SEC v. MORRIE TOBIN; MILAN PATEL; MATTHEW LEDVINA; DANIEL LACHER; BRIAN QUINN; and AND DAVID SKRILOFF, No. 1:18-CV-12451, District of Massachusetts (Aug. 30, 2019)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
    Plaintiff,
     v.

MORRIE TOBIN, MILAN PATEL,
MATTHEW LEDVINA, DANIEL
LACHER, BRIAN QUINN, AND DAVID
SKRILOFF,
    Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-CV-12451
(NMG)

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
     Plaintiff, Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”), alleges the
following against Defendants Morrie Tobin (“Tobin”), Milan Patel (“Patel”), Matthew Ledvina
(“Ledvina”), Daniel Lacher (“Lacher”), Brian Quinn (“Quinn”), and David Skriloff (“Skriloff”):
SUMMARY
1. This is a securities fraud enforcement action.  The defendants engaged in a
deceptive scheme to sell publicly traded stock to investors.  Tobin secretly controlled and owned
substantially all of the stock in two public companies:  Environmental Packaging Technologies
Holdings, Inc. (“Environmental Packaging”) and CURE Pharmaceutical Holding Corp.
(“CURE”).  From approximately June 2013 to the present (the “Relevant Period”), the
defendants defrauded investors by concealing Tobin’s control of these companies, enabling
Tobin to sell his shares: (a) without registering the offers or sales of stock with the Commission;
(b) without disclosing accurate information about Tobin’s ownership and control over the
companies; and (c) without complying with legal limitations on sales of stock by company
“affiliates” such as Tobin.  As a result of the defendants’ scheme, what appeared to be ordinary

2
 
trading by unaffiliated investors was actually a massive dump of shares by a company insider
and his team seeking to profit at the expense of defrauded investors.
2. A company is considered “public” when its securities trade on public markets,
which carries with it legal requirements, such as obligations to disclose certain business and
financial information regularly to the public.  Investors in certain public companies are required
to disclose publicly any ownership interest in excess of 5% of the company’s stock.  As part of
the scheme, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher disguised Tobin’s ownership to make it appear
that his shares were owned by multiple unaffiliated entities and individuals.  In reality, these
entities and individuals were merely holding the stock as nominees for Tobin, the true owner and
control person.
3. Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher arranged for Tobin’s stock to be transferred to two
offshore asset managers, including Wintercap SA (“Wintercap”), a Swiss company run by Roger
Knox.  The accounts at the offshore asset managers were in the names of nominee entities—
entities created to hold stock for Tobin—which further concealed Tobin’s ownership and control.
The offshore asset managers deposited the stock in omnibus securities accounts (accounts used
to execute orders on behalf of asset managers’ undisclosed clients, such as Tobin) at foreign and
domestic brokerage firms, in blocks of shares, each of which constituted less than 5% of each
company’s outstanding shares.  The offshore asset managers, through the brokerage firms, then
sold millions of dollars of shares of Tobin’s stock to investors.
4. To further preserve Tobin’s anonymity, Ledvina and Lacher each served as
purported “beneficial owners” of nominee accounts held at Wintercap, and also arranged for
multiple other individuals to do so.  To establish these accounts for Tobin’s nominees, Lacher
and Ledvina each filled out account opening documents falsely claiming to be the beneficial

3
 
owners, and furnished personal information such as copies of their passports.  These deceptive
steps were intended to conceal Tobin’s involvement in the event that law enforcement authorities
or regulators ever examined the records of Wintercap.
5. Quinn was Tobin’s partner in the scheme involving Environmental Packaging and
planned to share in the proceeds of the sale of Tobin’s Environmental Packaging stock.  Quinn’s
role in the scheme was to: (a) facilitate a reverse merger between the public company controlled
by Tobin (then a “shell company” with no operations) and a private bulk-packaging company,
the combination of which became Environmental Packaging; (b) arrange and oversee a $1
million promotional campaign designed to inflate the share price and trading volume of
Environmental Packaging stock after the reverse merger; and (c) direct the offshore asset
managers’ selling of the Environmental Packaging stock in order to profit from the artificially-
inflated demand for Environmental Packaging stock.
6. Skriloff was the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the private bulk-packaging
company, and, after its merger with Tobin’s public shell company, continued as the CEO of
Environmental Packaging.  Skriloff negotiated the reverse merger with Quinn and Tobin, raised
money from investors to pay $1 million for the promotional campaign, and attempted to disguise
the payment as part of a purported consulting agreement.  As the CEO of Environmental
Packaging, Skriloff made misstatements in public reports filed with the Commission about the
reverse merger and about the company’s connection to the promotional campaign.  Skriloff also
failed to disclose material facts regarding Tobin, Quinn, and their scheme.
7. Patel and Lacher helped Tobin and Quinn funnel the $1 million payment for the
promotional campaign from Skriloff to the lead stock promoter.  In particular, Patel arranged for
Wintercap to create an entity named Svarna Ltd. (“Svarna”) for the purpose of misleading

4
 
investors and potential investors into believing that the promotional campaign was paid for by a
third party—and not by Tobin or the company itself.  Lacher helped to open Svarna’s account at
Wintercap, and arranged for his girlfriend to pose as Svarna’s purported beneficial owner.  The
promotional campaign touted the stock of Environmental Packaging while falsely stating that the
campaign had been paid for by Svarna.
8. Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher engaged in a similar scheme with respect to
CURE, utilizing a network of nominee entities to secretly hold Tobin’s shares, arranging for
offshore asset managers to deposit those shares with brokers in blocks constituting less than 5%
of CURE’s outstanding shares, selling Tobin’s shares to investors, and sharing in the profits.
9. Tobin and his team failed to register their sales of either Environmental Packaging
or CURE stock with the Commission.  Consequently, the sale and offer of those securities
violated Sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act of 1933, respectively.
10. On June 27, 2017, the Commission suspended trading in the securities of
Environmental Packaging.  After the Commission suspended trading, the defendants attempted
further to conceal Tobin’s control over Environmental Packaging and its stock and to obstruct
the Commission’s investigation.  For example, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher arranged to change
the names on certain accounts at Wintercap to the names of individuals not directly involved
with the scheme.  Quinn and Skriloff each deleted incriminating emails to prevent their
discovery, and Quinn provided false testimony to the Commission staff.
11. As a result of the conduct alleged herein, Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and
Lacher violated, and unless restrained and enjoined will continue to violate, Sections 17(a)(1)
and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1), (3)], Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules

5
 
10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 340.10b-5(a), (c)] and Sections 5(a) and (c) of the
Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c)].
12. As a result of the conduct alleged herein, Skriloff violated Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)], Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and
Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 340.10b-5].  Skriloff also aided and abetted violations of
Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rules
10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder by the other defendants, and aided and abetted violations of Section
17(a)(2) of the Securities Act by Environmental Packaging.
13. The Commission seeks a permanent injunction against the defendants, enjoining
each from engaging in transactions, acts, practices, and courses of business of the type alleged in
this Complaint, disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains from the unlawful conduct set forth in this
Complaint, together with prejudgment interest, civil penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the
Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(3)], an order barring the defendants from participating in any offering of a penny stock,
pursuant to Section 20(g) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(g)] and/or 21(d) of the Exchange
Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)], an order barring Skriloff from acting as an officer or director of a
public company pursuant to Section 20(e) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §77t(e)] and Section
21(d)(2) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)], and such other relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
14. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Section 22(a) of the
Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)] and Sections 21(d), 21(e), and 27 of the Exchange Act [15
U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78u(e), and 78aa].

6
 
15. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to Section 22(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 77v(a)] and Section 27 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78aa].  Certain of the acts, practices,
transactions and courses of business alleged in this Complaint occurred within the District of
Massachusetts, and were effected, directly or indirectly, by making use of means or
instrumentalities of transportation or communication in interstate commerce, or the mails.  For
example, during the Relevant Period, promotional materials concerning Environmental
Packaging were mailed to various individuals’ residences in Massachusetts, and certain
individuals who reside in Massachusetts purchased stock of Environmental Packaging and
CURE.
DEFENDANTS
16. Morrie Tobin, (“Tobin”), age 56, is a resident of Los Angeles, California.
17. Milan Patel, (“Patel”), age 49, is a resident of Miami, Florida.  Patel is a licensed
attorney, and during the Relevant Period was a partner in the United States tax group of an
international law firm headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland.
18. Matthew Ledvina, (“Ledvina”), age 46, is a resident of Switzerland.  Ledvina is
an attorney and colleague of Patel’s at an international law firm headquartered in Zurich,
Switzerland.
19.  Daniel Lacher, (“Lacher”), age 55, is a resident of Switzerland.  During the
Relevant Period, Lacher operated a financial services company with a principal place of business
in Volketswil, Switzerland.  Lacher provided services to undisclosed company insiders or control
persons as an intermediary to foreign asset managers and brokers.
20. Brian Quinn, (“Quinn”), age 48, is a resident of Newport Beach, California.
During the Relevant Period, Quinn operated an investor relations company in Newport Beach

7
 
which, according to its website, “provides a wide variety of services for public companies that
need results-oriented investor relations programs,” and “assist[s] private companies with pre IPO
services.”
21. David Skriloff, (“Skriloff”), age 53, is a resident of New York.  During the
Relevant Period, Skriloff was the CEO of a private bulk-packaging company and then the CEO
of Environmental Packaging after the reverse merger.
RELATED PARTIES AND ENTITIES
22. Environmental Packaging Technologies Holdings, Inc. (“Environmental
Packaging”) is a public company which was incorporated in Nevada in 2011.  Environmental
Packaging initially was named GS Valet, Inc.  For several years, it purported to be a valet-
parking business.  In or about October 2012, its stock began trading on OTC Markets.  During
the same time period, the company began voluntarily filing quarterly, annual, and other periodic
reports with the Commission following an initial public offering to sell stock to prospective
investors.  In or around August 2013, Tobin acquired control of GS Valet, Inc., and subsequently
arranged for its name to be changed to International Metals Streaming Corp. (“International
Metals”).  International Metals subsequently declared itself to be a shell company—a company
with no or nominal operations or assets.  In or about 2017, International Metals merged with
Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., a private company, and changed its name to
Environmental Packaging.  Environmental Packaging continued to trade on OTC Markets under
the ticker symbol EPTI and continued voluntarily to file periodic reports with the Commission.
According to reports filed with the Commission, Environmental Packaging is in the business of
manufacturing “flexitanks” used to transport liquids in shipping containers.  After the
Commission suspended trading in Environmental Packaging’s stock in June 2017,

8
 
Environmental Packaging stock was traded on the so-called “Grey Market.”  That is, its stock is
available for purchase or sale by brokers acting on instructions initiated by their customers.
23. CURE Pharmaceutical Holding Corp. (“CURE”), formerly known as Makkanotti
Group Corp. (“Makkanotti”), is a public company which was incorporated in Nevada in May
2014.  In or about December 2015, Makkanotti began trading on OTC Markets.  During the same
time period, Makkanotti began voluntarily filing periodic reports with the Commission following
an initial public offering to sell stock to prospective investors.  In or about November 2016,
Makkanotti merged with a private company named Cure Pharmaceutical Corporation and
changed its name to CURE.  CURE continued to be available for trading on OTC Markets under
the ticker CURR and continued voluntarily to file periodic reports with the Commission.  In
March 2018, CURE registered its securities with the Commission, thereby requiring it to file
periodic reports.  According to reports filed with the Commission, CURE is in the business of
developing patents it holds for an oral drug delivery system.
24. Roger J. Knox, (“Knox”), age 48, is a citizen of the United Kingdom and resident
of France.  Knox is the founder and chief executive officer of Wintercap SA.
25. Wintercap SA, (“Wintercap”), formerly known as Silverton SA (“Silverton”), is a
Swiss entity that purports to be an asset manager.  Wintercap SA trades stock for its clients, who
are company insiders or control persons, and sells that stock into the United States’ securities
market.  For consistency, the Complaint refers to Wintercap, although it was known as Silverton
during much of the Relevant Period.
BACKGROUND
26.  “Restricted stock” is stock of a publicly traded company (also known as an
“issuer”) that is acquired from an issuer, or an affiliate of the issuer, in a private transaction that

9
 
is not registered with the Commission.  Stock held by an issuer or affiliate of an issuer is
restricted stock.  Absent an exemption under the federal securities laws and rules, restricted stock
cannot legally be offered or sold to the public unless a securities registration statement has been
filed with the Commission (for an offer) or is in effect (for a sale).  A registration statement
contains important information about an issuer’s business operations, financial condition, results
of operation, risk factors, and management.  It also should disclose any person or group who is
the beneficial owner of more than 5% of the company’s securities.
27. An “affiliate” of an issuer is a person or entity that, directly or indirectly through
one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, such
issuer (i.e. a control person).  “Control” means the power to direct management and policies of
the company in question.  Typically, affiliates include officers, directors and controlling
shareholders but any person who is “under common control” with an issuer may also be an
affiliate.  Absent registration, affiliates are only permitted to sell a small percentage of their stock
according to SEC Rule 144 [17 C.F.R. 230.144].
28. “Unrestricted stock” is stock that may legally be offered and sold in the public
marketplace by a non-affiliate, without registration or restriction, ordinarily having previously
been subject to a registration statement filed with the Commission.  Registration statements are
transaction specific; they apply to each separate offer and sale as detailed in the registration
statement.  Registration does not attach to the security itself, and registration at one stage for one
party does not necessarily suffice to register subsequent offers and sales by the same or different
parties.  For example, if a control person buys shares in the company s/he controls, those shares
are subject to restrictions and ordinarily require registration for bulk sales of such shares.

