relations, roles that did not include operational or compliance
responsibilities for the Liquidnet ATSs. Documentation relating to employee ATS access indicates
that these employees did not receive access to unmatched indication data.
10
Liquidnet Failed to File Accurate Disclosures on its Forms ATS-N and ATS
34. NMS Stock ATSs, as defined in Regulation ATS Rule 300(k), must file a public
report on Form ATS-N in accordance with Rule 304 of Regulation ATS to disclose the activities of
the broker-dealer operator and the operations of the NMS Stock ATSs. See NMS Stock ATS
Adopting Release, 83 Fed. Reg. at 38768. NMS Stock ATSs are required by Rule 304(a)(2)(i) to
publicly file certain amendments to the NMS Stock ATSs’ Forms ATS-N, in accordance with
certain conditions, including: at least 30 calendar days prior to the implementation of a material
change to the operation of the ATS or the activities of the broker-dealer operator or its affiliates
subject to disclosure on Form ATS-N, and promptly to correct information in any previous Form
ATS-N after discovery that such information was materially inaccurate or incomplete when filed.
In the NMS Stock ATS Adopting Release, the Commission stated that a change to the operations of
an NMS Stock ATS, or the disclosures regarding the activities of the broker-dealer operator and its
affiliates, would be material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable market participant
would consider the change important when evaluating the NMS Stock ATS as a potential trading
venue. See NMS Stock ATS Adopting Release, 83 Fed. Reg. at 38803. The Commission also
stated that, among others, one scenario that is particularly likely to implicate a material change is a
change to the broker-dealer operator’s policies and procedures governing the written safeguards
and written procedures to protect the confidential trading information of subscribers pursuant to
Rule 301(b)(10)(i) of Regulation ATS. See id.
35. Liquidnet’s Fixed Income ATS trades fixed income securities, primarily corporate
bonds, and does not trade NMS stocks. As such, the Fixed Income ATS files a Form ATS with the
Commission pursuant to Rule 301(b)(2). Unlike Form ATS-N, Form ATS is not a public report.
A non-NMS Stock ATS, such as the Liquidnet Fixed Income ATS, must amend its Form ATS at
least 20 calendar days prior to implementing a material change to the operation of the ATS, within
30 calendar days after the end of a quarter when information contained in an initial operation report
filed on Form ATS becomes inaccurate, and promptly upon discovering that an initial operation
report filed on Form ATS or an amendment on Form ATS was inaccurate when filed.
36. As detailed above in paragraphs 26 through 33, from at least 2019 until 2024,
material information in Liquidnet’s public Forms ATS-N, which relate to the NMS Stock ATSs,
was inaccurate. The firm’s practices with regard to which employees had access to subscriber
confidential trading information in the NMS Stock ATSs, the nature of that access, the type of
supervisory reviews that were performed with respect to that access, and the security of
subscribers’ trading data differed from the disclosures in the Forms ATS-N. Subscribers
evaluating whether to enter orders or continue to enter orders to trade in the NMS Stock ATSs
frequently asked the firm about how it protected their confidential trading information. These
questions show that the firm’s written safeguards and written procedures were material to
subscribers and potential subscribers.
37. As a result, after discovering that its Forms ATS were materially inaccurate,
Liquidnet was obligated to promptly file correcting amendments to its public Form ATS-N
11
disclosures for both NMS Stock ATSs to accurately reflect information concerning access to
subscribers’ confidential trading information and file material amendments to Form ATS-N at least
30 calendar days before granting access to subscriber confidential trading information that differed
from its disclosures in its Forms ATS-N. Liquidnet, however, did not do so in these instances.
38. In addition, as described above in paragraph 33, Liquidnet’s disclosures about
access to confidential subscriber trading information in the Fixed Income ATS’s Form ATS were
also inaccurate. Accordingly, after discovering that its Forms ATS were materially inaccurate,
Liquidnet was required to amend those filings to correct any information that became inaccurate
within 30 calendar days after the end of the calendar quarter, but it did not do so in the instances
described above.
Liquidnet Made Material Misrepresentations to Certain Subscribers
and Potential Subscribers about Access to Confidential Subscriber Trading Information
39. Liquidnet held itself out in its disclosures on Forms ATS-N and ATS, as well as in
marketing materials and other materials, as providing anonymity for subscriber trades, minimizing
data leakage, and maintaining security over customer data. The lack of adequate access controls
over daily ATS replications and logs, described above in paragraph 29, for example, was
inconsistent with these representations.
40. The firm was also regularly asked by subscribers and potential subscribers about
the general type and scope of access the firm granted to confidential subscriber trading data. In
response to these inquiries, Liquidnet often directed subscribers and potential subscribers to the
firm’s disclosures in its Trading Rules, which, as described in paragraphs 30 through 33 above,
were in certain instances inaccurate.
