In re CREDIT SUISSE

 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Before the 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
Release No. 83593 / July 5, 2018 
 
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT 
Release No. 3948 / July 5, 2018 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING 
File No. 3-18571 
 
 
In the Matter of 
 
CREDIT SUISSE  
GROUP AG, 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND-
DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 21C OF THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING 
FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING A CEASE-
AND-DESIST ORDER 
  
I. 
 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that cease-
and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), against Credit Suisse Group AG (“Credit Suisse” or 
“Respondent”). 
 
II. 
 
 In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Credit Suisse has submitted an Offer 
of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept.  Solely for the 
purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the 
Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, Respondent admits the Commission’s 
jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, and consents to the entry of this 
Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set 
forth below.  
 
 
 

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III. 
 
 On the basis of this Order and Credit Suisse’s Offer, the Commission finds
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 that:  
 
SUMMARY 
 
1. This matter concerns violations of the anti-bribery and internal accounting controls 
provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by Credit Suisse.  Between at least 2007 
and 2013, Credit Suisse provided valuable employment to the relatives and friends of certain 
foreign government officials in the Asia-Pacific region (“APAC”) as a personal benefit to the 
requesting officials in order to obtain or retain investment banking business or other benefits for 
the bank.  Because many of Credit Suisse’s clients were state-owned entities (“SOEs”), and 
because the individuals personally requesting employment or internships for their relatives and 
friends were either executives of these SOEs or were foreign government ministers with influence 
over the business decisions of SOEs, the requesting individuals were foreign government officials 
under the FCPA.  Credit Suisse provided these jobs to certain of the referred candidates (“Referral 
Hires”) with the intent to corruptly influence the foreign government officials making the requests 
to secure banking business from the SOEs.  Credit Suisse’s referral hiring practice resulted in 
multiple deals and substantial profits for Credit Suisse. 
 
2. While Credit Suisse had written policies beginning in at least 2007 that prohibited 
the hiring of candidates referred by or related to officials from SOEs or government ministries in 
order to obtain or retain business, those policies were not meaningfully enforced.  At least one 
senior Credit Suisse manager in APAC believed that restrictions on referral hiring -- including a 
proposed requirement that all Referral Hires be vetted through the established, merit-based campus 
recruiting program -- would “kill” their business.  Steps were taken to make certain Referral Hires 
from SOEs appear to be normal, merit-based hires at Credit Suisse.  The candidates would undergo 
interviews and submit their applications through Credit Suisse’s human resources department 
(“Human Resources”).  However, in some instances, certain senior bankers made decisions to 
recommend hiring referrals in advance of this process and based on the prospect of business from 
the referring SOE rather than the merit of the prospective employee.  Since the company’s 
prohibition on improper SOE Referral Hires was not implemented in practice, many client referrals 
were hired by Credit Suisse without the requirement of any review by the bank’s Legal and 
Compliance Department (“LCD” or “legal and compliance”) to ensure compliance with the bank’s 
policies.   
 
3. During the six-year period referenced above, Credit Suisse offered employment to 
more than 100 individuals referred by or who had some connection to APAC foreign government 
officials.  This included more than 60 employees and interns referred by foreign government 
officials at more than 20 different Chinese SOEs.  Credit Suisse HK and its affiliates obtained 
deals from referring officials’ SOEs totaling tens of millions of dollars in revenue during this 
period.  Credit Suisse also hired referrals from numerous government agencies.  In exchange these 
                                                 
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 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent’s Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any other 
person or entity in this or any other proceeding.  
 

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government officials assisted Credit Suisse in navigating complex regulatory landscapes in order to 
obtain or retain business.  Senior Credit Suisse managers in APAC tracked the success of some of 
the bank’s Referral Hires in generating business through the use of spreadsheets that linked 
particular referral hires to specific business deals for the firm.  Certain senior personnel with Credit 
Suisse HK and in the U.S. were aware that referral hiring was taking place in the APAC region.   
 
4. Credit Suisse’s internal accounting controls were insufficiently devised or 
maintained to reasonably enforce or effectuate the policies against Referral Hires or bribery of 
foreign officials and were therefore inadequate to address the corruption risks the company had 
identified in connection with referral hiring.  The written restrictions put in place by Credit Suisse 
to minimize compliance and FCPA risks were not sufficient to curb Credit Suisse’s corrupt referral 
hiring practices.   
 
Respondent
 
 
5. Credit Suisse Group AG is a corporation incorporated and domiciled in 
Switzerland.  It is a multinational financial services holding company that provides a broad range 
of services, including investment banking.  Credit Suisse’s American Depository Shares are 
registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange.  Credit Suisse files periodic reports, including Forms 20-F, with the Commission.  
 
Other Relevant Entity 
 
6. Credit Suisse (Hong Kong) Limited (“Credit Suisse HK”) is a Hong Kong 
incorporated company and wholly owned subsidiary of Credit Suisse.  Credit Suisse offers 
securities products and financial advisory services in the APAC region.  Credit Suisse’s global 
investment banking business is headquartered in the United States and was conducted in the APAC 
region primarily by and through Credit Suisse HK and its employees.  Credit Suisse HK is an 
“agent” of the issuer within the meaning of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  
 
FACTS  
Credit Suisse’s Written Policies Prohibited the Hiring of Government Referrals in Exchange 
for Business 
7. As early as 2007, Credit Suisse recognized the FCPA risks in hiring the relatives of 
foreign government officials.  Credit Suisse’s Global Anti-Bribery Policy (the “Global Policy”) 
specified that “[o]ffers of employment, including internships, to Government Officials, their family 
members, or associates,” could be considered to be “things of value” under the FCPA, and were 
prohibited if offered “to obtain or retain business, or otherwise secure an improper advantage.”  
The Global Policy was also reflected in regional policies applicable in APAC that recognized the 
bribery risks inherent in referral hiring and specified additional restrictions on the practice. 
8. In 2011, the Global Policy was updated to specify that ad hoc training activities and 
internships for relatives of government officials that were clients both fell within the scope of 
prohibited employment practices.  The updated Global Policy stated that such referrals could only 

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qualify for positions in existing campus or lateral hiring programs with open application processes 
and that no special treatment could be provided for those referrals in the recruiting process.    
Senior Credit Suisse Managers in APAC Knew About Prohibitions Regarding Government 
Hires  
9. Credit Suisse HK senior managers were aware that hiring referrals from SOEs and 
government ministries to obtain or retain business was restricted under Credit Suisse’s written 
compliance policies and could violate the FCPA.  For example, in an April 2009 e-mail, a Credit 
Suisse Banker wrote that “[g]iven the importance of these two referrals, I’m thinking whether we 
should add them to the regular intern program.  Can we make two more spaces?”  A Credit Suisse 
employee responded that “[g]iven the LCD resistance on the hiring of gov’t related interns, we 
should clarify how the individuals are related to these entities.  We can then decide the best course 
of action.”   
10. Additionally, in a May 2009 e-mail LCD informed APAC senior managers that 
Credit Suisse was unable to provide summer internships to two SOE client referrals because:  
“[a]fter consultation with the Bank’s Anti Corruption Team in New York, LCD in [sic] have 
deemed both requests to be potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and as such 
are too risky a venture for the Bank to pursue.”  The LCD representative went on to describe why 
the two proposed hires could violate the FCPA, and concluded: “I am sorry for this news, however 
given the increased attention the regulators are now dedicating to this area and the fact that all of 
our key competitors have either disbanded their similar programmes, or are in the final stages of 
doing so, [LCD] in deeming the provision of these types of work experience or internships to 
FCPA subject parties to be too great a risk to enter into are simply adhering to what is now the 
industry practice.”   
11. Also, in April 2010 LCD officials informed a Human Resources officer of a 
problem with hiring a client referral from an Indonesian SOE, noting “[a]s such, there is a blanket 
ban on offering these internships to anyone with direct government or SOE relations.” 
Credit Suisse HK Personnel Developed a Referral Hiring Practice to Hire SOE Referrals 
Without Proper Scrutiny 
12. From at least 2007 through 2013, multiple senior Credit Suisse managers in APAC 
engaged in a practice of hiring, promoting and retaining government-connected Referral Hires as 
part of a quid pro quo by which Credit Suisse managers sought to improperly influence foreign 
officials to assist Credit Suisse in winning lucrative investment banking mandates.   
13. Rather than enforce Credit Suisse’s anti-corruption policies, senior Credit Suisse 
managers repeatedly took steps to onboard Referral Hires from SOEs and government ministries 
independently from the scrutiny of the company’s established, merit-based campus recruiting 
program.  A 2009 e-mail from a Credit Suisse HK Human Resources executive to two Credit 
Suisse HK senior managers on “Client interns” stated:  “One of LCD’s recommendations will be to 
hire the client interns through the formal Summer Programme for Analyst & Associates (managed 
by campus recruiting).  We think this is not a great idea... we think it would be better if we could 

