United States v. FLASHDOT LIMITED; PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED; PHOENIXFIN PRIVATE LIMITED; CHUN GAN; and KE TANG, Southern District of New York (Mar. 26, 2024) — Indictment

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YO
RK 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
V . 
FLASHDOT LIMITED, 
f/k/a "Phoenixfin Li
mited," 
PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, and 
PHOENJXFIN PRIVATE LIMITED, together 
with Flashdot Limited and Peken Global 
Limited, d/b/a KuCoin, 
CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael," and 
KE TANG, a/k/a "Eric," 
Defendants. 
SEALED INDICTMENT 
24Cr. 
COUNT ONE 
(Cons piracy to Violate the Bank Secrecy Act) 
The Grand Jury charges: 
OVERVIEW 
1. At all times relevant to this Indictment, FLASHDOT LIMITED (a business entity 
incorporated 
in the Cayman Islands), formerly lmown as Phoenixfi11 Limited, PEKEN GLOBAL 
LIMITED (a business entity incorporated in the Repub
lic of Seychelles), and PHOENIXF IN 
PRIVATE LIMITED (a business entity incorporated in Singapore) (together, "KuCoin"), and two 
ofKuCoin's founders and majority owners, CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael," and KE TANG, a/Ida 
"Eric," the defendants, have operated an online  cryptocmrency exchange and  trading platform 
through the website www.kucoin.com and an application available for download on mobile 
phones. 

2. Since its founding  in or about September 2017  by, among others, CHUN GAN, 
a/k/a "Michael," and KE TANG, a/Ida "Eric," the defendants, KuCoin has become one 
of the 
largest global cryptocurrency exchange platforms. As 
of in or about March 2024, according to its 
public website,  KuCoin had over 30 million customers located in at least 207 countries and 
territories, and, according to a third-par
ty public website, its daily spot trading volume exceeded 
$2.8 billion.  KuCoin's website also touts public rankings of cryptocurrency exchanges that place 
KuCoin in the top five worldwide. As 
of December 2023, one of these public rankings listed 
KuCoin as the 
fifth largest c1yptocurrency spot exchange based on traffic, liquidity, and trading 
volumes, among other factors, and the fourth largest cryptocurrency derivatives exchange based 
on liquidity and no1malized volume, among other factors. 
3. KuCoin solicits and accepts  orders for spot trades in c1yptocunencies, including 
Bitcoi
n, Ethereum, and others. KuCoin customers are required to deposit  cryptocurrency in a 
Ku Coin account prior to engaging in any trading activity, including spot trading. 
4. KuCoin also solicits and accepts  orders for trades in, among other things, futures 
contracts and other derivative products tied to the value 
of cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin. 
KuCoin accepts cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, from its customers to margin and guarantee 
derivative products and, as 
of at least in or about October 2019, offered its customers up to 100 
times leverage. 
5. Since its launch in September 2017 through the present, KuCoin,  CHUN GAN, 
a/I
da ''Michael," and KE TANG, a/k/a "Eric," the defe_ndants, have actively sought to serve, and 
have in fact served, thousands 
of customers located in the United States, and through in or about 
December 2023, actively sought 
to serve and in fact served customers located in the Southern 
District 
of New York. 
2 

6. By engaging in the foregoing actions, among other things, KuCoin has at aII 
relevant t imes been a money transmitting business required to register with the U.S. Depattment 
of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") and, since in or about July 
2019, when it launched a  derivatives trading platform, has been a futures commission merchant 
("FCM"). As such, Ku Coin 
is required to comply with the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act, 
31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq. (the "BSA"), applicable to money transmitting businesses and FCMs. 
7. Prom at  least 
in or about September 2017 through the present, however, KuCoin, 
CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael
," and KE TANG, a/Ida "Eric," the defendants, willfully failed to 
establish, implement, and  maintain an adequate and effective anti-money laundering ("AML") 
program, including an adequate customer verification program, more commonly referred to 
as a 
know-your-customer ("KYC") program, in violation 
of the  BSA. From at least in or about 
September 20
17 through at least in or about December 2023, KuCoin also failed to register with 
FinCEN as a money transmitting business. 
8. As patt of this willful evasion of KuCoin's obligations to comply with U.S. AML 
and KYC requirements, KuCoin, CHUN GAN, a/k/a 
"Michael," and KE TANG, a/Ida "Eric," the 
defendants, affirmatively attempted to, and did, conceal the existence 
of KuCoin's large base of 
U.S. customers in order to make it  appear as if KuCoin was exempt from U.S. AML and KYC 
requirements. Indeed, KuCoin actively prevented its U.S .  customers from even  identifying 
themselves 
as such to KuCoin when establishing KuCoin accounts.  Moreover, KuCoin lied to at 
least one investor regarding the geographic location 
of its customers, falsely representing that it 
had no U.S. customers, when, 
in truth and in fact, KuCoin and its executives, including GAN and 
TANG, knew 
thatKuCoin's customer base included a substantial po1tion of customers based in 
the 
United States. 
3 

