In re DEUTSCHE BANK AG

 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Before the 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
Release No. 90875 / January 8, 2021 
 
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT 
Release No. 4201 / January 8, 2021 
                                        
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING 
File No. 3-20200 
 
 
In the Matter of 
 
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND-
DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 21C OF THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING 
FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING A CEASE-
AND-DESIST ORDER  
  
 
 
I. 
 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that cease-
and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), against Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank” or 
“Respondent”).   
 
 
II. 
 
 In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Deutsche Bank has submitted an 
Offer of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept.  Solely for the 
purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the 
Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, Respondent admits the Commission’s 
jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, and consents to the entry of this 
Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set 
forth below. 

 2 
 
 
 
III. 
 
 On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds
1
 that: 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1. This matter concerns the improper use, from at least 2009 through 2016, by Deutsche Bank 
of third-party intermediaries, business development consultants, and finders (collectively “BDCs”) 
to obtain and retain global business.  Hundreds of BDCs were used during this timeframe, and their 
use was approved by past members of Deutsche Bank’s senior management and various regional 
committees.
2
  Among those engaged were foreign officials, their relatives and associates in 
circumstances where bribery risks were neither assessed nor sufficient steps taken to mitigate 
bribery risks posed by such engagements. 
 
2. Deutsche Bank lacked sufficient internal accounting controls related to the use and 
payment of BDCs during this time period, resulting in payments to BDCs that were actually bribe 
payments as well as payments made for unknown, undocumented or unauthorized services.  The 
payments in those circumstances were inaccurately recorded as legitimate business expenses in 
Deutsche Bank’s books and records, and involved invoices and documentation falsified by its 
employees.  During this period, certain now-former members of senior management, including 
members of the Management Board, were aware that these internal accounting controls were 
insufficient to provide reasonable assurance that transactions with BDCs were executed in 
accordance with management authorization and to provide reasonable assurance that payments 
were accurately recorded in Deutsche Bank’s books and records.  Deutsche Bank failed to take 
sufficient steps to address and remediate these known internal accounting control failures until 
2016.   
 
3. As a result of this conduct, Deutsche Bank violated the internal accounting control and 
books and records provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.  During this period 
approximately $7 million in payments to BDC’s were improperly booked as legitimate expenses, 
and Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by approximately $35 million.  
 
RESPONDENT 
 
4. Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank” or “the Bank”) is a multinational financial 
services corporation incorporated and domiciled in Germany.  The company issues and maintains a 
class of publicly traded securities registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and is 
                                                
1
  The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent's Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any 
other person or entity in this or any other proceeding. 
 
2
  All of the relevant Management Board members and most members of senior management referenced in 
this Order are former employees of the Bank. 

 3 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (ticker: DB).  Deutsche Bank files periodic reports, 
including Forms 20-F, with the Commission.  Deutsche Bank operates in more than 70 countries 
worldwide and is the direct or indirect holding company for Deutsche Bank’s subsidiaries.  
Deutsche Bank employees in various parts of the world engaged in the conduct discussed herein.
3
   
 
FACTS 
 
5. Throughout the relevant time period, Deutsche Bank’s Global Anti-Corruption Policy 
(“Anti-Corruption Policy”) prohibited the payment of bribes, both directly and indirectly, to obtain 
an improper personal or business advantage in both the public and private sectors.  Deutsche Bank 
prohibited the offer of anything of value which may be deemed to influence any act or decision of 
a public official and also prohibited the use of BDCs to improperly obtain confidential information 
about business opportunities.  Under Deutsche Bank’s relevant policies, third-party representatives 
could only be engaged in circumstances where: 1) there was documented pre-contractual due 
diligence; 2) a written contract which set out the representative’s role and/or services was provided 
in a form approved by the Bank’s Legal department (“Legal”); 3) the contract contained a 
documented description of services to be performed, amount to be paid, and other material terms of 
the engagement; 4) the payment was proportionate to the value of the services rendered; and 5) 
appropriate review and approval was obtained before the engagement began.  Additionally, 
Deutsche Bank prohibited any undocumented payments or bribes. 
 
6. Since at least 2008, Deutsche Bank’s Use of Business Development Consultants Policy 
(“BDC Policy”), its global policy governing the use of consultants and finders, required that the 
Bank conduct thorough due diligence prior to retaining and paying a BDC to determine, among 
other things, whether the BDC, or their immediate family members and close associates, had any 
political or governmental affiliations or exposures.  A BDC with a “political or governmental 
affiliation” was classified as a politically exposed person (“PEP”) and required enhanced due 
diligence; this person could not be engaged without additional vetting and approval by senior 
management, Legal, and the Bank’s compliance function (“Compliance”) to provide reasonable 
assurance that potential conflicts of interest were identified and addressed.  The BDC Policy also 
required that prospective BDCs have “sufficient expertise and qualifications” to perform the 
contemplated services.  Payments were required to be proportionate to the services rendered and 
made only in circumstances where the supporting invoice contained “sufficient detail regarding the 
services or matters to which such invoice relates.”  
 
7. While the BDC Policy required that regional and divisional management approve and 
oversee the use of BDCs, in practice, the implementation and oversight of the Policy fell to the 
BDC’s “business sponsor.”  Business sponsors were responsible for generating business for 
Deutsche Bank and were compensated, in part, based on the revenue earned by Deutsche Bank.  
The business sponsors recommended the engagement of the identified BDC, determined whether 
payments to the BDCs complied with both the terms of the BDC contract and the Bank’s policies, 
and maintained records concerning the services provided by the BDC, including invoices.    
                                                
3
    Deutsche Bank employees referenced in this Order may have worked for one or more Deutsche Bank legal 
entities during the relevant time.  Deutsche Bank is required to make and keep accurate books and records 
and sufficient internal accounting controls within its subsidiaries. 