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hire these interns independently (as in the past) for this summer.  We can agree with LCD a new 
way to approach this for next year.”  This practice persisted for the ensuing years.   
14. APAC Credit Suisse senior managers at times agreed in principle to hire a referred 
candidate before conducting interviews or vetting of any kind, based on business advantages the 
government official who referred the candidate could provide.  Senior Credit Suisse managers in 
APAC engaged in sham practices intended to give the appearance of a regular hiring process being 
followed.  Senior Credit Suisse managers in APAC instructed subordinates to conduct interviews 
of referral candidates and automatically score the candidate highly, regardless of his/her actual 
performance.   
15. In seeking approval to hire or promote a referred candidate, rather than highlighting 
the skills or experience of the candidate, Senior Credit Suisse managers in APAC referenced 
particular business or mandates that had been or could be gained as a result of the Referral Hire.  
For example: 
 One SOE executive emailed a senior Credit Suisse banker to refer a candidate who 
had a “very good and close relationship” with senior management at the SOE, and 
wrote that hiring the Referral Hire would “bring [Credit Suisse] the big surprise in 
the near future if you could coordinate with CS Asian team to arrange a position in 
CS team in Beijing.”   
 The senior Credit Suisse banker later told a colleague about an impending deal that 
the SOE was pursuing and explained that the referring SOE official “was focused 
on having us make a relationship hire and said it was very important for us to win 
future business with [the SOE].”   
 Another banker wrote of another government-connected Referral Hire:  “Need a 
favor from you.  [The Referral Hire] will get us a US$1bn bond deal from [a 
prospective client].  His family requested to change his status to permanent with 
CS.  Given of [sic] the level of importance of this deal, we will decide to renew his 
contact [sic] for another 24 months instead of permanent.”   
16. Many candidates were offered full-time salaried positions and paid internships that 
were eligible for bonuses, housing allotments, and other benefits, and some were hired without any 
approval or vetting from the LCD or any other compliance body.   
Credit Suisse HK Control Failures 
17. Credit Suisse’s compliance policies governing the bank’s referral hiring practices 
highlighted the corruption risks associated with referral hiring, and dictated that Credit Suisse HK 
could employ government-connected Referral Hires under only very limited circumstances.  From 
at least 2007, the Global Policy prohibited offering a job or internship to any foreign official or 
relative of a foreign official to obtain or retain business or otherwise for improper purposes.   
18. In light of the corruption risks identified in its own compliance policies, Credit 
Suisse placed written requirements around the onboarding of Referral Hires.  Despite these written 

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requirements, senior Credit Suisse managers in APAC repeatedly made Referral Hires in order to 
obtain banking business and other advantages from senior officials at SOEs and government 
agencies.   
19. Certain Credit Suisse managers in the U.S. were aware of Credit Suisse HK’s hiring 
of client referrals, some of whom treated the job as a mere “boondoggle.”  For certain Referral 
Hires, Credit Suisse senior managers in the U.S. approved the hire and took him or her on in the 
United States.  This led to complaints from Credit Suisse U.S. bankers due to the frequency of the 
requests and the poor quality of the Referral Hires.  For example, one senior U.S. Credit Suisse 
banker wrote:  “. . . to be honest, we have had really bad experiences with many of the individuals 
from Asia . . . [a particular Credit Suisse HK senior manager] generates most of them and there is 
enough frustration in the system over this at this point that I wanted to check in with you for a 
sanity check on whether we should always break the mold for his requests or not . . . .” 
20. In making Referral Hires, Credit Suisse repeatedly deviated from its established, 
merit-based hiring requirements which assessed job candidates based purely on qualifications and 
expected job performance.  Credit Suisse failed to take adequate steps to mitigate known risks of 
bribery and corruption in its APAC operations.  Credit Suisse HK failed to meaningfully 
implement or enforce Credit Suisse’s policies until 2013. 
Credit Suisse Hired SOE Referral Hires To Assist in Winning or Retaining Business 
21. Between 2007 and 2013, Credit Suisse hired multiple relatives and friends of 
officials with foreign government entities and senior officials at foreign SOEs to obtain or retain 
business for Credit Suisse.    
22. Credit Suisse maintained spreadsheets that listed “referral hires” or “relationship 
hires.”  These spreadsheets included information identifying the referring client or relationship 
when the relationship was with a government regulator.  Some of these spreadsheets identified the 
“[c]ontribution” of the referral hire, including in at least three instances, deals specifically 
attributable to the relevant relationship.  In an email to colleagues, a Credit Suisse employee 
explained:  “Relationship hires have to translate to $” or “the relationship is worthless to our 
organization.”  This email was forwarded to a senior Credit Suisse banking official in the U.S.  In a 
different email, a senior Credit Suisse banker stated that a referral hire “will get us a US$1bn bond 
deal. . . .  His family requested to change his status to permanent with CS.  Given [] the level of 
importance of this deal, we will decide to renew his contract for another 24 months instead of 
permanent.” 
23. Credit Suisse’s Referral Hires often lacked technical skills, were less qualified, and 
had significantly less banking and other relevant experience than candidates hired through Credit 
Suisse’s other employment channels.  Credit Suisse Referral Hires included the following: 
 In 2008, Credit Suisse HK hired the nephew of a senior Chinese government 
official, despite the fact that the nephew lacked investment banking qualifications 
and a Credit Suisse HK manager acknowledged that “most likely he will not be 
good.”  The hire was made at the request of a government official with a Chinese 
SOE from which Credit Suisse was seeking to win business.  The same Credit 

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Suisse HK manager reasoned that “[t]here is a relationship hire in every industry” 
and stated that this particular individual should be hired in order to “open doors on 
SOE fronts which we are in lack of and our marketing effort has been handicapped, 
including [the referrer’s SOE].”  After repeated efforts to “leverage” the Referral 
Hire to obtain business from various Chinese SOEs, Credit Suisse HK successfully 
won a mandate generating approximately $475,170 in revenue for the bank.  
 
 From 2010 to 2011, Credit Suisse HK employed the relative of a government 
official with a Chinese state-owned oil company.  A Credit Suisse HK employee 
explained:  “the girl is [the] relative of someone staying at core decision making 
circle of [the SOE] . . . . this girl is particularly important for . . . us to be blessed by 
the [SOE].”  After the hire the SOE awarded Credit Suisse HK multiple mandates 
that yielded over $12 million in net profits for the bank.   
 
 Beginning in 2010, Credit Suisse HK employed an individual closely connected to 
a key government minister.  The Referral Hire worked at Credit Suisse HK in 
various roles from June 2010 until December 2012.  Credit Suisse HK was awarded 
lucrative roles in a securities offering for two Chinese SOEs as a consequence of 
this hire, and received net profits for its work of more than $4 million.  
 
 In 2011, the company hired the son of a senior commerce minister in China.  A 
Credit Suisse HK senior manager strongly advocated hiring the son, stating that the 
company’s relationship with the government ministry was “very important” 
because all  “red chip” deals [involving companies based in mainland China but 
incorporated elsewhere and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange] “need to get 
approved there.”  The bank proceeded to employ the son for over a year, and during 
his employment one of the senior managers used her “chit” with the minister to 
assist the bank in securing the necessary approval from the ministry for a deal on 
which Credit Suisse eventually received net profits of approximately $6 million.  
 
24. The following are specific instances of Credit Suisse Referral Hires resulting in 
lucrative investment banking mandates for the firm. 
Referral Hire from Energy-Related SOE to Obtain Investment Banking Mandates 
25. In or around March 2010, Credit Suisse pitched for a mandate involving a Chinese 
energy-related company (“Company A”).  Referral Hire A was the daughter of a high-ranking 
official (“Official A”) at a Chinese energy-related SOE (“SOE A”) that was the controlling 
shareholder of Company A.  
26. On or around March 9, 2010, a Credit Suisse Vice President sent an email to a 
Credit Suisse HK senior investment banking manager in Hong Kong (“Employee A”), attaching 
Referral Hire A’s resume and asking whether Employee A could “check with [Foreign Official A] 
as to whether we can move things to the next step at the same time?”  After stating “not too many 
interviews,” and explaining that Referral Hire A was “a princess [who was] not used to too many 
rounds of interview,” Employee A proposed “giv[ing] her the offer letter asap,” at which point 

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Employee A would “push her mum [Official A].”  In order to make Referral Hire A’s application 
appear more presentable, Credit Suisse HK bankers drafted a resume for her requiring them to be a 
bit “creative” in filling in the details. 
27. Four days after receiving the request to hire Referral Hire A, on or about March 13, 
2010, Employee A emailed the Credit Suisse Vice President, using a shorthand term that referred to 
Company A in the subject line, writing, “I am seeing [Official A] to push. [Official A] will get us in 
the deal.”  Two days later, Employee A sent another email, again using a shorthand reference to 
Company A in the subject line, writing, “I am meeting [Official A] . . . tomorrow.  Where is 
[Referral Hire A’s] contract?” A Credit Suisse employee responded that the offer letter was being 
prepared, and a Credit Suisse HK Human Resources manager (“Employee B”) subsequently 
confirmed Referral Hire A would receive a first year analyst salary and a housing allowance, 
respectively approximately $70,000 and $30,000 annually.  In or around April 2010, Credit Suisse 
booked the mandate for Company A, realizing a $950,000 fee. 
28. On or about July 1, 2010, Referral Hire A began working at Credit Suisse, without 
being vetted or approved by LCD.  During her probationary period, Referral Hire A exhibited 
unprofessional behavior.  In connection with a July 2010 training, Credit Suisse employees 
complained that she failed to attend a mandatory boot camp, brought her mother to training events, 
and left early.  One Credit Suisse employee wrote that she received the worst grade in the class on 
an assessment, commenting that “from the looks of her assessment she didn’t even try (she filled in 
a pattern of 5As in a row, 5 Bs in a row, etc. on the answer key).”  Less than a month later, in or 
around early August 2010, Referral Hire A and another intern made “the same exact error which 
nobody makes” on a homework assignment, and it was “apparent that they shared an Excel file and 
cheated on the homework.”  On or about August 5, 2010, after a Credit Suisse employee reported 
that Referral Hire A “has been leaving at 4 pm right after every lecture every day this week while 
the rest of the class is working until at least 9pm, 10 pm” and that she “has yet to show up to 
training today,” Employee B commented, “[Referral Hire A] is the most famous intern ever.”  
Notwithstanding these performance issues during the probationary period, in or around early 
October 2010, Referral Hire A’s employment was fully approved, and both Employee A and 
another employee vouched for her performance.  
29. In April 2011, Credit Suisse obtained a mandate from SOE A for a convertible 
bond offering, generating approximately $1,248,111 in revenue for Credit Suisse upon the closing 
of the deal.  On or about April 12, 2011, a Credit Suisse HK senior investment banking manager 
(“Employee C”) forwarded to Employee A an email stating: “We’ve just closed books on the [SOE 
A] $150m CB.  Order book is above $900m.”  Employee A responded, “[Referral Hire A] is a 
star” who “also will help us to get [a] USD2bn [initial public offering (“IPO”)],” adding that they 
should “say we will promote her to associate 1 if she delivers.”  On or about April 18, 2011, 
shortly before Credit Suisse hosted a dinner in Paris for “[Foreign Official A] and her delegation” 
(including Referral Hire A), Employee A emailed a colleague that Referral Hire A was Foreign 
Official A’s daughter and that they “will promote her to associate soon as she will bring some 
sizeable IPO mandates to CS.” 
30. On or about June 17, 2011, a Credit Suisse managing director emailed Employee B 
that the managing director was “at a complete loss as to what to write for” Referral Hire A’s 

