2016-12-31 SEC Press pdf 367 KB 102,925 chars

This is a report of the staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The

Exhibit of Annual Staff Reports on Credit Rating Agencies Show Improvements

summary

Despite regulatory reforms and modest gains by smaller NRSROs like Morningstar and KBRA in niche asset-backed markets, Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch retained 96.4% of outstanding ratings and 94.4% of revenue in 2016, with systemic conflicts of interest persisting amid ongoing SEC oversight following crisis-era settlements.

paragraph

As of December 31, 2016, Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch collectively controlled 96.4% of outstanding credit ratings and 94.4% of NRSRO revenue, with S&P leading at 48.9% market share. Smaller NRSROs such as Morningstar, DBRS, and KBRA gained ground in specialized sectors like CMBS, ABS, CLOs, and PACE securitizations, increasing analyst staffing and market share despite regulatory and institutional barriers. The SEC, under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act and Dodd-Frank, mandated greater transparency and conflict-of-interest disclosures, while Moody’s and S&P resolved major DOJ lawsuits over misleading ratings tied to the financial crisis.

narrative

As of December 31, 2016, Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch dominated the U.S. credit rating market, collectively holding 96.4% of all outstanding ratings and 94.4% of total NRSRO revenue, with S&P alone accounting for 48.9% of the market. Smaller NRSROs—including Morningstar, DBRS, and KBRA—made measurable gains in niche asset-backed segments such as conduit and single-borrower CMBS, ABS, CLOs, PACE securitizations, and aircraft leases, reflected in rising analyst staffing and market share. Despite these advances, structural barriers like investor guidelines favoring the Big Three, high regulatory compliance costs under Dodd-Frank, and index inclusion rules continued to impede meaningful competition. The SEC, pursuant to the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, mandated enhanced transparency through public disclosure of rating methodologies, performance data, and conflicts-of-interest policies, and approved new registrations for Morningstar and HR Ratings in corporate and financial institution ratings. Moody’s and S&P had previously settled major Department of Justice lawsuits over misleading ratings issued during the financial crisis, prompting intensified SEC oversight, including annual compliance examinations and 'look-back' reviews of rating practices. Although regulatory reforms improved accountability, systemic conflicts of interest persisted due to the issuer-pays model and lack of independent oversight. The 2017 SEC report concluded that while diversification was emerging, the market remained highly concentrated and vulnerable to the same structural flaws that contributed to the 2008 crisis.

Enriched metadata

Scheme: non-corporate (100%)
Victim loss: $5,900,000,000

Classified non-corporate(confidence 100%). No EDGAR filing fingerprint (criminal/DOJ-side scheme). detection rule →

Extracted insights

Dollar amounts 11

$67.40B $67.4 billion ≥$1B
$51.20B $51.2 billion ≥$1B
$5.90B $5.9 billion ≥$1B
$4.00B $4.0 billion ≥$1B
$1.80B $1.8 billion ≥$1B
$1.38B $1.375 Billion ≥$1B
$864.00M $864 Million $100M–$1B
$662.00M $662 million $100M–$1B
$651.00M $651 million $100M–$1B
$233.00M $233 million $100M–$1B
$100.00M $100 million $100M–$1B

Entities 1

agency staff of the u.s. securities and exchange commission

Triples 3

Staff Of The U.S. Securities And Exchange Commission Prepared Report
Commission Expressed No View Regarding Analysis, Findings, Or Conclusions Contained In This Report
Section 6 Of The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act Of 2006 Requires Annual Report On Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations

PDF

This is a report of the staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The · Source

Text layers

Extracted body text (102,925c)

_____________________________________________________________________________

Annual Report on Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations

As Required by Section 6 of the
Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act of 2006

December 2017

This is a report of the staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The
Commission has expressed no view regarding the analysis, findings, or conclusions
contained in this report.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1
II. STATUS OF REGISTRANTS AND APPLICANTS ........................................... 2
III. ACTIVITIES RELATING TO NRSROs .............................................................. 3
A. Activities ........................................................................................................... 3
B. Commission Orders and Releases and Staff Publications ................................ 4
IV. COMPETITION ...................................................................................................... 6
A. Select NRSRO Statistics ................................................................................... 6
1. NRSRO Credit Ratings Outstanding ....................................................... 7
(a) Number of Outstanding Ratings in Statutory Rating Categories .....7
(b) Industry Concentration...................................................................12
2. NRSRO Analytical Staffing Levels ....................................................... 14
3. NRSRO Revenue Growth ...................................................................... 15
B. Recent Developments in the State of Competition among NRSROs ............. 17
1. Market Share Developments in the Asset-Backed Securities Rating
Category ................................................................................................. 17
(a) CMBS ............................................................................................18
(b) ABS/MBS ......................................................................................20
2. Other NRSRO Developments ................................................................ 21
C. Barriers to Entry .............................................................................................. 24
V. TRANSPARENCY ................................................................................................ 25
VI. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST .............................................................................. 29
VII. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 31

TABLE OF CHARTS
Chart 1: Number of Outstanding Credit Ratings as of December 31, 2016 by
Rating Category ..............................................................................................8

Chart 2: Percentage by Rating Category of Each NRSRO’s Outstanding Credit
Ratings of the Total Outstanding Credit Ratings of all NRSROs, as of
December 31, 2016 .........................................................................................9

Chart 3: Breakdown of Ratings Reported Outstanding on December 31, 2016 .........10
Chart 4: Breakdown of Non-Government Securities Ratings Reported
Outstanding on December 31, 2016

.............................................................11
Chart 5: HHI Inverses for Each Rating Category .......................................................13
Chart 6: NRSRO Credit Analysts and Credit Analyst Supervisors ............................14
Chart 7: NRSRO Revenue Information: Fiscal Year Percentage of Total
Reported NRSRO Revenue...........................................................................15
Chart 8: Rating Agency Market Share for Total U.S. CMBS Issued in 2015,
2016, and First Half of 2017 .........................................................................18
Chart 9: Rating Agency Market Share for U.S. Conduit CMBS Issued in 2015,
2016, and First Half of 2017 .........................................................................19
Chart 10: Rating Agency Market Share for U.S. Single Borrower CMBS Issued in
2015, 2016, and First Half of 2017 ...............................................................19
Chart 11: Rating Agency Market Shares for U.S. ABS Issued in 2015, 2016, and
First Half of 2017 ..........................................................................................20
Chart 12: Rating Agency Market Shares for U.S. MBS Issued in 2015, 2016, and
First Half of 2017 ..........................................................................................20

ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS

As Required by Section 6 of the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006
I. INTRODUCTION
The staff (the “Staff”) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission” or
“SEC”) is providing this report (“Report”) regarding nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations (“NRSROs”) pursuant to Section 6 of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
(“Rating Agency Act”).
1
This Report reflects solely the Staff’s views. Section 6 of the Rating
Agency Act requires the Commission to submit an annual report (“Annual Report”) to the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Financial Services
of the U.S. House of Representatives that, with respect to the year to which the Annual Report relates:
 identifies applicants for registration as NRSROs under Section 15E of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (as amended, the “Exchange Act”);
2

 specifies the number of, and actions taken on, such applications; and
 specifies the views of the Commission on the state of competition, transparency, and
conflicts of interest among NRSROs.
This Report relates generally to the period from June 26, 2016 to June 25, 2017 (the
“Report Period”). In addition to addressing the items specified in Section 6 of the Rating
Agency Act, this R eport provides an overview of certain Commission and Staff activities
relating to NRSROs.
Information regarding the topics covered in this Report with respect to prior periods can
be found on the Office of Credit Ratings (“OCR” or the “Office”) page of the Commission’s
website.
3

1
Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (Sept. 29, 2006). The Rating Agency Act, among other things, added
Section 15E to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §78o-7) to establish self-executing
requirements on NRSROs and provide the Commission with the authority to implement a registration and
oversight program for NRSROs. In June 2007, the Commission approved rules implementing such a
program. See Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Release No. 34-55857, 72 FR 33564 (Jun. 18, 2007), available at:
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-55857.pdf.
2
Unless otherwise noted, all references to specific statutory sections and rules in this Report are to sections
in the Exchange Act and related rules.
3
Prior Annual Reports can be found under “Annual Reports to Congress” in the “Reports and Studies”
section of the OCR webpage, available at: http://www.sec.gov/ocr
.

