In re BHP Billiton Ltd. and BHP
BHP Billiton Ltd. and BHP Billiton Plc agreed to a $25 million SEC settlement for violating the FCPA’s internal controls and books and records provisions by hosting an inadequately supervised 2008 Beijing Olympics hospitality program that provided luxury trips to 176 government officials from high-corruption-risk countries, many involved in pending business negotiations, without proper due diligence or accurate documentation.
BHP Billiton Ltd. and BHP Billiton Plc paid a $25 million civil penalty to the SEC for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by failing to maintain adequate internal controls and accurate books and records related to a 2008 Olympic hospitality program. The company extended luxury hospitality packages—valued at $12,000 to $16,000 per guest—to 176 government officials from countries with known corruption risks, including those involved in pending regulatory or contractual matters in the Philippines, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Guinea. Internal forms used to approve invitations lacked independent legal review, contained misleading or standardized responses, and failed to disclose ongoing business negotiations, directly violating FCPA requirements.
BHP Billiton Ltd. and BHP Billiton Plc agreed to a $25 million SEC settlement for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s internal controls and books and records provisions in connection with a 2008 Beijing Olympics hospitality program. The company hosted 176 government officials and employees of state-owned enterprises from high-corruption-risk countries, primarily in Africa and Asia, providing them with luxury accommodations, event tickets, meals, and business-class airfare at an estimated cost of $12,000 to $16,000 per guest. Despite recognizing the heightened corruption risks, BHPB’s internal controls were insufficient: hospitality applications lacked independent legal review, contained boilerplate or misleading responses, and were not updated to reflect pending business negotiations with officials from countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, and the Philippines. The company’s books and records failed to accurately reflect these business relationships, violating FCPA requirements for detailed and fair disclosure. Although BHPB had a corporate Guide to Business Conduct, it was not effectively enforced, and compliance oversight was fragmented across business units. To resolve the matter, BHPB cooperated fully with the SEC, implemented significant remedial measures—including creating an independent compliance function, revising policies, and enhancing global training—and agreed to a one-year reporting period with detailed compliance updates. The SEC acknowledged these remedial efforts in accepting the settlement without requiring an admission of guilt.
Extracted insights
- $190.00B $190 billion ≥$1B
- $25.00M $25,000,000 $10M–$100M
- $16K $16,000 $10K–$100K
- $12K $12,000 $10K–$100K
- company approximately 176 government officials and employees of state-owned enterprises
- company BHP Billiton Ltd.
- company bhp billiton plc
- agency Securities and Exchange Commission
- Commission deems it appropriate that cease-and-desist proceedings be instituted
- Respondents have submitted Offers of Settlement
- Commission has determined to accept Offers of Settlement
- BHPB invited approximately 176 government officials and employees of state-owned enterprises
- BHPB recognized that inviting government officials created a heightened risk of violating anti-corruption laws
- BHPB violated the internal controls and books and records provisions
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 74998 / May 20, 2015
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-16546
In the Matter of
BHP Billiton Ltd. and BHP
Billiton Plc,
Respondents.
ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND-
DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 21C OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING
FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING A CEASE-
AND-DESIST ORDER
I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that cease-
and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), against BHP Billiton Ltd. and BHP Billiton Plc
(collectively, “BHPB” or “Respondents”).
II.
In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondents have submitted Offers
of Settlement (the “Offers”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the
purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the
Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings
herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of these
proceedings, which are admitted, Respondents consent to the entry of this Order Instituting Cease-
and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making
Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set forth below.
III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondents’ Offers, the Commission finds
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that:
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The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondents’ Offers of Settlement and are not binding on any
other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.
2
Summary
1. This matter concerns BHPB’s failure to devise and maintain sufficient internal
controls over a global hospitality program that the company hosted in connection with its
sponsorship of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. BHPB invited approximately 176
government officials and employees of state-owned enterprises (collectively, “government
officials”) to attend the Olympics at BHPB’s expense. The majority of these invitations were
extended to government officials from countries in Africa and Asia that had well-known histories
of corruption. The three to four day hospitality packages included event tickets, luxury hotel
accommodations, meals, other hospitality, and, in many instances, offers of business-class airfare
for government officials and their guests. BHPB informed its employees that “[o]ne of the core
objectives [of the Olympic sponsorship] is to maximize the commercial investment made in the
Games through assisting [BHPB] to strengthen relationships with key local and global
stakeholders, e.g.: Government Ministers, Suppliers and Customers,” and that the hospitality
program was “a primary vehicle to ensure this goal is achieved.”
2. BHPB recognized that inviting government officials to the Olympics created a
heightened risk of violating anti-corruption laws and the company’s own Guide to Business
Conduct, but the internal controls it developed and relied upon in an effort to address this risk were
insufficient. As a result, BHPB invited government officials who were directly involved in, or in a
position to influence, pending contract negotiations, efforts to obtain access rights, regulatory
actions, or business dealings affecting BHPB in multiple countries. In addition, BHPB’s books
and records, namely certain internal forms that employees prepared in order to invite a government
official to the Olympics, did not, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect BHPB’s pending
negotiations or business dealings with the government official at the time of the invitation.
3. As a result of this conduct, BHPB violated the internal controls and books and
records provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).
Respondent
4. BHP Billiton (“BHPB”) is a combination of two companies: BHP Billiton Limited,
which is headquartered in Melbourne, Australia, and BHP Billiton Plc, which is headquartered in
London, England. Since 2001, BHPB has operated under a Dual Listed Company structure, under
which BHP Billiton Limited and BHP Billiton Plc operate as a single economic entity, run by a
unified Board of Directors and management team. BHP Billiton Limited American Depositary
Shares (“ADSs”) and BHP Billiton Plc ADSs are registered with the Commission pursuant to
Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the tickers
“BHP” and “BBL” respectively.
Background
5. BHPB is a global resources company that is among the world’s leading producers
of major commodities, including iron ore, coal, oil and gas, copper, aluminum, manganese,
uranium, nickel, and silver. As of June 30, 2014, the end of its most recently completed fiscal
year, BHPB had a market capitalization of approximately $190 billion, with over 140 locations,
operations in 25 countries, and a workforce of more than 128,000 employees and contractors.
6. During the relevant period, BHPB operated through different business divisions,
called Customer Sector Groups (“CSGs”). These CSGs included Iron Ore, Aluminium, Petroleum,
Base Metals, Diamonds and Specialty Products, Stainless Steel Materials, Manganese,
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Metallurgical Coal, and Energy Coal. Each CSG had its own president, which reported to a
member of BHPB’s Group Management Committee.
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BHPB also had a Minerals Exploration
Group (“MinEx”) that assisted the CSGs with exploration activities.