9 
evaluation, asking, “[h]as anything been written on her file previously that we could copy and 
paste?”  The two then proposed feedback for Referral Hire A:  “Pls come to the office more often 
— we would like to see more of your smiling face,” and, “Come to the office, answer your phone, 
don’t be rude...”  On or about June 22, 2011, a Credit Suisse employee emailed Employee B, 
attaching “manager summaries for everyone but [Referral Hire A],” along with the message, “I’m 
wondering if we can explain that she’s a special situation and there’s no need to give feedback.”  
Despite this, on or about June 30, 2011, Credit Suisse awarded Referral Hire A a bonus of 
approximately $58,000.  
31. During Referral Hire A’s employment with Credit Suisse, Referral Hire A’s mother 
accompanied her to Credit Suisse trainings in New York, traveled with her on Credit Suisse 
business trips, approved a list of client deals for her to work on, and requested that she be promoted 
by Credit Suisse.  For example, in or around May 2012, Employee A and a another Credit Suisse 
HK senior investment banking manager (“Employee D”) had a meeting with Foreign Official A, 
during which Foreign Official A approved a list of Credit Suisse clients with whom Referral Hire 
A could work, including SOE A. 
32. On July 5, 2012, Referral Hire A was promoted to the rank of Associate.  
Approximately one week later, Employee A reported to another banker that Foreign Official A 
stated that Foreign Official A would execute a “block [trade]” with Credit Suisse.  Employee A 
added a request to “[p]ls keep this confidential for now.” 
33. In addition, Credit Suisse employees took steps to attribute credit for certain deals 
to Referral Hire A, even where she did not contribute any work to those projects.  For instance, on 
or about July 25, 2012, Employee A drafted an email that Employee A directed Referral Hire A to 
send back to Employee A and other Credit Suisse managers to make it appear as though Referral 
Hire A had worked to win a mandate from SOE A for the privatization of another Chinese energy-
related SOE.  After the email was sent, Employee A forwarded it to various Credit Suisse 
employees, giving them the false impression that Referral Hire A had herself worked to secure the 
deal and drafted the email.  Later, Employee A emailed other Credit Suisse employees to alert 
them to another email from Referral Hire A regarding an SOE A block trade.  Employee A advised 
them to respond to Referral Hire A that, “[W]e know you made this deal possible for us.”  Shortly 
thereafter, on or about August 6, 2012, Credit Suisse received the mandate to act as joint 
bookrunner with the other international investment bank on the SOE A equity block trade and 
convertible bond offering promised by Foreign Official A in July.  This transaction generated 
approximately $2,680,733 in revenue for Credit Suisse. 
34. On or about August 16, 2012, Employee A emailed Employee C and Employee D 
with the message, “Btw — [Foreign Official A] mentioned about [Referral Hire A]’s promotion to 
VP again.”  On or about August 17, 2012, Employee A emailed Employee C and Employee D, 
directing them to “send an email to [Referral Hire A] on [SOE A] . . . [t]hank[ing] her and her 
mum for the deal.”  On or about August 27, 2012, Employee A inquired about when Referral Hire 
A could be promoted to “Associate 2,” and Employee B agreed, on or about September 1, 2012, to 
“move [her] class year.” 

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35. The circumstances of Referral Hire A’s employment eventually gave rise to 
questions from legal and compliance.  A Credit Suisse HK senior manager responded that it was 
her “oversight not to bring to the attention of the in-house legal counsel at the time of the 
transaction in 2012.”  In April, 2013, a member of Credit Suisse’s LCD e-mailed a series of 
questions relating to Referral Hire A’s employment, including “her background, level of 
experience and qualifications,” “[a]ny record of any external third party/ personal referee referring, 
recommending or endorsing her for the position,” “[w]ho in Credit Suisse interviewed her,” “[w]ho 
in Credit Suisse approved her hire,” and “[w]hat ... her annual performance ratings” were.  
Nevertheless, Referral Hire A remained at Credit Suisse until May 31, 2015.  During her tenure at 
Credit Suisse, Referral Hire A received multiple promotions, and Credit Suisse “fast tracked” her 
promotions by changing her class year.  In total, Credit Suisse paid Referral Hire A over $1 million 
in total compensation. 
Referral Hire from Government Ministry to Obtain Favorable Treatment  
36. In 2009, Credit Suisse offered employment to Referral Hire B, the daughter of an 
influential official with a powerful Chinese government ministry (“Official B”).  Credit Suisse 
employees decided to recommend hiring Referral Hire B after Employee D forwarded the 
individual’s resume to colleagues and recommended that Credit Suisse HK “take an exceptional 
decision to enroll [Referral Hire B] into our first year analyst program this year.”  In his 
recommendation Employee D emphasized that Official B was “very powerful” and “extremely 
influential in all the banking restructurings/IPOs.”  Employee D specified a mandate sought by 
Credit Suisse HK and stated that Official B would be “very influential” in awarding it.  Employee 
D made these recommendations prior to any interview or other vetting of Referral Hiring B.    
37. In November 2009, after receiving a short summary of the interview feedback for 
Referral Hire B, Employee A authorized a Credit Suisse recruiting specialist to offer Referral Hire 
B an 18-month contract for a full-time paid position eligible for bonuses and a relocation 
allowance.  Shortly thereafter, a Credit Suisse HK senior manager informed Official B about her 
daughter’s offer.  Referral Hire B began working at Credit Suisse in March 2010, without having 
received any screening or approval from LCD or any other compliance body. 
38. During Referral Hire B’s tenure at Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse staffed Referral Hire 
B on deals where it was believed her mother could be useful.  Credit Suisse HK senior managers 
and other Credit Suisse employees sought to use Referral Hire B’s connections to her mother to 
secure business for Credit Suisse, and provided Referral Hire B with promotions and high 
performance ratings in connection with these efforts. 
39. In April 2011, shortly before Credit Suisse secured a lucrative IPO mandate from a 
Chinese financial SOE (“SOE B”), a Credit Suisse HK senior manager e-mailed Referral Hire B to 
“[g]et your mum a full set of the docs which we gave to [the chairperson of the financial SOE] 
when she is back!”  In May 2011, a Credit Suisse HK senior manager sent an e-mail to Credit 
Suisse employees encouraging them to “make sure [Referral Hire B] gets involved in all the 
meetings” related to the potential deal with SOE B due to her relationships which “will be very 
important to position us on the overall progress.”  Subsequently, in May 2011, Credit Suisse 

11 
secured the mandate from SOE B, generating approximately $8,961,177 in revenue for Credit 
Suisse. 
40. Later in May 2011, a Credit Suisse HK senior manager sent an e-mail to various 
Credit Suisse employees, noting that “[Referral Hire B] was instrumental in helping us to secure 
[the mandate from SOE B]” and directing them to “invite [Referral Hire B] (e-mails) on all 
communications” as she was feeling “left out” and a Credit Suisse HK senior manager “[w]ant[ed] 
to keep [Referral Hire B] happy :).”  Less than a month later, Referral Hire B’s performance rating 
was upgraded from A to AA. 
41. In August 2011, a Credit Suisse HK senior manager e-mailed colleagues with a 
subject heading including the words, “Don’t forward-Confidential” writing that the SOE promised 
to “give CS the JGC [joint global coordinator] and JBR [joint bookrunner] role in the IPO, based 
on Referral Hire B’s family’s contribution” to the SOE B. 
42. Referral Hire B routinely requested and was granted special accommodations.  
When she requested to take a training course in New York, she was permitted to do so, even 
though Credit Suisse managers believed a comparable Hong Kong course would be more 
appropriate.  Referral Hire B performed poorly at the New York training, completing only 4 out of 
16 training modules, scoring a 64% on her exam, and receiving an “Average” grade, placing her in 
the bottom 14% of her class.  Despite this, Referral Hire B was given repeated job promotions by 
Credit Suisse. 
43. Notwithstanding Referral Hire B’s relationship to a foreign official, Credit Suisse 
employees did not disclose her background to LCD.  In May 2011, over a year after Referral Hire 
B began her employment, a senior Credit Suisse banker inquired with whom Referral Hire B was 
affiliated, as the banker “[d]idn’t see that in our RH [Referral Hire] file/list.”  Employee B replied 
that Referral Hire B’s mother was the “current #1 or 2” of the Chinese government ministry.  In 
response, the Credit Suisse banker asked if they could “share this with LCD,” to which Employee 
B responded, “I would prefer not to unless there is a clear conflict” and added that he doubted 
Referral Hire B was qualified for the position, noting that he had “doubts about her abilities 
beyond getting a meeting and completing a ppt slide for a pitchbook” and that “if you have met her 
you might not even believe that!”  He also acknowledged that it would be improper to ask Referral 
Hire B’s mother to take actions on the company’s behalf, noting, “[I]f we must [disclose Referral 
Hire B’s relationship to LCD], think it is fair to share this as long as we don’t ask her Mom to do 
or sign anything?”  Nevertheless, Referral Hire B remained employed at Credit Suisse until 2016. 
Referral Hire to Obtain Investment Banking Mandates for Credit Suisse 
44. In October 2007, after receiving a resume for Referral Hire C, Employee D emailed 
three colleagues:  “This is the candidate referred by [Official C, a high-ranking official at SOE C].”  
On or about November 27, 2007, Employee D emailed a senior Credit Suisse manager about 
Referral Hire C and another referral hire candidate, writing:  “We’re seriously approached by two 
important clients or business partners for jobs,” noting that one of the candidates was “referred by 
[Official C, a high-ranking official at SOE C].”  After proposing that they offer each candidate “a 3 
month intern opportunity,” Employee D added, “Btw, we’re expecting two mandates (one equity 