 4 
 
 
 
Deutsche Bank Identified Internal Accounting Control Failures in 2009 but Failed to 
Remediate Until 2016  
 
8. In approximately 2008, as part of the Bank’s anti-corruption program, a group within 
Deutsche Bank’s internal audit function conducted a review of business arrangements in its Asia-
Pacific region in order to assess the integrity and legitimacy of certain transactions.  In 2009, the 
internal audit group issued a report (“2009 Report”) in which it identified certain concerns with the 
Bank’s use of one BDC including insufficient oversight over that BDC engagement to ensure it 
was not being used for corrupt purposes and a lack of documentation detailing what actual services 
were rendered by the BDC.  The 2009 Report recommended that Deutsche Bank’s global BDC 
Policy be revised and that the internal accounting controls around BDCs be enhanced to include 
centralized and thoroughly documented due diligence to demonstrate that a BDC was qualified to 
perform the services for which it was contracted, maintenance of detailed records of all work 
performed by the BDC, and a requirement that BDC engagements include books and 
recordkeeping provisions giving Deutsche Bank inspection rights.  The 2009 Report was provided 
to senior management at Deutsche Bank, including members of the Management Board; however, 
only limited steps were taken in response.   
 
9. In 2011, the same group conducted another internal investigation into the Bank’s BDC 
relationships and identified numerous internal accounting control failures.  Those failures were 
identified in a report (“2011 Report”) and included: problems related to specific BDC 
engagements; lack of due diligence; general lack of training and awareness of Deutsche Bank’s 
BDC Policy and due diligence requirements among employees; failure by business sponsors to 
appropriately assess, document, and mitigate corruption risks and conflicts of interests; and failure 
to document the proportionality and justification for certain BDC payments.  The 2011 Report was 
also distributed to senior management at Deutsche Bank, including members of the Management 
Board, and again only limited steps were taken in response.  
 
10. Contrary to its internal policies and with known failures in its relevant internal accounting 
controls, between 2009 and 2016, Deutsche Bank engaged some BDCs: 1) with no demonstrated 
expertise or qualifications; 2) who simultaneously worked for a government entity from which 
Deutsche Bank sought business; 3) without a written agreement; 4) using form agreements with no 
substantive description of the services to be performed and/or provisions calling for “success fee” 
payments; 5) at rates that were unreasonably high as compared to the work allegedly being 
performed; and 6) in circumstances where either adequate due diligence was not performed or 
where due diligence was conducted more than a year after the BDC was retained and paid.   
 
11. As a result of its lack of sufficient internal accounting controls relating to BDCs, Deutsche 
Bank paid certain BDCs in circumstances where no invoices were submitted and where invoices 
contained insufficient documentation to detail what services were performed.  In certain instances, 
when invoices were submitted, they were vague and inadequate, making it nearly impossible to 
determine what, if any, services were performed or to determine the purpose for the payment.  In 

 5 
some instances, BDCs were paid in excess of what was provided for pursuant to their contract with 
Deutsche Bank and some BDCs were paid even though they had no contract at the time certain of 
the services were purportedly performed.  Amongst the BDC payments made in these 
circumstances were those that were bribes.   
 
Consultant A – Chinese BDC 
 
12. Deutsche Bank retained Consultant A to help the Bank establish a clean energy 
investment fund with a Chinese government entity.  Prior to entering into a BDC relationship, 
Consultant A introduced himself and provided certain Deutsche Bank employees with a 
curriculum vitae indicating that he “is currently the senior advisor to [the regional Chinese] . . . 
Government” with which the Bank sought to establish the investment fund.  Deutsche Bank 
employees working to establish the investment fund knew that in addition to potentially being a 
government official or otherwise acting in an official capacity, Consultant A was also “a close 
friend of” a foreign government official whose approval was needed for the establishment of the 
investment fund.  Notably, that same government official required that Deutsche Bank work 
through Consultant A to establish the investment fund.   
 
13. Despite these facts, Consultant A was retained as a BDC without due diligence review 
being conducted as required.   
 
14. Between April 2011 and May 2013, Consultant A was paid at least $1.6 million.  This 
included payments for services purportedly performed before he was engaged.  Consultant A 
submitted invoices for gifts and entertainment provided to foreign government officials that were 
reimbursed without adequate review or advance approval by Compliance, as required under 
Deutsche Bank’s policies.  Moreover, Deutsche Bank did not fully document the services 
Consultant A purportedly performed and paid him without appropriate documentation.  For 
example, although Deutsche Bank paid him for purported reimbursements of “out-of-pocket 
expenses” or “client-related expenses,” Consultant A provided little verifiable support for the 
purported expenses.  
 
15. In addition to these payments, Consultant A was given a partnership interest in the 
investment fund that required little or no upfront capital and entitled him to a large potential 
profit share.  One Deutsche Bank employee explained contemporaneously, “[Consultant A] has 
acted as an advisor and facilitator to this initiative and it is a requirement of [the government 
entity] that he is included as both an equity (very small) participant and also part of the 
investment committee.”  This agreement was executed without Legal and Compliance having 
full information about the circumstances of Consultant A’s relationship with the government 
entity. 
 
16. In early 2017, Deutsche Bank began the dissolution of the investment fund because it 
failed to raise capital; the Bank earned no profits from this arrangement. 

 6 
 
Consultant B – Abu Dhabi BDC 
 
17. Between 2010 and 2011, Deutsche Bank retained and paid Consultant B to obtain a 
specific deal (“Project X”) with an Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund (“Abu Dhabi SOE”).  
Consultant B approached Deutsche Bank about Project X and within weeks of that meeting, 
Deutsche Bank employees understood that Consultant B’s brother would also be involved in the 
proposed BDC engagement, although Deutsche Bank did not immediately engage either of them.   
 