7. Under BHPB’s operating model during the relevant period, each CSG President
was responsible for ensuring their businesses’ compliance with the company’s Guide to Business
Conduct. Every CSG President also was required to certify annually that they had read and
understood the Guide, confirmed that their direct reports had done the same, and discussed it with
their direct reports. BHPB had a centralized legal department. In addition, it had an advisory body
with internal and external membership called the Global Ethics Panel (“Ethics Panel”), which
advised business leaders on compliance with the Guide to Business Conduct and other business
ethics issues. BHPB did not have an independent, centralized compliance group within its legal
department, or otherwise.
BHPB’s Hospitality Program for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games
A. The Scope and Goals of BHPB’s Olympic Hospitality Program
8. In December 2005, BHPB and the Beijing Organizing Committee announced their
agreement for BHPB to become an official sponsor of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Under
this agreement, BHPB paid a sponsorship fee and supplied the raw materials used to make the
Olympic medals. In exchange, BHPB received the rights to use the Olympic trademark and other
intellectual property in public announcements and advertisements, as well as priority access to
tickets, hospitality suites, and accommodations in Beijing during the August 2008 Games.
9. BHPB established an Olympic Sponsorship Steering Committee (“OSSC”) to plan,
oversee, and implement its sponsorship program, which involved multiple different branding,
promotion, and relationship-building initiatives. The chair of the OSSC, who also was the chair of
the Ethics Panel, reported directly to BHPB’s CEO.
10. One of BHPB’s objectives for the sponsorship was “to reinforce and develop
relationships with key stakeholders” in China and in “product and investor markets, and regions
where we have or would like to have operations.” BHPB’s strategy for accomplishing its
objectives included “[u]tiliz[ing] Olympic hospitality to motivate China-based stakeholders,
including customers, suppliers, government and media, to enhance business opportunities for BHP
Billiton in China” and “[u]tiliz[ing] Olympic hospitality to build relationships with stakeholders
from product and investor markets, and regions where we have or would like to have operations.”
11. One of the company’s sponsorship-related initiatives was a global hospitality
program under which BHPB invited guests from around the world, including foreign government
officials and representatives of state-owned enterprises, to attend the Beijing Olympics on three to
four day hospitality packages. The hospitality packages included luxury hotel accommodations,
meals, event tickets, and sightseeing excursions, at a cost of approximately $12,000 to $16,000 per
package. In addition, BHPB executives approved the offer of round trip business class airfare to
approximately 51 foreign government officials, as well as the airfares for 35 of these government
2
In 2012 and 2013, BHPB re-organized to consolidate the CSGs into five business units: Petroleum and Potash;
Copper; Iron Ore; Coal; and Aluminium, Manganese and Nickel.
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officials’ spouses or guests. Apart from BHPB’s desire to enhance business opportunities by
strengthening relationships with its guests, these trips had no other business purpose.
12. An internal e-mail to CSG presidents and other senior BHPB business managers
emphasized the importance of the hospitality program to the success of BHPB’s sponsorship,
stating, “[a]s you know we have made a commitment to support the Beijing Olympic Games in
2008. One of the core objectives is to maximise the commercial investment made in the Games
through assisting [BHPB] to strengthen relationships with key local and global stakeholders, e.g.:
Government Ministers, Suppliers and Customers. The BHP Billiton Hospitality Program is a
primary vehicle to ensure this goal is achieved.”
13. In early 2007, BHPB employees prepared country-specific Olympic Leverage
Plans, which summarized BHPB’s business and Olympic-related objectives. In a number of
instances, these plans discussed inviting key stakeholders, including government officials, to help
BHPB develop relationships with a view to increasing or maintaining its business opportunities.
For example, the Olympic Leverage Plan prepared for one country stated that BHPB’s business
objectives in that country included “gaining access to regions that will provide growth for
[BHPB’s] business” and “gaining port access.” The plan further stated that the hospitality program
would “provide useful relationship building opportunity for . . . stakeholders” and that the invitees
would include the country’s Minister of Mines and Minister of Transport. The Olympic Leverage
Plan for another country, while not specifically addressing the hospitality program, stated that one
of the goals for the sponsorship was “us[ing] Olympics program to strengthen and build the govt’s
confidence and relationship with [BHPB], to help facilitate approvals for future projects.”
14. After Olympic Leverage Plans were prepared for each country, BHPB business
managers submitted lists of potential invitees and were instructed to rank them in order of
importance, with “Category A” being those “most critical to the business.” Internal BHPB
presentations discussed the need to establish “the business benefit” of an Olympic invitation.
15. Eventually, BHPB invited approximately 650 people to attend the Beijing
Olympics, including 176 government officials, 98 of whom were representatives of state-owned
enterprises that were BHPB customers or suppliers. BHPB also invited the spouses of 102 of these
government officials. Most of the invited government officials were from countries in Africa and
Asia where there was a known risk of corruption. Sixty of these government officials ultimately
attended, 24 of them with their spouses or guests. A number of other invited government officials
accepted their invitations, but then cancelled before the Olympics began.
B. BHPB’s Insufficient Internal Controls over the Olympic Hospitality Program
16. Early in its planning for the Olympics, BHPB identified the risk that inviting
government officials to the Olympics could potentially violate anti-corruption laws and the
company’s own Guide to Business Conduct. The company relied on its existing operating model
and an Olympic-specific internal approval process to address this risk. However, these internal
controls, and BHPB’s implementation of them, were insufficient.
17. BHPB developed a hospitality application which business managers were required
to complete for any individuals, including government officials, whom they wished to invite.
These applications included the following questions:
9. What business obligation exists or is expected to develop
between the proposed invitee and BHP Billiton?
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10. Is BHP Billiton negotiating or considering any contract, license
agreement or seeking access rights with a third party where the
proposed invitee is in a position to influence the outcome of that
negotiation?
11. Do you believe that the offer of the proposed hospitality would
be likely to create an impression that there is an improper
connection between the provision of the hospitality and the business
that is being negotiated, considered or conducted, or in any way
might be perceived as breaching the Company’s Guide to Business
Conduct?
If yes, please provide details.
12. Are there other matters relating to the relationship between BHP Billiton
and the proposed invitee that you believe should be considered in relation to the
provision of hospitality having regard to BHP Billiton’s Guide to Business
Conduct?
18. BHPB required each such application to be filled out and signed by an employee
with knowledge of the invitee’s relationship with the company, and approved in writing by the
president of the relevant CSG or the BHPB country president.
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A cover sheet that accompanied
the blank forms included a short description of anti-bribery provisions in the Guide to Business
Conduct and urged employees to re-read the section of the Guide concerning travel, entertainment,
and gifts before completing the form. However, the controls did not adequately address the anti-
bribery risks associated with offering expensive travel and entertainment packages to government
officials.