12 
and one m&a) from SOE C later this year and it’s an important account for us longer term.”  On or 
around December 17, 2007, Credit Suisse gave Referral Hire C a three-month employment 
contract. 
45. On or about March 4, 2008, multiple Credit Suisse senior managers had dinner with 
Official C, during which an upcoming IPO by SOE C was discussed.  After dinner, Official C 
spoke to at least one of the Credit Suisse senior managers about permanent employment at Credit 
Suisse for Referral Hire C.  The following day, that Credit Suisse senior manager notified a 
colleague that Official C would send an email about Referral Hire C to a Credit Suisse employee, 
and added:  “We’re pitching for the [SOE C] IPO, a multi billion dollar IPO. . . .”  In another 
email, Employee D requested support for Referral Hire C’s hire, noting “we’re pushed by [Official 
C],” and reiterating that Credit Suisse was pitching for the SOE C IPO.  Less than two weeks later, 
or about March 17, 2008, Credit Suisse provided Referral Hire C a full-time position in Hong 
Kong with a salary of approximately $90,000.  In May 2008, Credit Suisse received the mandate 
from a subsidiary of SOE C to act as bookrunner on its IPO, generating approximately 
$21,090,349 in revenue for Credit Suisse upon the closing of the deal in 2009.  Credit Suisse was 
also awarded a mandate to act as financial advisor on a SOE C-related merger and acquisition in 
May 2008, earning approximately $225,000. 
46. During Referral Hire C’s four-year employment at Credit Suisse, senior managers 
repeatedly emphasized to their colleagues the importance of including Referral Hire C in all 
matters related to SOE C, referring to ways Referral Hire C could be “leveraged” or included on 
transactions for which Referral Hire C lacked relevant banking experience and expertise. 
47. In or around November 2008, several senior managers decided to eliminate the 
positions of several highly-rated, regular analysts in order to keep client referral hires linked to 
banking mandates expected in the next year.  Employee D wrote that with respect to Referral Hire 
C and two other candidates, “we’ll see real relationship revenue coming in the next 12 months if 
we show good will to them at this critical moment.”  In or around March 2009, Credit Suisse was 
awarded a mandate by SOE C that brought in $1,179,906. 
48. On or about May 17, 2010, Employee D emailed three senior colleagues that 
“[Official C was] ready for [a SOE C affiliate] to do the block [trade] next month, aiming to raise 
[funds] via an asset injection. . . .  He will ask [the SOE C affiliate] to arrange a bidding process, 
similar to the [SOE C property development company] block we did before. However, given the 
parent will be in the deal, he won’t be too sensitive on the bid price.  Let’s get ourselves prepared 
and keep [i]t very confidential at this stage. . . .  Please make sure that [Referral Hire C] is invited 
to the working team.” 
49. Credit Suisse HK senior managers exaggerated Referral Hire C’s contributions to 
the firm.  On or about May 18, 2009, Employee D emailed Referral Hire C:  “We just did the block 
[trade] for [a subsidiary of SOE C].  You’ll be nominated in the deal team pls give [Official C] a 
call to congratulate him and thank him for the mandate.”  Referral Hire C later replied, “[A]s I 
know, almost all banks want to have this deal, including [three competitor banks of Credit 
Suisse]...But [a subsidiary of SOE C] decided to give CS si[n]ce [Official C] made lots of efforts 
on this.” 

13 
50. The next day, on or about May 19, 2009, Credit Suisse acted as a bookrunner on a 
secondary offering for the subsidiary company associated with SOE C valued at over 500 million 
dollars, earning fees of approximately $6,787,128.  On or about June 30, 2009, Referral Hire C 
received a bonus of approximately $40,000. 
51. On or about June 15, 2010, a Credit Suisse banker emailed various senior banking 
employees to provide an update on the pending and future deals.  The banker wrote that a senior 
official of [SOE C] “recently obtained greenlight from [Official C] regarding asset injection.”  
Employee D then directed an employee to “leverage [Referral Hire C] on all [SOE C] deal flows.” 
52. On or about July 27, 2010, Credit Suisse learned that a SOE C affiliate had awarded 
mandates related to a bond deal worth several hundred million dollars to two Credit Suisse 
competitors.  On or about July 28, 2010, Employee D referenced the deal and wrote:  “It was 
[Referral Hire C] who made the last minute breakthrough and got us a role around 6pm last night.”  
This deal earned Credit Suisse $222,899.  Referral Hire C’s bonus for 2010 was over $320,000. 
53. Or about May 16, 2011, Employee A emailed others that two managing directors 
wanted to cover SOE C more proactively.  Employee A noted steps a select group of Credit Suisse 
managers had acted to increase Referral Hire C’s compensation (without informing their 
colleagues), writing “we matched [Referral Hire C]’s bump-up and guarantee.  [Referral Hire C’s] 
major contribution to the firm will be on this account.  How can we push [Referral Hire C] harder 
to pursue this account?”  Employee C then replied privately to Employee A that the other senior 
managers “don’t know about what we did with [Referral Hire C].  Only [Employee D], you and me 
plus H.R.”  During Referral Hire C’s employment with Credit Suisse, Referral Hire C was paid 
approximately $1.5 million in total compensation.  During that same period, Credit Suisse was 
mandated on five SOE C deals, earning over $29 million dollars. 
Hiring and Advancement of Referral Hire to Secure Client Relationship with SOE 
54. During or around June 2010, Credit Suisse hired Referral Hire D as a referral hire 
from a large energy-related SOE (“SOE D”) in order to obtain business from SOE D.  Referral 
Hire D’s employment was arranged by Credit Suisse during the summer of 2010, with Employee 
C, and Referral Hire D was to start as an Associate with a promotion to Vice President that same 
year. 
55. Referral Hire D started work at Credit Suisse on or about November 8, 2010.  Three 
days later, Credit Suisse was awarded a mandate to act “as a joint bookrunner in [a SOE D 
affiliate]’s IPO” on or about November 11, 2010.  Several weeks later, Credit Suisse booked 
approximately $986,439 in revenue as the deal closed. 
56. In a November 16, 2010 email related to the SOE D deal, Employee A relayed 
that when Employee A had asked a high-ranking executive of SOE D to “push for our 
incentive,” the high-ranking executive “reminded [Employee A] that we need to pay [SOE 
D’s] relationship hire — [Referral Hire D], the Associate well at the year end bonus.”  One 
day earlier, Employee A had told Employee B that Referral Hire D was not up for a 
promotion to Vice President.  After the discussion with the high-ranking executive at SOE D, 
Employee A advocated for Referral Hire D’s promotion, which became official less than two 

 
 
 
14 
 
 
months after Referral Hire D began working at Credit Suisse.  Referral Hire D was promoted 
and consequently became eligible for a bonus.  In an earlier email exchange between 
Employee B and Credit Suisse employees in London and New York concerning the 
promotion for Referral Hire D, a London employee noted that the promotion request was 
“abnormal.” 
57. In a Credit Suisse internal spreadsheet that listed specific deals attributable to 
relationship hires, “[SOE D]” was listed as Referral Hire D’s “[c]ontribution” to the 
company.  Referral Hire D was terminated approximately one year after starting at Credit 
Suisse. 
LEGAL STANDARDS AND VIOLATIONS 
 
58. As a result of the conduct described above, Credit Suisse violated Section 30A 
of the Exchange Act which prohibits any issuer with a class of securities registered pursuant 
to Section 12 of the Exchange Act, or any officer, director, employee, or agent acting on 
behalf of such issuer, in order to obtain or retain business, from corruptly giving or 
authorizing the giving of, anything of value to any foreign official for the purposes of 
influencing the official or inducing the official to act in violation of his or her lawful duties, 
or to secure any improper advantage, or to induce a foreign official to use his influence with a 
foreign governmental instrumentality to influence any act or decision of such government or 
instrumentality.  
59. As a result of the conduct described above Credit Suisse violated Section 
13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, which requires issuers that have a class of securities 
registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act and issuers with reporting 
obligations pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act to devise and maintain a system 
of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i) 
transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific 
authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of 
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any 
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets; 
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific 
authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing 
assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences. 
Commission Consideration of Credit Suisse’s Remedial Efforts 
 
60. The Commission has considered the remedial efforts undertaken by Credit 
Suisse to enhance its internal accounting controls as well as its global implementation in 2015 
of procedures intended to ensure that all job candidates are assessed based purely on merit, 
qualifications and expected job performance. 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
15 
 
 
Non-Prosecution Agreement 
 
61. Credit Suisse HK has entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the 
Department of Justice that acknowledges responsibility for criminal conduct relating to 
certain findings in the Order. 
Non-Imposition of a Civil Penalty 
 
62. Respondent acknowledges that the Commission is not imposing a civil 
penalty based upon the imposition of a $47 million criminal fine as part of Credit Suisse’s 
settlement with the United States Department of Justice. 
IV. 
 
In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the 
sanctions agreed to in Respondent’s Offer. 
 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 
 
A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondent cease and desist 
from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 
13(b)(2)(B) and 30A of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B), and 
78dd-1]. 
 
B. Respondent shall, within 10 days of the entry of this Order, pay 
disgorgement of $24,989,843 and prejudgment interest of $4,833,961, for a total 
payment of $29,823,804 to the Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the 
general fund of the United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3).  
If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to SEC Rule of 
Practice 600.  Payment must be made in one of the following ways: 
 
(1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, 
which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon 
request; 
(2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov 
through the SEC Web site at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; 
or 
(3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United 
States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to: 
 
Enterprise Services Center
 
Accounts Receivable Branch 
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341 
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard 
Oklahoma City, OK 73169 
 

 
 
 
 
Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying 
Credit Suisse as the Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these 
proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Paul G. Block, 
Assistant Regional Director, FCPA Unit, Enforcement Division, Boston Regional Office, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 Arch Street, Suite 2300, Boston, Massachusetts 02110. 
 