41. Liquidnet also made misrepresentations in response to questions from subscribers
and potential subscribers about specific safeguards over confidential subscriber trading
information. For example, during a period when the Transparency Working Group had been
disbanded, Liquidnet provided subscribers and/or potential subscribers conducting due diligence
on the firm copies of its security policy, which stated that all proposed new uses of customer
trading information not specifically permitted by the Trading Rules would be reviewed by the
Transparency Working Group. Several other subscribers asked about access by non-U.S. persons
to trading data; the firm referred them to the Trading Rules, which inaccurately described the
nature and extent of access the firm gave to non-U.S. employees.
42. These misrepresentations resulted from the firm’s negligence. The firm did not take
reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of its representations, and as a result, made misstatements to
customers about access to and safeguards over confidential subscriber trading information. These
misrepresentations were material in light of Liquidnet’s representations about anonymity and the
minimization of data leakage and the fact that subscribers and potential subscribers specifically
inquired about such as part of their due diligence on the firm.
12
VIOLATIONS
43. As a result of the conduct described above, Liquidnet willfully7 violated:
a. Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, which prohibit, directly or
indirectly, in the offer or sale of securities obtaining money or property by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading and engaging in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser.
b. Section 15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act and Rules 15c3-5(b), (c) and (e) thereunder.
Liquidnet violated Rule 15c3-5(b) by failing to establish, document, and maintain a
system of risk management controls and supervisory procedures reasonably
designed to manage the financial, regulatory, and other risks of having market
access, Rule 15c3-5(c)(1) because its risk management controls and supervisory
procedures were not reasonably designed to systematically limit the financial
exposure of the broker or dealer, including preventing the entry of orders that
exceed appropriate pre-set credit or capital thresholds in the aggregate for each
customer and preventing the entry of erroneous orders, and Rule 15c3-5(e) because
it did not establish, document, and maintain a system for regularly reviewing the
effectiveness of the risk management controls and supervisory procedures required
by Rules 15c3-5(b) and (c) and promptly address any issues or properly certify for
2021 that such risk management controls and supervisory procedures comply with
the rule.
c. Section 5 of the Exchange Act by failing to either register as a national
securities exchange or operate pursuant to an exemption from such registration,
despite meeting the criteria of “exchange” under Exchange Act Section 3(a)(1) and
Rule 3b-16(a). Specifically, Liquidnet failed to comply with the following
conditions of the Regulation ATS exemption: (1) Rule 301(b)(2), which requires an
ATS that does not trade NMS stocks to amend its Form ATS at least 20 calendar
days prior to implementing a material change to the operation of the ATS, within 30
calendar days after the end of a calendar quarter when information contained in an
initial operation report filed on Form ATS becomes inaccurate, and promptly upon
discovering that an initial operation report filed on Form ATS or an amendment on
Form ATS was inaccurate when filed; (2) Rule 301(b)(10), which requires an ATS
7 “Willfully” for purposes of imposing relief under Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act means “‘no
more than that the person charged with the duty knows what he is doing.’” Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d
408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1949)). There is no
requirement that the actor “also be aware that he is violating one of the Rules or Acts.” Tager v. SEC,
344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965).
13
to establish adequate written safeguards and written procedures to protect
subscribers’ confidential trading information, including by limiting access to
confidential trading information of subscribers to those employees of the ATS who
are operating the system or responsible for its compliance with applicable rules, and
to adopt and implement adequate written oversight procedures to ensure that the
written safeguards and procedures for protecting subscribers’ confidential trading
information are followed; and (3) Rule 304, which requires an NMS Stock ATS to
file an amendment on Form ATS-N at least 30 calendar days prior to the
implementation of a material change to the operations of the ATS or the activities of
the broker-dealer operator or its affiliates that are subject to disclosure on Form
ATS-N, and promptly to correct information in any previous Form ATS-N after
discovery that such information was materially inaccurate or incomplete when filed.
REMEDIAL EFFORTS
44. In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered remedial acts
promptly undertaken by Respondent and cooperation afforded the Commission staff, including
engaging a compliance consultant tasked with assisting Liquidnet in remediating the compliance
deficiencies identified herein and self-reporting the conduct relating to access controls over ATS
replications described in paragraph 29 above.