II. STATUS OF REGISTRANTS AND APPLICANTS
Section 3(a)(62) defines a “nationally recognized statistical rating organization” as a
credit rating agency that issues credit ratings certified by qualified institutional buyers, in
accordance with Section 15E(a)(1)(B)(ix), with respect to:
(i) financial institutions, brokers, or dealers;
(ii) insurance companies;
(iii) corporate issuers;
(iv) issuers of asset-backed securities (as that term is defined in 17 CFR 229.1101(c));
(v) issuers of government securities, municipal securities, or securities issued by a
foreign government; or
(vi) a combination of one or more categories of obligors described in any of clauses
(i) through (v) above
and is registered under Section 15E.
As of the date of this Report, there are ten credit rating agencies registered as NRSROs.
The NRSROs, categories of credit ratings described in clauses (i) through (v) of Section
3(a)(62)(A) in which they are registered, and locations of their principal offices, as of the date of
this Report, are listed below:
4

NRSRO Categories of Credit Ratings Principal Office
A.M. Best Rating Services, Inc.
(“A.M. Best”)
(ii), (iii), and (iv) U.S.
DBRS, Inc.
(“DBRS”)
(i) through (v) U.S.
Egan-Jones Ratings Company
(“EJR”)
(i) through (iii) U.S.
Fitch Ratings, Inc.
(“Fitch”)
(i) through (v) U.S.
HR Ratings de México, S.A. de C.V.
(“HR Ratings”)
(i), (iii), and (v) Mexico
Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd.
(“JCR”)
(i), (ii), (iii), and (v) Japan
Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc.
(“KBRA”)
(i) through (v) U.S.
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.
(“Moody’s”)
(i) through (v) U.S.
Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC
(“Morningstar”)
(i), (iii), and (iv) U.S.
S&P Global Ratings
(“S&P”)
(i) through (v) U.S.

4
See the current Form NRSRO on each NRSRO’s website for any updates to this information.

Applications for initial registration and for registration by current NRSROs in additional
rating categories are filed on Form NRSRO (“Form NRSRO”).
5
In addition, Section 15E(b)
requires NRSROs to promptly amend Form NRSRO if any information or document provided
therein becomes materially inaccurate. Such section also requires NRSROs to annually amend
Form NRSRO to update ratings count and performance information, certify the continuing
accuracy of the information and documents provided therein, and list any material change thereto
during the previous calendar year. OCR Staff review such amendments to Forms NRSRO in
light of the requirements of Section 15E(b), Rule 17g-1, and the instructions to Form NRSRO,
and may comment on such amendments and refer certain observations regarding such
amendments to OCR examination Staff.
During the Report Period, each of Morningstar and HR Ratings filed with the
Commission, in accordance with Section 15E(a)(1) and Rule 17g-1, applications for registration
in the financial institutions and corporate issuers rating categories.
6
No other complete
applications for initial registration as an NRSRO or for registration by current NRSROs in
additional rating categories were received during the Report Period.
III. ACTIVITIES RELATING TO NRSROs
A. Activities
The creation of OCR was mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”)
7
and the Office was established in June 2012.
OCR is responsible for the oversight of credit rating agencies registered with the Commission as
NRSROs. OCR’s Staff includes professionals with expertise in a variety of areas that relate to
its regulatory mission, such as corporate, municipal, and structured debt finance.
8

OCR’s responsibilities – as mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act – include conducting an
examination of each NRSRO at least annually in eight specified review areas.
9
Information

5
See Section 15E(a) and Rule 17g-1. Rule 17g-1 requires an applicant/NRSRO to use Form NRSRO for the
following, as applicable:
 an initial application to be registered as an NRSRO;
 an application to register for an additional class of credit ratings;
 an application supplement;
 an update of registration pursuant to Section 15E(b)(1);
 an annual certification pursuant to Section 15E(b)(2); and
 a withdrawal of registration pursuant to Section 15E(e).

See http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formnrsro.pdf
for additional information.
6
The Commission approved Morningstar’s application on August 24, 2016. See
https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2016/34-78671.pdf. The Commission approved HR Ratings’ application on
November 23, 2016. See https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2016/34-79382.pdf.
7
See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
8
See Section 15E(p)(2) for a description of OCR staffing requirements.
9
See Section 15E(p)(3) for a description of the scope of the required examinations.

regarding the examinations, including those that concluded during the Report Period, is included
in OCR’s annual examination reports.
10

In connection with its regulatory mission, OCR also monitors trends and developments
affecting the credit rating industry. For example, OCR Staff meets with each NRSRO to discuss
rating and industry developments and meets with the boards of directors of certain NRSROs to
discuss, among other things, compliance and oversight matters. OCR Staff also meets with a
variety of other market participants, including investors, issuers, regulators, and industry
organizations, to discuss matters relevant to the credit rating industry. OCR Staff also attends
various conferences, seminars, and other events addressing topics applicable to the industry.
These monitoring activities are focused on informing Commission policy and rulemaking and
NRSRO examinations.
During the Report Period, OCR S taff also continued to participate in meetings that
involved rating agency regulators globally, including those of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) Committee 6 on Credit Rating Agencies
11
and the
supervisory colleges that were formed at IOSCO’s recommendation for the largest
internationally-active credit rating agencies.
12
During the Report Period, the colleges held an in-
person meeting and conducted quarterly calls. OCR Staff also conducted additional discussions
with international regulators as appropriate.
B. Commission Orders and Releases and Staff Publications
The Commission and the Staff, as applicable, issued the following orders, releases, and
publications relating to NRSROs or credit ratings in general from the start of the Report Period
to November 28, 2017:
 Order Extending Conditional Temporary Exemption for Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations from Requirements of Rule 17g-5(a)(3) under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-82144 (Nov. 22, 2017), 82 FR 56309
(Nov. 28, 2017).
13
The Commission extended the order exempting NRSROs from
complying with Rule 17g-5(a)(3) with respect to credit ratings for certain structured
finance products where the issuer is a non-U.S. person and the NRSRO has a reasonable
basis to conclude that the structured finance product will be offered and sold only in
transactions outside the United States, until the earlier of (i) December 2, 2019, or (ii) the

10
The examination reports can be found under “Summary Examination Reports” in the “Reports and Studies”
section of the OCR webpage, available at http://www.sec.gov/ocr.
11
IOSCO Committee 6 was formed to evaluate and consider regulatory and policy initiatives relating to credit
rating agencies’ activities and oversight and facilitate regular dialogue between regulators and the credit
rating industry. The SEC chairs Committee 6, and OCR Staff represents the SEC in this regard.
12
The supervisory colleges were formed to enhance communication among credit rating agency regulators
globally with respect to examinations of the relevant credit rating agencies. See Supervisory Colleges for
Credit Rating Agencies, Final Report (July 2013), available at:
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD416.pdf. The SEC serves as chair of the colleges for
S&P and Moody’s, and OCR Staff represents the SEC in this regard. The European Securities and Markets
Authority serves as chair of the college for Fitch.
13
Available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/2017/34-82144.pdf.