19. First, BHPB did not require independent legal or compliance review of hospitality
applications by someone outside the CSG that was submitting the application, and did not clearly
communicate to its employees the fact that the Ethics Panel was not reviewing and approving each
invitation to a government official. On the one hand, BHPB’s internal website stated that the
hospitality applications were subject to “scrutiny by the Ethics Panel [steering committee],” and
the hospitality applications themselves stated that, “[r]equests for travel and accompanying spouses
will be approved by the Olympic Sponsorship Steering Committee and the Global Ethics Panel
Sub-Committee.” E-mails sent to some BHPB business managers by a member of the OSSC staff
stated that the Ethics Panel had “approved” their applications.
20. However, other than reviewing approximately 10 hospitality applications for
government officials in mid-2007 in order to assess the invitation process, the OSSC and the Ethics
Panel subcommittee did not review the appropriateness of individual hospitality applications or
airfare requests. The Ethics Panel’s charter stated that its role simply was to provide advice on
ethical and compliance matters, and that “accountability rest[ed] with business leaders.” Members
of the Ethics Panel understood that, consistent with their charter, their role with respect to
implementation of the hospitality program was purely advisory. As a result, business managers
had sole responsibility for reconciling the competing goals of inviting guests – including
3
In countries where multiple CSGs operated, BHPB had employees designated as “country presidents” or “country
managers” to coordinate the activities of the various business units.
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government officials – who would “maximize [BHPB’s] commercial investment made in the
Olympic Games” without violating anti-bribery laws.
21. Second, some hospitality applications were not accurate or complete. Many
applications identified an employee of a state-owned enterprise as a “Customer,” but failed to
identify the invitee as a “Representative of Government.” In addition, a number of applications
contained “No” responses to Question 10, even when BHPB had pending negotiations, efforts to
obtain access rights, regulatory actions, or other business dealings in which the government
official was directly involved or in a position to influence. Furthermore, in a number of instances,
BHPB business people were provided with examples of language that had been used by other
employees when responding to Questions 10 and 11 in order to explain why an invitation was
appropriate, even when there was a “Yes” response to Questions 10-12. As a result, many
hospitality applications contained the exact same statements in response to Questions 10 and 11,
rather than a description of the specific facts and circumstances relating to that government
official.
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22. Third, while BHPB had an annual Guide to Business Conduct review and
certification process, and generalized training, it did not provide its employees and executives with
any specific training on how to fill out the hospitality forms or how to evaluate whether an
invitation to a government official complied with the Guide. During the relevant period, this
portion of the Guide included a case example concerning a negotiation between BHPB and a
Ministry for Planning in a particular country, in which the Minister indicated that it would help his
consideration of the company’s application if the Minister and his wife could visit BHPB’s
operations in Australia. The example stated that “this kind of situation requires the utmost caution
and you must consult senior management. You must not offer to provide anything that could be
reasonably regarded as an attempt to unduly influence the Minister’s decision. This means that
you must not pay for travel by the Minister’s wife.” However, BHPB did not provide any
guidance to its senior managers on how they should apply this portion of the Guide when
determining whether to approve invitations and airfares for government officials’ spouses.
23. Fourth, although the form asked whether any business was “expected to develop”
with the invitee, BHPB did not institute a process for updating hospitality applications or
reassessing the appropriateness of invitations to government officials if conditions changed.
Almost all of the hospitality applications relating to government officials were approved and
submitted in mid-2007. However, BHPB did not require hospitality forms to be updated, or
invitations to be reconsidered, in those situations when government officials subsequently became
involved in negotiations, attempts by BHPB to obtain access rights, or other pending matters.
24. Fifth, hospitality applications were submitted by individual CSGs, and generally
only reflected negotiations between the government official and that CSG. While lists of invitees
were circulated among senior BHPB business managers, BHPB had no process in place to
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For example, a number of hospitality forms included the following response to Question 10: “Yes, the invitee is in
a position to influence the outcome of the pending contract, however, this is an organization that we have been
conducting business with for over five years. Negotiations and contract outcomes are a regular occurrence but due
to the lengthy relationship with BHP Billiton there is evidence [of] a long term commitment that would not
necessarily be influenced by this gesture. It is a way of rewarding the business that has previously been conducted
with BHP Billiton.”
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determine whether the invited government official also was involved in other CSGs’ negotiations,
efforts to obtain access rights, or other business dealings.
C. As a Result of its Insufficient Internal Controls, BHPB Invited Government Officials
who were Directly Involved in, or in a Position to Influence, Pending Negotiations,
Regulatory Actions, or Business Dealings with BHPB
25. As a result of its failure to design and maintain sufficient internal controls over the
Olympic global hospitality program, BHPB invited a number of government officials who were
directly involved with, or in a position to influence, pending negotiations, efforts by BHPB to
obtain access rights, or other pending matters.
Republic of Burundi
26. In mid-2007, BHPB’s MinEx group submitted a hospitality application form to
invite the as-yet-unidentified Burundi Minister of Mines and spouse to the Olympics, with airfare
included. Because BHPB was not currently in negotiations with the Minister of Mines at the time,
the hospitality application form contained a “No” response to Question 10. However, BHPB had a
joint venture (“JV”) in Burundi with an entity that was in danger of losing a nickel exploration
permit unless it made a substantial near-term financial investment in the project or negotiated a
renewal or amendment of the permit. Under Burundi law, the Minister of Mines was responsible
for reviewing an application to renew or amend a mining permit and presenting the application to
the country’s Council of Ministers for final approval.
27. In late 2007 and early 2008, BHPB began to negotiate directly with the newly-
appointed Minister of Mines to extend and modify the JV’s nickel exploration permit. However,
BHPB employees did not update the hospitality application or take steps to re-review the
appropriateness of the invitation after these negotiations began. As noted above, no such re-review
was required by the internal controls that BHPB relied upon for the Olympic hospitality program.
The Minister of Mines and his wife attended the Olympics as BHPB’s guests for four days.
Republic of the Philippines
28. In July 2007, BHPB became embroiled in a dispute with a local JV partner
concerning a prospective nickel mining operation in the Philippines. The JV partner sued BHPB in
local court and filed requests with the country’s Secretary of Department of Environment and
Resources (“DENR”), requesting reversion of the mining rights that the JV partner had assigned to
the JV.
29. In October 2007, a BHPB employee from the Stainless Steel Materials CSG
submitted a hospitality application to invite the Secretary and his spouse to attend the Olympics,
with airfare included. The completed application contained a “Yes” response to Question 10, but
only described a technical services agreement that BHPB was considering submitting to the DENR
for the Secretary’s approval. Question 10 of the hospitality form did not explicitly require, and the
employee’s response did not provide, any information about the Secretary’s role in reviewing the
JV partner’s reversion request or the fact that the President of the Philippines had designated the
Secretary to mediate the dispute between BHPB and its JV partner. The form included a “No”
response to Question 11.