10
 
29. A “transfer agent” is a business which, among other things, issues and cancels
certificates of a company’s stock to reflect changes in ownership.  Many companies that have
publicly traded securities use transfer agents to keep track of the individuals and entities that own
their stocks.
30. The Over-The-Counter Securities Market (“OTC Markets”) is an inter-dealer
quotation and reporting service through which certain stocks are available for trading and are
publicly purchased and sold through brokered orders.
ENVIRONMENTAL PACKAGING
Scheme to Conceal Tobin’s Control and Stock Ownership
31. In or about August 2013, Tobin acquired, directly or indirectly, undisclosed
control of substantially all of the stock of GS Valet, Inc., the public company which would
ultimately become Environmental Packaging.
32. Tobin did not hold any shares of GS Valet, Inc., in his own name.  Instead, he
used a nominee entity created for Tobin by Patel and Ledvina—MT Global Holdings—to hold a
large block of restricted stock, and a group of friends and relatives to hold smaller blocks of
purportedly unrestricted stock.  By using these nominees, Tobin concealed his ownership and
control of GS Valet, Inc., stock.
33. Tobin arranged for GS Valet, Inc., to change its name to International Metals in
September 2013.  International Metals subsequently declared itself to be a shell company—a
company with no or nominal operations or assets.  Prior to 2016, International Metals had little
to no business operations.  Although International Metals had a CEO, the CEO took instructions
from Tobin with respect to numerous corporate activities.

11
 
34. Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher planned to use Tobin’s secret control over
International Metals as part of a scheme to profit from illegal stock sales using a network of
foreign and domestic nominee entities.  Lacher charged Tobin a fee of 1.5% of the group’s
trading proceeds for his involvement in the scheme.  Patel and Ledvina agreed with Tobin that
they would be paid 4.5% of the group’s net trading proceeds, after paying fees associated with
offshore asset managers and other costs.
Negotiation for Reverse Merger and Stock Promotion
35. As part of the scheme, Tobin set out to find a private company that he could use
to generate positive news, thereby increasing the value of International Metals’ stock.
36. In or around early 2016, Quinn introduced Tobin to Skriloff, the CEO of
Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., a private bulk-packaging company that was a
potential partner in their scheme.
37. Quinn had a prior business relationship with the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., which Quinn understood to be seeking
to raise capital by merging with a public company, such as the one controlled by Tobin.
38. In exchange for Quinn’s introduction to Skriloff and continued assistance, Tobin
agreed to share half of his share of the trading proceeds with Quinn (after paying fees to Lacher,
Patel, Ledvina, and offshore asset managers, as well as other costs of the scheme).  Together they
planned to use Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., as an entity whose operations
would provide the pretext for a promotional campaign aimed at raising the market value of
Tobin’s secret holdings of International Metals.  Tobin’s stock could then be sold to investors for
a profit using the network of nominee entities and accounts managed by Patel, Ledvina, and
Lacher.  Because of their agreement, Tobin and Quinn communicated with each other about

12
 
Environmental Packaging stock as if it were jointly owned, though Tobin was the one who had
the ability to exercise control over the stock through Patel, Ledvina, Lacher, and their network of
nominees.
39. During the remainder of 2016, Tobin and Quinn negotiated with Skriloff for
Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., to “reverse merge” into International Metals.
40. In a reverse merger, a private company becomes a public company by purchasing
a public shell company.  Typically, the shareholders of the private operating company exchange
their shares for a large majority of the shares of the public company. Although the public shell
company survives the merger, the private operating company’s shareholders gain a controlling
interest in the voting power and outstanding shares of stock of the public shell company.  The
assets and business operations of the post-merger surviving public company are primarily, if not
solely, those of the former private operating company.
41. Skriloff knew that Tobin and Quinn secretly controlled International Metals, and
that they intended to retain substantially all of its purportedly unrestricted stock after the reverse
merger was complete so that they could promote the stock, artificially create demand, and then
illegally sell the stock to unsuspecting investors.
42. Tobin, Quinn, and Skriloff initially agreed that Environmental Packaging
Technologies, Inc., would pay $1.5 million for International Metals, including $1 million which
would be spent on a stock promotion campaign.  A stock promotion campaign is typically an
effort by parties to generate interest in a company’s stock among investors, often in an effort to
increase trading volume in the stock and/or boost the company’s stock price.  Stock promotion
materials are usually disseminated to potential investors in a variety of ways, including by mass
emails or Internet-based newsletters.  Under the initial agreement, Tobin and Quinn would retain

13
 
approximately 12 million shares of purportedly unrestricted stock in International Metals, which
was substantially all of its unrestricted stock.  International Metals would issue 40 million shares
of restricted stock—that is, stock that could not yet be sold in the market—to the shareholders of
Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc.  International Metals would become Environmental
Packaging and, in effect, the reverse merger would leave Tobin and Quinn secretly holding
nearly all of the Environmental Packaging stock that could purportedly be sold in the U.S.
market.
43. Skriloff knowingly joined the scheme.  At the time he was negotiating the terms
of the transaction, Skriloff understood that Tobin and Quinn would retain, and intended to sell,
their 12 million shares of purportedly unrestricted stock.  In an email sent by Skriloff
transmitting the executed term sheet for the reverse merger to Tobin, Quinn, and an attorney
working on the reverse merger at Tobin’s direction, Skriloff described the fact that the
Tobin/Quinn “team” would be getting “$1.5 million and stock worth $4-5 million,” that “parts of
it need to go out” (referencing the funds to be spent on the stock promotion), and that they would
“collectively become the largest shareholders as part of this.”  During the negotiations, Skriloff
also requested that Quinn and Tobin give two million of their purportedly unrestricted shares to
Skriloff and another individual associated with the company, so that they could personally profit
from the promotional campaign and illegal stock sales.
44. Tobin, Quinn, and Skriloff also agreed to a financing deal related to the reverse
merger, in which Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., would raise approximately $5
million from investors in a private offering in anticipation of the reverse merger, and would use
$1 million of these funds to pay for the promotional campaign.

14
 
45. To conceal their scheme, Tobin and Skriloff attempted to disguise the $1 million
payment for promotional services as a fee for consulting services.  Accordingly, the draft merger
agreement was modified to remove $1 million of the $1.5 million purchase price, and drafts of a
purported consulting agreement for $1 million were exchanged.  In reality, the consulting
agreement was a sham, and the only purpose of the $1 million payment was to finance the stock
promotion campaign.
46. In December 2016, International Metals publicly announced the reverse merger,
and filed a Form 8-K (a form used to notify investors about significant events) with the
Commission.  The Form 8-K described the agreement and attached a copy of the merger
agreement.  The merger agreement, which was signed by Skriloff, reflected that Environmental
Packaging Technologies, Inc., had agreed to pay $500,000 “to the shareholder of the controlling
block” of stock in International Metals.  This was materiality false and misleading in that it
concealed the fact that Skriloff had also agreed that Environmental Packaging Technologies,
Inc., would pay an additional $1 million, to be used for the stock promotion desired by Tobin and
Quinn as a condition of the merger.
Preparations for Reverse Merger, Stock Promotion, and Stock Sales
47. The reverse merger between International Metals and Environmental Packaging
Technologies, Inc. closed on or around June 9, 2017.  During the approximately six months
between the announcement of the merger in December 2016 and the completion of the
transaction in June 2017, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher worked to prepare to sell Tobin’s
shares during the stock promotion campaign.  This involved, among other things: (a) readying
International Metals for the reverse merger; (b) transferring Tobin’s stock from his friends and
relatives to nominee entities (the “Environmental Packaging Nominees”) that would appear to be

15
 
unconnected to Tobin; (c) opening accounts at Wintercap and another offshore asset manager in
the names of the Environmental Packaging Nominees; and (d) arranging for these asset managers
to deposit Tobin’s Environmental Packaging shares with brokers in small blocks, each
constituting just under 5% of Environmental Packaging’s outstanding shares, in order to conceal
the fact that one individual or group (here, Tobin and his team) controlled more than 5% of
Environmental Packaging’s outstanding shares and substantially all of its purportedly
unrestricted shares.
48. Tobin and Patel used Tobin’s control over International Metals to prepare it for
the reverse merger.  The private company, Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., was
supposed to pay a certain amount ($500,000, later adjusted to $550,000) in exchange for Tobin
“cancelling” the large block of restricted shares of International Metals which had been held for
Tobin by MT Global since 2013.
49. In December 2016, Tobin, Patel, and Lacher arranged for MT Global to transfer
its block of restricted shares to Sundrive Holdings Corp. (“Sundrive”), an entity incorporated in
the Caribbean island of Nevis by an offshore asset manager as arranged by Lacher, Patel, and
Ledvina.  This created the false appearance that International Metals was controlled by Sundrive,
an entity with no apparent connection to Tobin.
50. In February 2017, Tobin and Patel arranged for International Metals to change its
name to Environmental Packaging in anticipation of the completed merger.  To do this, Patel
signed an authorization for the name change on behalf of Sundrive, at Tobin’s direction.
51. Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and Lacher planned to sell the purportedly
unrestricted shares that had been held for Tobin by friends and relatives since 2013.  As they
each knew, or recklessly disregarded, these shares were restricted from resale without

16
 
registration because Tobin was an affiliate of Environmental Packaging who owned substantially
all its stock.  They further knew, or recklessly disregarded, that because the shares falsely
appeared to be unrestricted, a broker was likely to accept a deposit of the shares and sell them to
investors without further inquiry as to a possible exemption from registration and without
limiting the amount of shares that could be sold in accordance with SEC Rule 144.
52. Starting in or around January 2017, Patel coordinated with Tobin and others to
transfer Environmental Packaging stock from Tobin’s relatives and friends to the Environmental
Packaging Nominees.
53. Patel signed phony stock purchase agreements reciting amounts of consideration
that had purportedly been paid by the Environmental Packaging Nominees to Tobin’s relatives
and friends.  In reality, the Environmental Packaging Nominees never paid for the stock and
Tobin was, and remained, the true beneficial owner of the stock.  For example, Patel signed a
stock purchase agreement dated January 20, 2017, on behalf of an Environmental Packaging
Nominee purporting to purchase 359,316 shares of Environmental Packaging stock from Tobin’s
brother-in-law for $359.32.  In reality, even that nominal payment was not made.
54. After Tobin’s stock in Environmental Packaging had been transferred to the
Environmental Packaging Nominees, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher arranged to open several
accounts on Tobin’s behalf with Wintercap, with each account in the name of one of the
Environmental Packaging Nominees.  On January 12, 2017, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher met in
person with Knox in Switzerland to arrange to open the accounts.  To avoid direct association
with the stock sales, Ledvina, Lacher, and a colleague at Patel’s and Ledvina’s law firm posed as
the supposed beneficial owners of one of these accounts instead of Tobin.  Wintercap kept track

17
 
of these “beneficial owners” on a Swiss regulatory form called “Form A” that asset managers are
required to maintain to track beneficial ownership of assets.
55. Patel and Lacher then facilitated the transfer of Tobin’s stock to the accounts held
by Wintercap and to one account at another asset manager.  For each of these transfers, Patel
signed transfer agent instruction forms, which caused the stock to be transferred to the offshore
asset managers.  For example, Patel signed two transfer instruction forms dated March 27, 2017,
to instruct the transfer agent to transfer stock certificates from two Environmental Packaging
Nominees to Wintercap.  Lacher sent transfer instruction forms signed by Patel to the transfer
agent, and arranged for payment to the transfer agent for the costs of the transactions.
56. Knox and Wintercap deposited Tobin’s shares of Environmental Packaging with
multiple brokers in order to sell the shares in the U.S. securities market.  The deposits to brokers
were all in amounts constituting less than 5% of Environmental Packaging’s outstanding shares,
so as to conceal the fact that these shares were all owned and controlled by an individual or
group that was an affiliate of Environmental Packaging.  The use of the offshore asset managers’
accounts added another layer of concealment concerning Tobin’s ownership of the stock because
the stock was deposited into omnibus brokerage accounts (i.e., accounts that do not identify
specific beneficial ownership information) at foreign and domestic brokerage firms.
57. Immediately prior to the completion of the reverse merger between
Environmental Packaging and the private company, Tobin controlled substantially all of
Environmental Packaging’s stock, while concealing his ownership through multiple nominees
and false representations about beneficial ownership.
58. By using a network of nominees, accounts at offshore asset managers in the
names of those nominees, and omnibus accounts at brokers in the names of the asset managers,

18
 
Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher, hid Tobin’s control over Environmental Packaging’s stock,
thereby creating the false appearance that no single Environmental Packaging Nominee or Tobin
owned more than 5% of the company’s stock.  This façade enabled the defendants to evade SEC
rules that required Environmental Packaging to list all persons holding greater than 5% of its
outstanding stock in reports filed with the Commission.
Stock Promotion Efforts to Sell Tobin’s Environmental Packaging Stock
59. As agreed with Tobin and Quinn, Skriloff solicited investments in anticipation of
the merger of Environmental Packaging and the private company in order to finance the stock
promotion campaign for Environmental Packaging in support of Tobin’s unregistered sale of
millions of shares of his stock.  Unbeknownst to those investors, Tobin, Quinn, and Skriloff had
agreed that $1 million of the funds raised from investors would be used to pay for a promotional
campaign targeting investors and potential investors in Environmental Packaging.
60. To that end, in anticipation of the reverse merger, Tobin and Quinn hired a
company (the “Stock Promoter”) to lead a promotional campaign carefully timed to coincide
with the announcement of the completion of the reverse merger in June 2017.  The Stock
Promoter’s role was to target potential investors with a mass mail and mass email promotional
campaign designed to create interest in Environmental Packaging stock.  The Stock Promoter
also referred Quinn to a writer whom Tobin and Quinn hired to draft the creative content for the
promotion, which Quinn and Tobin reviewed and edited.
61. Skriloff provided Tobin and Quinn with a detailed PowerPoint presentation about
Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., an executive summary, and a spreadsheet of
financial projections, with the understanding that Tobin and Quinn would use these materials for