18. During this same time period, an Abu Dhabi SOE Official with authority to influence the 
award of Project X was pressuring Deutsche Bank to finance a mega-yacht.  One email from an 
Abu Dhabi SOE official read:  
 
“[Abu Dhabi SOE Official] has asked me to get in touch with DB: reputationally, this 
financing is regarded as absolutely crucial, and [Abu Dhabi SOE Official] made the point 
very forcefully that those institutions which participate in it can expect in future to enjoy 
‘most favoured status’ with [the Abu Dhabi SOE].”    
 
19. Deutsche Bank employees working on Project X encouraged the Bank to finance the mega-
yacht in order to influence the Abu Dhabi SOE Official and better position Deutsche Bank to 
obtain Project X.  The Bank agreed to do so.  Despite that, a banker working to obtain Project X 
expressed concern that there was still “no guaranty” that Deutsche Bank would win Project X and 
told a senior executive at Deutsche Bank, “We need to close the [Consultant B and brother] angle 
within the next 48hrs. Need ur [sic] leadership and influence on getting it thru GMRAC.”  The 
senior executive agreed to sponsor the BDC arrangement, but expressed concern about entering 
into a BDC arrangement shortly before Project X would be awarded.  
 
20. At the time Consultant B was retained as a BDC, Deutsche Bank knew Consultant B was a 
relative of the Abu Dhabi SOE Official, a high ranking official of and key decision maker for the 
Abu Dhabi SOE.  Deutsche Bank knew that Consultant B was a proxy for the Abu Dhabi SOE 
Official and that it needed to pay Consultant B to obtain the Abu Dhabi SOE’s business.  A 
Deutsche Bank employee described Consultant B as a “gatekeeper” to the Abu Dhabi SOE Official 
who expected to be paid for his services.  At the time Consultant B was retained as a BDC, the 
Regional Head of Compliance, the banker acting as business sponsor, and the senior executive 
each knew that Consultant B’s brother would be working with Consultant B, but did not disclose 
the role of Consultant B’s brother in the BDC arrangement and Consultant B’s brother did not sign 
a BDC contract with Deutsche Bank. 
 
21.  Consultant B’s engagement was approved by the then-Global Markets Risk Assessment 
Committee (“GMRAC”), which included senior-level Deutsche Bank executives.  Despite the 
requirements of the BDC Policy, the GMRAC at the time approved the engagement despite the 
lack of due diligence on Consultant B, and without assessing or mitigating corruption risks and 
conflicts of interest related to the retention which included: 1) Consultant B was related to the Abu 
Dhabi SOE Official, a key decision maker at the SOE from which Deutsche Bank sought business; 
2) Consultant B had no known qualifications for the role; and 3) the fact that the Abu Dhabi SOE 

 7 
Official had made repeated requests to Deutsche Bank to finance a mega-yacht as a means to help 
position Deutsche Bank to obtain Project X.   
 
22.  Deutsche Bank was awarded Project X shortly after it retained Consultant B.  Within a 
week after Consultant B was retained as a BDC, Deutsche Bank paid him more than $2 million for 
his purported legitimate services.   
23. Consultant B was paid approximately $3.5 million without invoices or other documentation 
to support the payments; the agreement itself did not call for Consultant B to perform any services 
other than to provide generic advice and introductions; and the payments were not proportionate to 
any legitimately rendered services.  Despite this, a senior Deutsche Bank executive approved the 
payments.  As a result, Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by approximately $30 million.  
Consultant C – Italian BDC 
 
24. Deutsche Bank retained Consultant C from approximately February 2007 through 
December 2015 to refer high net worth clients to Deutsche Bank.  Reasonable due diligence was 
not done prior to the engagement of Consultant C, who was a regional tax judge in Italy and, 
therefore, a current government official during his BDC engagement.  Contemporaneous email and 
documents show that Consultant C’s business sponsor was aware of this fact when sponsoring 
Consultant C.  
 
25. Numerous payments were made to Consultant C that exceeded the commission rate in his 
contract and included payments outside the terms of his contract.  Consultant C was paid more 
frequently than permitted by contract and was paid despite not performing some of the services for 
which invoices were issued.  Deutsche Bank employees were aware that payments were made to 
him on the basis of inaccurate invoices.  For example, he received payments for at least three 
purported client introductions despite not having introduced those clients to the Bank.  When he 
made demands for payments outside the scope of his contract, he received additional payments and 
was paid for research reports and advisory information that were of no value to the Bank.   
 
26. Although Consultant C’s contract ended in December 2015, Consultant C was paid beyond 
the period required by the BDC agreement.  Per the contract, the commission on those client assets 
should have ceased in December 2015.  
 
27. As a result, Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by approximately $1 million.  
 
Consultant D – Middle Eastern BDC  
 
28. From 2011 through the end of 2012, Deutsche Bank paid bribes to one of two General 
Managers (“Consultant D”) of the Family Office (“FO”) of a senior member of a Middle Eastern 
Royal Family in order to obtain and retain the FO’s lucrative banking business.  Consultant D 
made investment decisions for the FO and managed hundreds of millions of dollars in investments 
on behalf of the FO.  To make the payments, Deutsche Bank entered into a BDC contract with, and 
made these payments to, a shell company (“BVI Company”) owned by Consultant D’s wife.   
 

 8 
29. Although the FO was a preexisting client of Deutsche Bank, the employees who managed 
that relationship at Deutsche Bank believed that Consultant D would take the FO business to 
another bank if they did not pay him.  A Deutsche Bank employee stated, “We are faced with the 
serious potential of the client withdrawing and closing his relationship, putting at risk a potential 
€5-6m revenue in 2013.  Unless we manage to resolve this (and confirm payment by close of week 
1 in December) we are highly likely to lose the entire relationship.”  Deutsche Bank employees 
justified the payments based both on the amount of revenue Deutsche Bank had already earned 
from the FO’s assets and the expectation that Consultant D would provide the bank with future 
business.  One senior Deutsche Bank employee stated that the FO business was the Bank’s “single 
largest relationship” in the Middle East and Africa and “also a top 3 revenue” relationship.   
 