compliance date set forth in any final rule that may be adopted by the Commission that
provides for a similar exemption.
 2016 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examinations of Each Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, dated December 2016, as required under
Section 15E(p)(3)(C).
14
The r eport summarizes essential findings of the examinations
conducted by Staff under Section 15E(p)(3)(C), generally focusing on the period from
January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015.
 Annual Report on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, dated
December 2016, as required by Section 6 of the Rating Agency Act.
15
The Annual
Report addresses the matters described in the first paragraph under Section I. of this
Report, generally covering the period from June 26, 2015 to June 25, 2016.
 Order Granting Registration of HR Ratings de México, S.A. de C.V. for Two Additional
Classes of Credit Ratings, Release No. 34-79382 (Nov. 23, 2016).
16
The Commission
granted HR Ratings’ registration for the following two additional classes of credit
ratings: (1) the class of credit ratings described in clause (i) of Section 3(a)(62)(A) (i.e.,
financial institutions, brokers, or dealers); and (2) the class of credit ratings described in
clause (iii) of Section 3(a)(62)(A) (i.e., corporate issuers).
 Order Granting Registration of Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC for Two Additional
Classes of Credit Ratings, Release No. 34-78671 (Aug. 24, 2016).
17
The Commission
granted Morningstar registration for the following two additional classes of credit ratings:
(1) the class of credit ratings described in clause (i) of Section 3(a)(62)(A) (i.e., financial
institutions, brokers, or dealers); and (2) the class of credit ratings described in clause (iii)
of Section 3(a)(62)(A) (i.e., corporate issuers).
 Order Granting Conditional Exemption of Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC from a
Requirement in Section 15E(a)(1)(C)(iv) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Item 6C of Form NRSRO, Release No. 34-78670 (Aug. 24, 2016).
18
The Commission
granted Morningstar a conditional exemption from the requirement in Section
15E(a)(1)(C)(iv) and Item 6C of Form NRSRO that an NRSRO applying to register for
additional classes of credit ratings provide at least two certifications from qualified
institutional buyers stating, among other things, that they have used the credit ratings of
the applicant in such classes in the course of making some of their investment decisions
for at least the three years immediately preceding the date of the certifications. An
exemption was requested because the related credit ratings had been issued by a non-
NRSRO affiliate of Morningstar. Under the order, Morningstar is required to file
certifications from qualified institutional buyers as to the additional classes of credit

14
Available at: http://www.sec.gov/ocr/reportspubs/special-studies/nrsro-summary-report-2016.pdf.
15
Available at: http://www.sec.gov/ocr/reportspubs/annual-reports/2016-annual-report-on-nrsros.pdf.
16
Available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2016/34-79382.pdf.
17
Available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2016/34-78671.pdf.
18
Available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/2016/34-78670.pdf.

ratings by no later than four years following its registration in those classes of credit
ratings.
 Proposed Rule: Disclosure Update and Simplification, Release Nos. 33-10110, 34-78310,
and IC-32175 (July 13, 2016), 81 FR 51607 (Aug. 4, 2016).
19
The Commission proposed
amendments to certain disclosure requirements that may have become redundant,
duplicative, overlapping, outdated, or superseded in light of other Commission disclosure
requirements, U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“U.S. GAAP”),
International Financial Reporting Standards, or changes in the information environment.
The proposed amendments relate to issuers of securities and other entities, including a
proposed change to Rule 17g-3 to conform the financial statement reporting requirements
applicable to NRSROs to U.S. GAAP.
 Staff Guidance Sent to NRSROs in July 2016.
20
In July 2016, OCR sent letters to the
compliance officers of the NRSROs designated under Section 15E(j), setting forth OCR
Staff’s view on a particular aspect of Section 15E(h)(4)(A) relating to required policies
and procedures of NRSROs involving the conduct of “look-back” reviews with respect to
certain former employees.
IV. COMPETITION
A. Select NRSRO Statistics
Sections 1. through 3. below summarize and discuss certain information reported by
NRSROs on Form NRSRO or pursuant to Rule 17g-3 that provides insight into the state of
competition among NRSROs. While this information indicates that Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch
continue to account for the highest percentages of outstanding ratings, other information
suggests that smaller NRSROs have been able to gain market share in certain asset classes.
21
In
addition, investor recognition of a wider range of NRSROs in investment guidelines, as
discussed in Section IV.C. of this Report, may benefit the competitive position of the smaller
NRSROs.

19
Available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2016/33-10110.pdf. See also Extension of the Comment
Period for Disclosure Update and Simplification, Release Nos. 33-10220, 34-78926, and IC-32281 (Sept.
23, 2016), 81 FR 66898 (Sept. 29, 2016).
20
Available at: https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocr/dear-dco-letter-15eh4a-071816.pdf.
21
As discussed in Section IV.B.1. of this Report, information available on the websites of Commercial
Mortgage Alert (https://www.cmalert.com/) and Asset-Backed Alert (https://www.abalert.com/) regarding
NRSRO market shares in the asset-backed securities category indicates that some of the smaller NRSROs
have developed significant market shares in such category over the past few years. In addition, Section
IV.B.2. of this Report provides examples of certain asset classes in which it has been reported that smaller
NRSROs have been able to gain market share.

1. NRSRO Credit Ratings Outstanding
(a) Number of Outstanding Ratings in Statutory Rating Categories
Each NRSRO annually reports the number of credit ratings outstanding, as of the end of
the preceding calendar year, in each rating category for which it is registered.
22
This
information, for the calendar year ending December 31, 2016, is summarized in Charts 1 through
4 below and can be useful in determining the breadth of an NRSRO’s coverage with respect to
issuers and obligors within a particular rating category.
Chart 1 depicts the number of credit ratings each NRSRO had outstanding in each rating
category for which it was registered as of December 31, 2016. Chart 2 shows the percentage of
credit ratings each NRSRO had outstanding across all rating categories and also breaks out the
percentages for each NRSRO in each of the rating categories. Chart 3 illustrates the relative size
of each rating category based on the aggregate number of ratings reported outstanding by all
NRSROs. Chart 4 depicts the percentage of ratings each NRSRO had outstanding across all
rating categories other than the government securities category.
Comparing the number of ratings outstanding for established NRSROs and newer
NRSROs may not provide as comprehensive a picture of the state of competition as comparing
the number of ratings issued by such NRSROs in a given period. Certain NRSROs (particularly
S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch) have a longer history of issuing ratings and their ratings include those
for debt obligations and obligors that were rated well before the establishment of the newer
entrants.
23
Consequently, the information described in Section IV.B.1. of this Report (relating to
recent market share developments in the asset-backed securities rating category) may provide
additional insight regarding how well newer entrants are competing with more established rating
agencies, specifically in the asset-backed securities rating category.
There are additional limitations to assessing the state of competition in each rating
category and in the aggregate based on the number of outstanding ratings. For instance, some
NRSROs have pursued business strategies to specialize in particular rating categories or sub-
categories
24
and may not desire to issue ratings in certain of the other NRSRO rating categories.
Also, the reported information does not reflect any credit ratings being issued by NRSROs in
rating categories in which they are not registered with the Commission, nor does it reflect ratings

22
Annual certifications on Form NRSRO must be filed with the Commission on EDGAR pursuant to Rule
17g-1(f) and made publicly and freely available on each NRSRO’s website pursuant to Rule 17g-1(i). The
number of outstanding credit ratings for each rating category for which an NRSRO is registered is reported
on Item 7A of Form NRSRO.
23
The ratings counts disclosed on Item 7A of Form NRSRO include outstanding credit ratings, regardless of
when they were issued. As a result, the ratings counts of the more established NRSROs may include credit
ratings that were issued before the newer entrants began issuing credit ratings. These earlier ratings will
continue to be included in the disclosed ratings counts until the rated securities are repaid or the credit
ratings are otherwise withdrawn. Because outstanding ratings are included in the ratings counts, historical
results factor significantly into the disclosed number of ratings, making it more difficult to discern current-
year trends and identify gains achieved by the newer entrants.
24
For example, A.M. Best has traditionally focused on credit ratings with respect to insurance companies and
their affiliates.