19
 
the stock promotion campaign.  Quinn sent the presentation to the Stock Promoter and to the
writer, and the writer used these materials to author the creative content for the promotion.
62. Although Quinn knew that the stock promotion would be paid for by
Environmental Packaging, as directed by Tobin and Quinn, Quinn falsely informed the Stock
Promoter that a third party named “Svarna” was paying for the stock promotion.
63. The defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that the Stock Promoter
would disclose to the investing public the name of the party that was purportedly paying for the
promotion and that such disclosures would be misleading absent a disclosure that the promotion
was being underwritten by controlling affiliates of Environmental Packaging.
64. In order to deceive investors about Tobin’s connection with Environmental
Packaging and the stock promotion, Patel asked Wintercap to create an offshore nominee
account through which to funnel payment for the promotional campaign.
65. On or about May 19, 2017, Lacher emailed Patel an invoice for $1 million from
the Stock Promoter, billed to “Svarna, LLC,” along with wiring instructions.  That same day,
Patel wrote an email to Knox which states, in relevant part: “[w]e need to form an entity with the
name Svarna LLC . . . .”  Patel also wrote that his team would provide the name of an individual
that could be named as the “beneficial owner” of Svarna LLC.  Patel also stated in this email
that, in sum and substance, the Svarna entity would be used as a conduit to pay the Stock
Promoter.
66. On or about May 22, 2017, Knox emailed the following to Patel: “[a]s discussed,
the amended Marshall Island company named Svarna Ltd is available and incorporation has been
requested today.”  Patel and Lacher arranged for Lacher’s girlfriend to serve as the purported

20
 
“beneficial owner” of Svarna, and provided Wintercap with a curriculum vitae, a copy of her
passport, and a signed “Form A” which represented that she was the beneficial owner of Svarna.
67. On or about May 20 through May 25, 2017, Tobin and Skriloff caused the transfer
of a total of approximately $1 million from Environmental Packaging to Svarna’s account at
Wintercap.  On or about May 24 through June 1, 2017, Tobin, Quinn, Patel, and Lacher arranged
for these funds to be transferred from Svarna’s account to the Stock Promoter for the purpose of
promoting Environmental Packaging and its stock.
68. On or about June 12, 2017, the Stock Promoter began disseminating marketing
and promotional materials concerning Environmental Packaging.  These materials included a 16-
page glossy mailer that was sent by U.S. mail to thousands of investors across the United States.
The mailer touted the stock of Environmental Packaging with statements such as,
“Environmental Packaging . . . Could be Perfectly Positioned To Put Up To 1,118% In Your
Pocket!”  As planned, the Stock Promoter listed “Svarna” as the paying “third party” in its
disclosures to investors.
69. Tobin exercised control over Environmental Packaging and Skriloff during the
promotional campaign.  At Tobin’s direction, Skriloff caused Environmental Packaging to issue
press releases touting positive news about Environmental Packaging.  For example, on June 23,
2017, Tobin emailed Skriloff a draft press release announcing that Environmental Packaging was
expanding the capacity of its manufacturing facility due to increased customer demand.  Tobin
wrote in an email to Skriloff, “Attached is the press release to go out before the market opens . . .
. please confirm this is going out before the open.”  Skriloff followed Tobin’s instruction and
Environmental Packaging issued the press release that day.  Tobin and Quinn coordinated the

21
 
timing of Environmental Packaging’s press releases to dovetail with the dissemination of emails
in the stock promotion.
Misstatements by Environmental Packaging
70. Skriloff also contributed to the scheme by making misstatements and misleading
omissions, in the company’s filings with the Commission or otherwise to investors, as the CEO
of Environmental Packaging.  For example, in Form 8-Ks filed with the Commission on June 12,
2017, and June 21, 2017, and signed by Skriloff, Environmental Packaging made multiple
misstatements and omissions, including:
a. Omitting to state that Tobin was the beneficial owner of nearly 20% of
Environmental Packaging’s outstanding shares (following the issuance of more
than 40 million new shares as part of the reverse merger) and that Tobin
controlled substantially all of the company’s unrestricted shares;
b. Falsely describing the terms of the merger, specifically by stating that the public
shell’s “majority shareholder” was to be paid $550,000, when, in reality, Skriloff
had agreed with Tobin and Quinn to pay $1.5 million, which included the $1
million payment for the stock promotion; and
c. Omitting to state that the company had paid $1 million for the stock promotion
designed to increase demand, in order to sell Tobin’s shares.
71. Skriloff obtained money for Environmental Packaging from investors using these
misstatements and misleading omissions.  For example, just days after Skriloff signed
Environmental Packaging’s false Form 8-K dated June 21, 2017, two individuals invested an
aggregate of $120,000 with Environmental Packaging.

22
 
Illegal Stock Sales
72. Prior to the promotional campaign, there was virtually no public trading of
Environmental Packaging’s stock.  The average daily trading volume of Environmental
Packaging’s stock during the period from May 1, 2017, through June 9, 2017 (a Friday), was less
than 23,000 shares per day, and on most days during that period of time, Environmental
Packaging’s stock did not trade at all in the public securities markets.  But, on or about June 12,
2017, the first day of the paid promotional campaign, approximately 424,956 shares of
Environmental Packaging traded in the public securities markets, of which approximately
224,000 shares were Tobin’s stock, sold by Wintercap and a second offshore asset manager.
73. Quinn directed the trading on behalf of the group by telling Tobin how many
shares of Environmental Packaging to sell and at what price.  Tobin passed these instructions to
Lacher, who in turn instructed the offshore asset managers.
74. On or about June 13, 2017, approximately 226,263 shares of Environmental
Packaging traded in the public securities market, of which approximately 66,000 shares were
Tobin’s stock, sold by Wintercap.
75. Thereafter, the offshore asset managers continued to sell Tobin’s Environmental
Packaging stock.  Between June 14 and 27, 2017, the offshore asset managers dumped
approximately 735,000 additional shares of Environmental Packaging stock into the public
securities markets to investors.  Collectively, Tobin’s sales of Environmental Packaging stock in
June 2017 generated approximately $1.5 million in trading proceeds.  Lacher received trading
and account records from the offshore asset managers and prepared spreadsheets which
aggregated the activity of the several Environmental Packaging Nominee accounts in order to
track all of the selling of Tobin’s shares through the various nominee accounts.

23
 
76. By virtue of the scheme perpetrated by the defendants, the sales of Tobin’s stock
were presented and processed as if they were ordinary market purchases of a widely-traded
stock.  In reality, the purchasers were buying the stock of a company insider who was illegally
and secretly dumping his shares.
77. The defendants failed to register these stock sales pursuant to Section 5 of the
Securities Act.  Tobin’s Environmental Packaging stock was, by law, restricted from resale
because Tobin was an affiliate of Environmental Packaging.  The sales of Tobin’s Environmental
Packaging stock also failed to meet the conditions of SEC Rule 144.
Attempts to Cover-Up the Fraud
78. Starting in or about August 2017, the Commission staff issued investigative
subpoenas for documents concerning Environmental Packaging and the above-mentioned
conduct to a number of individuals and entities, including Tobin, Environmental Packaging, and
Quinn’s company.
79. Tobin discussed the Commission’s investigation with the other defendants, and
they coordinated efforts to conceal the Environmental Packaging scheme and to thwart and
obstruct the Commission’s investigation.  In particular, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher
became concerned that the purported beneficial owners listed on paperwork (including Form As)
for the Environmental Packaging Nominees were too closely connected to them and that the
Commission would be able to figure out that Tobin and his group were really in control of the
Environmental Packaging stock held by the Environmental Packaging Nominees.
80. In or about September 2017, Patel and Ledvina met in Switzerland with Knox and
another Wintercap representative to discuss their group’s concern.  Knox advised them that they
should change the names of the purported beneficial owners on the Form As and should use the

24
 
names of people who were not so obviously connected to their group.  Knox further advised
them that the Form As should be changed before December 2017 because a Swiss regulator was
scheduled to audit Wintercap’s records at that time.
81. Prior to December 2017, Ledvina sought out two new names to list as beneficial
owners—individuals from Dubai and Switzerland—to take the place of Ledvina and his law firm
colleague.  Ledvina obtained and submitted to Wintercap the documents necessary to accomplish
this, including false Form As and backdated “know-your-client” letters in which Ledvina falsely
represented that these individuals were each the “sole (100%) beneficial owner” of their
respective Environmental Packaging Nominee.
82. Tobin agreed to pay approximately $60,000 of the Environmental Packaging
trading proceeds to each of Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher in exchange for their help in concealing
the fraud.  Lacher agreed with Tobin to keep his designation as the purported beneficial owner of
one of the Environmental Packaging Nominee accounts at Wintercap, and to be the “target” if
the account was discovered during the investigation.
83. To obstruct the Commission’s investigation and conceal their roles in the scheme,
Quinn and Skriloff deleted incriminating emails concerning the Environmental Packaging deal.
Quinn deleted from his email account all electronic communications concerning Environmental
Packaging.  Skriloff deleted from his email account all of his electronic communications with
Quinn.
84. Tobin, Patel, and Skriloff attempted to conceal the source of the $1 million
payment for the promotional campaign by: (a) raising another $1 million from new investors by
selling them some of Tobin’s shares in private transactions and (b) using those funds to refund
the $1 million to Environmental Packaging under the guise of a cancelled consulting agreement.

25
 
To support this ruse, Skriloff emailed an attorney whose firm was to receive the funds from the
new investors and stated, “It is my understanding that the consultant will be returning the
payment as nothing ever got signed.  I think it will be coming in a few different wires.  Let me
know when they arrive.”  In reality, there was never any consultant, the $1 million purportedly
paid to the “consultant” had actually been spent on the promotion, and the money being
“refunded” was actually money that had been newly raised from investors through stock sales.
85. In telephone conversations with a cooperating witness (“CW1”), Skriloff stated,
in sum and substance:  (a) that Skriloff knew Quinn and Tobin controlled substantially all of
Environmental Packaging’s purportedly unrestricted shares after the reverse merger; (b) that
Skriloff had provided Quinn with information about the company to use in the stock promotion;
(c) that the “refund” scheme described above was intended to replace the $1 million for the
promotional campaign; (d) and that Skriloff deleted all of his emails with Quinn.  Skriloff also
discussed with CW1 the status of the Commission’s investigation and what CW1 should say to
Commission staff, including various falsehoods.
86. In March 2018, Environmental Packaging filed belated Form 10-Qs (a quarterly
report that public companies are generally required to file with the Commission after the end of
each quarter) for the quarters ended June 30, 2017 and September 30, 2017.  These were signed
by Skriloff, and falsely stated that the company “had no prior knowledge and did not participate
in the preparation and/or distribution of” the promotional material.  These forms also omitted to
disclose various material facts about the scheme and about the role of Tobin’s group.
87. Quinn testified under oath to the Commission staff in May 2018 and made
numerous false statements concerning Tobin and the Environmental Packaging scheme.  For
example, Quinn testified that he did not own or expect to receive any shares of Environmental

26
 
Packaging, and that he did not expect to profit from the sale of anyone else’s shares of
Environmental Packaging.   In reality, Quinn and Tobin had agreed to share the proceeds of the
sale of Tobin’s Environmental Packaging shares, and those proceeds were held for their benefit
in the Environmental Packaging Nominee accounts at the offshore asset managers.  In telephone
conversations with CW1 between March 2018 and June 2018, Quinn repeatedly asked CW1
when he would be able to get his share of the trading proceeds.  In those telephone
conversations, Quinn and CW1 specifically discussed that the shares were held in various
nominee accounts and that Patel was the intermediary between Tobin and Wintercap.  During an
in-person meeting with CW1, Quinn also informed CW1 that Quinn had lied during his
testimony before the Commission staff, and discussed the need to keep their stories straight.
CURE
Scheme to Conceal Tobin’s Control and Sales of CURE Stock
88. Defendants Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher engaged in a substantially similar
scheme with respect to the stock of CURE.  As with Environmental Packaging, Tobin, Patel,
Lacher, and Ledvina sought to sell Tobin’s shares of CURE: (a) without registering the offer or
sale of stock with the Commission; (b) without disclosing accurate information about Tobin’s
ownership and control over CURE; and (c) without complying with limitations on the sale of
stock by company “affiliates” such as Tobin.
89. In or about June 2016, Tobin entered into an agreement to acquire, directly or
indirectly, undisclosed control of substantially all of the stock of a public company, Makkanotti,
by purchasing: (a) a large block of restricted stock, and (b) a significant percentage of the stock
that had been trading as unrestricted shares.

27
 
90. Between June 2016 and November 2016, Tobin exercised his control over
Makkanotti by installing a new CEO, and arranging for Makkanotti’s reverse merger with a
private drug-delivery company.  Following the reverse merger, Makkanotti changed its name to
CURE.  As of September 30, 2016, immediately prior to the merger, Tobin controlled
approximately 95% of CURE’s stock; consequently, Tobin was an affiliate of CURE.
91. In order to hide Tobin’s control over CURE, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher:
(a) arranged for the restricted stock to be held by a nominee created and controlled by Patel,
Lacher, and Ledvina, and (b) arranged for the majority of Tobin’s holdings in previously
unrestricted stock to be held on his behalf by a series of offshore corporations and accounts
created by Patel, Lacher, and Ledvina (the “CURE Nominees”).
92. Patel, Lacher, and Ledvina knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that the entity
used by Tobin to hold his block of restricted shares, Aureus Fiduciary Nevis Limited (“Aureus
Fiduciary”), was designed to conceal Tobin’s control of CURE in order to facilitate his illegal
sale of shares that he held as a control person.  For example, Patel signed a document, dated
November 7, 2016, on behalf of Aureus Fiduciary (as its purported controlling shareholder) that
approved the terms of the merger and the public company’s name change following the merger.
In reality, and as Patel knew, Tobin, operating through Aureus Fiduciary, was calling the shots
and directed the merger and name change.
93. Tobin, working with Patel, Lacher, and Ledvina, hid his control over CURE’s
purportedly unrestricted stock by using the CURE Nominees, and treated the CURE stock held
by the CURE Nominees as if the stock was unrestricted.  In reality, as Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher
knew or recklessly disregarded, this CURE stock was restricted because it was owned by Tobin,
who was an affiliate of the issuer and controlled the issuer through financing and through his

28
 
substantial ownership interest.  The use of multiple CURE Nominees hid Tobin’s control over
CURE’s stock to make it appear that no single CURE Nominee or Tobin controlled more than
5% of the company’s stock.  This façade enabled Tobin to evade SEC rules that required CURE
to disclose all persons holding greater than 5% of its outstanding stock in reports filed with the
Commission.
94. Patel and Ledvina created another corporation named Aureus Financial Holdings
LLC (“Aureus Financial”), with an address of record located at Patel’s then residence in Short
Hills, New Jersey.  Patel and Ledvina then used Aureus Financial to directly invest in the CURE
scheme, on their own behalf, by purchasing 300,000 shares of stock from Tobin for $300,000.
95. Patel’s and Ledvina’s CURE stock was subject to sale restrictions because they,
like Tobin, were affiliates of CURE.  By working on behalf of Tobin as his agents and by
scheming with Tobin to illegally sell stock, Patel and Ledvina were affiliates in light of Tobin’s
control of CURE.  Thus Patel and Ledvina’s CURE stock was subject to Rule 144’s restrictions
on the amount of stock of CURE they could sell without registration.
96. By November 2016, following the merger, Tobin, Patel, and Ledvina controlled
approximately 6.8 million shares of CURE (29% of the company), of which approximately 4
million shares (the vast majority of CURE’s purportedly unrestricted stock) were held by the
CURE Nominees.
97. In or around February and March 2017, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher facilitated the
transfer of Tobin’s CURE stock from the CURE Nominees to accounts at Wintercap and another
offshore asset manager.  These transfers added another layer of concealment of Tobin’s
ownership of the stock because the offshore asset managers could deposit Tobin’s stock into
omnibus brokerage accounts at foreign and domestic brokerage firms.