9. In part as a result of the willful failure of Ku Coin, CHUN GAN, a/Ida "Michael," 
and KE TANG, a/lda "Eric," the defendants, to implement AML and KYC programs, KuCoin 
made itself available to be used, and in fact was used, 
as a vehicle for laundering the proceeds of 
suspicious and criminal activities, including proceeds from sanctions violations, darknet markets, 
and malware, ransomware, 
and fraud schemes. Specifically, since its founding, KuCoin has 
received over $5.39 billion and transmitted over $4.09 billion of such suspicious and criminal 
proceeds. 
10. Many KuCoin customers used 
its trading platform specifically because of the 
anonymity 
of the services it provided. In other words, KuCoin's no-KYC policy was integral to 
its growth 
and success between in or about 2017 and in or about July 2023. 
Background on the Bank Secrecy Act 
11. The Bank Secrecy Act, as amended by the Patriot Act of 2001, is designed to 
"prevent the laundering 
of money and the financing of terrorism" and "protect the financial system 
of the United States from criminal abuse.>' 31 U.S.C. §  5311. The BSA imposes reporting, 
recordkeeping, and controls requirements 
on covered "financial institutions," which include FCMs 
that are required to register 
as such under the Commodity Exchange Act (the "CEA"), and money 
transmitting businesses "who engage[] 
as a  business in the transmission of currency, funds, or 
value that substitutes for currency" and are required to register as such with FinCEN. 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5312. 
12. The CEA requires an entity to register as an FCM with the United States 
Commodity 
and Futures Trading Commission (the "CFTC") if it  solicits or accepts orders for 
commodity futures contracts, swaps, or retail commodity transactions (among other specified 
products), 
and in or in connection with such  activity accepts any money or property to margin, 
guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or may result therefrom. Bitcoin and other 
4 

cryptocurrencies are "commodities" under the CEA. 
13. Under the BSA, an PCM must establish an AML program that is approved by senior 
management and that includes, at a  minimum: "policies, procedures, and internal controls 
reasonably designed to prevent the financial institution from being used for money laundering or 
the financing 
of terrorist activities"; independent compliance testing; ongoing training for 
appropriate personnel; and "risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due 
diligence." 
See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(l); 31 C.F.R. § 1026.210. FCMs must also file suspicious 
activity repo1ts ("SARs") in ce1tain situations, including when a transaction involves funds or other 
assets 
of at least $5,000 and the FCM lmows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that the transaction 
involves funds derived from illegal activity or that the PCM is  being used to facilitate criminal 
activity. 
See31 C.F.R. § 1026.320. 
14. As part 
of its AML program, an FCM must implement a written KYC program that 
includes "risk-based procedures for verifying the identity 
of each customer to the extent reasonable 
and practicable." This KYC program must enable an PCM to "form a reasonable belief that it 
lmows the true identity 
of each customer." At a minimum, an PCM must collect the name, date of 
bitth, address, and government identification number of each customer prior to account opening, 
and must take steps to verify that information 
in a reasonable time. The KYC program must also 
include procedures for "determining whether a customer appears on any list 
of known or suspected 
terrorists or terrorist organizations issued by any Federal government agency." 
See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5318(1); 31 C.F.R. § 1026.220. 
15. The BSA also requires money transmitting businesses 
to register with the U.S. 
Secretary 
of the Treasury. See 31 U.S.C. §  5330. Cryptocurrency exchanges that accept and 
transmit cryptocurrencies are money transmitting businesses. Under the BSA and its 
5 

implementing regulations, money transmitting businesses must "develop, implement, and maintain 
an effective anti-money laundering program," 
i.e., "one that is reasonably designed to prevent the 
money services business from being  used to facilitate money laundering and the financing of 
terrorist  activities." 31 C.F.R.  §  1022.210. At a  minimum, an effective AML program must 
include customer identification procedures, a  compliance of
ficer, training and education of 
appropriate personnel in the AML program, and provide for independent review to monitor and 
maintain  an adequate program. 
See id. Money transmitting businesses must also identify and 
report suspicious transactions relevant to a  possible violation 
of law or regulat ions with the 
Depa1tment 
of the Treasury. See 31 C.F.R. § I 022.320. 
Background on KuCoin, GAN, and TANG 
16. KuCoin has, at all times re levant to this Indictment, been owned and operated by 
and through one or more associated  companies, including FLASHDOT LIMITED, formerly 
known 
as Phoenixfin Limited, PEK.EN GLOBAL LIMITED,  and  PHOENIXFIN PRJVATE 
LIMITED, the defendants. KuCoin has never 
had a physical presence in either the Seychelles or 
the Cayman Islands, where the defendants are incorporated.   Rather, KuCoin 's employees and 
physical operations are located in Singapore and China, among other places. 
17. KuCoin was founded in or about September 2017 by CH
UN GAN, a/k/a "Michael," 
and KE TANG, a/k/a "Eric," the defendants, and others.  GAN and TANG have been co-owners 
of Ku Coin since its founding.  As of in or about March 2022, GAN and TANG have been Directors 
of and  together held an approximately 75% ownership share in KuCoin's holding company 
FLASHDOT LIMITED, 
formerly known as Phoenixfin Limited, the defendant. PEKEN 
GLOBAL LIMITED and PHOENIXFIN PRJVA TE  LIMITED, the defendants, 
are subsidiaries 
and/or affiliates ofFLASHDOT LIMITED. 
6 

18. PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, the defendant, has operated KuCoin since in or about 
September 2019 through the present. CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael," and KE TANG, a/Ida "Eric," 
the defendants, control PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED; GAN is  its Directol' and GAN and TANG 
are its sole shareholders. 
19. PHOENIXFIN PRJVATE LIMITED, the defendant, is the entity that operated 
Ku Coin from 
in or about September 2017 through in or about December 2018. As of in or about 
May 2018, CHUN GAN, a/Ida "Michael," the defendant, was the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") 
of PHOENIXFIN PRJVATE LIMITED and KE TANG, a/lda "Eric," the defendant, was its 
President. 
20. From in or about September 2017 through the present, KuCoin has offered and 
allowed its customers to engage in spot trades 
of ciyptocurrencies, including Bitcoin. As of 
October 2023, KuCoin allowed its customers to buy and sell more than 700 cryptocurrencies. 
According to Ku Coin's public website as of October 2023, Ku Coin had daily spot trading volume 
of approximately $10 billion, allowed the purchase of c1yptocurrencies with more than fifty fiat 
currencies, and offered customers margin spot trading at 
up to ten times leverage. 
21. In or about July 2019, KuCoin launched a derivatives trading platform that allowed 
its customers 
to trade futures contracts based on cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin. KuCoin's 
first futures product offering was a "Bitcoin Perpetual Contract," the value 
of which was derived 
by reference 
to the Bitcoin/U.S. dollar exchange rate as published on six third-pmty c1yptocurrency 
exchanges. At that time, KuCoin offered its customers up to 
20 times leverage. 
22. At various times since July 2019, KuCoin has expanded its futures product 
offerings. By October 2019, KuCoin offered its customers 
up to 100 times leverage on futures 
trades, and 
by August 2021, KuCoin offered futures contracts involving over 60 different 
7 

cryptocurrencies. 
23. Since in or about November 2021, KuCoin has permitted customers to use fiat 
currency, including U.S. dollars, in addition 
to cryptocurrency to make deposits into their Ku Coin 
accounts. Before then, KuCoin customers who wanted to use fiat currency in connection with 
deposits could 
do so, but only through third-party fiat gateways. 
Ku Coin Deliberately Failed to Implement BSA-Compliant AML and KYC Programs 
KuCoin Has Deliberately Sought and Obtained Substantial Numbers of U.S. Customers 
24. At all times relevant to this Indictment, Ku Coin has solicited and accepted offers 
on its spot trading and derivatives trading platforms from customers located in the United States, 
including individual retail customers. As 
of in or about May 2018, for example, KuCoin, in 
materials sent 
to a potential investor ("Investor-I") via email on which two of Ku Coin's founders 
and majority owners, CHUN GAN, a/lda "Michael," and KE TANG, a/Ida "Eric," the defendants, 
were copied, represented that 
it had more than double the customers in the United States-
approximately 17% of its customer base-than it had in any other country in the world. The next 
largest country had approximately 6.8% 
of KuCoin's customer base. Consistent with this 
representation, 
as of in or about November 2022, a third-party analysis of digital traffic showed 
that approximately 19% 
of visits to KuCoin's website, www.kucoin.com, were from individuals 
in the United States. 
25. Ku Coin also engaged in marketing activities with the intent and effect 
of attracting 
U.S. customers. For example, KuCoin employees regularly attended cryptocurrency conferences 
in the Southern District 
of New York and elsewhere in the United States. In or about June 2022, 
KuCoin was a sponsor ofNFT.NYC 2022, a conference regarding non-fungible tokens ("NFTs") 
held in Manhattan. Also in or about 
Ju1,1e 2022, a KuCoin senior executive  and other KuCoin 
8 

employees attended Consensus 2022, a cryptocurrency conference held in Austin, Texas at which 
KuCoin hosted an infonnational booth. 
26. KuCoin and its founders, CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael," and KE TANG, 
a/le/a 
"Eric," the defendants, were well aware that substantial numbers ofU.S.-based persons were using 
KuCoin. At all times relevant to this Indictment, KuCoin collected customers' location 
information, including internet protocol ("IP") address information, from customers> electronic 
devices, which indicated the location from which the device accessed 
Ku Coin's platform. The IP 
address information collected by KuCoin demonstrated that KuCoin customers were accessing 
KuCoin using U.S.-based 
IP addresses. Moreover, KuCoin maintained login history for its 
customers, which included associated location information under the heading "Login Region." For 
example, an email sent from KuCoin 
to a U.S. customer on or about November 14, 2022 notified 
the customer that he had logged in from "United States Bridgehampton." In addition, KuCoin 
included customer IP address information, including U.S.-based IP addresses, in emails sent to 
KuCoin customers for verification purposes in connection with customer withdrawals. 
27. This location information collected by   KuCoin included U.S. locations for 
customers in the United States. KuCoin also included location information in certain automated 
emails it sent to customers. CBUN GAN, 
a/le/a "Michael," and KE TANG, a/k/a "Eric," the 
defendants, lmew that such automated emails reflected that KuCoin users were logging into 
KuCoin from the United States. Indeed, in ce1tain instances GAN and TANG received such emails 
from Ku Coin reflecting that they themselves had logged into their Ku Coin accounts from locations 
in the United States. For example, in or about January 2021, TANG received an email from no-
[email protected] confirming that, according to his IP address, TANG had personally logged into 
KuCoin from Los Angeles, California. Likewise, in or about January 2019, GAN received an 
9 