30. Deutsche Bank employees managing the FO account inaccurately portrayed that Consultant 
D’s wife, represented by the BVI Company, was the source of the business.  Neither Compliance 
nor the committee members approving the arrangement verified this claim.  Deutsche Bank did not 
negotiate the terms of the contract or conduct any business with Consultant D’s wife, and email 
clearly indicated that “[Consultant D] has approved the Finder agreement.”  The agreement was 
supported by Deutsche Bank executives and various others on the approval committee including 
some who were aware that there was an inherent conflict of interest in paying the wife of the 
decision maker for the client.    
 
31. Although there is no evidence that either the BVI Company or Consultant D’s wife ever 
provided any services to Deutsche Bank, the payments were authorized and paid.  Because 
Deutsche Bank helped establish the BVI Company and managed its bank account, Deutsche Bank 
employees were aware that Consultant D was the real beneficiary of the payments.  Deutsche Bank 
made at least four payments totaling approximately $1.1 million to the BVI Company to induce 
and “incentivize” Consultant D to invest and maintain the FO’s substantial assets with Deutsche 
Bank.
 
 Deutsche Bank made two payments to the BVI Company under the BDC contract and two 
additional extra-contractual payments: a $150,000 “exceptional payment” that cleared through 
New York and a €220,000 “goodwill payment.”  In one request for approval for an extra-
contractual payment, a senior level Deutsche Bank employee explained that payment was needed 
to “secure the retention” and “future ... contribution of the relationship” and “urgently” requested 
that the payment be approved.      
 
32.   The payments to Consultant D were inaccurately recorded in Deutsche Bank’s books and 
records as legitimate payments, and as a result, Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by 
approximately $3 million. 
 
LEGAL STANDARDS AND VIOLATIONS 
 
33. Under Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act, the Commission may impose a cease-and-
desist order upon any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of 
the Exchange Act or any rule or regulation thereunder, and upon any other person that is, was, or 
would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known 
would contribute to such violation. 
 

 9 
Deutsche Bank Violated Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(A) 
 
34. The books and records provision of the FCPA, Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, 
requires every issuer with a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange 
Act to make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and 
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.  15 U.S.C. § 
78m(b)(2)(A). 
   
35. As a result of the conduct described above, Deutsche Bank violated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of 
the Exchange Act.  
 
Deutsche Bank Violated Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B) 
 
36. Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act requires companies with a class of securities 
registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act to devise and maintain a system of internal 
accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i) transactions are executed in 
accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as 
necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain 
accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s 
general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with 
the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any 
differences.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
 
37. As described above, Deutsche Bank failed to devise and maintain a system of internal 
accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions were executed in 
accordance with management’s general or specific authorization and that access to assets was 
permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization.  By this 
conduct, Deutsche Bank violated Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B). 
 
Commission Consideration of Deutsche Bank’s Cooperation and Remedial Efforts 
 
38. In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered Deutsche Bank’s 
cooperation and remedial efforts.     
 
39. Deutsche Bank’s cooperation included: responding promptly to the Commission’s requests 
for information and documents; identifying issues and facts that would likely be of interest to the 
Commission’s staff; providing regular updates of factual findings developed during the course of 
its own internal investigation; making employees and now-former employees located outside the 
United States available for interviews; and identifying key documents and providing factual 
chronologies to the Commission’s staff.  
 
40. Deutsche Bank’s remedial measures included: enhancements to its internal accounting 
controls; enhancements to its Anti-Bribery & Corruption Framework and policies concerning 
BDCs on a global basis; the significant reduction of the number of BDCs used by the Bank; the 

 10 
institution of enhanced procedures and practices to monitor and control BDC engagements; 
increasing the Bank’s anti-corruption compliance staff; and increased and regular anti-bribery 
training specifically addressing the use of third parties to obtain and retain business.  Deutsche 
Bank also undertook employment actions based upon its findings regarding the underlying 
conduct, including separating certain employees.   
 
Criminal Disposition 
 
41. Deutsche Bank has entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the United States 
Department of Justice that acknowledges responsibility for criminal conduct relating to certain 
findings in the Order. 
 
Non-Imposition of a Civil Penalty 
 
42. Respondent acknowledges that the Commission is not imposing a civil penalty based upon 
the imposition of a $79,561,206 criminal penalty for the same misconduct as part of Deutsche 
Bank’s above referenced resolution with the United States Department of Justice. 
 
 
IV. 
 
 In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions 
agreed to in Respondent’s Offer. 
 
 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 
 
A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Deutsche Bank cease and desist from 
committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 
13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. 
 
B. Respondent shall, within 20 days of the entry of this Order, pay disgorgement of 
$35,145,619 and prejudgment interest of $8,184,003, for a total payment of $43,329,622, to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the general fund of the United States 
Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3).  If timely payment is not made, additional 
interest shall accrue pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600.  Payment must be made in one of the 
following ways:   
 
(1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will 
provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;  
 
(2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the 
SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or  
 

 11 
(3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States 
postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
hand-delivered or mailed to:  
 
Enterprise Services Center 
Accounts Receivable Branch 
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341 
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard 
Oklahoma City, OK 73169 
 
Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying 
Deutsche Bank as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a 
copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Daniel J. Wadley, Director, Salt 
Lake Regional Office, Securities and Exchange Commission, 351 S. West Temple, Suite 6.100, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101.   
 
  
By the Commission. 
 