29
 
98. For each transfer, Patel signed transfer instruction forms which caused the stock
to be transferred from the CURE Nominees to the offshore asset manager.  For example, Patel
signed three transfer instruction forms dated February 10, 2017 to instruct the transfer agent to
transfer CURE stock from three CURE Nominees to Wintercap.
99. Ledvina, Lacher, and a relative of Lacher each posed as a purported beneficial
owner of one of the CURE Nominees’ accounts at Wintercap.  Patel sent Wintercap letters
falsely declaring that each was “the sole (100%) beneficial owner” of their respective CURE
Nominee.  Ledvina and Lacher then each sent Wintercap signed Form As in which they falsely
declared themselves to be the beneficial owners of their respective CURE Nominees, and Lacher
also sent Wintercap a false Form A purportedly signed by the relative of Lacher.
100. Between February and March 2017, Wintercap and a second offshore asset
manager placed large orders to sell Tobin’s CURE stock (held in the name of the CURE
Nominees).  At or about the same time, CURE issued approximately eight press releases, and
Tobin’s group paid to market the company through online advertising.  During this time period,
there was a price and daily trading volume spike of CURE’s stock.  Between February 27, 2017,
and March 31, 2017, the volume of trading in CURE stock increased from approximately 4,500
shares per day to an average of approximately 36,000 shares per day, and the price rose from
approximately $2-$3 per share to a high of $15 per share.  Tobin sold approximately 466,000
shares of CURE stock through the two offshore asset managers, realizing trading proceeds of
approximately $2.1 million.  Tobin agreed with Patel and Ledvina to treat 300,000 of the
466,000 shares sold as belonging to Patel and Ledvina, because the shares held by Patel’s and
Ledvina’s nominee (Aureus Financial) had not been deposited with a broker.

30
 
101. Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher failed to register these stock sales pursuant to
Section 5 of the Securities Act.  By law, Tobin’s CURE stock was restricted from resale because
Tobin was an affiliate of CURE.  The sales of Tobin’s CURE stock also failed to meet the
conditions of SEC Rule 144.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
FRAUD IN THE OFFER OR SALE OF SECURITIES
(Violations of Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act)
(All Defendants — Environmental Packaging)

102. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
103. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities
under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)].
104. By reason of the conduct described above, the defendants, in connection with the
offer or sale of securities, by the use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce or
of the mails, directly or indirectly, acting with the requisite degree of knowledge, state of mind
or negligence (i) employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud; and (ii) engaged in
transactions, practices, or courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any persons, including purchasers or sellers of the securities.
105. By reason of the conduct described above, the defendants each violated Securities
Act Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) and (3)].

31
 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
FRAUD IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE OR SALE OF SECURITIES
(Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder)
(All Defendants — Environmental Packaging)

106. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
107. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities
under Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)].
108. By reason of the conduct described above, the defendants, directly or indirectly,
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, by the use of the means or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, (i) employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud;
and (ii) engaged in acts, practices, or courses of business which operated or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any persons, including purchasers or sellers of the securities.
109. By reason of the conduct described above, the defendants violated Exchange Act
Section 10(b) [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) and (c)]
thereunder.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES
(Violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act)
(Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and Lacher — Environmental Packaging)

110. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
111. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities
under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)].

32
 
112. By reason of the conduct described above, Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and
Lacher, directly or indirectly:  (a) made use of the means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell, through the use or medium of a
prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no registration statement has been in effect and
for which no exemption from registration has been available; and/or (b) made use of the means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer
to sell, through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no
registration statement has been filed and for which no exemption from registration has been
available.
113. As a result, Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and Lacher violated Sections 5(a) and
(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c)].
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
FRAUD IN THE OFFER OR SALE OF SECURITIES
 (Violations of Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act)
(Skriloff — Environmental Packaging)

114. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
115. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities
under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)].
116. By reason of the conduct described above, Skriloff, in connection with the offer
or sale of securities of Environmental Packaging, by the use of the means or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce or of the mails, directly or indirectly, acting with the requisite degree of
knowledge, state of mind or negligence, obtained money or property by means of untrue
statements of material fact or by omissions to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.

33
 
117. By reason of the conduct described above, Skriloff violated Securities Act Section
17(a)(2) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)].
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
FRAUD IN THE OFFER OR SALE OF SECURITIES
 (Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b) thereunder)
(Skriloff — Environmental Packaging)

118. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
119. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities
under Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)].
120. By reason of the conduct described above, Skriloff, directly or indirectly, in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, by the use of the means or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state
material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading.
121. By reason of the conduct described above, Skriloff violated Exchange Act Section
10(b) [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5(b) [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)] thereunder.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
AIDING AND ABETTING
 (Violations of Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act)
(Skriloff — Environmental Packaging)

122. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
123. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities
under Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)].

34
 
124. By reason of the conduct described above, Defendants Tobin, Patel, Quinn,
Ledvina, and Lacher directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
of Environmental Packaging, by the use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce
or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly, (i) employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud; and (ii) engaged in acts,
practices, or courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
persons, including purchasers or sellers of the securities.
125. Skriloff knowingly or recklessly provided substantial assistance to Defendants
Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and Lacher, in their violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder.
126. As a result, Skriloff violated Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §
78t(e).]
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
AIDING AND ABETTING
 (Violations of Section 15(b) of the Securities Act)
(Skriloff — Environmental Packaging)

127. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
128. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities
under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)].
129. By reason of the conduct described above, Defendants Tobin, Patel, Quinn,
Ledvina, and Lacher in connection with the offer or sale of securities, by the use of the means or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of the mails, directly or indirectly, acting with the
requisite degree of knowledge, state of mind or negligence (i) employed devices, schemes, or
artifices to defraud; and (ii) engaged in transactions, practices, or courses of business which

35
 
operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any persons, including purchasers or sellers
of the securities.
130. Skriloff knowingly or recklessly provided substantial assistance to Defendants
Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and Lacher, in their violation of Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the
Securities Act.
131. As a result, Skriloff violated Section 15(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§
77o(b)].
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
AIDING AND ABETTING
 (Violations of Section 15(b) of the Securities Act)
(Skriloff — Environmental Packaging)

132. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
133. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities
under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)].
134. By reason of the conduct described above, Environmental Packaging, in
connection with the offer or sale of securities, by the use of the means or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce or of the mails, directly or indirectly, acting with requisite degree of
knowledge, state of mind or negligence obtained money or property by means of untrue
statements of material fact or by omissions to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
135.  Skriloff knowingly or recklessly provided substantial assistance to
Environmental Packaging in its violation of Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act.
136. As a result, Skriloff violated Section 15(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§
77o(b)].

36
 
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
FRAUD IN THE OFFER OR SALE OF SECURITIES
(Violations of Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act)
(Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher — CURE)

137. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
138. During the Relevant Period, the stock of CURE were securities under Section
2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)].
139. By reason of the conduct described above, defendants Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and
Lacher, in connection with the offer or sale of securities, by the use of the means or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of the mails, directly or indirectly, acting with the
requisite degree of knowledge, state of mind or negligence (i) employed devices, schemes, or
artifices to defraud; and (ii) engaged in transactions, practices, or courses of business which
operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any persons, including purchasers or sellers
of the securities.
140. By reason of the conduct described above, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher each
violated Securities Act Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) and (3)].
TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
FRAUD IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE OR SALE OF SECURITIES
(Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder)
(Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher — CURE)

141. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
142. During the Relevant Period, the stock of CURE were securities under Section
3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)].

37
 
143. By reason of the conduct described above, defendants Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and
Lacher, directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, by the use of
the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, (i) employed devices,
schemes, or artifices to defraud; and (ii) engaged in acts, practices, or courses of business which
operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any persons, including purchasers or sellers
of the securities.
144. By reason of the conduct described above, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher
violated Exchange Act Section 10(b) [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) [17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5(a) and (c)] thereunder.
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES
(Violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act)
(Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher — CURE)

145. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
146. During the Relevant Period, the stock of CURE were securities under Section
2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)].
147. By reason of the conduct described above, defendants Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and
Lacher, directly or indirectly:  (a) made use of the means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell, through the use or medium of a
prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no registration statement has been in effect and
for which no exemption from registration has been available; and/or (b) made use of the means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer
to sell, through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no

38
 
registration statement has been filed and for which no exemption from registration has been
available.
148. As a result, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher violated Sections 5(a) and (c) of the
Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c)].
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court:
A.   Enter a permanent injunction restraining each of the defendants, his officers,
agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation
with him who receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service or otherwise, from
violating Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) and (3)], and
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder
[17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(a) and (c)].
B.     Enter a permanent injunction restraining each of Tobin, Quinn, Patel, Ledvina,
and Lacher, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and those persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service
or otherwise, from violating Sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c)].
C.    Enter a permanent injunction restraining Skriloff, his officers, agents, servants,
employees and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with him who
receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service or otherwise, from violating Section
17(a)(2) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)] and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15
U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules 10b-5(b) thereunder [17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(b)].
D.   Order the defendants to disgorge, with prejudgment interest, all ill-gotten gains
obtained by reason of the unlawful conduct alleged in this Complaint;

39
 
E.    Order the defendants to pay civil monetary penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of
the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(3)];
F.    Enter an order barring the defendants from participating in any offering of a
penny stock, pursuant to Section 20(g) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(g)] and 21(d) of the
Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)];
G.   Impose an officer and director bar against Skriloff pursuant to Section 20(e) of the
Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §77t(e)] and Section 21(d)(2) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §
78u(d)(2)];
H.   Retain jurisdiction over this action to implement and carry out the terms of all
orders and decrees that may be entered; and
I.    Grant such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
JURY DEMAND
The Commission demands a jury in this matter for all claims so triable.

DATED this 29th day of August 2019.

      Respectfully submitted,
                                             /s/ David M. Scheffler
David M. Scheffler (Mass Bar No.670324)
Eric A. Forni (Mass Bar No. 669685)
J. Lauchlan Wash (Mass Bar No. 629092)
Kathleen B. Shields (Mass Bar No. 637438)
Amy Gwiazda (Mass Bar No.663494)
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Boston Regional Office
33 Arch St., 24
th
 Floor
Boston, MA 02110

40
 
Phone: (617) 573-8810 (Scheffler direct)
Fax: (617) 573-4590 (fax)
[email protected] (Scheffler email)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

 

 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, 
    Plaintiff, 
 v. 
 
MORRIE TOBIN, MILAN PATEL, 
MATTHEW LEDVINA, DANIEL 
LACHER, BRIAN QUINN, AND DAVID 
SKRILOFF, 
    Defendants. 
 

 
 

Civil Action No. 18-CV-12451 
(NMG) 

 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

 
 

 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 

 Plaintiff, Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”), alleges the 

following against Defendants Morrie Tobin (“Tobin”), Milan Patel (“Patel”), Matthew Ledvina 

(“Ledvina”), Daniel Lacher (“Lacher”), Brian Quinn (“Quinn”), and David Skriloff (“Skriloff”): 

SUMMARY  

1. This is a securities fraud enforcement action.  The defendants engaged in a 

deceptive scheme to sell publicly traded stock to investors.  Tobin secretly controlled and owned 

substantially all of the stock in two public companies:  Environmental Packaging Technologies 

Holdings, Inc. (“Environmental Packaging”) and CURE Pharmaceutical Holding Corp. 

(“CURE”).  From approximately June 2013 to the present (the “Relevant Period”), the 

defendants defrauded investors by concealing Tobin’s control of these companies, enabling 

Tobin to sell his shares: (a) without registering the offers or sales of stock with the Commission; 

(b) without disclosing accurate information about Tobin’s ownership and control over the 

companies; and (c) without complying with legal limitations on sales of stock by company 

“affiliates” such as Tobin.  As a result of the defendants’ scheme, what appeared to be ordinary 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 1 of 40



2 
 

trading by unaffiliated investors was actually a massive dump of shares by a company insider 

and his team seeking to profit at the expense of defrauded investors. 

2. A company is considered “public” when its securities trade on public markets, 

which carries with it legal requirements, such as obligations to disclose certain business and 

financial information regularly to the public.  Investors in certain public companies are required 

to disclose publicly any ownership interest in excess of 5% of the company’s stock.  As part of 

the scheme, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher disguised Tobin’s ownership to make it appear 

that his shares were owned by multiple unaffiliated entities and individuals.  In reality, these 

entities and individuals were merely holding the stock as nominees for Tobin, the true owner and 

control person. 

3. Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher arranged for Tobin’s stock to be transferred to two 

offshore asset managers, including Wintercap SA (“Wintercap”), a Swiss company run by Roger 

Knox.  The accounts at the offshore asset managers were in the names of nominee entities—

entities created to hold stock for Tobin—which further concealed Tobin’s ownership and control.  

The offshore asset managers deposited the stock in omnibus securities accounts (accounts used 

to execute orders on behalf of asset managers’ undisclosed clients, such as Tobin) at foreign and 

domestic brokerage firms, in blocks of shares, each of which constituted less than 5% of each 

company’s outstanding shares.  The offshore asset managers, through the brokerage firms, then 

sold millions of dollars of shares of Tobin’s stock to investors. 

4. To further preserve Tobin’s anonymity, Ledvina and Lacher each served as 

purported “beneficial owners” of nominee accounts held at Wintercap, and also arranged for 

multiple other individuals to do so.  To establish these accounts for Tobin’s nominees, Lacher 

and Ledvina each filled out account opening documents falsely claiming to be the beneficial 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 2 of 40



3 
 

owners, and furnished personal information such as copies of their passports.  These deceptive 

steps were intended to conceal Tobin’s involvement in the event that law enforcement authorities 

or regulators ever examined the records of Wintercap. 

5. Quinn was Tobin’s partner in the scheme involving Environmental Packaging and 

planned to share in the proceeds of the sale of Tobin’s Environmental Packaging stock.  Quinn’s 

role in the scheme was to: (a) facilitate a reverse merger between the public company controlled 

by Tobin (then a “shell company” with no operations) and a private bulk-packaging company, 

the combination of which became Environmental Packaging; (b) arrange and oversee a $1 

million promotional campaign designed to inflate the share price and trading volume of 

Environmental Packaging stock after the reverse merger; and (c) direct the offshore asset 

managers’ selling of the Environmental Packaging stock in order to profit from the artificially-

inflated demand for Environmental Packaging stock. 

6. Skriloff was the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the private bulk-packaging 

company, and, after its merger with Tobin’s public shell company, continued as the CEO of 

Environmental Packaging.  Skriloff negotiated the reverse merger with Quinn and Tobin, raised 

money from investors to pay $1 million for the promotional campaign, and attempted to disguise 

the payment as part of a purported consulting agreement.  As the CEO of Environmental 

Packaging, Skriloff made misstatements in public reports filed with the Commission about the 

reverse merger and about the company’s connection to the promotional campaign.  Skriloff also 

failed to disclose material facts regarding Tobin, Quinn, and their scheme. 

7. Patel and Lacher helped Tobin and Quinn funnel the $1 million payment for the 

promotional campaign from Skriloff to the lead stock promoter.  In particular, Patel arranged for 

Wintercap to create an entity named Svarna Ltd. (“Svarna”) for the purpose of misleading 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 3 of 40



4 
 

investors and potential investors into believing that the promotional campaign was paid for by a 

third party—and not by Tobin or the company itself.  Lacher helped to open Svarna’s account at 

Wintercap, and arranged for his girlfriend to pose as Svarna’s purported beneficial owner.  The 

promotional campaign touted the stock of Environmental Packaging while falsely stating that the 

campaign had been paid for by Svarna. 

8. Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher engaged in a similar scheme with respect to 

CURE, utilizing a network of nominee entities to secretly hold Tobin’s shares, arranging for 

offshore asset managers to deposit those shares with brokers in blocks constituting less than 5% 

of CURE’s outstanding shares, selling Tobin’s shares to investors, and sharing in the profits.           

9. Tobin and his team failed to register their sales of either Environmental Packaging 

or CURE stock with the Commission.  Consequently, the sale and offer of those securities 

violated Sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act of 1933, respectively.   

10. On June 27, 2017, the Commission suspended trading in the securities of 

Environmental Packaging.  After the Commission suspended trading, the defendants attempted 

further to conceal Tobin’s control over Environmental Packaging and its stock and to obstruct 

the Commission’s investigation.  For example, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher arranged to change 

the names on certain accounts at Wintercap to the names of individuals not directly involved 

with the scheme.  Quinn and Skriloff each deleted incriminating emails to prevent their 

discovery, and Quinn provided false testimony to the Commission staff. 

11. As a result of the conduct alleged herein, Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and 

Lacher violated, and unless restrained and enjoined will continue to violate, Sections 17(a)(1) 

and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1), (3)], Section 

10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 4 of 40



5 
 

10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 340.10b-5(a), (c)] and Sections 5(a) and (c) of the 

Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c)]. 

12. As a result of the conduct alleged herein, Skriloff violated Section 17(a) of the 

Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)], Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and 

Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 340.10b-5].  Skriloff also aided and abetted violations of 

Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rules 

10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder by the other defendants, and aided and abetted violations of Section 

17(a)(2) of the Securities Act by Environmental Packaging. 

13. The Commission seeks a permanent injunction against the defendants, enjoining 

each from engaging in transactions, acts, practices, and courses of business of the type alleged in 

this Complaint, disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains from the unlawful conduct set forth in this 

Complaint, together with prejudgment interest, civil penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the 

Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 

§ 78u(d)(3)], an order barring the defendants from participating in any offering of a penny stock, 

pursuant to Section 20(g) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(g)] and/or 21(d) of the Exchange 

Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)], an order barring Skriloff from acting as an officer or director of a 

public company pursuant to Section 20(e) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §77t(e)] and Section 

21(d)(2) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)], and such other relief as the Court may 

deem appropriate. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

14. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Section 22(a) of the 

Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)] and Sections 21(d), 21(e), and 27 of the Exchange Act [15 

U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78u(e), and 78aa]. 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 5 of 40



6 
 

15. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to Section 22(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 

§ 77v(a)] and Section 27 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78aa].  Certain of the acts, practices, 

transactions and courses of business alleged in this Complaint occurred within the District of 

Massachusetts, and were effected, directly or indirectly, by making use of means or 

instrumentalities of transportation or communication in interstate commerce, or the mails.  For 

example, during the Relevant Period, promotional materials concerning Environmental 

Packaging were mailed to various individuals’ residences in Massachusetts, and certain 

individuals who reside in Massachusetts purchased stock of Environmental Packaging and 

CURE.  

DEFENDANTS 

16. Morrie Tobin, (“Tobin”), age 56, is a resident of Los Angeles, California.  

17. Milan Patel, (“Patel”), age 49, is a resident of Miami, Florida.  Patel is a licensed 

attorney, and during the Relevant Period was a partner in the United States tax group of an 

international law firm headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland.   

18. Matthew Ledvina, (“Ledvina”), age 46, is a resident of Switzerland.  Ledvina is 

an attorney and colleague of Patel’s at an international law firm headquartered in Zurich, 

Switzerland.  

19.  Daniel Lacher, (“Lacher”), age 55, is a resident of Switzerland.  During the 

Relevant Period, Lacher operated a financial services company with a principal place of business 

in Volketswil, Switzerland.  Lacher provided services to undisclosed company insiders or control 

persons as an intermediary to foreign asset managers and brokers. 

20. Brian Quinn, (“Quinn”), age 48, is a resident of Newport Beach, California.  

During the Relevant Period, Quinn operated an investor relations company in Newport Beach 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 6 of 40



7 
 

which, according to its website, “provides a wide variety of services for public companies that 

need results-oriented investor relations programs,” and “assist[s] private companies with pre IPO 

services.” 

21. David Skriloff, (“Skriloff”), age 53, is a resident of New York.  During the 

Relevant Period, Skriloff was the CEO of a private bulk-packaging company and then the CEO 

of Environmental Packaging after the reverse merger.   

RELATED PARTIES AND ENTITIES 

22. Environmental Packaging Technologies Holdings, Inc. (“Environmental 

Packaging”) is a public company which was incorporated in Nevada in 2011.  Environmental 

Packaging initially was named GS Valet, Inc.  For several years, it purported to be a valet-

parking business.  In or about October 2012, its stock began trading on OTC Markets.  During 

the same time period, the company began voluntarily filing quarterly, annual, and other periodic 

reports with the Commission following an initial public offering to sell stock to prospective 

investors.  In or around August 2013, Tobin acquired control of GS Valet, Inc., and subsequently 

arranged for its name to be changed to International Metals Streaming Corp. (“International 

Metals”).  International Metals subsequently declared itself to be a shell company—a company 

with no or nominal operations or assets.  In or about 2017, International Metals merged with 

Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., a private company, and changed its name to 

Environmental Packaging.  Environmental Packaging continued to trade on OTC Markets under 

the ticker symbol EPTI and continued voluntarily to file periodic reports with the Commission.  

According to reports filed with the Commission, Environmental Packaging is in the business of 

manufacturing “flexitanks” used to transport liquids in shipping containers.  After the 

Commission suspended trading in Environmental Packaging’s stock in June 2017, 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 7 of 40



8 
 

Environmental Packaging stock was traded on the so-called “Grey Market.”  That is, its stock is 

available for purchase or sale by brokers acting on instructions initiated by their customers. 

23. CURE Pharmaceutical Holding Corp. (“CURE”), formerly known as Makkanotti 

Group Corp. (“Makkanotti”), is a public company which was incorporated in Nevada in May 

2014.  In or about December 2015, Makkanotti began trading on OTC Markets.  During the same 

time period, Makkanotti began voluntarily filing periodic reports with the Commission following 

an initial public offering to sell stock to prospective investors.  In or about November 2016, 

Makkanotti merged with a private company named Cure Pharmaceutical Corporation and 

changed its name to CURE.  CURE continued to be available for trading on OTC Markets under 

the ticker CURR and continued voluntarily to file periodic reports with the Commission.  In 

March 2018, CURE registered its securities with the Commission, thereby requiring it to file 

periodic reports.  According to reports filed with the Commission, CURE is in the business of 

developing patents it holds for an oral drug delivery system. 

24. Roger J. Knox, (“Knox”), age 48, is a citizen of the United Kingdom and resident 

of France.  Knox is the founder and chief executive officer of Wintercap SA. 

25. Wintercap SA, (“Wintercap”), formerly known as Silverton SA (“Silverton”), is a 

Swiss entity that purports to be an asset manager.  Wintercap SA trades stock for its clients, who 

are company insiders or control persons, and sells that stock into the United States’ securities 

market.  For consistency, the Complaint refers to Wintercap, although it was known as Silverton 

during much of the Relevant Period. 

BACKGROUND 

26.  “Restricted stock” is stock of a publicly traded company (also known as an 

“issuer”) that is acquired from an issuer, or an affiliate of the issuer, in a private transaction that 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 8 of 40



9 
 

is not registered with the Commission.  Stock held by an issuer or affiliate of an issuer is 

restricted stock.  Absent an exemption under the federal securities laws and rules, restricted stock 

cannot legally be offered or sold to the public unless a securities registration statement has been 

filed with the Commission (for an offer) or is in effect (for a sale).  A registration statement 

contains important information about an issuer’s business operations, financial condition, results 

of operation, risk factors, and management.  It also should disclose any person or group who is 

the beneficial owner of more than 5% of the company’s securities.   

27. An “affiliate” of an issuer is a person or entity that, directly or indirectly through 

one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, such 

issuer (i.e. a control person).  “Control” means the power to direct management and policies of 

the company in question.  Typically, affiliates include officers, directors and controlling 

shareholders but any person who is “under common control” with an issuer may also be an 

affiliate.  Absent registration, affiliates are only permitted to sell a small percentage of their stock 

according to SEC Rule 144 [17 C.F.R. 230.144].   

28. “Unrestricted stock” is stock that may legally be offered and sold in the public 

marketplace by a non-affiliate, without registration or restriction, ordinarily having previously 

been subject to a registration statement filed with the Commission.  Registration statements are 

transaction specific; they apply to each separate offer and sale as detailed in the registration 

statement.  Registration does not attach to the security itself, and registration at one stage for one 

party does not necessarily suffice to register subsequent offers and sales by the same or different 

parties.  For example, if a control person buys shares in the company s/he controls, those shares 

are subject to restrictions and ordinarily require registration for bulk sales of such shares.  

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 9 of 40



10 
 

29. A “transfer agent” is a business which, among other things, issues and cancels 

certificates of a company’s stock to reflect changes in ownership.  Many companies that have 

publicly traded securities use transfer agents to keep track of the individuals and entities that own 

their stocks. 

30. The Over-The-Counter Securities Market (“OTC Markets”) is an inter-dealer 

quotation and reporting service through which certain stocks are available for trading and are 

publicly purchased and sold through brokered orders. 

ENVIRONMENTAL PACKAGING 

Scheme to Conceal Tobin’s Control and Stock Ownership 

31. In or about August 2013, Tobin acquired, directly or indirectly, undisclosed 

control of substantially all of the stock of GS Valet, Inc., the public company which would 

ultimately become Environmental Packaging.   

32. Tobin did not hold any shares of GS Valet, Inc., in his own name.  Instead, he 

used a nominee entity created for Tobin by Patel and Ledvina—MT Global Holdings—to hold a 

large block of restricted stock, and a group of friends and relatives to hold smaller blocks of 

purportedly unrestricted stock.  By using these nominees, Tobin concealed his ownership and 

control of GS Valet, Inc., stock. 

33. Tobin arranged for GS Valet, Inc., to change its name to International Metals in 

September 2013.  International Metals subsequently declared itself to be a shell company—a 

company with no or nominal operations or assets.  Prior to 2016, International Metals had little 

to no business operations.  Although International Metals had a CEO, the CEO took instructions 

from Tobin with respect to numerous corporate activities. 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 10 of 40



11 
 

34. Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher planned to use Tobin’s secret control over 

International Metals as part of a scheme to profit from illegal stock sales using a network of 

foreign and domestic nominee entities.  Lacher charged Tobin a fee of 1.5% of the group’s 

trading proceeds for his involvement in the scheme.  Patel and Ledvina agreed with Tobin that 

they would be paid 4.5% of the group’s net trading proceeds, after paying fees associated with 

offshore asset managers and other costs.  