30. The Secretary accepted BHPB’s invitation in December 2007. In March 2008, he
issued a decision denying the JV partner’s reversion request and continued during the ensuing
months to mediate the parties’ dispute. In late July, BHPB became concerned that the company’s
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JV partner had learned about the Olympics invitation. As a result, BHPB withdrew the invitation
shortly before the Olympics began.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
31. In mid-2007, MinEx submitted a hospitality application form to invite the Governor
of the Katanga Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the “DRC”) and his spouse,
with airfare included. Following its June 2007 review of 10 invitations to government officials, the
Ethics Panel subcommittee advised MinEx to provide more detail about whether the invitation
involved Gecamines, a state-owned entity with which BHPB was attempting to negotiate a copper
exploration deal. In response, MinEx submitted a revised application that contained a “No”
response to Question 10, stating, “[t]he issuing and management of mineral titles and negotiations
with third parties in DRC have nothing to do with the Governor’s roles and responsibilities.
Although [BHPB] are currently engaged in negotiations with State copper company, Gecamines,
the Governor of Katanga will have no influence in these dealings.”
32. Later in 2007, however, BHPB employees held several meetings with the
Governor. Internal summaries of these meetings noted that the Governor was “a close ally of [the
DRC] President” and that having the Governor as BHPB’s ally “could be the key to unlock a
successful entry in a deal with Gecamines.” In spite of obtaining this information after making the
initial decision to invite the Governor of Katanga and his wife to the Olympics, BHPB employees
did not update the hospitality application form or take steps to re-review the appropriateness of the
invitation. No such re-review was required under the internal controls that BHPB relied upon for
the Olympic hospitality program. The Governor accepted the invitation, but then cancelled before
the Olympics.
Republic of Guinea
33. In May 2007, MinEx submitted a hospitality application to invite the Guinea
Minister of Mines and his spouse to the Olympics, with airfare included. The application
contained a “No” response to Question 10, and in response to Question 11 it stated, “No. A sound
professional relationship with the Guinea Ministry of Mines is key for the success of the [BHPB]
exploration and mining business in this country.” Following its June 2007 review of 10 invitations
to government officials, the Ethics Panel subcommittee advised MinEx to provide additional
information concerning this invitation. The MinEx employee who had prepared the original form
asked BHPB’s Guinea country president to respond to the request for information concerning any
pending negotiations with the Minister. The country president replied that “of course” there would
be “further negotiations” regarding the upcoming renewal of a bauxite mining concession held by
BHPB and the government’s intention to review all existing mining concessions, but that the
response to Question 11 was “key in that regard.”
34. This information was not passed along to the Ethics Panel subcommittee, however,
and the form was not updated to accurately reflect the pending negotiations across all of the CSGs
operating in Guinea. Because they received no response to the Guinea country president’s email,
MinEx officials mistakenly understood that the Ethics Panel had approved the invitation. The
Minister accepted the invitation on behalf of himself and his wife in January 2008, but cancelled
shortly before the Olympics began.
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Legal Standards and FCPA Violations
35. Under Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act, the Commission may impose a cease-
and-desist order upon any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any
provision of the Exchange Act or any rule or regulation thereunder, and upon any other person
that is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or
should have known would contribute to such violation.
36. Under Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, issuers are required to make and
keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and disposition of the assets of the issuer.
37. Under Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, issuers are required to devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such
statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in
accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded
accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and
appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.
38. As a result of the conduct described above, BHPB violated Section 13(b)(2)(A)
because its books and records, namely certain Olympic hospitality applications, did not, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect pending negotiations or business dealings between
BHPB and government officials invited to the Olympics. BHPB violated Section 13(b)(2)(B)
because it did not devise and maintain internal accounting controls over the Olympic hospitality
program that were sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that access to assets and
transactions were in executed in accordance with management’s authorization.
BHPB’s Cooperation and Remedial Efforts
39. In response to the Commission’s investigation, BHPB retained outside counsel to
assist it with conducting an extensive internal investigation into potential improper conduct in
the jurisdictions that were the subject of the staff’s inquiry. BHPB provided significant
cooperation with the Commission’s investigation by voluntarily producing large volumes of
business, financial, and accounting documents from around the world in response to the staff’s
requests, and by voluntarily producing translations of key documents. BHPB’s counsel
conducted scores of interviews and provided the staff with regular reports on the findings of its
internal investigation.
40. BHPB also has undertaken significant remedial actions. BHPB has created a
compliance group within its legal department that is independent from the business units. This
compliance group is responsible for FCPA compliance, among other things, and reports directly
to BHPB’s general counsel and Audit Committee. In addition, it has reviewed its existing anti-
corruption compliance program and implemented other changes. These include embedding
independent anti-corruption managers into its businesses and further enhancing its policies and
procedures concerning hospitality, gift giving, use of third party agents, business partners, and
other high-risk compliance areas. BHPB also has enhanced its financial and auditing controls,
including policies to specifically address conducting business in high-risk markets. BHPB has
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conducted extensive employee training on anti-corruption issues and overhauled its processes for
conducting internal investigations of potential violations of anti-corruption laws.
IV.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions
agreed to in Respondents BHP Billiton Ltd.’s and BHP Billiton Plc’s Offers.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondents cease and desist from
committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and
13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act.
B. Respondents shall, within 10 days of the entry of this Order, pay a civil money
penalty totaling $25,000,000 to the Securities and Exchange Commission for remission to the
United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3). If timely payment is not
made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3717. Payment must be made in one
of the following ways:
(1) Respondents may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will
provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;
(2) Respondents may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through
the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
(3) Respondents may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States
postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and
hand-delivered or mailed to:
Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169
Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying BHP
Billiton Ltd. and BHP Billiton Plc as Respondents in these proceedings, and the file number of
these proceedings. A copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Antonia
Chion, Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F
St., NE, Washington, DC 20549.
C. During a one-year term as set forth below, Respondents shall report to the
Commission staff on the operation of BHPB’s FCPA and anti-corruption compliance program.
If Respondents discover credible evidence, not already reported to the Commission staff, that:
(1) questionable or corrupt payments or questionable or corrupt transfers of property or interests
may have been offered, promised, paid, or authorized by Respondents, or any entity or person
while working directly for Respondents, to any government official; (2) that related false books
and records have been maintained; or (3) that Respondents’ internal controls failed to detect and
prevent such conduct, Respondents shall promptly report such conduct to the Commission staff.