issued by an affiliate of an NRSRO unless the affiliate is identified as a credit rating affiliate on
Item 3 of Form NRSRO.
Further, the outstanding ratings reported by the NRSROs are based on their own
determinations of the applicable categories and number of ratings, which are not necessarily
consistent among NRSROs. In addition, to the extent NRSROs have adjusted their ratings count
disclosures in accordance with the new instructions to Form NRSRO, comparisons to ratings
counts disclosed in prior years may also be more difficult to draw.
25

Chart 1 provides the number of outstanding credit ratings reported by each NRSRO in its
annual certification for the calendar year ending December 31, 2016, in each of the five
categories identified in Section 3(a)(62) for which the NRSRO is registered, as applicable.
Chart 1: Number of Outstanding Credit Ratings as of December 31, 2016 by Rating Category*
NRSRO Financial
Institutions
Insurance
Companies
Corporate
Issuers
Asset-Backed
Securities
Government
Securities
Total
Ratings
A.M. Best
N/R 7,537 1,359 18 N/R 8,914
DBRS
7,969 158 3,037 12,757 16,784 40,705
EJR
11,112 837 6,480 N/R N/R 18,429
Fitch
44,965 3,188 17,848 39,981 197,543 303,525
HR Ratings
547 N/R 140 N/R 352 1,039
JCR
787 65 2,356 N/R 486 3,694
KBRA
705 5 1 5,561 63 6,335
Moody's
49,472 3,230 44,676 64,188 619,478 781,044
Morningstar
35 N/R 308 3,591 N/R 3,934
S&P
58,582 6,859 50,672 49,162 952,910 1,118,185
Total 174,174 21,879 126,877 175,258 1,787,616 2,285,804
* N/R indicates that the NRSRO was not registered in the applicable rating category as of the reporting date.
Source: NRSRO annual certifications for the 2016 calendar year, Item 7A on Form NRSRO

25
Effective January 1, 2015, Item 7A of Form NRSRO and the corresponding instructions were amended to
clarify the manner in which the number of outstanding credit ratings should be calculated and presented.
The clarifying amendments are designed to ensure that disclosures on Item 7A of Form NRSRO are
consistent across NRSROs. The change in instructions may have caused some NRSROs to modify the way
they count ratings for purposes of Item 7A of Form NRSRO, which may affect comparisons to disclosures
made in prior years. See Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Release No. 34-72936
(Aug. 27, 2014), 79 FR 55077 (Sept. 15, 2014) at 55220-22 (discussing the clarifying amendments to Item
7A of Form NRSRO).

Chart 2 displays the percentage of each NRSRO’s outstanding credit ratings of the total
outstanding credit ratings of all NRSROs, for each rating category in which the NRSRO was
registered, based on information reported by the NRSROs as of December 31, 2016.
26

Chart 2: Percentage by Rating Category of Each NRSRO’s Outstanding Credit Ratings of the Total
Outstanding Credit Ratings of all NRSROs, as of December 31, 2016*
NRSRO Financial
Institutions
Insurance
Companies
Corporate
Issuers
Asset-Backed
Securities
Government
Securities
Total
Ratings
A.M. Best
N/R 34.4% 1.1% <0.1% N/R 0.4%
DBRS
4.6% 0.7% 2.4% 7.3% 0.9% 1.8%
EJR
6.4% 3.8% 5.1% N/R N/R 0.8%
Fitch
25.8% 14.6% 14.1% 22.8% 11.1% 13.3%
HR Ratings
0.3% N/R 0.1% N/R <0.1% <0.1%
JCR
0.5% 0.3% 1.9% N/R <0.1% 0.2%
KBRA
0.4% <0.1% <0.1% 3.2% <0.1% 0.3%
Moody's
28.4% 14.8% 35.2% 36.6% 34.7% 34.2%
Morningstar
<0.1% N/R 0.2% 2.0% N/R 0.2%
S&P
33.6% 31.3% 39.9% 28.1% 53.3% 48.9%
* N/R indicates that the NRSRO was not registered in the applicable rating category as of the reporting date.
Percentages have been rounded to the nearest one-tenth of one percent.
Source: NRSRO annual certifications for the 2016 calendar year, Item 7A on Form NRSRO

As illustrated in Chart 2, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch account for 96.4% of all the ratings
outstanding as of December 31, 2016—slightly lower than 96.5% as of December 31, 2015.
27

This change is largely attributable to an approximate 2.0% decrease in the share of outstanding
asset-backed securities ratings that were issued by these NRSROs, which was partially offset by
an increase of approximately 1.1% of these NRSROs’ share of outstanding insurance company
ratings. All other categories for these NRSROs as a percentage of total outstanding ratings
remained relatively constant, increasing or decreasing by no more than 0.2%.
Chart 2 also illustrates the relative percentages of ratings outstanding among the
NRSROs. S&P accounts for the highest number of ratings outstanding with nearly half (48.9%)
of the total number of ratings reported by all NRSROs. Moody’s reported the second highest
number of ratings outstanding, accounting for 34.2% of the total. Fitch was third and DBRS was
fourth, with 13.3% and 1.8% of the total, respectively. Each other NRSRO reported less than
1.0% of the total number of ratings outstanding.

26
For example, according to Chart 1, A.M. Best reported that it had 7,537 insurance company credit ratings,
and the total of the credit ratings in that category reported by all NRSROs was 21,879. Dividing 7,537 by
21,879 equals (approximately) 0.344 or 34.4% (which is the percentage of NRSRO insurance company
ratings attributable to A.M. Best, as shown on Chart 2).
27
In 2007, the year when NRSROs began reporting outstanding ratings on Form NRSRO, these three NRSROs
accounted for 98.8% of all outstanding ratings.

Finally and notably, Chart 2 shows that, in the insurance category, A.M. Best had the
most credit ratings outstanding. A.M. Best has consistently reported being one of the top three
issuers of insurance ratings since this information began to be reported in 2007.
Chart 3 depicts the percentages of outstanding credit ratings attributable to each rating
category, based on information reported by the NRSROs as of December 31, 2016.
Chart 3: Breakdown of Ratings Reported Outstanding on December 31, 2016
*

* Percentages have been rounded to the nearest one-tenth of one percent.
Source: NRSRO annual certifications for the 2016 calendar year, Item 7A on Form NRSRO
As illustrated by Chart 3, as of December 31, 2016, a disproportionate number of the
aggregate credit ratings reported to be outstanding were in the government securities category,
which may be attributable to the large number of government bond issuers and their multiple
debt offerings. The government securities category accounted for 78.2% of the total number of
credit ratings reported across all categories and, as shown on Chart 2, is also the most
concentrated rating category, with Moody’s and S&P accounting for 88.0% of all outstanding
government ratings.
Given the disproportionate size of the government securities rating category relative to
the other rating categories and the high concentration of NRSROs rating government securities,
the inclusion of the government securities category in the calculation of total market share for
each NRSRO may make it difficult to assess the relative market shares of the smaller NRSROs.
Financial Institutions
7.6%
Insurance Companies
1.0%
Corporate Issuers
5.6%
Asset-Backed
Securities
7.7%
Government
Securities
78.2%

Chart 4 depicts the percentages of the credit ratings outstanding that are attributable to
each NRSRO over all rating categories other than the government securities category, based on
information reported by the NRSROs as of December 31, 2016.
Chart 4: Breakdown of Non-Government Securities Ratings Reported Outstanding on December 31, 2016