Negotiation for Reverse Merger and Stock Promotion 

35. As part of the scheme, Tobin set out to find a private company that he could use 

to generate positive news, thereby increasing the value of International Metals’ stock. 

36. In or around early 2016, Quinn introduced Tobin to Skriloff, the CEO of 

Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., a private bulk-packaging company that was a 

potential partner in their scheme.   

37. Quinn had a prior business relationship with the Chairman of the Board of 

Directors of Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., which Quinn understood to be seeking 

to raise capital by merging with a public company, such as the one controlled by Tobin.   

38. In exchange for Quinn’s introduction to Skriloff and continued assistance, Tobin 

agreed to share half of his share of the trading proceeds with Quinn (after paying fees to Lacher, 

Patel, Ledvina, and offshore asset managers, as well as other costs of the scheme).  Together they 

planned to use Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., as an entity whose operations 

would provide the pretext for a promotional campaign aimed at raising the market value of 

Tobin’s secret holdings of International Metals.  Tobin’s stock could then be sold to investors for 

a profit using the network of nominee entities and accounts managed by Patel, Ledvina, and 

Lacher.  Because of their agreement, Tobin and Quinn communicated with each other about 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 11 of 40



12 
 

Environmental Packaging stock as if it were jointly owned, though Tobin was the one who had 

the ability to exercise control over the stock through Patel, Ledvina, Lacher, and their network of 

nominees. 

39. During the remainder of 2016, Tobin and Quinn negotiated with Skriloff for 

Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., to “reverse merge” into International Metals.  

40. In a reverse merger, a private company becomes a public company by purchasing 

a public shell company.  Typically, the shareholders of the private operating company exchange 

their shares for a large majority of the shares of the public company. Although the public shell 

company survives the merger, the private operating company’s shareholders gain a controlling 

interest in the voting power and outstanding shares of stock of the public shell company.  The 

assets and business operations of the post-merger surviving public company are primarily, if not 

solely, those of the former private operating company. 

41. Skriloff knew that Tobin and Quinn secretly controlled International Metals, and 

that they intended to retain substantially all of its purportedly unrestricted stock after the reverse 

merger was complete so that they could promote the stock, artificially create demand, and then 

illegally sell the stock to unsuspecting investors. 

42. Tobin, Quinn, and Skriloff initially agreed that Environmental Packaging 

Technologies, Inc., would pay $1.5 million for International Metals, including $1 million which 

would be spent on a stock promotion campaign.  A stock promotion campaign is typically an 

effort by parties to generate interest in a company’s stock among investors, often in an effort to 

increase trading volume in the stock and/or boost the company’s stock price.  Stock promotion 

materials are usually disseminated to potential investors in a variety of ways, including by mass 

emails or Internet-based newsletters.  Under the initial agreement, Tobin and Quinn would retain 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 12 of 40



13 
 

approximately 12 million shares of purportedly unrestricted stock in International Metals, which 

was substantially all of its unrestricted stock.  International Metals would issue 40 million shares 

of restricted stock—that is, stock that could not yet be sold in the market—to the shareholders of 

Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc.  International Metals would become Environmental 

Packaging and, in effect, the reverse merger would leave Tobin and Quinn secretly holding 

nearly all of the Environmental Packaging stock that could purportedly be sold in the U.S. 

market. 

43. Skriloff knowingly joined the scheme.  At the time he was negotiating the terms 

of the transaction, Skriloff understood that Tobin and Quinn would retain, and intended to sell, 

their 12 million shares of purportedly unrestricted stock.  In an email sent by Skriloff 

transmitting the executed term sheet for the reverse merger to Tobin, Quinn, and an attorney 

working on the reverse merger at Tobin’s direction, Skriloff described the fact that the 

Tobin/Quinn “team” would be getting “$1.5 million and stock worth $4-5 million,” that “parts of 

it need to go out” (referencing the funds to be spent on the stock promotion), and that they would 

“collectively become the largest shareholders as part of this.”  During the negotiations, Skriloff 

also requested that Quinn and Tobin give two million of their purportedly unrestricted shares to 

Skriloff and another individual associated with the company, so that they could personally profit 

from the promotional campaign and illegal stock sales. 

44. Tobin, Quinn, and Skriloff also agreed to a financing deal related to the reverse 

merger, in which Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., would raise approximately $5 

million from investors in a private offering in anticipation of the reverse merger, and would use 

$1 million of these funds to pay for the promotional campaign. 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 13 of 40



14 
 

45. To conceal their scheme, Tobin and Skriloff attempted to disguise the $1 million 

payment for promotional services as a fee for consulting services.  Accordingly, the draft merger 

agreement was modified to remove $1 million of the $1.5 million purchase price, and drafts of a 

purported consulting agreement for $1 million were exchanged.  In reality, the consulting 

agreement was a sham, and the only purpose of the $1 million payment was to finance the stock 

promotion campaign. 

46. In December 2016, International Metals publicly announced the reverse merger, 

and filed a Form 8-K (a form used to notify investors about significant events) with the 

Commission.  The Form 8-K described the agreement and attached a copy of the merger 

agreement.  The merger agreement, which was signed by Skriloff, reflected that Environmental 

Packaging Technologies, Inc., had agreed to pay $500,000 “to the shareholder of the controlling 

block” of stock in International Metals.  This was materiality false and misleading in that it 

concealed the fact that Skriloff had also agreed that Environmental Packaging Technologies, 

Inc., would pay an additional $1 million, to be used for the stock promotion desired by Tobin and 

Quinn as a condition of the merger. 

Preparations for Reverse Merger, Stock Promotion, and Stock Sales 

47. The reverse merger between International Metals and Environmental Packaging 

Technologies, Inc. closed on or around June 9, 2017.  During the approximately six months 

between the announcement of the merger in December 2016 and the completion of the 

transaction in June 2017, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher worked to prepare to sell Tobin’s 

shares during the stock promotion campaign.  This involved, among other things: (a) readying 

International Metals for the reverse merger; (b) transferring Tobin’s stock from his friends and 

relatives to nominee entities (the “Environmental Packaging Nominees”) that would appear to be 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 14 of 40



15 
 

unconnected to Tobin; (c) opening accounts at Wintercap and another offshore asset manager in 

the names of the Environmental Packaging Nominees; and (d) arranging for these asset managers 

to deposit Tobin’s Environmental Packaging shares with brokers in small blocks, each 

constituting just under 5% of Environmental Packaging’s outstanding shares, in order to conceal 

the fact that one individual or group (here, Tobin and his team) controlled more than 5% of 

Environmental Packaging’s outstanding shares and substantially all of its purportedly 

unrestricted shares.  

48. Tobin and Patel used Tobin’s control over International Metals to prepare it for 

the reverse merger.  The private company, Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., was 

supposed to pay a certain amount ($500,000, later adjusted to $550,000) in exchange for Tobin 

“cancelling” the large block of restricted shares of International Metals which had been held for 

Tobin by MT Global since 2013.   

49. In December 2016, Tobin, Patel, and Lacher arranged for MT Global to transfer 

its block of restricted shares to Sundrive Holdings Corp. (“Sundrive”), an entity incorporated in 

the Caribbean island of Nevis by an offshore asset manager as arranged by Lacher, Patel, and 

Ledvina.  This created the false appearance that International Metals was controlled by Sundrive, 

an entity with no apparent connection to Tobin.   

50. In February 2017, Tobin and Patel arranged for International Metals to change its 

name to Environmental Packaging in anticipation of the completed merger.  To do this, Patel 

signed an authorization for the name change on behalf of Sundrive, at Tobin’s direction. 

51. Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and Lacher planned to sell the purportedly 

unrestricted shares that had been held for Tobin by friends and relatives since 2013.  As they 

each knew, or recklessly disregarded, these shares were restricted from resale without 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 15 of 40



16 
 

registration because Tobin was an affiliate of Environmental Packaging who owned substantially 

all its stock.  They further knew, or recklessly disregarded, that because the shares falsely 

appeared to be unrestricted, a broker was likely to accept a deposit of the shares and sell them to 

investors without further inquiry as to a possible exemption from registration and without 

limiting the amount of shares that could be sold in accordance with SEC Rule 144. 

52. Starting in or around January 2017, Patel coordinated with Tobin and others to 

transfer Environmental Packaging stock from Tobin’s relatives and friends to the Environmental 

Packaging Nominees.   

53. Patel signed phony stock purchase agreements reciting amounts of consideration 

that had purportedly been paid by the Environmental Packaging Nominees to Tobin’s relatives 

and friends.  In reality, the Environmental Packaging Nominees never paid for the stock and 

Tobin was, and remained, the true beneficial owner of the stock.  For example, Patel signed a 

stock purchase agreement dated January 20, 2017, on behalf of an Environmental Packaging 

Nominee purporting to purchase 359,316 shares of Environmental Packaging stock from Tobin’s 

brother-in-law for $359.32.  In reality, even that nominal payment was not made. 

54. After Tobin’s stock in Environmental Packaging had been transferred to the 

Environmental Packaging Nominees, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher arranged to open several 

accounts on Tobin’s behalf with Wintercap, with each account in the name of one of the 

Environmental Packaging Nominees.  On January 12, 2017, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher met in 

person with Knox in Switzerland to arrange to open the accounts.  To avoid direct association 

with the stock sales, Ledvina, Lacher, and a colleague at Patel’s and Ledvina’s law firm posed as 

the supposed beneficial owners of one of these accounts instead of Tobin.  Wintercap kept track 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 16 of 40



17 
 

of these “beneficial owners” on a Swiss regulatory form called “Form A” that asset managers are 

required to maintain to track beneficial ownership of assets. 

55. Patel and Lacher then facilitated the transfer of Tobin’s stock to the accounts held 

by Wintercap and to one account at another asset manager.  For each of these transfers, Patel 

signed transfer agent instruction forms, which caused the stock to be transferred to the offshore 

asset managers.  For example, Patel signed two transfer instruction forms dated March 27, 2017, 

to instruct the transfer agent to transfer stock certificates from two Environmental Packaging 

Nominees to Wintercap.  Lacher sent transfer instruction forms signed by Patel to the transfer 

agent, and arranged for payment to the transfer agent for the costs of the transactions.  

56. Knox and Wintercap deposited Tobin’s shares of Environmental Packaging with 

multiple brokers in order to sell the shares in the U.S. securities market.  The deposits to brokers 

were all in amounts constituting less than 5% of Environmental Packaging’s outstanding shares, 

so as to conceal the fact that these shares were all owned and controlled by an individual or 

group that was an affiliate of Environmental Packaging.  The use of the offshore asset managers’ 

accounts added another layer of concealment concerning Tobin’s ownership of the stock because 

the stock was deposited into omnibus brokerage accounts (i.e., accounts that do not identify 

specific beneficial ownership information) at foreign and domestic brokerage firms.   

57. Immediately prior to the completion of the reverse merger between 

Environmental Packaging and the private company, Tobin controlled substantially all of 

Environmental Packaging’s stock, while concealing his ownership through multiple nominees 

and false representations about beneficial ownership.   

58. By using a network of nominees, accounts at offshore asset managers in the 

names of those nominees, and omnibus accounts at brokers in the names of the asset managers, 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 17 of 40



18 
 

Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher, hid Tobin’s control over Environmental Packaging’s stock, 

thereby creating the false appearance that no single Environmental Packaging Nominee or Tobin 

owned more than 5% of the company’s stock.  This façade enabled the defendants to evade SEC 

rules that required Environmental Packaging to list all persons holding greater than 5% of its 

outstanding stock in reports filed with the Commission.  

Stock Promotion Efforts to Sell Tobin’s Environmental Packaging Stock 

59. As agreed with Tobin and Quinn, Skriloff solicited investments in anticipation of 

the merger of Environmental Packaging and the private company in order to finance the stock 

promotion campaign for Environmental Packaging in support of Tobin’s unregistered sale of 

millions of shares of his stock.  Unbeknownst to those investors, Tobin, Quinn, and Skriloff had 

agreed that $1 million of the funds raised from investors would be used to pay for a promotional 

campaign targeting investors and potential investors in Environmental Packaging. 

60. To that end, in anticipation of the reverse merger, Tobin and Quinn hired a 

company (the “Stock Promoter”) to lead a promotional campaign carefully timed to coincide 

with the announcement of the completion of the reverse merger in June 2017.  The Stock 

Promoter’s role was to target potential investors with a mass mail and mass email promotional 

campaign designed to create interest in Environmental Packaging stock.  The Stock Promoter 

also referred Quinn to a writer whom Tobin and Quinn hired to draft the creative content for the 

promotion, which Quinn and Tobin reviewed and edited. 

61. Skriloff provided Tobin and Quinn with a detailed PowerPoint presentation about 

Environmental Packaging Technologies, Inc., an executive summary, and a spreadsheet of 

financial projections, with the understanding that Tobin and Quinn would use these materials for 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 18 of 40



19 
 

the stock promotion campaign.  Quinn sent the presentation to the Stock Promoter and to the 

writer, and the writer used these materials to author the creative content for the promotion.  

62. Although Quinn knew that the stock promotion would be paid for by 

Environmental Packaging, as directed by Tobin and Quinn, Quinn falsely informed the Stock 

Promoter that a third party named “Svarna” was paying for the stock promotion.   

63. The defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that the Stock Promoter 

would disclose to the investing public the name of the party that was purportedly paying for the 

promotion and that such disclosures would be misleading absent a disclosure that the promotion 

was being underwritten by controlling affiliates of Environmental Packaging.  

64. In order to deceive investors about Tobin’s connection with Environmental 

Packaging and the stock promotion, Patel asked Wintercap to create an offshore nominee 

account through which to funnel payment for the promotional campaign. 