By the Commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brent J. Fields
 
Secretary 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Before the 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

 

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 

Release No. 83593 / July 5, 2018 

 

ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT 

Release No. 3948 / July 5, 2018 

 

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING 

File No. 3-18571 

 

 

In the Matter of 

 

CREDIT SUISSE  

GROUP AG, 

 

Respondent. 

 

 

ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND-

DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 21C OF THE SECURITIES 

EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING 

FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING A CEASE-

AND-DESIST ORDER 

  

I. 
 

 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that cease-

and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), against Credit Suisse Group AG (“Credit Suisse” or 

“Respondent”). 

 

II. 
 

 In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Credit Suisse has submitted an Offer 

of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept.  Solely for the 

purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the 

Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, Respondent admits the Commission’s 

jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, and consents to the entry of this 

Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set 

forth below.  

 

 

 



2 

III. 
 

 On the basis of this Order and Credit Suisse’s Offer, the Commission finds
1
 that:  

 
SUMMARY 

 

1. This matter concerns violations of the anti-bribery and internal accounting controls 

provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by Credit Suisse.  Between at least 2007 

and 2013, Credit Suisse provided valuable employment to the relatives and friends of certain 

foreign government officials in the Asia-Pacific region (“APAC”) as a personal benefit to the 

requesting officials in order to obtain or retain investment banking business or other benefits for 

the bank.  Because many of Credit Suisse’s clients were state-owned entities (“SOEs”), and 

because the individuals personally requesting employment or internships for their relatives and 

friends were either executives of these SOEs or were foreign government ministers with influence 

over the business decisions of SOEs, the requesting individuals were foreign government officials 

under the FCPA.  Credit Suisse provided these jobs to certain of the referred candidates (“Referral 

Hires”) with the intent to corruptly influence the foreign government officials making the requests 

to secure banking business from the SOEs.  Credit Suisse’s referral hiring practice resulted in 

multiple deals and substantial profits for Credit Suisse. 

 

2. While Credit Suisse had written policies beginning in at least 2007 that prohibited 

the hiring of candidates referred by or related to officials from SOEs or government ministries in 

order to obtain or retain business, those policies were not meaningfully enforced.  At least one 

senior Credit Suisse manager in APAC believed that restrictions on referral hiring -- including a 

proposed requirement that all Referral Hires be vetted through the established, merit-based campus 

recruiting program -- would “kill” their business.  Steps were taken to make certain Referral Hires 

from SOEs appear to be normal, merit-based hires at Credit Suisse.  The candidates would undergo 

interviews and submit their applications through Credit Suisse’s human resources department 

(“Human Resources”).  However, in some instances, certain senior bankers made decisions to 

recommend hiring referrals in advance of this process and based on the prospect of business from 

the referring SOE rather than the merit of the prospective employee.  Since the company’s 

prohibition on improper SOE Referral Hires was not implemented in practice, many client referrals 

were hired by Credit Suisse without the requirement of any review by the bank’s Legal and 

Compliance Department (“LCD” or “legal and compliance”) to ensure compliance with the bank’s 

policies.   

 

3. During the six-year period referenced above, Credit Suisse offered employment to 

more than 100 individuals referred by or who had some connection to APAC foreign government 

officials.  This included more than 60 employees and interns referred by foreign government 

officials at more than 20 different Chinese SOEs.  Credit Suisse HK and its affiliates obtained 

deals from referring officials’ SOEs totaling tens of millions of dollars in revenue during this 

period.  Credit Suisse also hired referrals from numerous government agencies.  In exchange these 

                                                 
1
 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent’s Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any other 

person or entity in this or any other proceeding.  

 



3 

government officials assisted Credit Suisse in navigating complex regulatory landscapes in order to 

obtain or retain business.  Senior Credit Suisse managers in APAC tracked the success of some of 

the bank’s Referral Hires in generating business through the use of spreadsheets that linked 

particular referral hires to specific business deals for the firm.  Certain senior personnel with Credit 

Suisse HK and in the U.S. were aware that referral hiring was taking place in the APAC region.   

 

4. Credit Suisse’s internal accounting controls were insufficiently devised or 

maintained to reasonably enforce or effectuate the policies against Referral Hires or bribery of 

foreign officials and were therefore inadequate to address the corruption risks the company had 

identified in connection with referral hiring.  The written restrictions put in place by Credit Suisse 

to minimize compliance and FCPA risks were not sufficient to curb Credit Suisse’s corrupt referral 

hiring practices.   

 

Respondent 
 

5. Credit Suisse Group AG is a corporation incorporated and domiciled in 

Switzerland.  It is a multinational financial services holding company that provides a broad range 

of services, including investment banking.  Credit Suisse’s American Depository Shares are 

registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and traded on the New York Stock 

Exchange.  Credit Suisse files periodic reports, including Forms 20-F, with the Commission.  

 

Other Relevant Entity 
 

6. Credit Suisse (Hong Kong) Limited (“Credit Suisse HK”) is a Hong Kong 

incorporated company and wholly owned subsidiary of Credit Suisse.  Credit Suisse offers 

securities products and financial advisory services in the APAC region.  Credit Suisse’s global 

investment banking business is headquartered in the United States and was conducted in the APAC 

region primarily by and through Credit Suisse HK and its employees.  Credit Suisse HK is an 

“agent” of the issuer within the meaning of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  

 

FACTS  

Credit Suisse’s Written Policies Prohibited the Hiring of Government Referrals in Exchange 

for Business 

7. As early as 2007, Credit Suisse recognized the FCPA risks in hiring the relatives of 

foreign government officials.  Credit Suisse’s Global Anti-Bribery Policy (the “Global Policy”) 

specified that “[o]ffers of employment, including internships, to Government Officials, their family 

members, or associates,” could be considered to be “things of value” under the FCPA, and were 

prohibited if offered “to obtain or retain business, or otherwise secure an improper advantage.”  

The Global Policy was also reflected in regional policies applicable in APAC that recognized the 

bribery risks inherent in referral hiring and specified additional restrictions on the practice. 

8. In 2011, the Global Policy was updated to specify that ad hoc training activities and 

internships for relatives of government officials that were clients both fell within the scope of 

prohibited employment practices.  The updated Global Policy stated that such referrals could only 



4 

qualify for positions in existing campus or lateral hiring programs with open application processes 

and that no special treatment could be provided for those referrals in the recruiting process.    

Senior Credit Suisse Managers in APAC Knew About Prohibitions Regarding Government 

Hires  

9. Credit Suisse HK senior managers were aware that hiring referrals from SOEs and 

government ministries to obtain or retain business was restricted under Credit Suisse’s written 

compliance policies and could violate the FCPA.  For example, in an April 2009 e-mail, a Credit 

Suisse Banker wrote that “[g]iven the importance of these two referrals, I’m thinking whether we 

should add them to the regular intern program.  Can we make two more spaces?”  A Credit Suisse 

employee responded that “[g]iven the LCD resistance on the hiring of gov’t related interns, we 

should clarify how the individuals are related to these entities.  We can then decide the best course 

of action.”   

10. Additionally, in a May 2009 e-mail LCD informed APAC senior managers that 

Credit Suisse was unable to provide summer internships to two SOE client referrals because:  

“[a]fter consultation with the Bank’s Anti Corruption Team in New York, LCD in [sic] have 

deemed both requests to be potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and as such 

are too risky a venture for the Bank to pursue.”  The LCD representative went on to describe why 

the two proposed hires could violate the FCPA, and concluded: “I am sorry for this news, however 

given the increased attention the regulators are now dedicating to this area and the fact that all of 

our key competitors have either disbanded their similar programmes, or are in the final stages of 

doing so, [LCD] in deeming the provision of these types of work experience or internships to 

FCPA subject parties to be too great a risk to enter into are simply adhering to what is now the 

industry practice.”   

11. Also, in April 2010 LCD officials informed a Human Resources officer of a 

problem with hiring a client referral from an Indonesian SOE, noting “[a]s such, there is a blanket 

ban on offering these internships to anyone with direct government or SOE relations.” 

Credit Suisse HK Personnel Developed a Referral Hiring Practice to Hire SOE Referrals 

Without Proper Scrutiny 

12. From at least 2007 through 2013, multiple senior Credit Suisse managers in APAC 

engaged in a practice of hiring, promoting and retaining government-connected Referral Hires as 

part of a quid pro quo by which Credit Suisse managers sought to improperly influence foreign 

officials to assist Credit Suisse in winning lucrative investment banking mandates.   

13. Rather than enforce Credit Suisse’s anti-corruption policies, senior Credit Suisse 

managers repeatedly took steps to onboard Referral Hires from SOEs and government ministries 

independently from the scrutiny of the company’s established, merit-based campus recruiting 

program.  A 2009 e-mail from a Credit Suisse HK Human Resources executive to two Credit 

Suisse HK senior managers on “Client interns” stated:  “One of LCD’s recommendations will be to 

hire the client interns through the formal Summer Programme for Analyst & Associates (managed 

by campus recruiting).  We think this is not a great idea... we think it would be better if we could 



5 

hire these interns independently (as in the past) for this summer.  We can agree with LCD a new 

way to approach this for next year.”  This practice persisted for the ensuing years.   

14. APAC Credit Suisse senior managers at times agreed in principle to hire a referred 

candidate before conducting interviews or vetting of any kind, based on business advantages the 

government official who referred the candidate could provide.  Senior Credit Suisse managers in 

APAC engaged in sham practices intended to give the appearance of a regular hiring process being 

followed.  Senior Credit Suisse managers in APAC instructed subordinates to conduct interviews 

of referral candidates and automatically score the candidate highly, regardless of his/her actual 

performance.   

15. In seeking approval to hire or promote a referred candidate, rather than highlighting 

the skills or experience of the candidate, Senior Credit Suisse managers in APAC referenced 

particular business or mandates that had been or could be gained as a result of the Referral Hire.  

For example: 

 One SOE executive emailed a senior Credit Suisse banker to refer a candidate who 

had a “very good and close relationship” with senior management at the SOE, and 

wrote that hiring the Referral Hire would “bring [Credit Suisse] the big surprise in 

the near future if you could coordinate with CS Asian team to arrange a position in 

CS team in Beijing.”   