During this one-year period:
11
(1) Respondents shall submit to the Commission staff a written report within 180
calendar days of the entry of this Order on the operation of BHPB’s FCPA and
anti-corruption compliance program (the “Initial Report”). The Initial Report
shall be transmitted to Alexander Koch, Assistant Director, Division of
Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F St., NE, Washington,
DC 20549-5041. Respondents may extend the time period for issuance of the
Initial Report with prior written approval of the Commission staff.
(2) Respondents shall undertake one follow-up review, incorporating any comments
provided by the Commission staff on the Initial Report, to further monitor and
assess the operation of its FCPA and anti-corruption compliance program and
whether Respondents’ policies and procedures are reasonably designed to detect
and prevent violations of the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws (the
“Final Report”).
(3) The Final Report shall be completed by no later than 180 days after the Initial
Report, and shall be transmitted to Alexander Koch, Assistant Director, Division
of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F St., NE,
Washington, DC 20549-5041. Respondents may extend the time period for
issuance of the Final Report with prior written approval of the Commission staff.
(4) The reports submitted by Respondents will likely include proprietary, financial,
confidential, and competitive business information. Public disclosure of the
reports could discourage cooperation, impede pending or potential government
investigations or undermine the objectives of the reporting requirement. For these
reasons, among others, the reports and the contents thereof are intended to remain
and shall remain non-public, except (a) pursuant to court order, (b) as agreed by
the parties in writing, (c) to the extent that the Commission staff determines in its
sole discretion that disclosure would be in furtherance of the Commission’s
discharge of its duties and responsibilities, or (d) is otherwise required by law.
By the Commission.
Brent J. Fields
Secretary UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 74998 / May 20, 2015
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-16546
In the Matter of
BHP Billiton Ltd. and BHP
Billiton Plc,
Respondents.
ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND-
DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 21C OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING
FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING A CEASE-
AND-DESIST ORDER
I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that cease-
and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), against BHP Billiton Ltd. and BHP Billiton Plc
(collectively, “BHPB” or “Respondents”).
II.
In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondents have submitted Offers
of Settlement (the “Offers”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the
purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the
Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings
herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of these
proceedings, which are admitted, Respondents consent to the entry of this Order Instituting Cease-
and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making
Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set forth below.
III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondents’ Offers, the Commission finds1 that:
1 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondents’ Offers of Settlement and are not binding on any
other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.
2
Summary
1. This matter concerns BHPB’s failure to devise and maintain sufficient internal
controls over a global hospitality program that the company hosted in connection with its
sponsorship of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. BHPB invited approximately 176
government officials and employees of state-owned enterprises (collectively, “government
officials”) to attend the Olympics at BHPB’s expense. The majority of these invitations were
extended to government officials from countries in Africa and Asia that had well-known histories
of corruption. The three to four day hospitality packages included event tickets, luxury hotel
accommodations, meals, other hospitality, and, in many instances, offers of business-class airfare
for government officials and their guests. BHPB informed its employees that “[o]ne of the core
objectives [of the Olympic sponsorship] is to maximize the commercial investment made in the
Games through assisting [BHPB] to strengthen relationships with key local and global
stakeholders, e.g.: Government Ministers, Suppliers and Customers,” and that the hospitality
program was “a primary vehicle to ensure this goal is achieved.”
2. BHPB recognized that inviting government officials to the Olympics created a
heightened risk of violating anti-corruption laws and the company’s own Guide to Business
Conduct, but the internal controls it developed and relied upon in an effort to address this risk were
insufficient. As a result, BHPB invited government officials who were directly involved in, or in a
position to influence, pending contract negotiations, efforts to obtain access rights, regulatory
actions, or business dealings affecting BHPB in multiple countries. In addition, BHPB’s books
and records, namely certain internal forms that employees prepared in order to invite a government
official to the Olympics, did not, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect BHPB’s pending
negotiations or business dealings with the government official at the time of the invitation.
3. As a result of this conduct, BHPB violated the internal controls and books and
records provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).
Respondent
4. BHP Billiton (“BHPB”) is a combination of two companies: BHP Billiton Limited,
which is headquartered in Melbourne, Australia, and BHP Billiton Plc, which is headquartered in
London, England. Since 2001, BHPB has operated under a Dual Listed Company structure, under
which BHP Billiton Limited and BHP Billiton Plc operate as a single economic entity, run by a
unified Board of Directors and management team. BHP Billiton Limited American Depositary
Shares (“ADSs”) and BHP Billiton Plc ADSs are registered with the Commission pursuant to
Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the tickers
“BHP” and “BBL” respectively.
Background
5. BHPB is a global resources company that is among the world’s leading producers
of major commodities, including iron ore, coal, oil and gas, copper, aluminum, manganese,
uranium, nickel, and silver. As of June 30, 2014, the end of its most recently completed fiscal
year, BHPB had a market capitalization of approximately $190 billion, with over 140 locations,
operations in 25 countries, and a workforce of more than 128,000 employees and contractors.
6. During the relevant period, BHPB operated through different business divisions,
called Customer Sector Groups (“CSGs”). These CSGs included Iron Ore, Aluminium, Petroleum,
Base Metals, Diamonds and Specialty Products, Stainless Steel Materials, Manganese,
3
Metallurgical Coal, and Energy Coal. Each CSG had its own president, which reported to a
member of BHPB’s Group Management Committee.2 BHPB also had a Minerals Exploration
Group (“MinEx”) that assisted the CSGs with exploration activities.
7. Under BHPB’s operating model during the relevant period, each CSG President
was responsible for ensuring their businesses’ compliance with the company’s Guide to Business
Conduct. Every CSG President also was required to certify annually that they had read and
understood the Guide, confirmed that their direct reports had done the same, and discussed it with
their direct reports. BHPB had a centralized legal department. In addition, it had an advisory body
with internal and external membership called the Global Ethics Panel (“Ethics Panel”), which
advised business leaders on compliance with the Guide to Business Conduct and other business
ethics issues. BHPB did not have an independent, centralized compliance group within its legal
department, or otherwise.
BHPB’s Hospitality Program for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games
A. The Scope and Goals of BHPB’s Olympic Hospitality Program
8. In December 2005, BHPB and the Beijing Organizing Committee announced their
agreement for BHPB to become an official sponsor of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Under
this agreement, BHPB paid a sponsorship fee and supplied the raw materials used to make the
Olympic medals. In exchange, BHPB received the rights to use the Olympic trademark and other
intellectual property in public announcements and advertisements, as well as priority access to
tickets, hospitality suites, and accommodations in Beijing during the August 2008 Games.
9. BHPB established an Olympic Sponsorship Steering Committee (“OSSC”) to plan,
oversee, and implement its sponsorship program, which involved multiple different branding,
promotion, and relationship-building initiatives. The chair of the OSSC, who also was the chair of
the Ethics Panel, reported directly to BHPB’s CEO.