* Percentages have been rounded to the nearest one-tenth of one percent.
Source: NRSRO annual certifications for the 2016 calendar year, Item 7A on Form NRSRO
A comparison of Chart 4 to Chart 2 (which shows each NRSRO’s total market share over
all rating categories, including government securities) illustrates that there is less concentration
in the non-government securities rating categories. S&P’s and Moody’s percentage share of the
overall market declines by 15.7 and 1.7 percentage points, respectively, when government
securities are excluded. Fitch’s percentage share of outstanding ratings, on the other hand,
increases by 8.0 percentage points when government securities are excluded. The market share
percentage for all the remaining NRSROs also increases when government securities are
excluded. Further, when government securities are included in the total calculation, all but one
(i.e., DBRS) of the smaller NRSROs have less than 1.0% of the market share, making it difficult
to assess their relative market shares. When government securities are excluded, a clearer
picture of the relative market shares of the smaller NRSROs can be observed, as illustrated in
Chart 4.
As discussed above, Charts 1 through 4 reflect the number of credit ratings outstanding
as of December 31, 2016, which may include credit ratings that were issued years ago. As a
result, the measure may not be indicative of the current market position of each NRSRO with
respect to newly issued credit ratings. For a discussion of recent market share developments in
the asset-backed securities rating category and other developments that could impact NRSRO
market share, see Section IV.B. of this Report.
A.M. Best
1.8%
DBRS
4.8%
EJR
3.7%
Fitch
21.3%
HR Ratings
0.1%
JCR
0.6%
Kroll
1.3%
Moody's
32.4%
Morningstar
0.8%
S&P
33.2%

(b) Industry Concentration
Economists generally measure industry concentration, which indicates the
competitiveness of an industry, by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”).
28
The
inverse of the HHI (“HHI Inverse”) can be used to represent the number of firms with equal
market share necessary to replicate the degree of concentration in a particular industry.
29
In
other words, an industry with an HHI Inverse of 3.0 has a concentration that is equal to an
industry where the entire market is evenly divided among three firms with a market share of one
third each. A highly concentrated market will have a low HHI Inverse, whereas an
unconcentrated market will have a high HHI Inverse.
30

Calculations of the HHI and HHI Inverse for the NRSRO industry are consistent with the
results included in Section IV.A .1.(a) of this Report and further illustrate gains in market share
made by smaller NRSROs in the asset-backed securities rating category. Based on the number
of outstanding ratings included in such section,
31
the HHI Inverse indicates that the NRSRO
industry constitutes a “highly concentrated” market, and has the equivalent concentration of an
industry with approximately 2.67 firms with equal market share. This is consistent with the high
proportion of outstanding ratings that have been issued by the three largest NRSROs, especially
Moody’s and S&P. Although the industry remains highly concentrated, a comparison of the
HHI Inverse calculations since 2008 shows that the asset-backed securities rating category and,
to a lesser extent, the financial institutions rating category have become less concentrated.

28
See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
§5.3 (2010) (discussing how the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission use HHI to
measure the impact of a merger on market concentration); however, since the HHI calculation does not take
into account that multiple NRSROs may rate a single issue, different considerations may be applicable to
the use of the HHI calculation for NRSROs.
29
The HHI Inverse is calculated by dividing 10,000 (i.e., the highest possible HHI) by the HHI. For
additional discussion of the HHI Inverse, see V
ERA PAWLOWSKY-GLAHN & ANTONELLA BUCCIANTI,
COMPOSITIONAL DATA ANALYSIS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (2011); Toby Roberts, When Bigger is
Better: A Critique of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index’s Use to Evaluate Mergers in Network Industries, 34
PACE L. REV. 894, 908 (2014).
30
A market with an HHI Inverse of less than 4.0 is considered to be highly concentrated; a market with an
HHI Inverse between 4.0 and 6.67 is considered to be moderately concentrated; and a market with an HHI
Inverse above 6.67 is considered to be unconcentrated. See generally U.S. Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §5.3 (2010).
31
See Section IV.A.1.(a) of this Report for a discussion of certain limitations involved in determining the
number of outstanding ratings reported.

Chart 5 reports the HHI Inverses calculated from 2008 to 2016 for the ratings outstanding
(as reported by the NRSROs) in each rating category, in total for all rating categories, and in
total for all rating categories excluding government securities.
Chart 5: HHI Inverses for Each Rating Category*
Year
Financial
Institutions
Insurance
Companies
Corporate
Issuers
Asset-
Backed
Securities
Government
Securities
Total (all
rating
categories)
Total
(excluding
government
securities)
2008 3.72 4.05 3.79 2.82 2.83 2.99 3.56
2009 3.85 3.84 3.18 3.18 2.65 2.86 3.58
2010 3.99 3.37 3.17 3.20 2.69 2.88 3.55
2011 4.16 3.76 3.02 3.38 2.47 2.74 3.70
2012 4.04 3.72 3.00 3.44 2.50 2.75 3.68
2013 3.99 3.68 3.03 3.48 2.46 2.72 3.65
2014 4.30 3.83 3.35 3.34 2.40 2.68 3.81
2015 3.72 3.82 3.23 3.53 2.40 2.65 3.67
2016 3.75 3.82 3.26 3.68 2.40 2.67 3.78
* The number of credit rating agencies registered as NRSROs varies by category and can change over time,
potentially affecting comparisons across categories and with prior years. For example, Morningstar and HR
Ratings each registered and had outstanding ratings in the financial institutions and corporate issuers
categories in 2016, contributing to the increase in the HHI Inverse in these categories compared to the prior
year.
Source: NRSRO annual certifications for the 2008-16 calendar years, Item 7A on Form NRSRO
As noted in Section IV.A .1.(a) of this Report, as of December 31, 2016, the government
securities rating category (which includes sovereigns, U.S. public finance, and international
public finance) was the category with the most ratings ( comprising approximately 78.2% of all
ratings outstanding). Given the disproportionate size of the government securities rating
category relative to the other rating categories and the high concentration of NRSROs rating
government securities,
32
the inclusion of the government securities category in the calculation of
the aggregate HHI Inverse may make it difficult to assess the overall level of market
concentration in the other four rating categories. Chart 5 therefore also includes the HHI Inverse
for these four rating categories in the aggregate. As shown in the chart, when the government
securities rating category is excluded, the total HHI inverse with respect to the four remaining
rating categories increases to 3.78, which indicates less concentration than in 2008.
Industry concentration in the asset-backed securities category is at its lowest point (i.e.,
having the highest HHI Inverse and reflecting the greatest historical competition) since NRSROs
began reporting information regarding the number of ratings outstanding on Form NRSRO. This
may reflect increased competition from some of the smaller NRSROs that have focused on rating
securities in this category (see Section IV.B . of this Report for a discussion of recent NRSRO
market shares in the asset-backed securities category). The other rating categories were more
concentrated in 2016 than they were in 2008, except for the financial institutions rating category,
which is slightly less concentrated than in 2008.

32
As shown in Chart 5, the government securities category has an HHI Inverse of 2.40, which is significantly lower
than the other categories, illustrating its status as the most concentrated rating category.

2. NRSRO Analytical Staffing Levels
Chart 6 reports the number of credit analysts (including credit analyst supervisors) and
the number of credit analyst supervisors employed by each of the NRSROs, as reported on
Exhibit 8 of Form NRSRO, and the ratio of credit analyst supervisors to credit analysts.
33

Chart 6: NRSRO Credit Analysts and Credit Analyst Supervisors
NRSRO
Credit Analysts
(Including Credit
Analyst Supervisors)
Credit Analyst
Supervisors
Ratio of Credit
Analyst Supervisors
to Credit Analysts
A.M. Best
142 43 1 : 2.3
DBRS
248 49 1 : 4.1
EJR
13 7 1 : 0.9
Fitch
1,137 317 1 : 2.6
HR Ratings
43 8 1 : 4.4
JCR
62 31 1 : 1.0
KBRA
123 24 1 : 4.1
Moody's
1,512 203 1 : 6.4
Morningstar
81 17 1 : 3.8
S&P
1,532 158 1 : 8.7
Total
4,893 857 1 : 4.7
Source: NRSRO annual certifications for the 2016 calendar year, Exhibit 8 on Form NRSRO
The three largest NRSROs report employing 4,181 credit analysts (including
supervisors), which is approximately 85.4% of the total number employed by all of the
NRSROs. Although the smaller NRSROs in the aggregate employ only approximately 14.6% of
all credit analysts employed by NRSROs, this percentage has increased steadily in recent
years.
34
During this time, some of the smaller NRSROs have reported significant increases in