automated email from [email protected] confirming that, according to his IP address, GAN 
had personally logged in to Ku Coin from San Mateo, California. 
Although KuCoin Had Substantial Numbers of U.S. Users, the Defendants DeUberately Failed to 
Register wW1 the CFTC and FinCEN 
28. Because KuCoin operates a derivatives exchange that offers and sells commodity 
futures to retail and non-retail customers in the United States, and in connection with such offers 
and sales accepts property to margin, guarantee, and secure those trades and contracts, it is required 
to register with the CFTC 
as an FCM. Neve1theless, KuCoin and CHUN GAN, a/Ida "Michael," 
and 
KET ANG, a/Ida "Eric," the defendants, failed to register Ku Coin with the CFTC as an FCM. 
29. In addition, because Ku Coin accepts and transmits cryptocurrencies to retail and 
non-retail customers in the United States, it 
is required to register with FinCEN as a  money 
transmitting business. Nevertheless, from at least 
in or about September 2017 through at least in 
or about December 2023, Ku Coin and CHUN GAN, a/Ida "Michael," and KE TANG, a/Ida "Eric," 
the defendants, failed to register KuCoin with FinCEN 
as a money transmitting business. 
The Defendants Willfully Failed to Implement BSA-Compliant AML and KYC Programs 
30. KuCoin, CHUN GAN, a/Ida "Michael," and KE TANG, a/Ida "Eric," the 
defendants, willfully solicited and accepted customers in the United States without complying with 
U.S. AML and KYC requirements. 
31. By at least in or about September 2017, KuCoin, CHUN GAN, a/Ida "Michael," 
and KE TANG, a/Ida "Eric," the defendants, understood that U.S. AML and KYC requirements 
would in fact apply to KuCoin 
if it served U.S. customers or otherwise operated within the United 
States. As KuCoin's CEO publicly acknowledged in or about October 2021 on Reddit, an 
American social news aggregation, content rating, and discussion website,  KuCoin "keep[s] a 
close eye on the regulation changes in every market we operate." 
10 

32. In or about May 2018, when a  sales representative from a  financial services 
company asked one 
of KuCoin's founders and majority owners, CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael," 
the defendant, to "provide your FinCEN registration as a money transmitter given your company 
services 
US citizens,"  GAN confirmed his knowledge of the FinCEN registration requirements 
when he responded, "[w]e haven't [sic] a FinCEN registration yet." As noted 
supra, paragraph 
29, from 
at least in or about September 2017 through at least i  n or about December 2023, KuCoin 
in fact did not register with FinCEN as a money transmitting business. 
33. KuCoin, CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael," and KE TANG, a/k/a 
"Eric," the 
defendants willfully flouted U.S. AML and KYC legal obligations and sought to conceal KuCoin's 
conduct from third patties.  Among other things, KuCoin, GAN;and T ANG allowed customers, 
including individual retail customers 
in the United States, to register and trade without providing 
sufficient  identifying infotmation or documents 
to allow KuCoin to form a reasonable belief that 
it  knew the trne identi
ty of  its customers. Prior to on or about Ju ly  15, 2023, customers could 
register to t
rade  on Ku Coin anonymously,  by providing only an email address and without 
providing any identifying information or documentation. For example, in or about March 2023, a 
new KuCoin customer was able to obtain a  new account and subsequently engage in  spot and 
futures trades 
by providing only an anonymous email address. 
34. Indeed, KuCoin employees regularly and frequently stated on public social media 
sites that K 
YC was not mandatory on KuCoin, including in response to posts from customers who 
had identified themselves_ 
as being in the United States. 
11 

• 
KuCoin Moderntor 
{<.jll(11ColnMndcirnt.or 
Replying to @l~evgri166 
Hi! KYC is not supported to USA users, however, it is 
not mandatory on KuCoin 
to do KYC. Usual 
transactions can 
be done using an unverified account -
support. kucoi
n. plus/hc/en-us/artic ... 
11::17 PM· Arr ?.1. 202?. 
35. As a  result, from at least in or about November 2022 through at least in or about 
March 2023, KuCoin customers who were located in the United States opened multiple KuCoin 
accounts and conducted spot and futures trades, 
inch1d ing margin trades, all without providing any 
personal identifying information or identity documents. 
36. On 
or about June 17, 2022, a KuCoin U.S. customer (the "U.S. Customer)>) wrote 
to [email protected], which account's distribution list included two 
ofKuCoin's founders and 
majority owners, CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael,"  and 
KE TANG, a/Ida "Eric," the defendants, as 
well as KuCoin's CEO, that the U.S. Customer was "a regulatory attorney" and had "found 
numerous regulatory issues at KuCoin (including AML, KYC, Unregistered Platform, Material 
Misstatements)." The U.S. Customer asked for assistance resolving an issue regarding a liquidated 
position and stated that 
"ifKuCoin is unwilling to refund my account, I will have no choice but to 
reach out to my regulatory  contacts with my  findings 
.... "   The  next day, after a  series of 
communications with the U.S. Customer, [email protected] responded to the U.S. Customer 
that "the platform found that your account IP address is from a restricted counhy" and asked the 
U.S. Customer 
to submit information from a non-restricted country for KYC or KuCoin would 
"according to our compliance policy, 
... have to terminate the account service with you." In 
response, the U.S. Customer sent KuCoin, among other  things, multiple screenshots 
of public 
12 