 
 
       Vanessa A. Countryman 
       Secretary 
 
 
 
 
 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Before the 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

 

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 

Release No. 90875 / January 8, 2021 

 

ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT 

Release No. 4201 / January 8, 2021 

                                        

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING 

File No. 3-20200 

 

 

In the Matter of 

 

DEUTSCHE BANK AG 

 

Respondent. 

 

 

 

 

 

ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND-

DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 21C OF THE SECURITIES 

EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING 

FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING A CEASE-

AND-DESIST ORDER  

  

 

 

I. 

 

 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that cease-

and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), against Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank” or 

“Respondent”).   

 

 

II. 

 

 In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Deutsche Bank has submitted an 

Offer of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept.  Solely for the 

purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the 

Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, Respondent admits the Commission’s 

jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, and consents to the entry of this 

Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set 

forth below. 



 2 

 

 

 

III. 

 

 On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds1 that: 

 

SUMMARY 

 

1. This matter concerns the improper use, from at least 2009 through 2016, by Deutsche Bank 

of third-party intermediaries, business development consultants, and finders (collectively “BDCs”) 

to obtain and retain global business.  Hundreds of BDCs were used during this timeframe, and their 

use was approved by past members of Deutsche Bank’s senior management and various regional 

committees.2  Among those engaged were foreign officials, their relatives and associates in 

circumstances where bribery risks were neither assessed nor sufficient steps taken to mitigate 

bribery risks posed by such engagements. 

 

2. Deutsche Bank lacked sufficient internal accounting controls related to the use and 

payment of BDCs during this time period, resulting in payments to BDCs that were actually bribe 

payments as well as payments made for unknown, undocumented or unauthorized services.  The 

payments in those circumstances were inaccurately recorded as legitimate business expenses in 

Deutsche Bank’s books and records, and involved invoices and documentation falsified by its 

employees.  During this period, certain now-former members of senior management, including 

members of the Management Board, were aware that these internal accounting controls were 

insufficient to provide reasonable assurance that transactions with BDCs were executed in 

accordance with management authorization and to provide reasonable assurance that payments 

were accurately recorded in Deutsche Bank’s books and records.  Deutsche Bank failed to take 

sufficient steps to address and remediate these known internal accounting control failures until 

2016.   

 

3. As a result of this conduct, Deutsche Bank violated the internal accounting control and 

books and records provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.  During this period 

approximately $7 million in payments to BDC’s were improperly booked as legitimate expenses, 

and Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by approximately $35 million.  

 

RESPONDENT 

 

4. Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank” or “the Bank”) is a multinational financial 

services corporation incorporated and domiciled in Germany.  The company issues and maintains a 

class of publicly traded securities registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and is 

                                                
1  The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent's Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any 

other person or entity in this or any other proceeding. 

 
2  All of the relevant Management Board members and most members of senior management referenced in 

this Order are former employees of the Bank. 



 3 

listed on the New York Stock Exchange (ticker: DB).  Deutsche Bank files periodic reports, 

including Forms 20-F, with the Commission.  Deutsche Bank operates in more than 70 countries 

worldwide and is the direct or indirect holding company for Deutsche Bank’s subsidiaries.  

Deutsche Bank employees in various parts of the world engaged in the conduct discussed herein.3   

 

FACTS 

 

5. Throughout the relevant time period, Deutsche Bank’s Global Anti-Corruption Policy 

(“Anti-Corruption Policy”) prohibited the payment of bribes, both directly and indirectly, to obtain 

an improper personal or business advantage in both the public and private sectors.  Deutsche Bank 

prohibited the offer of anything of value which may be deemed to influence any act or decision of 

a public official and also prohibited the use of BDCs to improperly obtain confidential information 

about business opportunities.  Under Deutsche Bank’s relevant policies, third-party representatives 

could only be engaged in circumstances where: 1) there was documented pre-contractual due 

diligence; 2) a written contract which set out the representative’s role and/or services was provided 

in a form approved by the Bank’s Legal department (“Legal”); 3) the contract contained a 

documented description of services to be performed, amount to be paid, and other material terms of 

the engagement; 4) the payment was proportionate to the value of the services rendered; and 5) 

appropriate review and approval was obtained before the engagement began.  Additionally, 

Deutsche Bank prohibited any undocumented payments or bribes. 

 

6. Since at least 2008, Deutsche Bank’s Use of Business Development Consultants Policy 

(“BDC Policy”), its global policy governing the use of consultants and finders, required that the 

Bank conduct thorough due diligence prior to retaining and paying a BDC to determine, among 

other things, whether the BDC, or their immediate family members and close associates, had any 

political or governmental affiliations or exposures.  A BDC with a “political or governmental 

affiliation” was classified as a politically exposed person (“PEP”) and required enhanced due 

diligence; this person could not be engaged without additional vetting and approval by senior 

management, Legal, and the Bank’s compliance function (“Compliance”) to provide reasonable 

assurance that potential conflicts of interest were identified and addressed.  The BDC Policy also 

required that prospective BDCs have “sufficient expertise and qualifications” to perform the 

contemplated services.  Payments were required to be proportionate to the services rendered and 

made only in circumstances where the supporting invoice contained “sufficient detail regarding the 

services or matters to which such invoice relates.”  

 

7. While the BDC Policy required that regional and divisional management approve and 

oversee the use of BDCs, in practice, the implementation and oversight of the Policy fell to the 

BDC’s “business sponsor.”  Business sponsors were responsible for generating business for 

Deutsche Bank and were compensated, in part, based on the revenue earned by Deutsche Bank.  

The business sponsors recommended the engagement of the identified BDC, determined whether 

payments to the BDCs complied with both the terms of the BDC contract and the Bank’s policies, 

and maintained records concerning the services provided by the BDC, including invoices.    

                                                
3    Deutsche Bank employees referenced in this Order may have worked for one or more Deutsche Bank legal 

entities during the relevant time.  Deutsche Bank is required to make and keep accurate books and records 

and sufficient internal accounting controls within its subsidiaries. 