33
Effective January 1, 2015, the instructions for Exhibit 8 of Form NRSRO were amended to clarify that
NRSROs must include credit analyst supervisors in the total number of credit analysts disclosed on Exhibit
8. This amendment was designed to enhance consistency of the disclosures on Exhibit 8 of Form NRSRO.
34
Based on reports by the currently-registered NRSROs on their annual certifications for the applicable
calendar year, the smaller NRSROs employed approximately 9.6% of all NRSRO analysts in 2013, 11.4%
of all NRSRO analysts in 2014, and 12.8% of all NRSRO analysts in 2015.

their analytical staff.
35
The trend in the number of rating analysts employed by an NRSRO can
indicate the state of the NRSRO’s business or its business outlook–i.e., NRSROs that are
increasing their staff may be experiencing or anticipating an increase in ratings volumes or
planning to enter new markets. In addition, when considered in light of the supervisory structure
and business model of an NRSRO, comparing the breadth of staffing across NRSROs may
provide insight into the adequacy of the managerial resources at each NRSRO.
3. NRSRO Revenue Growth
The t ot al revenue reported to the Commission
36
by all of the N RSROs for their 2016
fiscal year w as approximately $5.9 billion, which was higher by approximately $100 million than
the amount reported in the 2015 fiscal year. Chart 7 shows the percentage of total NRSRO
revenues since 2013 that were accounted for by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s in the aggregate and by
all other NRSROs in the aggregate.
Chart 7: NRSRO Revenue Information: Fiscal Year Percentage of Total Reported NRSRO Revenue

2013 2014 2015 2016
S&P, Fitch,
and Moody’s 94.5% 94.3% 93.7% 94.4%
All Other
NRSROs 5.5% 5.7% 6.3% 5.6%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Financial reports provided to the Commission under Rule 17g-3 for the fiscal years ended 2013-16. For the
preparation of this Report, if an NRSRO reported revenue in a foreign currency, the revenue was converted to U.S. dollars
using the average exchange rate over all U.S. banking days in the fiscal year of such NRSRO.

35
For example, in its most recent annual certification, DBRS reported employing 248 credit analysts
(including credit analyst supervisors), a 45.0% increase from the number of analysts reported on its annual
certification for the prior year. Morningstar also reported a sizeable increase in analysts; the 81 credit
analysts (including credit analyst supervisors) disclosed on its most recent annual certification was 19.1%
higher than the number of analysts disclosed on its annual certification for the prior year. Such increase
may be attributable to Morningstar’s registration as an NRSRO in the financial institutions and corporate
issuers rating categories. In connection with such registration, the thirteen-member corporate credit analyst
team of Morningstar’s parent, Morningstar, Inc., was transferred to Morningstar. See Morningstar Credit
Ratings, LLC Now Registered to Rate Corporate Issuers and Financial Institutions, Morningstar, Inc.,
August 29, 2016, available at:
https://ratingagency.morningstar.com/PublicDocDisplay.aspx?i=GPgHDsXEMGg%3d&m=i0Pyc%2bx7q
ZZ4%2bsXnymazBA%3d%3d&s=LviRtUKXqs8kml5dHt7FTeE2SZmY0Fvqd4iX49Mk%2f9UapyiFTEO
6TA%3d%3d.
36
Under Rule 17g-3(a)(3), NRSROs are required to provide to the Commission annual unaudited reports that
include revenue information. These reports are not required to be made publicly available.

Further revenue information is available for NRSROs that are owned, in whole or in part,
by public companies. The following information is from the annual reports of public companies
with an ownership interest in an NRSRO:
• Moody’s Corporation, the owner of Moody’s, attributed a 2% increase in revenues at
Moody’s from the previous fiscal year to robust rated issuance volumes for high-yield
corporate debt and bank loans as well as for public finance-related activity in the second
half of 2016. Moody’s Corporation further attributed the increase in revenue to changes
in the mix of fee type, new fee initiatives, and pricing increases. Moody’s Corporation
notes that the increases were mostly offset by challenges in corporate debt sectors and
lower U.S. securitization activity in the first half of 2016.
37

• S&P Global Inc. (“S&P Global”), which is S&P’s parent company, indicated that revenue
at S&P increased by 4% compared to its 2015 results and attributed the increase primarily
to an increase in U.S. bank loan ratings revenue, corporate bond ratings revenue, and
surveillance fees. S&P Global also noted that the increase in revenue was tempered by
unfavorable foreign exchange rates, a decrease in structured finance revenue, and a
decline in the provision of assessments of the potential credit impact of proposed strategic
initiatives.
38

• Fimalac, S.A., a n equity investor in Fitch’s parent, Fitch Group, Inc. (“Fitch Group”),
discussed an increase in revenue at Fitch Group in 2016, compared to 2015, noting that
the ratings business saw satisfactory revenue trends across most asset classes, led by an
increase in issuances, a rise in demand for Fitch’s credit opinions, and business
development efforts worldwide.
39

• Morningstar’s parent company, Morningstar, Inc., noted negative trends in issuance
volume for commercial mortgage-backed securities and competitive conditions when
discussing a decrease in revenue at Morningstar in 2016.
40

More recent regulatory filings have indicated a growth in revenue in the first half of 2017.
According to quarterly regulatory filings of their parent companies, revenues at each of Moody’s
and S&P increased by 18% during the first half of 2017, as compared to the first half of 2016.
41

S&P Global indicated that the increase at S&P was primarily due to growth in corporate bond and
bank loan ratings revenue, as well as increased structured finance revenue driven by an increase

37
See Moody’s Corporation Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2016, available
at: http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001059556/795d327d-c6b9-48dd-8437-d82865accb86.pdf.
38
See S&P Global Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2016, available at:
http://investor.spglobal.com/Cache/38247824.PDF?O=PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=38247824&iid=4023623.
39
See Fimalac 2016 Annual Report, available at:
http://www.fimalac.com/items/files/f5ecf37beb048fc109c9b760808cb432_FIMALAC--Rapport-annuel---
exercice-2016-english-version.pdf.
40
See Morningstar, Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2016, available at:
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001289419/3e16b6dc-63fc-41d4-9289-f551ba967060.pdf.
41
See Moody’s Corporation Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, for the period ending June 30, 2017, available at:
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001059556/7bd33772-624b-40e9-ad7e-67d24563b419.pdf ; S&P
Global Inc. Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, for the period ending June 30, 2017, available at:
http://investor.spglobal.com/Cache/389638175.pdf.

in collateralized loan obligation (“CLO”) and commercial mortgage-backed securities issuance in
the United States.
42
Moody’s Corporation also highlighted robust activity in the bank loan and
high-yield corporate debt sectors when discussing the revenue increase at Moody’s, while noting
that the comparison was to a weak prior year period.
43
Quarterly reports filed by Morningstar,
Inc. indicated that revenue at Morningstar was down slightly in the first quarter of 2017 but had
increased during the second quarter of 2017, in each case as compared to the corresponding three-
month period in 2016.
44

B. Recent Developments in t he State of Competition among NRSROs
1. Market Share Developments in the Asset-Backed Securities Rating
Category
As noted in Section IV.A.1.(a) of this Report, the number of ratings recently issued by
NRSROs may give a clearer picture of competition than the number of ratings each NRSRO currently
has outstanding. For example, Chart 2 indicates that, as of December 31, 2016, the smaller NRSROs
(i.e., those other than S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch) collectively have 12.5% of the ratings outstanding in
the asset-backed securities rating category. However, the market share data discussed in Sections (a)
and (b) below show that higher market share percentages have been obtained by smaller NRSROs in
ratings issuance with respect to certain types of asset-backed securities. This market share data
indicates that the growth trend the Staff has observed since the 2012 Annual Report continued during
the Report Period for some smaller NRSROs in the asset-backed securities rating category.
Sections (a) and (b) below discuss NRSRO market share information with respect to certain
asset-backed securities, as reported on the Commercial Mortgage Alert and Asset-Backed Alert
websites.
45
Commercial Mortgage Alert and Asset-Backed Alert report market share information on
three categories of asset-backed securities: (i) the CMBS category is comprised of transactions
collateralized by mortgages or leases on commercial or multi-family income-producing properties;
46