10. One of BHPB’s objectives for the sponsorship was “to reinforce and develop
relationships with key stakeholders” in China and in “product and investor markets, and regions
where we have or would like to have operations.” BHPB’s strategy for accomplishing its
objectives included “[u]tiliz[ing] Olympic hospitality to motivate China-based stakeholders,
including customers, suppliers, government and media, to enhance business opportunities for BHP
Billiton in China” and “[u]tiliz[ing] Olympic hospitality to build relationships with stakeholders
from product and investor markets, and regions where we have or would like to have operations.”
11. One of the company’s sponsorship-related initiatives was a global hospitality
program under which BHPB invited guests from around the world, including foreign government
officials and representatives of state-owned enterprises, to attend the Beijing Olympics on three to
four day hospitality packages. The hospitality packages included luxury hotel accommodations,
meals, event tickets, and sightseeing excursions, at a cost of approximately $12,000 to $16,000 per
package. In addition, BHPB executives approved the offer of round trip business class airfare to
approximately 51 foreign government officials, as well as the airfares for 35 of these government
2 In 2012 and 2013, BHPB re-organized to consolidate the CSGs into five business units: Petroleum and Potash;
Copper; Iron Ore; Coal; and Aluminium, Manganese and Nickel.
4
officials’ spouses or guests. Apart from BHPB’s desire to enhance business opportunities by
strengthening relationships with its guests, these trips had no other business purpose.
12. An internal e-mail to CSG presidents and other senior BHPB business managers
emphasized the importance of the hospitality program to the success of BHPB’s sponsorship,
stating, “[a]s you know we have made a commitment to support the Beijing Olympic Games in
2008. One of the core objectives is to maximise the commercial investment made in the Games
through assisting [BHPB] to strengthen relationships with key local and global stakeholders, e.g.:
Government Ministers, Suppliers and Customers. The BHP Billiton Hospitality Program is a
primary vehicle to ensure this goal is achieved.”
13. In early 2007, BHPB employees prepared country-specific Olympic Leverage
Plans, which summarized BHPB’s business and Olympic-related objectives. In a number of
instances, these plans discussed inviting key stakeholders, including government officials, to help
BHPB develop relationships with a view to increasing or maintaining its business opportunities.
For example, the Olympic Leverage Plan prepared for one country stated that BHPB’s business
objectives in that country included “gaining access to regions that will provide growth for
[BHPB’s] business” and “gaining port access.” The plan further stated that the hospitality program
would “provide useful relationship building opportunity for . . . stakeholders” and that the invitees
would include the country’s Minister of Mines and Minister of Transport. The Olympic Leverage
Plan for another country, while not specifically addressing the hospitality program, stated that one
of the goals for the sponsorship was “us[ing] Olympics program to strengthen and build the govt’s
confidence and relationship with [BHPB], to help facilitate approvals for future projects.”
14. After Olympic Leverage Plans were prepared for each country, BHPB business
managers submitted lists of potential invitees and were instructed to rank them in order of
importance, with “Category A” being those “most critical to the business.” Internal BHPB
presentations discussed the need to establish “the business benefit” of an Olympic invitation.
15. Eventually, BHPB invited approximately 650 people to attend the Beijing
Olympics, including 176 government officials, 98 of whom were representatives of state-owned
enterprises that were BHPB customers or suppliers. BHPB also invited the spouses of 102 of these
government officials. Most of the invited government officials were from countries in Africa and
Asia where there was a known risk of corruption. Sixty of these government officials ultimately
attended, 24 of them with their spouses or guests. A number of other invited government officials
accepted their invitations, but then cancelled before the Olympics began.
B. BHPB’s Insufficient Internal Controls over the Olympic Hospitality Program
16. Early in its planning for the Olympics, BHPB identified the risk that inviting
government officials to the Olympics could potentially violate anti-corruption laws and the
company’s own Guide to Business Conduct. The company relied on its existing operating model
and an Olympic-specific internal approval process to address this risk. However, these internal
controls, and BHPB’s implementation of them, were insufficient.
17. BHPB developed a hospitality application which business managers were required
to complete for any individuals, including government officials, whom they wished to invite.
These applications included the following questions:
9. What business obligation exists or is expected to develop
between the proposed invitee and BHP Billiton?
5
10. Is BHP Billiton negotiating or considering any contract, license
agreement or seeking access rights with a third party where the
proposed invitee is in a position to influence the outcome of that
negotiation?
11. Do you believe that the offer of the proposed hospitality would
be likely to create an impression that there is an improper
connection between the provision of the hospitality and the business
that is being negotiated, considered or conducted, or in any way
might be perceived as breaching the Company’s Guide to Business
Conduct?
If yes, please provide details.
12. Are there other matters relating to the relationship between BHP Billiton
and the proposed invitee that you believe should be considered in relation to the
provision of hospitality having regard to BHP Billiton’s Guide to Business
Conduct?
18. BHPB required each such application to be filled out and signed by an employee
with knowledge of the invitee’s relationship with the company, and approved in writing by the
president of the relevant CSG or the BHPB country president.3 A cover sheet that accompanied
the blank forms included a short description of anti-bribery provisions in the Guide to Business
Conduct and urged employees to re-read the section of the Guide concerning travel, entertainment,
and gifts before completing the form. However, the controls did not adequately address the anti-
bribery risks associated with offering expensive travel and entertainment packages to government
officials.
19. First, BHPB did not require independent legal or compliance review of hospitality
applications by someone outside the CSG that was submitting the application, and did not clearly
communicate to its employees the fact that the Ethics Panel was not reviewing and approving each
invitation to a government official. On the one hand, BHPB’s internal website stated that the
hospitality applications were subject to “scrutiny by the Ethics Panel [steering committee],” and
the hospitality applications themselves stated that, “[r]equests for travel and accompanying spouses
will be approved by the Olympic Sponsorship Steering Committee and the Global Ethics Panel
Sub-Committee.” E-mails sent to some BHPB business managers by a member of the OSSC staff
stated that the Ethics Panel had “approved” their applications.
20. However, other than reviewing approximately 10 hospitality applications for
government officials in mid-2007 in order to assess the invitation process, the OSSC and the Ethics
Panel subcommittee did not review the appropriateness of individual hospitality applications or
airfare requests. The Ethics Panel’s charter stated that its role simply was to provide advice on
ethical and compliance matters, and that “accountability rest[ed] with business leaders.” Members
of the Ethics Panel understood that, consistent with their charter, their role with respect to
implementation of the hospitality program was purely advisory. As a result, business managers
had sole responsibility for reconciling the competing goals of inviting guests – including
3 In countries where multiple CSGs operated, BHPB had employees designated as “country presidents” or “country
managers” to coordinate the activities of the various business units.
6
government officials – who would “maximize [BHPB’s] commercial investment made in the
Olympic Games” without violating anti-bribery laws.