Ku Coin social media posts confirming that U.S. customers could use KuCoin. 
37. KuCoin froze the U.S. Customer's account that same month. However, the U.S. 
Customer thereafter was simply able to open another KuCoin account from the United States from 
a computer associated with a U.S. IP address, showing that the U.S. Customer's account was frozen 
not because the U.S. Customer was a U.S. user, but because 
of the U.S. Customer's threat oflegal 
action. As noted 
in the U.S. Customer's responses to KuCoin and as shown by the ease with which 
the U.S. Customer thereafter opened another KuCoin account from the United States from a 
computer associated with a U.S. IP address, 
Ku Coin did not have a general practice of restricting 
use by U.S. customers; in fact, KuCoin's social media posts and its significant number 
of 
confirmed U.S. customers prove the opposite. 
38. Because KuCoin at 
no relevant time had an adequate KYC program, KuCoin could 
not and did not monitor its customer transactions for money laundering, terrorist financing, and 
sanctions violations. Accordingly, although 
Ku Coin has received over $5.39 billion and sent over 
$4.09 billion 
of suspicious and criminal proceeds since its launch in or about September 201_7, 
KuCoin has never filed any Suspicious Activity Repo1ts to rep01t !mown or suspected violations 
of law and suspicious activity to FinCEN. 
39. While KuCoin actively solicited U.S. customers and allowed them to use its 
platform without requiring any KYC or providing any AML controls, KuCoin took affirmative 
steps 
to make it  appear as if KuCoin was exempt from the application of U.S. AML and KYC 
requirements 
and to conceal the existence of its U.S. customer base. 
40. For example, KuCoin offered customers an optional identity verification process 
that, once completed, granted customers access 
to additional features such as the ability to make 
larger daily withdrawals. Despite knowing that many 
of its customers were located in the United 
13 

States, KuCoin did not include the United States as a possible country for selection by customers 
in this optional verification process. By excluding the United States from a lengthy list of countries 
in the drop-down menu provided to customers utilizing this  process, KuCoin prevented U.
S. 
customers from being able to identify themselves as such. 
41. De
spite  preventing customers from identifying themselves as U.S.-based, KuCoin 
actively encouraged U.S. customers 
to utilize its spot trading and derivatives trading  platforms. 
F
or example, in or about April 2022, a user of the ''X" social media platform (formedy known as 
"Twitter") wrote that he was "in the United States" and that his attempt to use KuCoin's optional 
verification process had failed.  In response, a KuCoin representative wrote that while "users from 
the 
USA is not suppo1ted for KYC service," "[r]est assured that you are 11ot obliged to do KYC on 
KuCoin." 
42. Similarly, in or about February 2022, a Reddit user asked "Will Kucoin ever follow 
U.S. KYC/AML requirements?" In response, a KuCoin representative stated that "we are only 
providing service for countries listed in the KYC countries list (US is  not included), in order to 
comply with all applicable laws and regulations," but further explained that ''you may still perform 
all fu nct ions on our exchange 
as normal" except that "[t]here will be individual account's daily 
withdrawal limitation 
of 5 BTC [Bitcoin]" and potential limitations on other activities. 
43. 
As described above, in or about May 2018, Ku Coin told Investor-I that 
approximately 1
7% of its customers wel'e based in the United States, see sipra paragraph 24. But 
over time KuCoin concealed its reliance on its U.S. customer base from third parties, including 
investors. 
In or about Janua1y 2022, for example, Ku Coin provided a potential investor ("Investor-
2") with fi nancial and operational data for 2020 and 2021 in which it falsely represented that it had 
no U.S. customers. Instead, Ku Coin claimed that its largest marke
t, with approximately 18.4% of 
14 