 The senior Credit Suisse banker later told a colleague about an impending deal that 

the SOE was pursuing and explained that the referring SOE official “was focused 

on having us make a relationship hire and said it was very important for us to win 

future business with [the SOE].”   

 Another banker wrote of another government-connected Referral Hire:  “Need a 

favor from you.  [The Referral Hire] will get us a US$1bn bond deal from [a 

prospective client].  His family requested to change his status to permanent with 

CS.  Given of [sic] the level of importance of this deal, we will decide to renew his 

contact [sic] for another 24 months instead of permanent.”   

16. Many candidates were offered full-time salaried positions and paid internships that 

were eligible for bonuses, housing allotments, and other benefits, and some were hired without any 

approval or vetting from the LCD or any other compliance body.   

Credit Suisse HK Control Failures 

17. Credit Suisse’s compliance policies governing the bank’s referral hiring practices 

highlighted the corruption risks associated with referral hiring, and dictated that Credit Suisse HK 

could employ government-connected Referral Hires under only very limited circumstances.  From 

at least 2007, the Global Policy prohibited offering a job or internship to any foreign official or 

relative of a foreign official to obtain or retain business or otherwise for improper purposes.   

18. In light of the corruption risks identified in its own compliance policies, Credit 

Suisse placed written requirements around the onboarding of Referral Hires.  Despite these written 



6 

requirements, senior Credit Suisse managers in APAC repeatedly made Referral Hires in order to 

obtain banking business and other advantages from senior officials at SOEs and government 

agencies.   

19. Certain Credit Suisse managers in the U.S. were aware of Credit Suisse HK’s hiring 

of client referrals, some of whom treated the job as a mere “boondoggle.”  For certain Referral 

Hires, Credit Suisse senior managers in the U.S. approved the hire and took him or her on in the 

United States.  This led to complaints from Credit Suisse U.S. bankers due to the frequency of the 

requests and the poor quality of the Referral Hires.  For example, one senior U.S. Credit Suisse 

banker wrote:  “. . . to be honest, we have had really bad experiences with many of the individuals 

from Asia . . . [a particular Credit Suisse HK senior manager] generates most of them and there is 

enough frustration in the system over this at this point that I wanted to check in with you for a 

sanity check on whether we should always break the mold for his requests or not . . . .” 

20. In making Referral Hires, Credit Suisse repeatedly deviated from its established, 

merit-based hiring requirements which assessed job candidates based purely on qualifications and 

expected job performance.  Credit Suisse failed to take adequate steps to mitigate known risks of 

bribery and corruption in its APAC operations.  Credit Suisse HK failed to meaningfully 

implement or enforce Credit Suisse’s policies until 2013. 

Credit Suisse Hired SOE Referral Hires To Assist in Winning or Retaining Business 

21. Between 2007 and 2013, Credit Suisse hired multiple relatives and friends of 

officials with foreign government entities and senior officials at foreign SOEs to obtain or retain 

business for Credit Suisse.    

22. Credit Suisse maintained spreadsheets that listed “referral hires” or “relationship 

hires.”  These spreadsheets included information identifying the referring client or relationship 

when the relationship was with a government regulator.  Some of these spreadsheets identified the 

“[c]ontribution” of the referral hire, including in at least three instances, deals specifically 

attributable to the relevant relationship.  In an email to colleagues, a Credit Suisse employee 

explained:  “Relationship hires have to translate to $” or “the relationship is worthless to our 

organization.”  This email was forwarded to a senior Credit Suisse banking official in the U.S.  In a 

different email, a senior Credit Suisse banker stated that a referral hire “will get us a US$1bn bond 

deal. . . .  His family requested to change his status to permanent with CS.  Given [] the level of 

importance of this deal, we will decide to renew his contract for another 24 months instead of 

permanent.” 

23. Credit Suisse’s Referral Hires often lacked technical skills, were less qualified, and 

had significantly less banking and other relevant experience than candidates hired through Credit 

Suisse’s other employment channels.  Credit Suisse Referral Hires included the following: 

 In 2008, Credit Suisse HK hired the nephew of a senior Chinese government 

official, despite the fact that the nephew lacked investment banking qualifications 

and a Credit Suisse HK manager acknowledged that “most likely he will not be 

good.”  The hire was made at the request of a government official with a Chinese 

SOE from which Credit Suisse was seeking to win business.  The same Credit 



7 

Suisse HK manager reasoned that “[t]here is a relationship hire in every industry” 

and stated that this particular individual should be hired in order to “open doors on 

SOE fronts which we are in lack of and our marketing effort has been handicapped, 

including [the referrer’s SOE].”  After repeated efforts to “leverage” the Referral 

Hire to obtain business from various Chinese SOEs, Credit Suisse HK successfully 

won a mandate generating approximately $475,170 in revenue for the bank.  

 

 From 2010 to 2011, Credit Suisse HK employed the relative of a government 

official with a Chinese state-owned oil company.  A Credit Suisse HK employee 

explained:  “the girl is [the] relative of someone staying at core decision making 

circle of [the SOE] . . . . this girl is particularly important for . . . us to be blessed by 

the [SOE].”  After the hire the SOE awarded Credit Suisse HK multiple mandates 

that yielded over $12 million in net profits for the bank.   

 

 Beginning in 2010, Credit Suisse HK employed an individual closely connected to 

a key government minister.  The Referral Hire worked at Credit Suisse HK in 

various roles from June 2010 until December 2012.  Credit Suisse HK was awarded 

lucrative roles in a securities offering for two Chinese SOEs as a consequence of 

this hire, and received net profits for its work of more than $4 million.  

 

 In 2011, the company hired the son of a senior commerce minister in China.  A 

Credit Suisse HK senior manager strongly advocated hiring the son, stating that the 

company’s relationship with the government ministry was “very important” 

because all  “red chip” deals [involving companies based in mainland China but 

incorporated elsewhere and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange] “need to get 

approved there.”  The bank proceeded to employ the son for over a year, and during 

his employment one of the senior managers used her “chit” with the minister to 

assist the bank in securing the necessary approval from the ministry for a deal on 

which Credit Suisse eventually received net profits of approximately $6 million.  

 

24. The following are specific instances of Credit Suisse Referral Hires resulting in 

lucrative investment banking mandates for the firm. 

Referral Hire from Energy-Related SOE to Obtain Investment Banking Mandates 

25. In or around March 2010, Credit Suisse pitched for a mandate involving a Chinese 

energy-related company (“Company A”).  Referral Hire A was the daughter of a high-ranking 

official (“Official A”) at a Chinese energy-related SOE (“SOE A”) that was the controlling 

shareholder of Company A.  

26. On or around March 9, 2010, a Credit Suisse Vice President sent an email to a 

Credit Suisse HK senior investment banking manager in Hong Kong (“Employee A”), attaching 

Referral Hire A’s resume and asking whether Employee A could “check with [Foreign Official A] 

as to whether we can move things to the next step at the same time?”  After stating “not too many 

interviews,” and explaining that Referral Hire A was “a princess [who was] not used to too many 

rounds of interview,” Employee A proposed “giv[ing] her the offer letter asap,” at which point 



8 

Employee A would “push her mum [Official A].”  In order to make Referral Hire A’s application 

appear more presentable, Credit Suisse HK bankers drafted a resume for her requiring them to be a 

bit “creative” in filling in the details. 

27. Four days after receiving the request to hire Referral Hire A, on or about March 13, 

2010, Employee A emailed the Credit Suisse Vice President, using a shorthand term that referred to 

Company A in the subject line, writing, “I am seeing [Official A] to push. [Official A] will get us in 

the deal.”  Two days later, Employee A sent another email, again using a shorthand reference to 

Company A in the subject line, writing, “I am meeting [Official A] . . . tomorrow.  Where is 

[Referral Hire A’s] contract?” A Credit Suisse employee responded that the offer letter was being 

prepared, and a Credit Suisse HK Human Resources manager (“Employee B”) subsequently 

confirmed Referral Hire A would receive a first year analyst salary and a housing allowance, 

respectively approximately $70,000 and $30,000 annually.  In or around April 2010, Credit Suisse 

booked the mandate for Company A, realizing a $950,000 fee. 

28. On or about July 1, 2010, Referral Hire A began working at Credit Suisse, without 

being vetted or approved by LCD.  During her probationary period, Referral Hire A exhibited 

unprofessional behavior.  In connection with a July 2010 training, Credit Suisse employees 

complained that she failed to attend a mandatory boot camp, brought her mother to training events, 

and left early.  One Credit Suisse employee wrote that she received the worst grade in the class on 

an assessment, commenting that “from the looks of her assessment she didn’t even try (she filled in 

a pattern of 5As in a row, 5 Bs in a row, etc. on the answer key).”  Less than a month later, in or 

around early August 2010, Referral Hire A and another intern made “the same exact error which 

nobody makes” on a homework assignment, and it was “apparent that they shared an Excel file and 

cheated on the homework.”  On or about August 5, 2010, after a Credit Suisse employee reported 

that Referral Hire A “has been leaving at 4 pm right after every lecture every day this week while 

the rest of the class is working until at least 9pm, 10 pm” and that she “has yet to show up to 

training today,” Employee B commented, “[Referral Hire A] is the most famous intern ever.”  

Notwithstanding these performance issues during the probationary period, in or around early 

October 2010, Referral Hire A’s employment was fully approved, and both Employee A and 

another employee vouched for her performance.  

29. In April 2011, Credit Suisse obtained a mandate from SOE A for a convertible 

bond offering, generating approximately $1,248,111 in revenue for Credit Suisse upon the closing 

of the deal.  On or about April 12, 2011, a Credit Suisse HK senior investment banking manager 

(“Employee C”) forwarded to Employee A an email stating: “We’ve just closed books on the [SOE 

A] $150m CB.  Order book is above $900m.”  Employee A responded, “[Referral Hire A] is a 

star” who “also will help us to get [a] USD2bn [initial public offering (“IPO”)],” adding that they 

should “say we will promote her to associate 1 if she delivers.”  On or about April 18, 2011, 

shortly before Credit Suisse hosted a dinner in Paris for “[Foreign Official A] and her delegation” 

(including Referral Hire A), Employee A emailed a colleague that Referral Hire A was Foreign 

Official A’s daughter and that they “will promote her to associate soon as she will bring some 

sizeable IPO mandates to CS.” 