21. Second, some hospitality applications were not accurate or complete. Many
applications identified an employee of a state-owned enterprise as a “Customer,” but failed to
identify the invitee as a “Representative of Government.” In addition, a number of applications
contained “No” responses to Question 10, even when BHPB had pending negotiations, efforts to
obtain access rights, regulatory actions, or other business dealings in which the government
official was directly involved or in a position to influence. Furthermore, in a number of instances,
BHPB business people were provided with examples of language that had been used by other
employees when responding to Questions 10 and 11 in order to explain why an invitation was
appropriate, even when there was a “Yes” response to Questions 10-12. As a result, many
hospitality applications contained the exact same statements in response to Questions 10 and 11,
rather than a description of the specific facts and circumstances relating to that government
official.4
22. Third, while BHPB had an annual Guide to Business Conduct review and
certification process, and generalized training, it did not provide its employees and executives with
any specific training on how to fill out the hospitality forms or how to evaluate whether an
invitation to a government official complied with the Guide. During the relevant period, this
portion of the Guide included a case example concerning a negotiation between BHPB and a
Ministry for Planning in a particular country, in which the Minister indicated that it would help his
consideration of the company’s application if the Minister and his wife could visit BHPB’s
operations in Australia. The example stated that “this kind of situation requires the utmost caution
and you must consult senior management. You must not offer to provide anything that could be
reasonably regarded as an attempt to unduly influence the Minister’s decision. This means that
you must not pay for travel by the Minister’s wife.” However, BHPB did not provide any
guidance to its senior managers on how they should apply this portion of the Guide when
determining whether to approve invitations and airfares for government officials’ spouses.
23. Fourth, although the form asked whether any business was “expected to develop”
with the invitee, BHPB did not institute a process for updating hospitality applications or
reassessing the appropriateness of invitations to government officials if conditions changed.
Almost all of the hospitality applications relating to government officials were approved and
submitted in mid-2007. However, BHPB did not require hospitality forms to be updated, or
invitations to be reconsidered, in those situations when government officials subsequently became
involved in negotiations, attempts by BHPB to obtain access rights, or other pending matters.
24. Fifth, hospitality applications were submitted by individual CSGs, and generally
only reflected negotiations between the government official and that CSG. While lists of invitees
were circulated among senior BHPB business managers, BHPB had no process in place to
4 For example, a number of hospitality forms included the following response to Question 10: “Yes, the invitee is in
a position to influence the outcome of the pending contract, however, this is an organization that we have been
conducting business with for over five years. Negotiations and contract outcomes are a regular occurrence but due
to the lengthy relationship with BHP Billiton there is evidence [of] a long term commitment that would not
necessarily be influenced by this gesture. It is a way of rewarding the business that has previously been conducted
with BHP Billiton.”
7
determine whether the invited government official also was involved in other CSGs’ negotiations,
efforts to obtain access rights, or other business dealings.
C. As a Result of its Insufficient Internal Controls, BHPB Invited Government Officials
who were Directly Involved in, or in a Position to Influence, Pending Negotiations,
Regulatory Actions, or Business Dealings with BHPB
25. As a result of its failure to design and maintain sufficient internal controls over the
Olympic global hospitality program, BHPB invited a number of government officials who were
directly involved with, or in a position to influence, pending negotiations, efforts by BHPB to
obtain access rights, or other pending matters.
Republic of Burundi
26. In mid-2007, BHPB’s MinEx group submitted a hospitality application form to
invite the as-yet-unidentified Burundi Minister of Mines and spouse to the Olympics, with airfare
included. Because BHPB was not currently in negotiations with the Minister of Mines at the time,
the hospitality application form contained a “No” response to Question 10. However, BHPB had a
joint venture (“JV”) in Burundi with an entity that was in danger of losing a nickel exploration
permit unless it made a substantial near-term financial investment in the project or negotiated a
renewal or amendment of the permit. Under Burundi law, the Minister of Mines was responsible
for reviewing an application to renew or amend a mining permit and presenting the application to
the country’s Council of Ministers for final approval.
27. In late 2007 and early 2008, BHPB began to negotiate directly with the newly-
appointed Minister of Mines to extend and modify the JV’s nickel exploration permit. However,
BHPB employees did not update the hospitality application or take steps to re-review the
appropriateness of the invitation after these negotiations began. As noted above, no such re-review
was required by the internal controls that BHPB relied upon for the Olympic hospitality program.
The Minister of Mines and his wife attended the Olympics as BHPB’s guests for four days.
Republic of the Philippines
28. In July 2007, BHPB became embroiled in a dispute with a local JV partner
concerning a prospective nickel mining operation in the Philippines. The JV partner sued BHPB in
local court and filed requests with the country’s Secretary of Department of Environment and
Resources (“DENR”), requesting reversion of the mining rights that the JV partner had assigned to
the JV.
29. In October 2007, a BHPB employee from the Stainless Steel Materials CSG
submitted a hospitality application to invite the Secretary and his spouse to attend the Olympics,
with airfare included. The completed application contained a “Yes” response to Question 10, but
only described a technical services agreement that BHPB was considering submitting to the DENR
for the Secretary’s approval. Question 10 of the hospitality form did not explicitly require, and the
employee’s response did not provide, any information about the Secretary’s role in reviewing the
JV partner’s reversion request or the fact that the President of the Philippines had designated the
Secretary to mediate the dispute between BHPB and its JV partner. The form included a “No”
response to Question 11.
30. The Secretary accepted BHPB’s invitation in December 2007. In March 2008, he
issued a decision denying the JV partner’s reversion request and continued during the ensuing
months to mediate the parties’ dispute. In late July, BHPB became concerned that the company’s
8
JV partner had learned about the Olympics invitation. As a result, BHPB withdrew the invitation
shortly before the Olympics began.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
31. In mid-2007, MinEx submitted a hospitality application form to invite the Governor
of the Katanga Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the “DRC”) and his spouse,
with airfare included. Following its June 2007 review of 10 invitations to government officials, the
Ethics Panel subcommittee advised MinEx to provide more detail about whether the invitation
involved Gecamines, a state-owned entity with which BHPB was attempting to negotiate a copper
exploration deal. In response, MinEx submitted a revised application that contained a “No”
response to Question 10, stating, “[t]he issuing and management of mineral titles and negotiations
with third parties in DRC have nothing to do with the Governor’s roles and responsibilities.
Although [BHPB] are currently engaged in negotiations with State copper company, Gecamines,
the Governor of Katanga will have no influence in these dealings.”