its customers, was "South America." Based in part on those representations, in or about May 2022, 
Investor-2 invested approximately 
$8 million in KuCoin. KuCoin's representation to Investor-2 
that it had 
no U.S. customers was false. As noted infra paragraph 47, over a year and a halflater, 
on or about December 
8, 2023, KuCoin, through its current operating entity PEK.EN GLOBAL 
LIMITED, the defendant, entered into a publicly filed consent order with the Attorney General 
of 
the State of New York, admitting that, as of November 29, 2023, KuCoin held approximately 
$16,766,642 
in assets for New York customers. 
44. It was only 
on or about May 15, 2023, that KuCoin belatedly adopted a  KYC 
program requiring verification 
of identities, after Investor-1 and a  financial services company 
notified KuCoin 
of a federal criminal investigation into its activities. And even then, KuCoin's 
KYC program was not BSA-compliant. On.or about May 
15, 2023, KuCoin revised the "Terms 
of Use" that are posted on its public website. KuCoin's prior Terms of Use, which were last 
revised in or about August 2019, included a purpo1ted undertaking that "the User 
... is not a 
resident 
of or registered in, any of the jurisdictions that [Ku Coin] has deemed to be high risk." 
These Terms 
of Use, however, did not actually identify any "high risk" jurisdictions. On or about 
May 15, 2023, this provision was replaced with one setting fmth a purpo1ted undertaking that "the 
User 
... is not a  resident of or registered in any of the Restricted Locations," and "Restricted 
Locations" was defined to include the United States. While KuCoin publicly trumpeted Terms 
of 
Use purportedly excluding U.S. users from its service, in truth and in fact, a substantial number of 
U.S. users continued to use the platform, as KuCoin well !mew. For example, as noted infra, 
paragraph 47, nearly seven months later, 
on or about December 8, 2023, KuCoin, through its 
current operating entity PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, the defendant, entered into a publicly filed 
consent order with the Attorney General 
of the State of New York, admitting that, as of November 
15 

29, 2023, Ku Coin held approximately $16,766,642 in assets for New York customers. 
45. Approximately a  month and a  half later, 
on or about June 28, 2023, KuCoin 
announced that, 
as of July 15, 2023, it was introducing a mandat01y KYC process. However, this 
KYC process applied to new customers only and did not apply 
to KuCoin's millions of existing 
customers, including the substantial number 
of customers based in the United States. According 
to KuCoin's announcement, existing customers would be allowed to continue using KuCoin's spot 
trading, futures trading, and margin trading features to withdraw, sell, and close positions without 
paiticipating in the mandatory KYC process, but would not be allowed to deposit new funds. 
46. In or about September 2023, KuCoin purported to "block" U.S. customers from 
using its website, but it did not in fact 
do so. Specifically, when a customer with a U.S. IP address 
visited the homepage 
of KuCoin's website,  www.kucoin.com, a  pop-up banner was displayed 
notifying the customer that "[b ]ased on your 
IP address, we currently do not provide services in 
your country or region due to local laws, regulations, or policies." This notification, however, was 
a mere fa9ade. KuCoin did not prevent customers in the United States, and using U.S. IP addresses, 
from logging in to their KuCoin accounts. Moreover, 
if a customer with a U.S. IP address visited 
pages on KuCoin's website 
other than the primary homepage-such as, for example, the account 
"Sign Up" or account "Log In" 
pages-no similar banner or warning was displayed. 
47. On or about December 
8, 2023, KuCoin, through its current operating entity 
PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, the defendant, entered into a publicly filed consent order with the 
Attorney General 
of the State of New York. In that consent order, Ku Coin acknowledged that it 
was acting 
as an unregistered securities broker or dealer in New York State and that, as of 
November 29, 2023, Ku Coin held approximately $16,766,642 in assets for New York customers. 
New York customers were identified based on a New York address, phone number, or IP address 
16 

or GPS location in KuCoin's records.  As part of its consent order, KuCoin agreed to terminate 
access 
to its services for New York users within 120 days. 
48. As a result 
of its failure to implement BSA-compliant AML and KYC programs, 
KuCoin made itself available 
as a vehicle for money laundering.  For example, from at least in or 
about 2020 through at least in or about 2022, KuCoin was used to launder the proceeds of a wire 
fraud and bank fraud scheme that operated for over two years and in which millions of dollars 
were stolen from U.S. ban
ks and other cryptocurrency exchanges. And between or about August 
8, 2022, and in or about November 2023, almost 197 KuCoin deposit addresses directly or 
indirectly 
received a total of more than $3.2 million wo1th of cryptocurrency from Tornado Cash, 
a virtual currency mixer that was designated 
by the Office of Foreign Assets Control as a Specially 
Designated National ("SDN") on August 
8, 2022 because it was used to launder the proceeds of 
cybercrimes. This SDN designation prohibited U.S. persons or persons within the United States 
from transacting 
with Tornado Cash. 
49. From in or  about September 2017 to the present, KuCoin failed to file any reports 
of suspicious transactions to the Depa1tment of the Treasu1y as required by 31 U.S.C. § 53 l 8(g) 
and 
31 C.F.R. §§ 1026.320 and 1022.320. 
STATUTORY ALLEGATIONS 
50. The allegations contained in paragraphs I   through 49 of this Indictment are 
repeated and realleged as 
if set fo1t h fully herein. 
51. From at least in or about July 2019 through the present, 
in the Southern District of 
New York and elsewhere, FLASHDOT LIMITED, fo1merly known as Phoenixfin Limited, 
PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, PHOENIX.FIN PRlVATE LIMITED, CHUN GAN, a/k/a 
"Michael," and KE TANG, 
a/le/a "Eric," the defendants, willfully and knowingly  combined, 
17 
I 
I 
I  , 
I 
I 
t 
M ' 
r. 