(ii) the MBS category is comprised of securities secured by U.S. first-lien mortgages on residential
properties (excluding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issues);
47
and (iii) the ABS category is comprised

42
See S&P Global Inc. Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, for the period ending June 30, 2017, available at:
http://investor.spglobal.com/Cache/389638175.pdf.
43
See Moody’s Corporation Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, for the period ending June 30, 2017, available at:
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001059556/7bd33772-624b-40e9-ad7e-67d24563b419.pdf.
44
See Morningstar, Inc. Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2017, available at:
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/MORN/4967152599x0xS1289419-17-13/1289419/filing.pdf;
Morningstar, Inc. Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2017, available at:
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/MORN/4967152599x0xS1289419-17-65/1289419/filing.pdf.
45
See https://www.abalert.com/ and https://www.cmalert.com/. Although the information available on these
websites may provide insight into recent developments regarding the state of competition among NRSROs
in the asset-backed securities rating category, it has certain limitations. For instance, the information is
self-reported by NRSROs. In addition, the information is presented using the number of transactions with
respect to which an NRSRO has reported issuing a credit rating and the aggregate dollar amount thereof,
rather than indicating where an NRSRO may have rated fewer than all tranches of a particular transaction.
46
See https://www.cmalert.com/market/about_db.pl.
47
See https://www.abalert.com/market/about_db.pl.

of securities that are collateralized by assets of some kind (excluding CMBS, MBS, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac issues, issuances by municipalities (i.e., revenue bonds), tax exempt issues, issues that
are fully retained by an affiliate of the deal sponsor, c ommercial paper, and other continuously offered
securities such as medium-term notes).
48

(a) CMBS
Charts 8 through 10 provide information concerning U.S.
49
CMBS ratings by NRSROs, as
reported to Commercial Mortgage Alert.
50
NRSRO market share varies between the conduit CMBS
and single borrower CMBS segments,
51
the two segments that account for most of the U.S. CMBS
transactions rated by NRSROs. The charts include reported market share information for total U.S.
CMBS transactions,
52
U.S. conduit CMBS transactions, and U.S. single borrower CMBS transactions
for calendar year 2015, calendar year 2016, and the first half of calendar year 2017.
Chart 8: Rating Agency Market Share for Total U.S. CMBS Issued in 2015, 2016, and First Half of 2017*
1H
2017
Rank NRSRO
1H-2017
Issuance
($Mil.)
No. of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
2016
Issuance
($Mil.)
No. of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
2015
Issuance
($Mil.)
No. of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
1 Fitch 25,441.0 33 65.6 53,161.7 72 70.0 55,720.2 67 55.2
2 Moody’s 25,414.2 29 65.6 57,344.0 73 75.5 71,525.7 77 70.8
3 KBRA 18,510.5 26 47.8 36,280.7 51 47.7 58,557.6 70 58.0
4 S&P 14,942.8 26 38.5 19,255.7 41 25.3 25,900.9 43 25.6
5 DBRS 11,860.1 16 30.6 17,549.1 26 23.1 28,429.5 35 28.1
6 Morningstar 3,941.0 8 10.2 14,516.6 27 19.1 44,179.0 56 43.7

Total Rated
Market
38,764.2 79 75,997.3 166 101,008.5 160
Source: https://www.cmalert.com/rankings.pl?Q=78

48
See id.
49
References to “U.S.” CMBS, MBS, and ABS issuance and market shares in this Section IV.B.1. reflect securities
issued for sale primarily in the U.S., which include securities issued publicly and those issued under Rule 144A
under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”). See
https://www.abalert.com/market/about_db.pl; https://www.cmalert.com/market/about_db.pl.
50
The charts reflect market share percentages based on dollar amounts of issuance. The market shares of
individual NRSROs do not add up to 100% since more than one NRSRO may rate a particular transaction
or obligor. CMBS market share data is from the Commercial Mortgage Alert, available at:
https://www.cmalert.com/rankings.pl?Q=78.
51
The term “conduit,” which had been previously referred to by Asset-Backed Alert as “conduit /fusion,”
refers to a financial intermediary that functions as a link, or conduit, between the lender(s) originating loans
and the ultimate investor(s). The conduit makes loans to, or purchases loans from, third parties under
standardized terms, underwriting, and documents and then, when sufficient volume has been accumulated,
pools the loans for sale to investors in the CMBS market. See
http://www.crefc.org/uploadedFiles/CMSA_Site_Home/Industry_Resources/Research/Glossary.pdf. In
contrast, a single borrower transaction includes commercial mortgage loans made to a single borrower.
52
Total U.S. CMBS ratings include conduit CMBS, single-borrower CMBS, and other types of CMBS, such
as distressed/non-performing CMBS transactions and re-securitizations of CMBS transactions.

Chart 9: Rating Agency Market Share for U.S. Conduit CMBS Issued in 2015, 2016, and First Half of 2017*
1H
2017
Rank NRSRO
1H-2017
Issuance
($Mil.)
No. of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
2016
Issuance
($Mil.)
No. of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
2015
Issuance
($Mil.)
No. of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
1 Moody’s 21,482.8 23 100.0 48,017.1 57 100.0 62,118.7 60 100.0
1 Fitch 21,482.8 23 100.0 46,388.8 54 96.6 39,001.9 38 62.8
3 KBRA 11,482.3 12 53.4 30,390.3 35 63.3 45,093.4 43 72.6
4 DBRS 9,821.6 11 45.7 13,755.6 17 28.6 23,769.3 22 38.3
5 S&P 3,701.2 4 17.2 4,679.6 5 9.7 0.0 0 0.0
6 Morningstar 1,061.9 1 4.9 6,443.1 8 13.4 27,568.4 26 44.4

Total Rated
Market
21,482.8 23 48,017.1 57 62,118.7 60
Source: https://www.cmalert.com/rankings.pl?Q=78
Chart 10: Rating Agency Market Share for U.S. Single Borrower CMBS Issued in 2015, 2016, and First Half
of 2017
*
1H
2017
Rank NRSRO
1H-2017
Issuance
($Mil.)
No. of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
2016
Issuance
($Mil.)
No. of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
2015
Issuance
($Mil.)
No. of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
1 S&P 9,040.6 17 73.2 12,697.0 30 65.6 24,285.2 40 79.1
2 KBRA 5,868.6 9 47.5 4,598.7 10 23.7 10,171.7 15 33.1
3 Moody’s 3,587.0 4 29.1 8,558.9 13 44.2 7,012.0 9 22.8
4 Fitch 3,035.0 4 24.6 4,229.8 6 21.8 13,977.6 19 45.5
5 Morningstar 2,502.0 5 20.3 6,944.3 14 35.9 14,560.9 25 47.4
6 DBRS 1,645.0 3 13.3 3,025.5 6 15.6 3,378.6 8 11.0

Total Rated
Market
12,347.6 22 19,369.0 39 30,690.7 51
Source: https://www.cmalert.com/rankings.pl?Q=78
* Charts 8-10 reflect market share percentages based on dollar amounts of issuance. The market shares of individual
NRSROs do not add up to 100% since more than one NRSRO may rate a particular transaction or obligor.
As the charts above indicate, some of the smaller NRSROs continue to report significant
market shares in rating U.S. CMBS transactions. In both 2016 and the first half of 2017, KBRA
achieved the third highest U.S. CMBS market share of all NRSROs, rating close to half of the
transaction volume in each such period. In the first half of 2017, KBRA rated more than half of
the U.S. conduit CMBS transactions and increased its market share in the U.S. single borrower
CMBS segment to 47.5%, approximately doubling its 2016 market share and moving from
fourth to second in the market share rankings for this segment. DBRS increased its overall U.S.
CMBS market share in the first half of 2017 to 30.6%. Such increase was largely attributable to
its performance in the U.S. conduit CMBS segment, in which it finished fourth in the rankings,
rating 45.7% of conduit issuances in the first half of 2017.