32. Later in 2007, however, BHPB employees held several meetings with the
Governor. Internal summaries of these meetings noted that the Governor was “a close ally of [the
DRC] President” and that having the Governor as BHPB’s ally “could be the key to unlock a
successful entry in a deal with Gecamines.” In spite of obtaining this information after making the
initial decision to invite the Governor of Katanga and his wife to the Olympics, BHPB employees
did not update the hospitality application form or take steps to re-review the appropriateness of the
invitation. No such re-review was required under the internal controls that BHPB relied upon for
the Olympic hospitality program. The Governor accepted the invitation, but then cancelled before
the Olympics.
Republic of Guinea
33. In May 2007, MinEx submitted a hospitality application to invite the Guinea
Minister of Mines and his spouse to the Olympics, with airfare included. The application
contained a “No” response to Question 10, and in response to Question 11 it stated, “No. A sound
professional relationship with the Guinea Ministry of Mines is key for the success of the [BHPB]
exploration and mining business in this country.” Following its June 2007 review of 10 invitations
to government officials, the Ethics Panel subcommittee advised MinEx to provide additional
information concerning this invitation. The MinEx employee who had prepared the original form
asked BHPB’s Guinea country president to respond to the request for information concerning any
pending negotiations with the Minister. The country president replied that “of course” there would
be “further negotiations” regarding the upcoming renewal of a bauxite mining concession held by
BHPB and the government’s intention to review all existing mining concessions, but that the
response to Question 11 was “key in that regard.”
34. This information was not passed along to the Ethics Panel subcommittee, however,
and the form was not updated to accurately reflect the pending negotiations across all of the CSGs
operating in Guinea. Because they received no response to the Guinea country president’s email,
MinEx officials mistakenly understood that the Ethics Panel had approved the invitation. The
Minister accepted the invitation on behalf of himself and his wife in January 2008, but cancelled
shortly before the Olympics began.
9
Legal Standards and FCPA Violations
35. Under Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act, the Commission may impose a cease-
and-desist order upon any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any
provision of the Exchange Act or any rule or regulation thereunder, and upon any other person
that is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or
should have known would contribute to such violation.
36. Under Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, issuers are required to make and
keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and disposition of the assets of the issuer.
37. Under Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, issuers are required to devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such
statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in
accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded
accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and
appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.
38. As a result of the conduct described above, BHPB violated Section 13(b)(2)(A)
because its books and records, namely certain Olympic hospitality applications, did not, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect pending negotiations or business dealings between
BHPB and government officials invited to the Olympics. BHPB violated Section 13(b)(2)(B)
because it did not devise and maintain internal accounting controls over the Olympic hospitality
program that were sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that access to assets and
transactions were in executed in accordance with management’s authorization.
BHPB’s Cooperation and Remedial Efforts
39. In response to the Commission’s investigation, BHPB retained outside counsel to
assist it with conducting an extensive internal investigation into potential improper conduct in
the jurisdictions that were the subject of the staff’s inquiry. BHPB provided significant
cooperation with the Commission’s investigation by voluntarily producing large volumes of
business, financial, and accounting documents from around the world in response to the staff’s
requests, and by voluntarily producing translations of key documents. BHPB’s counsel
conducted scores of interviews and provided the staff with regular reports on the findings of its
internal investigation.
40. BHPB also has undertaken significant remedial actions. BHPB has created a
compliance group within its legal department that is independent from the business units. This
compliance group is responsible for FCPA compliance, among other things, and reports directly
to BHPB’s general counsel and Audit Committee. In addition, it has reviewed its existing anti-
corruption compliance program and implemented other changes. These include embedding
independent anti-corruption managers into its businesses and further enhancing its policies and
procedures concerning hospitality, gift giving, use of third party agents, business partners, and
other high-risk compliance areas. BHPB also has enhanced its financial and auditing controls,
including policies to specifically address conducting business in high-risk markets. BHPB has
10
conducted extensive employee training on anti-corruption issues and overhauled its processes for
conducting internal investigations of potential violations of anti-corruption laws.
IV.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions
agreed to in Respondents BHP Billiton Ltd.’s and BHP Billiton Plc’s Offers.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondents cease and desist from
committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and
13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act.
B. Respondents shall, within 10 days of the entry of this Order, pay a civil money
penalty totaling $25,000,000 to the Securities and Exchange Commission for remission to the
United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3). If timely payment is not
made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3717. Payment must be made in one
of the following ways:
(1) Respondents may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will
provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;
(2) Respondents may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through
the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
(3) Respondents may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States
postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and
hand-delivered or mailed to:
Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169
Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying BHP
Billiton Ltd. and BHP Billiton Plc as Respondents in these proceedings, and the file number of
these proceedings. A copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Antonia
Chion, Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F
St., NE, Washington, DC 20549.
C. During a one-year term as set forth below, Respondents shall report to the
Commission staff on the operation of BHPB’s FCPA and anti-corruption compliance program.
If Respondents discover credible evidence, not already reported to the Commission staff, that:
(1) questionable or corrupt payments or questionable or corrupt transfers of property or interests
may have been offered, promised, paid, or authorized by Respondents, or any entity or person
while working directly for Respondents, to any government official; (2) that related false books
and records have been maintained; or (3) that Respondents’ internal controls failed to detect and
prevent such conduct, Respondents shall promptly report such conduct to the Commission staff.
During this one-year period:
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(1) Respondents shall submit to the Commission staff a written report within 180
calendar days of the entry of this Order on the operation of BHPB’s FCPA and
anti-corruption compliance program (the “Initial Report”). The Initial Report
shall be transmitted to Alexander Koch, Assistant Director, Division of
Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F St., NE, Washington,
DC 20549-5041. Respondents may extend the time period for issuance of the
Initial Report with prior written approval of the Commission staff.
(2) Respondents shall undertake one follow-up review, incorporating any comments
provided by the Commission staff on the Initial Report, to further monitor and
assess the operation of its FCPA and anti-corruption compliance program and
whether Respondents’ policies and procedures are reasonably designed to detect
and prevent violations of the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws (the
“Final Report”).
(3) The Final Report shall be completed by no later than 180 days after the Initial
Report, and shall be transmitted to Alexander Koch, Assistant Director, Division
of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F St., NE,
Washington, DC 20549-5041. Respondents may extend the time period for
issuance of the Final Report with prior written approval of the Commission staff.
(4) The reports submitted by Respondents will likely include proprietary, financial,
confidential, and competitive business information. Public disclosure of the
reports could discourage cooperation, impede pending or potential government
investigations or undermine the objectives of the reporting requirement. For these
reasons, among others, the reports and the contents thereof are intended to remain
and shall remain non-public, except (a) pursuant to court order, (b) as agreed by
the parties in writing, (c) to the extent that the Commission staff determines in its
sole discretion that disclosure would be in furtherance of the Commission’s
discharge of its duties and responsibilities, or (d) is otherwise required by law.
By the Commission.
Brent J. Fields
Secretary