 4 

 

 

 

Deutsche Bank Identified Internal Accounting Control Failures in 2009 but Failed to 

Remediate Until 2016  

 

8. In approximately 2008, as part of the Bank’s anti-corruption program, a group within 

Deutsche Bank’s internal audit function conducted a review of business arrangements in its Asia-

Pacific region in order to assess the integrity and legitimacy of certain transactions.  In 2009, the 

internal audit group issued a report (“2009 Report”) in which it identified certain concerns with the 

Bank’s use of one BDC including insufficient oversight over that BDC engagement to ensure it 

was not being used for corrupt purposes and a lack of documentation detailing what actual services 

were rendered by the BDC.  The 2009 Report recommended that Deutsche Bank’s global BDC 

Policy be revised and that the internal accounting controls around BDCs be enhanced to include 

centralized and thoroughly documented due diligence to demonstrate that a BDC was qualified to 

perform the services for which it was contracted, maintenance of detailed records of all work 

performed by the BDC, and a requirement that BDC engagements include books and 

recordkeeping provisions giving Deutsche Bank inspection rights.  The 2009 Report was provided 

to senior management at Deutsche Bank, including members of the Management Board; however, 

only limited steps were taken in response.   

 

9. In 2011, the same group conducted another internal investigation into the Bank’s BDC 

relationships and identified numerous internal accounting control failures.  Those failures were 

identified in a report (“2011 Report”) and included: problems related to specific BDC 

engagements; lack of due diligence; general lack of training and awareness of Deutsche Bank’s 

BDC Policy and due diligence requirements among employees; failure by business sponsors to 

appropriately assess, document, and mitigate corruption risks and conflicts of interests; and failure 

to document the proportionality and justification for certain BDC payments.  The 2011 Report was 

also distributed to senior management at Deutsche Bank, including members of the Management 

Board, and again only limited steps were taken in response.  

 

10. Contrary to its internal policies and with known failures in its relevant internal accounting 

controls, between 2009 and 2016, Deutsche Bank engaged some BDCs: 1) with no demonstrated 

expertise or qualifications; 2) who simultaneously worked for a government entity from which 

Deutsche Bank sought business; 3) without a written agreement; 4) using form agreements with no 

substantive description of the services to be performed and/or provisions calling for “success fee” 

payments; 5) at rates that were unreasonably high as compared to the work allegedly being 

performed; and 6) in circumstances where either adequate due diligence was not performed or 

where due diligence was conducted more than a year after the BDC was retained and paid.   

 

11. As a result of its lack of sufficient internal accounting controls relating to BDCs, Deutsche 

Bank paid certain BDCs in circumstances where no invoices were submitted and where invoices 

contained insufficient documentation to detail what services were performed.  In certain instances, 

when invoices were submitted, they were vague and inadequate, making it nearly impossible to 

determine what, if any, services were performed or to determine the purpose for the payment.  In 



 5 

some instances, BDCs were paid in excess of what was provided for pursuant to their contract with 

Deutsche Bank and some BDCs were paid even though they had no contract at the time certain of 

the services were purportedly performed.  Amongst the BDC payments made in these 

circumstances were those that were bribes.   

 

Consultant A – Chinese BDC 

 

12. Deutsche Bank retained Consultant A to help the Bank establish a clean energy 

investment fund with a Chinese government entity.  Prior to entering into a BDC relationship, 

Consultant A introduced himself and provided certain Deutsche Bank employees with a 

curriculum vitae indicating that he “is currently the senior advisor to [the regional Chinese] . . . 

Government” with which the Bank sought to establish the investment fund.  Deutsche Bank 

employees working to establish the investment fund knew that in addition to potentially being a 

government official or otherwise acting in an official capacity, Consultant A was also “a close 

friend of” a foreign government official whose approval was needed for the establishment of the 

investment fund.  Notably, that same government official required that Deutsche Bank work 

through Consultant A to establish the investment fund.   

 

13. Despite these facts, Consultant A was retained as a BDC without due diligence review 

being conducted as required.   

 

14. Between April 2011 and May 2013, Consultant A was paid at least $1.6 million.  This 

included payments for services purportedly performed before he was engaged.  Consultant A 

submitted invoices for gifts and entertainment provided to foreign government officials that were 

reimbursed without adequate review or advance approval by Compliance, as required under 

Deutsche Bank’s policies.  Moreover, Deutsche Bank did not fully document the services 

Consultant A purportedly performed and paid him without appropriate documentation.  For 

example, although Deutsche Bank paid him for purported reimbursements of “out-of-pocket 

expenses” or “client-related expenses,” Consultant A provided little verifiable support for the 

purported expenses.  

 

15. In addition to these payments, Consultant A was given a partnership interest in the 

investment fund that required little or no upfront capital and entitled him to a large potential 

profit share.  One Deutsche Bank employee explained contemporaneously, “[Consultant A] has 

acted as an advisor and facilitator to this initiative and it is a requirement of [the government 

entity] that he is included as both an equity (very small) participant and also part of the 

investment committee.”  This agreement was executed without Legal and Compliance having 

full information about the circumstances of Consultant A’s relationship with the government 

entity. 

 

16. In early 2017, Deutsche Bank began the dissolution of the investment fund because it 

failed to raise capital; the Bank earned no profits from this arrangement. 



 6 

 

Consultant B – Abu Dhabi BDC 

 

17. Between 2010 and 2011, Deutsche Bank retained and paid Consultant B to obtain a 

specific deal (“Project X”) with an Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund (“Abu Dhabi SOE”).  

Consultant B approached Deutsche Bank about Project X and within weeks of that meeting, 

Deutsche Bank employees understood that Consultant B’s brother would also be involved in the 

proposed BDC engagement, although Deutsche Bank did not immediately engage either of them.   