conspired, confederated, and agreed together and with each other to commit an offense against the 
United States, 
to wit, violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5318 and 
5322, and 
31 C.F.R. §§ 1026.210, 1026.220, 1026.300, and 1026.320. 
52. It was a  part 
aud object of the conspiracy that FLASHDOT LIMITED, formerly 
known as Phoenixfin Limited, PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, PHOENIXFIN 
PRIVATE 
LIMITED, CHUN GAN, a/Ida "Michael," and 
KE TANG, a/Ida "Eric," the defendants, and others 
!mown and unknown, would and did willfully'cause a  financial  institution 
to violate the Bank 
Secrecy Act by failing to establish, implement, and maintain 
an anti-money laundering program 
that satisfies the minimum standards required by 
31 U.S.C. §§ 5318 and 5322, and 31 C.F.R. §§ 
1026.210 and 1026.220, and by failing to abide by the rep01ting requirements of 31 U.S.C. §§ 
53 I 8 and 5322, and 31 C.F.R. §§ 1026.300 and 1026.320, to wit, the defendants caused KuCoin, 
a  futures commission merchant with U.S. customers, 
to fail to establish and implement an anti-
money laundering  program that included policies, procedures, and internal controls reasonab
ly 
designed to prevent KuCoin from being used for money laundering or terrorist financing; or risk.-
based procedures for verifying the identity of each Ku Coin customer to t he extent reasonable and 
practicable; and further caused KuCoin 
to fail to file any Suspicious Activity Repo1ts with 
FinCEN. 
Overt Acts 
53. In fuitherance of the conspiracy, and to effect the illegal object thereof, 
FLASHDOT L IMITED, formerly lmown as Phoenixfin Limited, PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, 
PHOENIXFIN PRIVATE LIMITED, CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael," and 
KE TANG, a/k/a "Eric," 
the defendants, together with others known and unknown, committed the following ove1t acts, in 
the Southern District 
of New .York and elsewhere: 
18 

a. From at least in  or about September 2017 through the present, the defendan~s 
caused KuCoin to transmit and accept funds, and value that substitutes for currency, in the form 
of  Bitcoin  and other cryptocul1'encks, on behaJf 
of customers who resided in the United States 
while using KuCoin's spot trading services. 
b. From at least in or about October 2018 through at least in or about March 2022, the 
domain kucoin.com was registered by TANG on behalf 
of PHOENIXFIN PRIVATE LIMITED. 
c. In or about January 2018, GAN opened an account with a third-party customer 
service software provider on behalf 
of Ku Coin, and the third party' s software and services were 
thereafter used 
to provide Ku Coin customer service to U.S. customers. 
d. In or about May 2018, when a  sales representative from a  financial  services 
company asked GAN to "provide your FinCEN registration as a money transmitter given your 
company services US citizens," GAN responded, "[w]e haven't [sic] a FinCEN registration yet." 
e. In 
or about   January 2019, GAN received an automated email from no-
[email protected] confirming that, according 
to his IP address, he had personally logged in to 
KuCoin from San Mateo, California. 
f. From at least in or about July 2019 through the present, the defendants caused 
KuCoin to allow customers who resided in the United States to anonymously obtain 
or maintain 
access to KuCoin, and to use KuCoin's derivative and margin trading services. 
g. In or about January 2021, TANG received an email from [email protected] 
confirming that,  according 
to his IP address, he had personally logged in to KuCoin from Los 
Angeles, California. 
h. In or about February 2022, TANG pa1iicipated in a meeting with representatives of 
lnvestor-2 regarding KuCoin's operations. 
19 

i. In  or about November 2022, the defendants allowed a  customer located in  New 
York, New York, who was using a computer associated with a U.S. IP address, to anonymously 
create a  Ku 
Coin account that provided access to KuCoin's spot, derivative, and margin trading 
services. 
j. In or about June 2022, the defendants sent KuCoin employees to a cryptocurrency 
conference being held in New York, N ew York for the purpose of, among other 
things, attracting 
U.S. customers. 
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.) 
COUNT TWO 
(Conspiracy to Operate 
an U nlicensed Money Transmitting Business) 
The Grand Jury flllther charges: 
54. The  allegations contained in paragraphs I  through 49 
of this Indictment  are 
repeated and realleged as if set forth fully herein. 
55. From at least 
in or about September 2017 tlu·ough at least in or about December 
2023,  in the Southern District of  New York and elsewhere, FLASHDOT LIMITED, formerly 
lmown as Phoenixfm Limited, PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, PHOENIXFIN PRIVATE 
LIMITED, CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael," and KE TANG, a/k/a «Eric," the defendants, willfully 
and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated, a
nd agreed together and with each other to 
commit an offense against the United States, 
to wit, operation of an unlicensed money transmitting 
business, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1960. 
56. It was a  part and object 
of the conspiracy that FLASHDOT LIMITED, formerly 
known as Phoenixfin Limited, PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, PHOENIXFIN PRIVATE 
LIMITED, CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael," and KE TANG, 
a/Ida "Eiic," the defendants, would and 
did knowingly conduct, control, manag
e, supervise, direct, and own all and patt of an unlicensed 
20 