30. On or about June 17, 2011, a Credit Suisse managing director emailed Employee B 

that the managing director was “at a complete loss as to what to write for” Referral Hire A’s 



9 

evaluation, asking, “[h]as anything been written on her file previously that we could copy and 

paste?”  The two then proposed feedback for Referral Hire A:  “Pls come to the office more often 

— we would like to see more of your smiling face,” and, “Come to the office, answer your phone, 

don’t be rude...”  On or about June 22, 2011, a Credit Suisse employee emailed Employee B, 

attaching “manager summaries for everyone but [Referral Hire A],” along with the message, “I’m 

wondering if we can explain that she’s a special situation and there’s no need to give feedback.”  

Despite this, on or about June 30, 2011, Credit Suisse awarded Referral Hire A a bonus of 

approximately $58,000.  

31. During Referral Hire A’s employment with Credit Suisse, Referral Hire A’s mother 

accompanied her to Credit Suisse trainings in New York, traveled with her on Credit Suisse 

business trips, approved a list of client deals for her to work on, and requested that she be promoted 

by Credit Suisse.  For example, in or around May 2012, Employee A and a another Credit Suisse 

HK senior investment banking manager (“Employee D”) had a meeting with Foreign Official A, 

during which Foreign Official A approved a list of Credit Suisse clients with whom Referral Hire 

A could work, including SOE A. 

32. On July 5, 2012, Referral Hire A was promoted to the rank of Associate.  

Approximately one week later, Employee A reported to another banker that Foreign Official A 

stated that Foreign Official A would execute a “block [trade]” with Credit Suisse.  Employee A 

added a request to “[p]ls keep this confidential for now.” 

33. In addition, Credit Suisse employees took steps to attribute credit for certain deals 

to Referral Hire A, even where she did not contribute any work to those projects.  For instance, on 

or about July 25, 2012, Employee A drafted an email that Employee A directed Referral Hire A to 

send back to Employee A and other Credit Suisse managers to make it appear as though Referral 

Hire A had worked to win a mandate from SOE A for the privatization of another Chinese energy-

related SOE.  After the email was sent, Employee A forwarded it to various Credit Suisse 

employees, giving them the false impression that Referral Hire A had herself worked to secure the 

deal and drafted the email.  Later, Employee A emailed other Credit Suisse employees to alert 

them to another email from Referral Hire A regarding an SOE A block trade.  Employee A advised 

them to respond to Referral Hire A that, “[W]e know you made this deal possible for us.”  Shortly 

thereafter, on or about August 6, 2012, Credit Suisse received the mandate to act as joint 

bookrunner with the other international investment bank on the SOE A equity block trade and 

convertible bond offering promised by Foreign Official A in July.  This transaction generated 

approximately $2,680,733 in revenue for Credit Suisse. 

34. On or about August 16, 2012, Employee A emailed Employee C and Employee D 

with the message, “Btw — [Foreign Official A] mentioned about [Referral Hire A]’s promotion to 

VP again.”  On or about August 17, 2012, Employee A emailed Employee C and Employee D, 

directing them to “send an email to [Referral Hire A] on [SOE A] . . . [t]hank[ing] her and her 

mum for the deal.”  On or about August 27, 2012, Employee A inquired about when Referral Hire 

A could be promoted to “Associate 2,” and Employee B agreed, on or about September 1, 2012, to 

“move [her] class year.” 



10 

35. The circumstances of Referral Hire A’s employment eventually gave rise to 

questions from legal and compliance.  A Credit Suisse HK senior manager responded that it was 

her “oversight not to bring to the attention of the in-house legal counsel at the time of the 

transaction in 2012.”  In April, 2013, a member of Credit Suisse’s LCD e-mailed a series of 

questions relating to Referral Hire A’s employment, including “her background, level of 

experience and qualifications,” “[a]ny record of any external third party/ personal referee referring, 

recommending or endorsing her for the position,” “[w]ho in Credit Suisse interviewed her,” “[w]ho 

in Credit Suisse approved her hire,” and “[w]hat ... her annual performance ratings” were.  

Nevertheless, Referral Hire A remained at Credit Suisse until May 31, 2015.  During her tenure at 

Credit Suisse, Referral Hire A received multiple promotions, and Credit Suisse “fast tracked” her 

promotions by changing her class year.  In total, Credit Suisse paid Referral Hire A over $1 million 

in total compensation. 

Referral Hire from Government Ministry to Obtain Favorable Treatment  

36. In 2009, Credit Suisse offered employment to Referral Hire B, the daughter of an 

influential official with a powerful Chinese government ministry (“Official B”).  Credit Suisse 

employees decided to recommend hiring Referral Hire B after Employee D forwarded the 

individual’s resume to colleagues and recommended that Credit Suisse HK “take an exceptional 

decision to enroll [Referral Hire B] into our first year analyst program this year.”  In his 

recommendation Employee D emphasized that Official B was “very powerful” and “extremely 

influential in all the banking restructurings/IPOs.”  Employee D specified a mandate sought by 

Credit Suisse HK and stated that Official B would be “very influential” in awarding it.  Employee 

D made these recommendations prior to any interview or other vetting of Referral Hiring B.    

37. In November 2009, after receiving a short summary of the interview feedback for 

Referral Hire B, Employee A authorized a Credit Suisse recruiting specialist to offer Referral Hire 

B an 18-month contract for a full-time paid position eligible for bonuses and a relocation 

allowance.  Shortly thereafter, a Credit Suisse HK senior manager informed Official B about her 

daughter’s offer.  Referral Hire B began working at Credit Suisse in March 2010, without having 

received any screening or approval from LCD or any other compliance body. 

38. During Referral Hire B’s tenure at Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse staffed Referral Hire 

B on deals where it was believed her mother could be useful.  Credit Suisse HK senior managers 

and other Credit Suisse employees sought to use Referral Hire B’s connections to her mother to 

secure business for Credit Suisse, and provided Referral Hire B with promotions and high 

performance ratings in connection with these efforts. 

39. In April 2011, shortly before Credit Suisse secured a lucrative IPO mandate from a 

Chinese financial SOE (“SOE B”), a Credit Suisse HK senior manager e-mailed Referral Hire B to 

“[g]et your mum a full set of the docs which we gave to [the chairperson of the financial SOE] 

when she is back!”  In May 2011, a Credit Suisse HK senior manager sent an e-mail to Credit 

Suisse employees encouraging them to “make sure [Referral Hire B] gets involved in all the 

meetings” related to the potential deal with SOE B due to her relationships which “will be very 

important to position us on the overall progress.”  Subsequently, in May 2011, Credit Suisse 



11 

secured the mandate from SOE B, generating approximately $8,961,177 in revenue for Credit 

Suisse. 

40. Later in May 2011, a Credit Suisse HK senior manager sent an e-mail to various 

Credit Suisse employees, noting that “[Referral Hire B] was instrumental in helping us to secure 

[the mandate from SOE B]” and directing them to “invite [Referral Hire B] (e-mails) on all 

communications” as she was feeling “left out” and a Credit Suisse HK senior manager “[w]ant[ed] 

to keep [Referral Hire B] happy :).”  Less than a month later, Referral Hire B’s performance rating 

was upgraded from A to AA. 

41. In August 2011, a Credit Suisse HK senior manager e-mailed colleagues with a 

subject heading including the words, “Don’t forward-Confidential” writing that the SOE promised 

to “give CS the JGC [joint global coordinator] and JBR [joint bookrunner] role in the IPO, based 

on Referral Hire B’s family’s contribution” to the SOE B. 

42. Referral Hire B routinely requested and was granted special accommodations.  

When she requested to take a training course in New York, she was permitted to do so, even 

though Credit Suisse managers believed a comparable Hong Kong course would be more 

appropriate.  Referral Hire B performed poorly at the New York training, completing only 4 out of 

16 training modules, scoring a 64% on her exam, and receiving an “Average” grade, placing her in 

the bottom 14% of her class.  Despite this, Referral Hire B was given repeated job promotions by 

Credit Suisse. 

43. Notwithstanding Referral Hire B’s relationship to a foreign official, Credit Suisse 

employees did not disclose her background to LCD.  In May 2011, over a year after Referral Hire 

B began her employment, a senior Credit Suisse banker inquired with whom Referral Hire B was 

affiliated, as the banker “[d]idn’t see that in our RH [Referral Hire] file/list.”  Employee B replied 

that Referral Hire B’s mother was the “current #1 or 2” of the Chinese government ministry.  In 

response, the Credit Suisse banker asked if they could “share this with LCD,” to which Employee 

B responded, “I would prefer not to unless there is a clear conflict” and added that he doubted 

Referral Hire B was qualified for the position, noting that he had “doubts about her abilities 

beyond getting a meeting and completing a ppt slide for a pitchbook” and that “if you have met her 

you might not even believe that!”  He also acknowledged that it would be improper to ask Referral 

Hire B’s mother to take actions on the company’s behalf, noting, “[I]f we must [disclose Referral 

Hire B’s relationship to LCD], think it is fair to share this as long as we don’t ask her Mom to do 

or sign anything?”  Nevertheless, Referral Hire B remained employed at Credit Suisse until 2016. 

Referral Hire to Obtain Investment Banking Mandates for Credit Suisse 

44. In October 2007, after receiving a resume for Referral Hire C, Employee D emailed 

three colleagues:  “This is the candidate referred by [Official C, a high-ranking official at SOE C].”  

On or about November 27, 2007, Employee D emailed a senior Credit Suisse manager about 

Referral Hire C and another referral hire candidate, writing:  “We’re seriously approached by two 

important clients or business partners for jobs,” noting that one of the candidates was “referred by 

[Official C, a high-ranking official at SOE C].”  After proposing that they offer each candidate “a 3 

month intern opportunity,” Employee D added, “Btw, we’re expecting two mandates (one equity 



12 

and one m&a) from SOE C later this year and it’s an important account for us longer term.”  On or 

around December 17, 2007, Credit Suisse gave Referral Hire C a three-month employment 

contract. 