 

18. During this same time period, an Abu Dhabi SOE Official with authority to influence the 

award of Project X was pressuring Deutsche Bank to finance a mega-yacht.  One email from an 

Abu Dhabi SOE official read:  

 

“[Abu Dhabi SOE Official] has asked me to get in touch with DB: reputationally, this 

financing is regarded as absolutely crucial, and [Abu Dhabi SOE Official] made the point 

very forcefully that those institutions which participate in it can expect in future to enjoy 

‘most favoured status’ with [the Abu Dhabi SOE].”    

 

19. Deutsche Bank employees working on Project X encouraged the Bank to finance the mega-

yacht in order to influence the Abu Dhabi SOE Official and better position Deutsche Bank to 

obtain Project X.  The Bank agreed to do so.  Despite that, a banker working to obtain Project X 

expressed concern that there was still “no guaranty” that Deutsche Bank would win Project X and 

told a senior executive at Deutsche Bank, “We need to close the [Consultant B and brother] angle 

within the next 48hrs. Need ur [sic] leadership and influence on getting it thru GMRAC.”  The 

senior executive agreed to sponsor the BDC arrangement, but expressed concern about entering 

into a BDC arrangement shortly before Project X would be awarded.  

 

20. At the time Consultant B was retained as a BDC, Deutsche Bank knew Consultant B was a 

relative of the Abu Dhabi SOE Official, a high ranking official of and key decision maker for the 

Abu Dhabi SOE.  Deutsche Bank knew that Consultant B was a proxy for the Abu Dhabi SOE 

Official and that it needed to pay Consultant B to obtain the Abu Dhabi SOE’s business.  A 

Deutsche Bank employee described Consultant B as a “gatekeeper” to the Abu Dhabi SOE Official 

who expected to be paid for his services.  At the time Consultant B was retained as a BDC, the 

Regional Head of Compliance, the banker acting as business sponsor, and the senior executive 

each knew that Consultant B’s brother would be working with Consultant B, but did not disclose 

the role of Consultant B’s brother in the BDC arrangement and Consultant B’s brother did not sign 

a BDC contract with Deutsche Bank. 

 

21.  Consultant B’s engagement was approved by the then-Global Markets Risk Assessment 

Committee (“GMRAC”), which included senior-level Deutsche Bank executives.  Despite the 

requirements of the BDC Policy, the GMRAC at the time approved the engagement despite the 

lack of due diligence on Consultant B, and without assessing or mitigating corruption risks and 

conflicts of interest related to the retention which included: 1) Consultant B was related to the Abu 

Dhabi SOE Official, a key decision maker at the SOE from which Deutsche Bank sought business; 

2) Consultant B had no known qualifications for the role; and 3) the fact that the Abu Dhabi SOE 



 7 

Official had made repeated requests to Deutsche Bank to finance a mega-yacht as a means to help 

position Deutsche Bank to obtain Project X.   

 

22.  Deutsche Bank was awarded Project X shortly after it retained Consultant B.  Within a 

week after Consultant B was retained as a BDC, Deutsche Bank paid him more than $2 million for 

his purported legitimate services.   

23. Consultant B was paid approximately $3.5 million without invoices or other documentation 

to support the payments; the agreement itself did not call for Consultant B to perform any services 

other than to provide generic advice and introductions; and the payments were not proportionate to 

any legitimately rendered services.  Despite this, a senior Deutsche Bank executive approved the 

payments.  As a result, Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by approximately $30 million.  

Consultant C – Italian BDC 

 

24. Deutsche Bank retained Consultant C from approximately February 2007 through 

December 2015 to refer high net worth clients to Deutsche Bank.  Reasonable due diligence was 

not done prior to the engagement of Consultant C, who was a regional tax judge in Italy and, 

therefore, a current government official during his BDC engagement.  Contemporaneous email and 

documents show that Consultant C’s business sponsor was aware of this fact when sponsoring 

Consultant C.  

 

25. Numerous payments were made to Consultant C that exceeded the commission rate in his 

contract and included payments outside the terms of his contract.  Consultant C was paid more 

frequently than permitted by contract and was paid despite not performing some of the services for 

which invoices were issued.  Deutsche Bank employees were aware that payments were made to 

him on the basis of inaccurate invoices.  For example, he received payments for at least three 

purported client introductions despite not having introduced those clients to the Bank.  When he 

made demands for payments outside the scope of his contract, he received additional payments and 

was paid for research reports and advisory information that were of no value to the Bank.   

 

26. Although Consultant C’s contract ended in December 2015, Consultant C was paid beyond 

the period required by the BDC agreement.  Per the contract, the commission on those client assets 

should have ceased in December 2015.  

 

27. As a result, Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by approximately $1 million.  

 

Consultant D – Middle Eastern BDC  

 

28. From 2011 through the end of 2012, Deutsche Bank paid bribes to one of two General 

Managers (“Consultant D”) of the Family Office (“FO”) of a senior member of a Middle Eastern 

Royal Family in order to obtain and retain the FO’s lucrative banking business.  Consultant D 

made investment decisions for the FO and managed hundreds of millions of dollars in investments 

on behalf of the FO.  To make the payments, Deutsche Bank entered into a BDC contract with, and 

made these payments to, a shell company (“BVI Company”) owned by Consultant D’s wife.   

 



 8 

29. Although the FO was a preexisting client of Deutsche Bank, the employees who managed 

that relationship at Deutsche Bank believed that Consultant D would take the FO business to 

another bank if they did not pay him.  A Deutsche Bank employee stated, “We are faced with the 

serious potential of the client withdrawing and closing his relationship, putting at risk a potential 

€5-6m revenue in 2013.  Unless we manage to resolve this (and confirm payment by close of week 

1 in December) we are highly likely to lose the entire relationship.”  Deutsche Bank employees 

justified the payments based both on the amount of revenue Deutsche Bank had already earned 

from the FO’s assets and the expectation that Consultant D would provide the bank with future 

business.  One senior Deutsche Bank employee stated that the FO business was the Bank’s “single 

largest relationship” in the Middle East and Africa and “also a top 3 revenue” relationship.   