money transmitting business, which affected interstate or foreign commerce and failed to comply 
with the money transmitting business registration requirements under 
31 U.S.C. §  5330, and 
regulations prescribed under such section, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1960, to wit, the defendants 
caused Ku Coin, a cryptocurrency exchange, to accept and transmit funds and value that substitutes 
for currency, in the form 
of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, on behalf of U.S. customers, 
without registering with FinCEN. 
Overt Acts 
57. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect the illegal object thereof, the 
following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District 
of New York and 
elsewhere: 
a. The overt acts contained in paragraphs 53.a through 53.j of this Indictment are 
repeated and realleged 
as if set fo1th fully herein. 
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.) 
COUNT THREE 
(Violation 
of the Bank Secrecy Act) 
The Grand Jury further charges: 
58. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 49 and 53 of this Indictment are 
repeated and realleged 
as if set forth fully herein. 
59. From at least in or about July 2019 through the present, in the Southern District 
of 
New Yorlc and elsewhere, FLASHDOT LIMITED, formerly known as Phoenixfin Limited, 
PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, and PHOENIXFIN PRIVATE LIMITED, the defendants, did 
willfully cause a  financial institution to violate the Bank Secrecy Act by failing to establish, 
implement, 
and maintain an anti-money laundering program that satisfies the minimum standards 
required by 
31 U.S.C. §§ 5318 and 5322, and 31 C.F.R. §§ 1026.210 and 1026.220, to wit, the 
21 

defendants caused Ku Coin, a futures commission merchant with U.S. customers, to fail to establish 
and implement 
an anti-money laundering program that included policies, procedures, and internal 
controls reasonably designed to prevent Ku Coin from being used for money laundering or terrorist 
financing, or risk-based procedures for verifying the identity of each KuCoin customer to the 
extent reasonable and practicable, 
as patt of a pattern of any illegal activity involving more than 
$100,000 in a 12-month period. 
(Title 31, United States Code, Sections 
5318(11)(1) and (I), 5322(6) and (c); Title 31, Code of 
Federal Regulations, Sections 1026.210 and 1026.220; and Title 18, United States Code, Section 
2.) 
COUNT FOUR 
(Operation 
of an Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business) 
The Grand Jury fmther charges: 
60. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 49, 53, and 57 
of this Indictment 
are repeated and realleged 
as if set forth fully herein. 
61. From at least in or about September 2017 through at least in or about December 
2023, in the Southern District 
of New York and elsewhere, FLASHDOT LIMITED, formerly 
known 
as Phoenixfin Limited, PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, and PHOENIXFIN PRIVATE 
LIMITED, the defendants, knowingly conducted, controlled, managed, supervised, directed, and 
owned all  and part 
of an unlicensed money transmitting business, which affected interstate and 
foreign commerce and failed to comply with the money transmitting business registration 
requirements under 
31 U .S.C. § 5330, and regulations prescribed under such section, to wit, the 
defendants caused KuCoin, a  cryptocurrency exchange, to accept and transmit funds and value 
that substitutes for currency, 
in the form of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, on behalf of U.S. 
customers without registering with FinCEN. 
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1960 and 2.) 
22 

FORFEITURE ALLEGATIONS 
62. As a  result of committing the offense alleged in Count Two of this Indictment, 
FLASHDOT LIMITED, formerly known 
as Phoenixfin Limited, PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, 
PHOENIXF
JN PRN ATE LIMITED, CHUN GAN, a/k/a "Michael," and KE TANG, a/le/a "Eric," 
the defendants, shall fotfeit 
to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 
982(a)(I ), any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense, 
or any property 
traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum 
of money in United States currency 
representing the amount 
of property involved in sa id offense. 
63. As a  result of committing  the offense alleged  in  Count Four of this Indictment, 
FLASHD OT LIMlTED, formerly known as Phoenixfin Limited, PEKEN GLOBAL LIMITED, 
and PHOENIXFIN PRIVATE LIMITED, the defendants, shall forfeit to the United  States, 
pursuant to 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(l), any and all property, real and personal, 
involved 
in said offense, or any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a 
sum 
of money in United States currency representing the amount of property involved in said 
offense. 
23 

Substitute Assets Provision 
64. If any of the above-described forfeitable prope1ty, as a result of any act or omission 
of the defendants: 
a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; 
b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a thil'd person; 
c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction 
of the Court; 
d. has been substantially diminished in value; or 
e. has been commingled with other  property which cannot be subdivided without 
difficulty; 
it is the intent 
of the United States, pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), and 
Title  28, United States Code, Section 246l (c), 
to seek forfeiture of any other property of the 
defendants 
up to the value of the above forfeitable property. 
(Title 1
8, United States Code, Section 982; 
T itle 21, United States Code, Section 853; and 
T
itle 28, United States Code, Section 2461.) 
24 
DAMIAN WILLIAMS 
United States Attorney