65. On or about May 19, 2017, Lacher emailed Patel an invoice for $1 million from 

the Stock Promoter, billed to “Svarna, LLC,” along with wiring instructions.  That same day, 

Patel wrote an email to Knox which states, in relevant part: “[w]e need to form an entity with the 

name Svarna LLC . . . .”  Patel also wrote that his team would provide the name of an individual 

that could be named as the “beneficial owner” of Svarna LLC.  Patel also stated in this email 

that, in sum and substance, the Svarna entity would be used as a conduit to pay the Stock 

Promoter. 

66. On or about May 22, 2017, Knox emailed the following to Patel: “[a]s discussed, 

the amended Marshall Island company named Svarna Ltd is available and incorporation has been 

requested today.”  Patel and Lacher arranged for Lacher’s girlfriend to serve as the purported 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 19 of 40



20 
 

“beneficial owner” of Svarna, and provided Wintercap with a curriculum vitae, a copy of her 

passport, and a signed “Form A” which represented that she was the beneficial owner of Svarna. 

67. On or about May 20 through May 25, 2017, Tobin and Skriloff caused the transfer 

of a total of approximately $1 million from Environmental Packaging to Svarna’s account at 

Wintercap.  On or about May 24 through June 1, 2017, Tobin, Quinn, Patel, and Lacher arranged 

for these funds to be transferred from Svarna’s account to the Stock Promoter for the purpose of 

promoting Environmental Packaging and its stock.  

68. On or about June 12, 2017, the Stock Promoter began disseminating marketing 

and promotional materials concerning Environmental Packaging.  These materials included a 16-

page glossy mailer that was sent by U.S. mail to thousands of investors across the United States.  

The mailer touted the stock of Environmental Packaging with statements such as, 

“Environmental Packaging . . . Could be Perfectly Positioned To Put Up To 1,118% In Your 

Pocket!”  As planned, the Stock Promoter listed “Svarna” as the paying “third party” in its 

disclosures to investors. 

69. Tobin exercised control over Environmental Packaging and Skriloff during the 

promotional campaign.  At Tobin’s direction, Skriloff caused Environmental Packaging to issue 

press releases touting positive news about Environmental Packaging.  For example, on June 23, 

2017, Tobin emailed Skriloff a draft press release announcing that Environmental Packaging was 

expanding the capacity of its manufacturing facility due to increased customer demand.  Tobin 

wrote in an email to Skriloff, “Attached is the press release to go out before the market opens . . . 

. please confirm this is going out before the open.”  Skriloff followed Tobin’s instruction and 

Environmental Packaging issued the press release that day.  Tobin and Quinn coordinated the 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 20 of 4021 
 

timing of Environmental Packaging’s press releases to dovetail with the dissemination of emails 

in the stock promotion. 

Misstatements by Environmental Packaging 

70. Skriloff also contributed to the scheme by making misstatements and misleading 

omissions, in the company’s filings with the Commission or otherwise to investors, as the CEO 

of Environmental Packaging.  For example, in Form 8-Ks filed with the Commission on June 12, 

2017, and June 21, 2017, and signed by Skriloff, Environmental Packaging made multiple 

misstatements and omissions, including: 

a. Omitting to state that Tobin was the beneficial owner of nearly 20% of 

Environmental Packaging’s outstanding shares (following the issuance of more 

than 40 million new shares as part of the reverse merger) and that Tobin 

controlled substantially all of the company’s unrestricted shares; 

b. Falsely describing the terms of the merger, specifically by stating that the public 

shell’s “majority shareholder” was to be paid $550,000, when, in reality, Skriloff 

had agreed with Tobin and Quinn to pay $1.5 million, which included the $1 

million payment for the stock promotion; and 

c. Omitting to state that the company had paid $1 million for the stock promotion 

designed to increase demand, in order to sell Tobin’s shares. 

71. Skriloff obtained money for Environmental Packaging from investors using these 

misstatements and misleading omissions.  For example, just days after Skriloff signed 

Environmental Packaging’s false Form 8-K dated June 21, 2017, two individuals invested an 

aggregate of $120,000 with Environmental Packaging. 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 21 of 40



22 
 

Illegal Stock Sales 

72. Prior to the promotional campaign, there was virtually no public trading of 

Environmental Packaging’s stock.  The average daily trading volume of Environmental 

Packaging’s stock during the period from May 1, 2017, through June 9, 2017 (a Friday), was less 

than 23,000 shares per day, and on most days during that period of time, Environmental 

Packaging’s stock did not trade at all in the public securities markets.  But, on or about June 12, 

2017, the first day of the paid promotional campaign, approximately 424,956 shares of 

Environmental Packaging traded in the public securities markets, of which approximately 

224,000 shares were Tobin’s stock, sold by Wintercap and a second offshore asset manager.   

73. Quinn directed the trading on behalf of the group by telling Tobin how many 

shares of Environmental Packaging to sell and at what price.  Tobin passed these instructions to 

Lacher, who in turn instructed the offshore asset managers. 

74. On or about June 13, 2017, approximately 226,263 shares of Environmental 

Packaging traded in the public securities market, of which approximately 66,000 shares were 

Tobin’s stock, sold by Wintercap. 

75. Thereafter, the offshore asset managers continued to sell Tobin’s Environmental 

Packaging stock.  Between June 14 and 27, 2017, the offshore asset managers dumped 

approximately 735,000 additional shares of Environmental Packaging stock into the public 

securities markets to investors.  Collectively, Tobin’s sales of Environmental Packaging stock in 

June 2017 generated approximately $1.5 million in trading proceeds.  Lacher received trading 

and account records from the offshore asset managers and prepared spreadsheets which 

aggregated the activity of the several Environmental Packaging Nominee accounts in order to 

track all of the selling of Tobin’s shares through the various nominee accounts.   

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 22 of 40



23 
 

76. By virtue of the scheme perpetrated by the defendants, the sales of Tobin’s stock 

were presented and processed as if they were ordinary market purchases of a widely-traded 

stock.  In reality, the purchasers were buying the stock of a company insider who was illegally 

and secretly dumping his shares. 

77. The defendants failed to register these stock sales pursuant to Section 5 of the 

Securities Act.  Tobin’s Environmental Packaging stock was, by law, restricted from resale 

because Tobin was an affiliate of Environmental Packaging.  The sales of Tobin’s Environmental 

Packaging stock also failed to meet the conditions of SEC Rule 144. 

Attempts to Cover-Up the Fraud 

78. Starting in or about August 2017, the Commission staff issued investigative 

subpoenas for documents concerning Environmental Packaging and the above-mentioned 

conduct to a number of individuals and entities, including Tobin, Environmental Packaging, and 

Quinn’s company. 

79. Tobin discussed the Commission’s investigation with the other defendants, and 

they coordinated efforts to conceal the Environmental Packaging scheme and to thwart and 

obstruct the Commission’s investigation.  In particular, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher 

became concerned that the purported beneficial owners listed on paperwork (including Form As) 

for the Environmental Packaging Nominees were too closely connected to them and that the 

Commission would be able to figure out that Tobin and his group were really in control of the 

Environmental Packaging stock held by the Environmental Packaging Nominees.   

80. In or about September 2017, Patel and Ledvina met in Switzerland with Knox and 

another Wintercap representative to discuss their group’s concern.  Knox advised them that they 

should change the names of the purported beneficial owners on the Form As and should use the 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 23 of 40



24 
 

names of people who were not so obviously connected to their group.  Knox further advised 

them that the Form As should be changed before December 2017 because a Swiss regulator was 

scheduled to audit Wintercap’s records at that time. 

81. Prior to December 2017, Ledvina sought out two new names to list as beneficial 

owners—individuals from Dubai and Switzerland—to take the place of Ledvina and his law firm 

colleague.  Ledvina obtained and submitted to Wintercap the documents necessary to accomplish 

this, including false Form As and backdated “know-your-client” letters in which Ledvina falsely 

represented that these individuals were each the “sole (100%) beneficial owner” of their 

respective Environmental Packaging Nominee. 

82. Tobin agreed to pay approximately $60,000 of the Environmental Packaging 

trading proceeds to each of Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher in exchange for their help in concealing 

the fraud.  Lacher agreed with Tobin to keep his designation as the purported beneficial owner of 

one of the Environmental Packaging Nominee accounts at Wintercap, and to be the “target” if 

the account was discovered during the investigation. 

83. To obstruct the Commission’s investigation and conceal their roles in the scheme, 

Quinn and Skriloff deleted incriminating emails concerning the Environmental Packaging deal.  

Quinn deleted from his email account all electronic communications concerning Environmental 

Packaging.  Skriloff deleted from his email account all of his electronic communications with 

Quinn. 

84. Tobin, Patel, and Skriloff attempted to conceal the source of the $1 million 

payment for the promotional campaign by: (a) raising another $1 million from new investors by 

selling them some of Tobin’s shares in private transactions and (b) using those funds to refund 

the $1 million to Environmental Packaging under the guise of a cancelled consulting agreement.  

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 24 of 40



25 
 

To support this ruse, Skriloff emailed an attorney whose firm was to receive the funds from the 

new investors and stated, “It is my understanding that the consultant will be returning the 

payment as nothing ever got signed.  I think it will be coming in a few different wires.  Let me 

know when they arrive.”  In reality, there was never any consultant, the $1 million purportedly 

paid to the “consultant” had actually been spent on the promotion, and the money being 

“refunded” was actually money that had been newly raised from investors through stock sales. 

85. In telephone conversations with a cooperating witness (“CW1”), Skriloff stated, 

in sum and substance:  (a) that Skriloff knew Quinn and Tobin controlled substantially all of 

Environmental Packaging’s purportedly unrestricted shares after the reverse merger; (b) that 

Skriloff had provided Quinn with information about the company to use in the stock promotion; 

(c) that the “refund” scheme described above was intended to replace the $1 million for the 

promotional campaign; (d) and that Skriloff deleted all of his emails with Quinn.  Skriloff also 

discussed with CW1 the status of the Commission’s investigation and what CW1 should say to 

Commission staff, including various falsehoods. 

86. In March 2018, Environmental Packaging filed belated Form 10-Qs (a quarterly 

report that public companies are generally required to file with the Commission after the end of 

each quarter) for the quarters ended June 30, 2017 and September 30, 2017.  These were signed 

by Skriloff, and falsely stated that the company “had no prior knowledge and did not participate 

in the preparation and/or distribution of” the promotional material.  These forms also omitted to 

disclose various material facts about the scheme and about the role of Tobin’s group. 

87. Quinn testified under oath to the Commission staff in May 2018 and made 

numerous false statements concerning Tobin and the Environmental Packaging scheme.  For 

example, Quinn testified that he did not own or expect to receive any shares of Environmental 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 25 of 40



26 
 

Packaging, and that he did not expect to profit from the sale of anyone else’s shares of 

Environmental Packaging.   In reality, Quinn and Tobin had agreed to share the proceeds of the 

sale of Tobin’s Environmental Packaging shares, and those proceeds were held for their benefit 

in the Environmental Packaging Nominee accounts at the offshore asset managers.  In telephone 

conversations with CW1 between March 2018 and June 2018, Quinn repeatedly asked CW1 

when he would be able to get his share of the trading proceeds.  In those telephone 

conversations, Quinn and CW1 specifically discussed that the shares were held in various 

nominee accounts and that Patel was the intermediary between Tobin and Wintercap.  During an 

in-person meeting with CW1, Quinn also informed CW1 that Quinn had lied during his 

testimony before the Commission staff, and discussed the need to keep their stories straight. 

CURE 

Scheme to Conceal Tobin’s Control and Sales of CURE Stock 

88. Defendants Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher engaged in a substantially similar 

scheme with respect to the stock of CURE.  As with Environmental Packaging, Tobin, Patel, 

Lacher, and Ledvina sought to sell Tobin’s shares of CURE: (a) without registering the offer or 

sale of stock with the Commission; (b) without disclosing accurate information about Tobin’s 

ownership and control over CURE; and (c) without complying with limitations on the sale of 

stock by company “affiliates” such as Tobin. 

89. In or about June 2016, Tobin entered into an agreement to acquire, directly or 

indirectly, undisclosed control of substantially all of the stock of a public company, Makkanotti, 

by purchasing: (a) a large block of restricted stock, and (b) a significant percentage of the stock 

that had been trading as unrestricted shares.  

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 26 of 40



27 
 

90. Between June 2016 and November 2016, Tobin exercised his control over 

Makkanotti by installing a new CEO, and arranging for Makkanotti’s reverse merger with a 

private drug-delivery company.  Following the reverse merger, Makkanotti changed its name to 

CURE.  As of September 30, 2016, immediately prior to the merger, Tobin controlled 

approximately 95% of CURE’s stock; consequently, Tobin was an affiliate of CURE.   

91. In order to hide Tobin’s control over CURE, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher: 

(a) arranged for the restricted stock to be held by a nominee created and controlled by Patel, 

Lacher, and Ledvina, and (b) arranged for the majority of Tobin’s holdings in previously 

unrestricted stock to be held on his behalf by a series of offshore corporations and accounts 

created by Patel, Lacher, and Ledvina (the “CURE Nominees”). 

92. Patel, Lacher, and Ledvina knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that the entity 

used by Tobin to hold his block of restricted shares, Aureus Fiduciary Nevis Limited (“Aureus 

Fiduciary”), was designed to conceal Tobin’s control of CURE in order to facilitate his illegal 

sale of shares that he held as a control person.  For example, Patel signed a document, dated 

November 7, 2016, on behalf of Aureus Fiduciary (as its purported controlling shareholder) that 

approved the terms of the merger and the public company’s name change following the merger.  

In reality, and as Patel knew, Tobin, operating through Aureus Fiduciary, was calling the shots 

and directed the merger and name change.     

93. Tobin, working with Patel, Lacher, and Ledvina, hid his control over CURE’s 

purportedly unrestricted stock by using the CURE Nominees, and treated the CURE stock held 

by the CURE Nominees as if the stock was unrestricted.  In reality, as Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher 

knew or recklessly disregarded, this CURE stock was restricted because it was owned by Tobin, 

who was an affiliate of the issuer and controlled the issuer through financing and through his 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 27 of 40



28 
 

substantial ownership interest.  The use of multiple CURE Nominees hid Tobin’s control over 

CURE’s stock to make it appear that no single CURE Nominee or Tobin controlled more than 

5% of the company’s stock.  This façade enabled Tobin to evade SEC rules that required CURE 

to disclose all persons holding greater than 5% of its outstanding stock in reports filed with the 

Commission.   