UNDERTAKINGS
45. Respondent Liquidnet has undertaken to do the following:
a. Liquidnet shall complete a review of the firm’s compliance with the market access
rule and Regulation ATS (the “Review”), which shall involve assessments of:
i. Liquidnet’s risk management controls and supervisory procedures relating
to market access to determine whether they are reasonably designed to (i)
prevent the entry of orders that exceed appropriate pre-set credit or capital
thresholds in the aggregate for each customer and (ii) prevent the entry of
erroneous orders, by rejecting orders that exceed appropriate price or size
parameters, as required by Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5(c)(1)(i)-(ii);
ii. Liquidnet’s procedures for conducting 15c3-5 reviews and causing 15c3-5
certifications to be made, as required by Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5(e);
iii. the adequacy of Liquidnet’s written safeguards and written procedures to
protect the confidential trading information of subscribers to the Liquidnet
ATSs and the adequacy of written oversight procedures to ensure that the
written safeguards and written procedures are followed, as required by Rule
301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS; and
14
iv. Liquidnet’s procedures for confirming that its marketing materials,
responses to customer due diligence inquiries, and Forms ATS-N and ATS
disclosures are accurate.
b. Liquidnet shall promptly file with the Commission any amendments to Form ATS-
N and Form ATS to accurately disclose its written safeguards and written
procedures to protect confidential trading information, including its written
oversight procedures to ensure that its safeguards and procedures are implemented
and followed.
c. Within 60 days of the entry of the Order, Liquidnet shall complete the Review.
d. Within 90 days of the entry of the Order, Liquidnet shall submit to the Commission
staff a written report (the “Report”) that includes:
i. an assessment of the matters described in subparagraphs a. and b. above and
ii. any remediation measures to be taken by Liquidnet to confirm that the
firm’s policies and procedures are reasonably designed to achieve
compliance with the market access rule and Regulation ATS (the
“Remediation Measures”).
e. Within 120 days of the entry of the Order, Liquidnet shall complete the
Remediation Measures.
46. Liquidnet shall certify, in writing, compliance with the undertakings set forth
above. The certification shall identify the undertakings, provide written evidence of compliance in
the form of a narrative, and be supported by exhibits sufficient to demonstrate compliance. The
Commission staff may make reasonable requests for further evidence of compliance, and
Respondent agrees to provide such evidence. The certification and supporting material shall be
submitted to Joseph G. Sansone, Chief, Market Abuse Unit, Division of Enforcement, or such
other person as the Commission staff may request, with a copy to the Office of Chief Counsel of
the Enforcement Division, no later than sixty (60) days from the date of the completion of the
undertakings. The Commission staff may make reasonable requests for further evidence of
compliance, and Respondent agrees to provide such evidence.
47. For good cause shown, the Commission Staff may extend any of the deadlines set
forth above.
48. The Report submitted by Liquidnet will likely include confidential financial,
proprietary, competitive business or commercial information. Public disclosure of the Report
could discourage cooperation, impede pending or potential government investigations or
15
undermine the objectives of the reporting requirement. For these reasons, among others, the
Report and the contents thereof are intended to remain and shall remain non-public, except (1)
pursuant to court order, (2) as agreed to by the parties in writing, (3) to the extent that the
Commission determines in its sole discretion that disclosure would be in furtherance of the
Commission’s discharge of its duties and responsibilities, or (4) is otherwise required by law.
IV.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate, and in the public interest to
impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent Liquidnet’s Offer.
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act and Sections 15(b) and 21C of
the Exchange Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:
A. Respondent Liquidnet cease and desist from committing or causing any violations
and any future violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act; Section 15(c)(3) of
the Exchange Act and Rules 15c3-5(b), (c), and (e) thereunder; and Section 5 of the Exchange Act
by failing to comply with Rules 301(b)(2), 301(b)(10), and 304 of Regulation ATS promulgated
under the Exchange Act.
B. Respondent Liquidnet shall comply with the undertakings enumerated in
paragraphs 45 through 48 above.
C. Respondent Liquidnet is censured.
D. Respondent Liquidnet shall, within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order, pay a
civil money penalty in the amount of $5,000,000 to the Securities and Exchange Commission for
transfer to the general fund of the United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section
21F(g)(3). If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C.
§ 3717.
Payment must be made in one of the following ways:
(1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which
will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;
(2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov
through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
(3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United
States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange
Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm
16
Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169
Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying
Liquidnet as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy
of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Joseph G. Sansone, Chief, Market
Abuse Unit, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 Pearl Street,
Suite 20-100, New York, NY 10004-2616.
Amounts ordered to be paid as civil money penalties pursuant to this Order shall be treated
as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the
deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Respondent agrees that in any Related Investor Action, it shall
not argue that it is entitled to, nor shall it benefit by, offset or reduction of any award of
compensatory damages by the amount of any part of Respondent’s payment of a civil penalty in
this action (“Penalty Offset”). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty
Offset, Respondent agrees that it shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the
Penalty Offset, notify the Commission’s counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty
Offset to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Such a payment shall not be deemed an
additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed
in this proceeding. For purposes of this paragraph, a “Related Investor Action” means a private
damages action brought against Respondent by or on behalf of one or more investors based on
substantially the same facts as alleged in the Order instituted by the Commission in this
proceeding.
By the Commission.
Vanessa A. Countryman
Secretary