 

30. Deutsche Bank employees managing the FO account inaccurately portrayed that Consultant 

D’s wife, represented by the BVI Company, was the source of the business.  Neither Compliance 

nor the committee members approving the arrangement verified this claim.  Deutsche Bank did not 

negotiate the terms of the contract or conduct any business with Consultant D’s wife, and email 

clearly indicated that “[Consultant D] has approved the Finder agreement.”  The agreement was 

supported by Deutsche Bank executives and various others on the approval committee including 

some who were aware that there was an inherent conflict of interest in paying the wife of the 

decision maker for the client.    

 

31. Although there is no evidence that either the BVI Company or Consultant D’s wife ever 

provided any services to Deutsche Bank, the payments were authorized and paid.  Because 

Deutsche Bank helped establish the BVI Company and managed its bank account, Deutsche Bank 

employees were aware that Consultant D was the real beneficiary of the payments.  Deutsche Bank 

made at least four payments totaling approximately $1.1 million to the BVI Company to induce 

and “incentivize” Consultant D to invest and maintain the FO’s substantial assets with Deutsche 

Bank.  Deutsche Bank made two payments to the BVI Company under the BDC contract and two 

additional extra-contractual payments: a $150,000 “exceptional payment” that cleared through 

New York and a €220,000 “goodwill payment.”  In one request for approval for an extra-

contractual payment, a senior level Deutsche Bank employee explained that payment was needed 

to “secure the retention” and “future … contribution of the relationship” and “urgently” requested 

that the payment be approved.      

 

32.   The payments to Consultant D were inaccurately recorded in Deutsche Bank’s books and 

records as legitimate payments, and as a result, Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by 

approximately $3 million. 

 

LEGAL STANDARDS AND VIOLATIONS 

 

33. Under Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act, the Commission may impose a cease-and-

desist order upon any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of 

the Exchange Act or any rule or regulation thereunder, and upon any other person that is, was, or 

would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known 

would contribute to such violation. 

 



 9 

Deutsche Bank Violated Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(A) 

 

34. The books and records provision of the FCPA, Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, 

requires every issuer with a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange 

Act to make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and 

fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.  15 U.S.C. § 

78m(b)(2)(A). 

   

35. As a result of the conduct described above, Deutsche Bank violated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of 

the Exchange Act.  

 

Deutsche Bank Violated Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B) 

 

36. Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act requires companies with a class of securities 

registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act to devise and maintain a system of internal 

accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i) transactions are executed in 

accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as 

necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted 

accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain 

accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s 

general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with 

the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any 

differences.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 

 

37. As described above, Deutsche Bank failed to devise and maintain a system of internal 

accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions were executed in 

accordance with management’s general or specific authorization and that access to assets was 

permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization.  By this 

conduct, Deutsche Bank violated Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B). 

 

Commission Consideration of Deutsche Bank’s Cooperation and Remedial Efforts 

 

38. In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered Deutsche Bank’s 

cooperation and remedial efforts.     

 

39. Deutsche Bank’s cooperation included: responding promptly to the Commission’s requests 

for information and documents; identifying issues and facts that would likely be of interest to the 

Commission’s staff; providing regular updates of factual findings developed during the course of 

its own internal investigation; making employees and now-former employees located outside the 

United States available for interviews; and identifying key documents and providing factual 

chronologies to the Commission’s staff.  

 

40. Deutsche Bank’s remedial measures included: enhancements to its internal accounting 

controls; enhancements to its Anti-Bribery & Corruption Framework and policies concerning 

BDCs on a global basis; the significant reduction of the number of BDCs used by the Bank; the 



 10 

institution of enhanced procedures and practices to monitor and control BDC engagements; 

increasing the Bank’s anti-corruption compliance staff; and increased and regular anti-bribery 

training specifically addressing the use of third parties to obtain and retain business.  Deutsche 

Bank also undertook employment actions based upon its findings regarding the underlying 

conduct, including separating certain employees.   

 

Criminal Disposition 

 

41. Deutsche Bank has entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the United States 

Department of Justice that acknowledges responsibility for criminal conduct relating to certain 

findings in the Order. 

 

Non-Imposition of a Civil Penalty 

 

42. Respondent acknowledges that the Commission is not imposing a civil penalty based upon 

the imposition of a $79,561,206 criminal penalty for the same misconduct as part of Deutsche 

Bank’s above referenced resolution with the United States Department of Justice. 

 

 

IV. 

 

 In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions 

agreed to in Respondent’s Offer. 

 

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 

A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Deutsche Bank cease and desist from 

committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 

13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. 

 

B. Respondent shall, within 20 days of the entry of this Order, pay disgorgement of 

$35,145,619 and prejudgment interest of $8,184,003, for a total payment of $43,329,622, to the 

Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the general fund of the United States 

Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3).  If timely payment is not made, additional 

interest shall accrue pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600.  Payment must be made in one of the 

following ways:   

 

(1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will 

provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;  

 

(2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the 

SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or  

 

http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm


 11 

(3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States 

postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and 

hand-delivered or mailed to:  

 

Enterprise Services Center 

Accounts Receivable Branch 

HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341 

6500 South MacArthur Boulevard 

Oklahoma City, OK 73169 

 

Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying 

Deutsche Bank as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a 

copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Daniel J. Wadley, Director, Salt 

Lake Regional Office, Securities and Exchange Commission, 351 S. West Temple, Suite 6.100, 

Salt Lake City, UT 84101.   

 

  

By the Commission. 

 

 

 

       Vanessa A. Countryman 

       Secretary