94. Patel and Ledvina created another corporation named Aureus Financial Holdings 

LLC (“Aureus Financial”), with an address of record located at Patel’s then residence in Short 

Hills, New Jersey.  Patel and Ledvina then used Aureus Financial to directly invest in the CURE 

scheme, on their own behalf, by purchasing 300,000 shares of stock from Tobin for $300,000.   

95. Patel’s and Ledvina’s CURE stock was subject to sale restrictions because they, 

like Tobin, were affiliates of CURE.  By working on behalf of Tobin as his agents and by 

scheming with Tobin to illegally sell stock, Patel and Ledvina were affiliates in light of Tobin’s 

control of CURE.  Thus Patel and Ledvina’s CURE stock was subject to Rule 144’s restrictions 

on the amount of stock of CURE they could sell without registration.     

96. By November 2016, following the merger, Tobin, Patel, and Ledvina controlled 

approximately 6.8 million shares of CURE (29% of the company), of which approximately 4 

million shares (the vast majority of CURE’s purportedly unrestricted stock) were held by the 

CURE Nominees. 

97. In or around February and March 2017, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher facilitated the 

transfer of Tobin’s CURE stock from the CURE Nominees to accounts at Wintercap and another 

offshore asset manager.  These transfers added another layer of concealment of Tobin’s 

ownership of the stock because the offshore asset managers could deposit Tobin’s stock into 

omnibus brokerage accounts at foreign and domestic brokerage firms.   

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 28 of 40



29 
 

98. For each transfer, Patel signed transfer instruction forms which caused the stock 

to be transferred from the CURE Nominees to the offshore asset manager.  For example, Patel 

signed three transfer instruction forms dated February 10, 2017 to instruct the transfer agent to 

transfer CURE stock from three CURE Nominees to Wintercap. 

99. Ledvina, Lacher, and a relative of Lacher each posed as a purported beneficial 

owner of one of the CURE Nominees’ accounts at Wintercap.  Patel sent Wintercap letters 

falsely declaring that each was “the sole (100%) beneficial owner” of their respective CURE 

Nominee.  Ledvina and Lacher then each sent Wintercap signed Form As in which they falsely 

declared themselves to be the beneficial owners of their respective CURE Nominees, and Lacher 

also sent Wintercap a false Form A purportedly signed by the relative of Lacher. 

100. Between February and March 2017, Wintercap and a second offshore asset 

manager placed large orders to sell Tobin’s CURE stock (held in the name of the CURE 

Nominees).  At or about the same time, CURE issued approximately eight press releases, and 

Tobin’s group paid to market the company through online advertising.  During this time period, 

there was a price and daily trading volume spike of CURE’s stock.  Between February 27, 2017, 

and March 31, 2017, the volume of trading in CURE stock increased from approximately 4,500 

shares per day to an average of approximately 36,000 shares per day, and the price rose from 

approximately $2-$3 per share to a high of $15 per share.  Tobin sold approximately 466,000 

shares of CURE stock through the two offshore asset managers, realizing trading proceeds of 

approximately $2.1 million.  Tobin agreed with Patel and Ledvina to treat 300,000 of the 

466,000 shares sold as belonging to Patel and Ledvina, because the shares held by Patel’s and 

Ledvina’s nominee (Aureus Financial) had not been deposited with a broker. 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 29 of 40



30 
 

101. Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher failed to register these stock sales pursuant to 

Section 5 of the Securities Act.  By law, Tobin’s CURE stock was restricted from resale because 

Tobin was an affiliate of CURE.  The sales of Tobin’s CURE stock also failed to meet the 

conditions of SEC Rule 144. 

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
FRAUD IN THE OFFER OR SALE OF SECURITIES 

(Violations of Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act) 
(All Defendants — Environmental Packaging) 

 
102. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if 

fully set forth herein. 

103. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities 

under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)]. 

104. By reason of the conduct described above, the defendants, in connection with the 

offer or sale of securities, by the use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce or 

of the mails, directly or indirectly, acting with the requisite degree of knowledge, state of mind 

or negligence (i) employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud; and (ii) engaged in 

transactions, practices, or courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or 

deceit upon any persons, including purchasers or sellers of the securities.   

105. By reason of the conduct described above, the defendants each violated Securities 

Act Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) and (3)]. 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 30 of 40



31 
 

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF   
FRAUD IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE OR SALE OF SECURITIES 

(Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder) 
(All Defendants — Environmental Packaging) 

 
106. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if 

fully set forth herein. 

107. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities 

under Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)].  

108. By reason of the conduct described above, the defendants, directly or indirectly, 

in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, by the use of the means or instrumentalities 

of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, (i) employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud; 

and (ii) engaged in acts, practices, or courses of business which operated or would operate as a 

fraud or deceit upon any persons, including purchasers or sellers of the securities. 

109. By reason of the conduct described above, the defendants violated Exchange Act 

Section 10(b) [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) and (c)] 

thereunder. 

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES 

(Violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act) 
(Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and Lacher — Environmental Packaging) 

 
110. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if 

fully set forth herein. 

111. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities 

under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)]. 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 31 of 40



32 
 

112. By reason of the conduct described above, Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and 

Lacher, directly or indirectly:  (a) made use of the means or instruments of transportation or 

communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell, through the use or medium of a 

prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no registration statement has been in effect and 

for which no exemption from registration has been available; and/or (b) made use of the means 

or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer 

to sell, through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no 

registration statement has been filed and for which no exemption from registration has been 

available. 

113. As a result, Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and Lacher violated Sections 5(a) and 

(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c)].  

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
FRAUD IN THE OFFER OR SALE OF SECURITIES 

 (Violations of Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act) 
(Skriloff — Environmental Packaging) 

 
114. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if 

fully set forth herein. 

115. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities 

under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)]. 

116. By reason of the conduct described above, Skriloff, in connection with the offer 

or sale of securities of Environmental Packaging, by the use of the means or instrumentalities of 

interstate commerce or of the mails, directly or indirectly, acting with the requisite degree of 

knowledge, state of mind or negligence, obtained money or property by means of untrue 

statements of material fact or by omissions to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 

statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.   

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 32 of 40



33 
 

117. By reason of the conduct described above, Skriloff violated Securities Act Section 

17(a)(2) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)]. 

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
FRAUD IN THE OFFER OR SALE OF SECURITIES 

 (Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b) thereunder) 
(Skriloff — Environmental Packaging) 

 
118. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if 

fully set forth herein. 

119. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities 

under Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)].  

120. By reason of the conduct described above, Skriloff, directly or indirectly, in 

connection with the purchase or sale of securities, by the use of the means or instrumentalities of 

interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state 

material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which 

they were made, not misleading. 

121. By reason of the conduct described above, Skriloff violated Exchange Act Section 

10(b) [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5(b) [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)] thereunder. 

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
AIDING AND ABETTING 

 (Violations of Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act) 
(Skriloff — Environmental Packaging) 

 
122. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if 

fully set forth herein. 

123. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities 

under Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)].  

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 33 of 40



34 
 

124. By reason of the conduct described above, Defendants Tobin, Patel, Quinn, 

Ledvina, and Lacher directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities 

of Environmental Packaging, by the use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce 

or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly, (i) employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud; and (ii) engaged in acts, 

practices, or courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 

persons, including purchasers or sellers of the securities. 

125. Skriloff knowingly or recklessly provided substantial assistance to Defendants 

Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and Lacher, in their violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 

and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder. 

126. As a result, Skriloff violated Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 

78t(e).] 

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
AIDING AND ABETTING 

 (Violations of Section 15(b) of the Securities Act) 
(Skriloff — Environmental Packaging) 

 
127. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if 

fully set forth herein. 

128. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities 

under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)]. 

129. By reason of the conduct described above, Defendants Tobin, Patel, Quinn, 

Ledvina, and Lacher in connection with the offer or sale of securities, by the use of the means or 

instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of the mails, directly or indirectly, acting with the 

requisite degree of knowledge, state of mind or negligence (i) employed devices, schemes, or 

artifices to defraud; and (ii) engaged in transactions, practices, or courses of business which 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 34 of 40



35 
 

operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any persons, including purchasers or sellers 

of the securities. 

130. Skriloff knowingly or recklessly provided substantial assistance to Defendants 

Tobin, Patel, Quinn, Ledvina, and Lacher, in their violation of Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the 

Securities Act. 

131. As a result, Skriloff violated Section 15(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 

77o(b)].  

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
AIDING AND ABETTING 

 (Violations of Section 15(b) of the Securities Act) 
(Skriloff — Environmental Packaging) 

 
132. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if 

fully set forth herein. 

133. During the Relevant Period, the stock of Environmental Packaging were securities 

under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)]. 

134. By reason of the conduct described above, Environmental Packaging, in 

connection with the offer or sale of securities, by the use of the means or instrumentalities of 

interstate commerce or of the mails, directly or indirectly, acting with requisite degree of 

knowledge, state of mind or negligence obtained money or property by means of untrue 

statements of material fact or by omissions to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 

statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.   

135.  Skriloff knowingly or recklessly provided substantial assistance to 

Environmental Packaging in its violation of Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act. 

136. As a result, Skriloff violated Section 15(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 

77o(b)].  

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 35 of 40



36 
 

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
FRAUD IN THE OFFER OR SALE OF SECURITIES 

(Violations of Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act) 
(Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher — CURE) 

 
137. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if 

fully set forth herein. 

138. During the Relevant Period, the stock of CURE were securities under Section 

2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)]. 

139. By reason of the conduct described above, defendants Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and 

Lacher, in connection with the offer or sale of securities, by the use of the means or 

instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of the mails, directly or indirectly, acting with the 

requisite degree of knowledge, state of mind or negligence (i) employed devices, schemes, or 

artifices to defraud; and (ii) engaged in transactions, practices, or courses of business which 

operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any persons, including purchasers or sellers 

of the securities.   

140. By reason of the conduct described above, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher each 

violated Securities Act Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) and (3)]. 

TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF   
FRAUD IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE OR SALE OF SECURITIES 

(Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder) 
(Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher — CURE) 

 
141. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if 

fully set forth herein. 

142. During the Relevant Period, the stock of CURE were securities under Section 

3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)].  

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 36 of 40



37 
 

143. By reason of the conduct described above, defendants Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and 

Lacher, directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, by the use of 

the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any 

national securities exchange, intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, (i) employed devices, 

schemes, or artifices to defraud; and (ii) engaged in acts, practices, or courses of business which 

operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any persons, including purchasers or sellers 

of the securities. 

144. By reason of the conduct described above, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher 

violated Exchange Act Section 10(b) [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) [17 C.F.R. 

§ 240.10b-5(a) and (c)] thereunder. 

ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES 

(Violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act) 
(Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher — CURE) 

 
145. Paragraphs 1 through 101 above are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if 

fully set forth herein. 

146. During the Relevant Period, the stock of CURE were securities under Section 

2(a)(1) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)]. 

147. By reason of the conduct described above, defendants Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and 

Lacher, directly or indirectly:  (a) made use of the means or instruments of transportation or 

communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell, through the use or medium of a 

prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no registration statement has been in effect and 

for which no exemption from registration has been available; and/or (b) made use of the means 

or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer 

to sell, through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 37 of 40



38 
 

registration statement has been filed and for which no exemption from registration has been 

available. 

148. As a result, Tobin, Patel, Ledvina, and Lacher violated Sections 5(a) and (c) of the 

Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c)].  

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: 

A. Enter a permanent injunction restraining each of the defendants, his officers, 

agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation 

with him who receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service or otherwise, from 

violating Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) and (3)], and 

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder 

[17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(a) and (c)]. 

B.  Enter a permanent injunction restraining each of Tobin, Quinn, Patel, Ledvina, 

and Lacher, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and those persons in active 

concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service 

or otherwise, from violating Sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c)]. 

C. Enter a permanent injunction restraining Skriloff, his officers, agents, servants, 

employees and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with him who 

receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service or otherwise, from violating Section 

17(a)(2) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)] and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 

U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules 10b-5(b) thereunder [17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(b)]. 

D. Order the defendants to disgorge, with prejudgment interest, all ill-gotten gains 

obtained by reason of the unlawful conduct alleged in this Complaint; 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 38 of 40



39 
 

E. Order the defendants to pay civil monetary penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of 

the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 

§ 78u(d)(3)];  

F. Enter an order barring the defendants from participating in any offering of a 

penny stock, pursuant to Section 20(g) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(g)] and 21(d) of the 

Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)]; 

G. Impose an officer and director bar against Skriloff pursuant to Section 20(e) of the 

Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §77t(e)] and Section 21(d)(2) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 

78u(d)(2)]; 

H. Retain jurisdiction over this action to implement and carry out the terms of all 

orders and decrees that may be entered; and  

I. Grant such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. 

JURY DEMAND 

The Commission demands a jury in this matter for all claims so triable. 

 

DATED this 29th day of August 2019. 

 

      Respectfully submitted, 

                                           /s/ David M. Scheffler 
David M. Scheffler (Mass Bar No.670324) 
Eric A. Forni (Mass Bar No. 669685)   
J. Lauchlan Wash (Mass Bar No. 629092) 
Kathleen B. Shields (Mass Bar No. 637438) 
Amy Gwiazda (Mass Bar No.663494) 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Boston Regional Office 
33 Arch St., 24th Floor 
Boston, MA 02110 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 39 of 40



40 
 

Phone: (617) 573-8810 (Scheffler direct) 
Fax: (617) 573-4590 (fax) 
[email protected] (Scheffler email) 

Case 1:18-cv-12451-NMG   Document 22   Filed 08/29/19   Page 40 of 40