45. On or about March 4, 2008, multiple Credit Suisse senior managers had dinner with 

Official C, during which an upcoming IPO by SOE C was discussed.  After dinner, Official C 

spoke to at least one of the Credit Suisse senior managers about permanent employment at Credit 

Suisse for Referral Hire C.  The following day, that Credit Suisse senior manager notified a 

colleague that Official C would send an email about Referral Hire C to a Credit Suisse employee, 

and added:  “We’re pitching for the [SOE C] IPO, a multi billion dollar IPO. . . .”  In another 

email, Employee D requested support for Referral Hire C’s hire, noting “we’re pushed by [Official 

C],” and reiterating that Credit Suisse was pitching for the SOE C IPO.  Less than two weeks later, 

or about March 17, 2008, Credit Suisse provided Referral Hire C a full-time position in Hong 

Kong with a salary of approximately $90,000.  In May 2008, Credit Suisse received the mandate 

from a subsidiary of SOE C to act as bookrunner on its IPO, generating approximately 

$21,090,349 in revenue for Credit Suisse upon the closing of the deal in 2009.  Credit Suisse was 

also awarded a mandate to act as financial advisor on a SOE C-related merger and acquisition in 

May 2008, earning approximately $225,000. 

46. During Referral Hire C’s four-year employment at Credit Suisse, senior managers 

repeatedly emphasized to their colleagues the importance of including Referral Hire C in all 

matters related to SOE C, referring to ways Referral Hire C could be “leveraged” or included on 

transactions for which Referral Hire C lacked relevant banking experience and expertise. 

47. In or around November 2008, several senior managers decided to eliminate the 

positions of several highly-rated, regular analysts in order to keep client referral hires linked to 

banking mandates expected in the next year.  Employee D wrote that with respect to Referral Hire 

C and two other candidates, “we’ll see real relationship revenue coming in the next 12 months if 

we show good will to them at this critical moment.”  In or around March 2009, Credit Suisse was 

awarded a mandate by SOE C that brought in $1,179,906. 

48. On or about May 17, 2010, Employee D emailed three senior colleagues that 

“[Official C was] ready for [a SOE C affiliate] to do the block [trade] next month, aiming to raise 

[funds] via an asset injection. . . .  He will ask [the SOE C affiliate] to arrange a bidding process, 

similar to the [SOE C property development company] block we did before. However, given the 

parent will be in the deal, he won’t be too sensitive on the bid price.  Let’s get ourselves prepared 

and keep [i]t very confidential at this stage. . . .  Please make sure that [Referral Hire C] is invited 

to the working team.” 

49. Credit Suisse HK senior managers exaggerated Referral Hire C’s contributions to 

the firm.  On or about May 18, 2009, Employee D emailed Referral Hire C:  “We just did the block 

[trade] for [a subsidiary of SOE C].  You’ll be nominated in the deal team pls give [Official C] a 

call to congratulate him and thank him for the mandate.”  Referral Hire C later replied, “[A]s I 

know, almost all banks want to have this deal, including [three competitor banks of Credit 

Suisse]...But [a subsidiary of SOE C] decided to give CS si[n]ce [Official C] made lots of efforts 

on this.” 



13 

50. The next day, on or about May 19, 2009, Credit Suisse acted as a bookrunner on a 

secondary offering for the subsidiary company associated with SOE C valued at over 500 million 

dollars, earning fees of approximately $6,787,128.  On or about June 30, 2009, Referral Hire C 

received a bonus of approximately $40,000. 

51. On or about June 15, 2010, a Credit Suisse banker emailed various senior banking 

employees to provide an update on the pending and future deals.  The banker wrote that a senior 

official of [SOE C] “recently obtained greenlight from [Official C] regarding asset injection.”  

Employee D then directed an employee to “leverage [Referral Hire C] on all [SOE C] deal flows.” 

52. On or about July 27, 2010, Credit Suisse learned that a SOE C affiliate had awarded 

mandates related to a bond deal worth several hundred million dollars to two Credit Suisse 

competitors.  On or about July 28, 2010, Employee D referenced the deal and wrote:  “It was 

[Referral Hire C] who made the last minute breakthrough and got us a role around 6pm last night.”  

This deal earned Credit Suisse $222,899.  Referral Hire C’s bonus for 2010 was over $320,000. 

53. Or about May 16, 2011, Employee A emailed others that two managing directors 

wanted to cover SOE C more proactively.  Employee A noted steps a select group of Credit Suisse 

managers had acted to increase Referral Hire C’s compensation (without informing their 

colleagues), writing “we matched [Referral Hire C]’s bump-up and guarantee.  [Referral Hire C’s] 

major contribution to the firm will be on this account.  How can we push [Referral Hire C] harder 

to pursue this account?”  Employee C then replied privately to Employee A that the other senior 

managers “don’t know about what we did with [Referral Hire C].  Only [Employee D], you and me 

plus H.R.”  During Referral Hire C’s employment with Credit Suisse, Referral Hire C was paid 

approximately $1.5 million in total compensation.  During that same period, Credit Suisse was 

mandated on five SOE C deals, earning over $29 million dollars. 

Hiring and Advancement of Referral Hire to Secure Client Relationship with SOE 

54. During or around June 2010, Credit Suisse hired Referral Hire D as a referral hire 

from a large energy-related SOE (“SOE D”) in order to obtain business from SOE D.  Referral 

Hire D’s employment was arranged by Credit Suisse during the summer of 2010, with Employee 

C, and Referral Hire D was to start as an Associate with a promotion to Vice President that same 

year. 

55. Referral Hire D started work at Credit Suisse on or about November 8, 2010.  Three 

days later, Credit Suisse was awarded a mandate to act “as a joint bookrunner in [a SOE D 

affiliate]’s IPO” on or about November 11, 2010.  Several weeks later, Credit Suisse booked 

approximately $986,439 in revenue as the deal closed. 

56. In a November 16, 2010 email related to the SOE D deal, Employee A relayed 

that when Employee A had asked a high-ranking executive of SOE D to “push for our 

incentive,” the high-ranking executive “reminded [Employee A] that we need to pay [SOE 

D’s] relationship hire — [Referral Hire D], the Associate well at the year end bonus.”  One 

day earlier, Employee A had told Employee B that Referral Hire D was not up for a 

promotion to Vice President.  After the discussion with the high-ranking executive at SOE D, 

Employee A advocated for Referral Hire D’s promotion, which became official less than two 



 

 

 

14 

 

 

months after Referral Hire D began working at Credit Suisse.  Referral Hire D was promoted 

and consequently became eligible for a bonus.  In an earlier email exchange between 

Employee B and Credit Suisse employees in London and New York concerning the 

promotion for Referral Hire D, a London employee noted that the promotion request was 

“abnormal.” 

57. In a Credit Suisse internal spreadsheet that listed specific deals attributable to 

relationship hires, “[SOE D]” was listed as Referral Hire D’s “[c]ontribution” to the 

company.  Referral Hire D was terminated approximately one year after starting at Credit 

Suisse. 

LEGAL STANDARDS AND VIOLATIONS 

 

58. As a result of the conduct described above, Credit Suisse violated Section 30A 

of the Exchange Act which prohibits any issuer with a class of securities registered pursuant 

to Section 12 of the Exchange Act, or any officer, director, employee, or agent acting on 

behalf of such issuer, in order to obtain or retain business, from corruptly giving or 

authorizing the giving of, anything of value to any foreign official for the purposes of 

influencing the official or inducing the official to act in violation of his or her lawful duties, 

or to secure any improper advantage, or to induce a foreign official to use his influence with a 

foreign governmental instrumentality to influence any act or decision of such government or 

instrumentality.  

59. As a result of the conduct described above Credit Suisse violated Section 

13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, which requires issuers that have a class of securities 

registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act and issuers with reporting 

obligations pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act to devise and maintain a system 

of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i) 

transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific 

authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of 

financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any 

other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets; 

(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific 

authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing 

assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences. 

Commission Consideration of Credit Suisse’s Remedial Efforts 

 

60. The Commission has considered the remedial efforts undertaken by Credit 

Suisse to enhance its internal accounting controls as well as its global implementation in 2015 

of procedures intended to ensure that all job candidates are assessed based purely on merit, 

qualifications and expected job performance. 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

15 

 

 

Non-Prosecution Agreement 

 

61. Credit Suisse HK has entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the 

Department of Justice that acknowledges responsibility for criminal conduct relating to 

certain findings in the Order. 

Non-Imposition of a Civil Penalty 

 

62. Respondent acknowledges that the Commission is not imposing a civil 

penalty based upon the imposition of a $47 million criminal fine as part of Credit Suisse’s 

settlement with the United States Department of Justice. 

IV. 
 

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the 

sanctions agreed to in Respondent’s Offer. 
 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 
 

A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondent cease and desist 

from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 

13(b)(2)(B) and 30A of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B), and 

78dd-1]. 

 

B. Respondent shall, within 10 days of the entry of this Order, pay 

disgorgement of $24,989,843 and prejudgment interest of $4,833,961, for a total 

payment of $29,823,804 to the Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the 

general fund of the United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3).  

If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to SEC Rule of 

Practice 600.  Payment must be made in one of the following ways: 
 

(1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, 

which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon 

request; 

(2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov 

through the SEC Web site at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; 

or 

(3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United 

States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange 

Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to: 

 

Enterprise Services Center 

Accounts Receivable Branch 

HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341 

6500 South MacArthur Boulevard 

Oklahoma City, OK 73169 

 

http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm%3B


 

 

 

 

Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying 

Credit Suisse as the Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these 

proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Paul G. Block, 

Assistant Regional Director, FCPA Unit, Enforcement Division, Boston Regional Office, U.S. 

Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 Arch Street, Suite 2300, Boston, Massachusetts 02110. 

 

By the Commission. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brent J. Fields 
Secretary