(b) ABS/MBS
Charts 11 and 12 provide information concerning U.S. ABS and U.S. MBS ratings by
NRSROs.
Chart 11: Rating Agency Market Shares for U.S. ABS Issued in 2015, 2016, and First Half of 2017*
1H
2017
Rank NRSRO
1H-2017
Issuance
($Mil.)
No.
of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
2016
Issuance
($Mil.)
No. of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
2015
Issuance
($Mil.)
No.
of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
1 Fitch 84,896.4 108 60.4 122,580.6 159 55.5 115,754.1 169 54.2
2 S&P 80,799.6 120 57.5 125,032.7 201 56.6 128,625.1 212 60.3
3 Moody’s 71,187.6 95 50.6 119,272.8 169 54.0 123,523.4 182 57.9
4 DBRS 28,826.3 62 20.5 46,750.6 118 21.2 44,842.6 97 21.0
5 KBRA 23,261.2 57 16.5 38,145.2 100 17.3 21,572.0 63 10.1
6 Morningstar 4,783.9 9 3.4 7,921.2 23 3.6 7,317.8 16 3.4
7 A.M. Best 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 115.0 1 0.1
Total Rated
Market 140,574.0 226 220,949.7 393 213,421.4 380
Source: https://www.abalert.com/rankings.pl?Q=102
Chart 12: Rating Agency Market Shares for U.S. MBS Issued in 2015, 2016, and First Half of 2017*
1H
2017
Rank NRSRO
1H-2017
Issuance
($Mil.)
No.
of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
2016
Issuance
($Mil.)
No. of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
2015
Issuance
($Mil.)
No.
of
deals
Market
Share
(%)
1 Moody’s 4,465.3 9 54.7 5,279.6 16 63.6 7,266.5 21 23.6
2 DBRS 4,445.3 7 54.5 3,245.9 10 39.1 20,921.3 76 67.8
3 KBRA 3,713.7 7 45.5 3,008.4 9 36.2 6,890.5 22 22.3
4 S&P 2,085.8 3 25.6 1,216.0 4 14.6 3,370.6 10 10.9
5 Fitch 1,540.8 2 18.9 3,478.4 12 41.9 7,614.3 26 24.7
6 Morningstar 0.0 0 0.0 585.6 4 7.1 4,585.5 9 14.9
Total Rated
Market 8,159.0 14 8,300.5 29 30,842.9 103
Source: https://www.abalert.com/rankings.pl?Q=102
* Charts 11 and 12 reflect market share percentages based on dollar amounts of issuance. The market shares of individual
NRSROs do not add up to 100% since more than one NRSRO may rate a particular transaction or obligor.

Chart 11 shows that smaller NRSROs, in particular DBRS and KBRA, appear to have built
significant market share rating U.S. ABS.
53
DBRS has consistently obtained a market share of over
20% in each of 2015, 2016, and the first half of 2017, and KBRA has increased its share of the market
from 10.1% in 2015 to 17.3% in 2016 and 16.5% in the first half of 2017. Also of note, Fitch for the
first time achieved the highest market share for U.S. ABS transactions in the first half of 2017. In
prior periods, either Moody’s or S&P had the highest market share.
Chart 12 shows reported NRSRO market share information for the U.S. MBS category.
Although issuance volume remains low in this category, DBRS and KBRA continue to claim a large
portion of the market, with the second and third highest market shares in the first half of 2017. In fact,
DBRS’s first half market share was only 0.2% less than Moody’s (the latter having the highest market
share in U.S. MBS in the same period). Both DBRS and KBRA issued ratings with respect to half the
U.S. MBS transactions issued in the first half of 2017, each rating seven transactions, as compared to
nine transactions for Moody’s. KBRA has increased its percentage share of the market since 2015,
when it rated 22.3% of the MBS issuances for that year. Its share of 2016 U.S. MBS issuances
increased to 36.2%, and its share of U.S. MBS issuances in the first half of 2017 increased further to
45.5%.
2. Other NRSRO Developments
54

As described in Section IV.B.1. of this Report, some of the smaller NRSROs have reported
success in gaining market share in the asset-backed securities rating category. In particular, these
NRSROs have had success rating asset-backed securities backed by newer or unique asset types,
commonly referred to as “esoteric” asset-backed securities.
Smaller NRSROs are significant raters of one of the largest segments of the esoteric asset-
backed securities market—marketplace lending securitizations. According to certain published
research, DBRS and KBRA are the most active rating agencies for marketplace lending transactions.
55

DBRS has issued the highest number of ratings of all NRSROs in the student loan category, having
issued credit ratings for 45.1% of all such rated issuances through the end of the Report Period,
including all but one of the twelve student loan transactions issued during the Report Period.
56
KBRA
has rated 52.7% of all rated ABS issuances in the consumer loan category through the end of the
Report Period, and DBRS has rated 22.1% of such issuances through the end of the Report Period.
57

KBRA rated all the consumer loan transactions issued during the Report Period.
58

53
See Section IV.B.2. of this Report for a discussion of specific ABS asset classes where the smaller NRSROs have
reported success in gaining market share.
54
Unless noted otherwise, all market share percentages in this Section IV.B.2. are based on dollar amounts of
issuance.
55
See Marketplace Lending Securitization Tracker Q2 2017, PeerIQ, available at:
http://www.peeriq.com/research/.
56
Id. Cumulative market share information is based on Exhibit 8 in the cited research, and observations regarding
the Report Period are based on information in the appendix to the cited research, which lists all marketplace
lending securitizations to date.
57
Id.
58
Id.

Another active segment of the esoteric asset-backed securities market is securitizations backed
by property assessed clean energy (PACE) assessments.
59
Through the end of the Report Period,
ratings of securities in this segment have been issued exclusively by smaller NRSROs.
60
KBRA and
DBRS are the most active NRSROs rating PACE securitizations, and Morningstar has recently begun
rating these transactions as well.
61
PACE securitizations are a type of “green bond,” which is broadly
projected to be an area of issuance growth across corporate issuers, government issuers, and financial
institutions, as well as issuers of asset-backed securities.
62

Single family rental securitizations are predominately rated by three NRSROs, including two
smaller NRSROs. During the Report Period, issuers priced ten rated single family rental
securitizations with an aggregate principal amount of $4.0 billion. Of these deals, Morningstar issued
ratings on all of them and KBRA issued ratings on 77.1% of them.
63

A final example of market share gains achieved by smaller NRSROs rating esoteric asset-
backed securities is KBRA’s performance rating securitizations backed by aircraft-lease receivables.
According to the Asset-Backed Alert database, KBRA has rated approximately 78% of all such
transactions (through the first half of 2017) since it began rating this type of asset-backed security in
2013, including all of the aircraft-lease receivable transactions completed in 2016 and the first half of
2017.
64

Smaller NRSROs have also been able to gain market share in rating more traditional types of
asset-backed securities. Beyond the MBS and CMBS categories discussed in Section IV.B.1. of this
Report, DBRS has gained the largest market share among the smaller NRSROs with respect to
traditional asset-backed securities. For example, DBRS rated 64.2% of the transactions backed by
student loans that priced during the Report Period, which was the second highest market share among

59
According to the database maintained by Asset-Backed Alert, eleven PACE asset-backed securities transactions
totaling $1.8 billion priced during the Report Period.
60
See Asset-Backed Alert database.
61
The Asset-Backed Alert database indicates that KBRA, DBRS, and Morningstar rated 87.7%, 71.4%, and 34.1%,
respectively, of the transactions priced during the Report Period. The database shows that Morningstar first rated
a PACE securitization in October 2016.
62
See Beyond Green Bonds: Sustainable Finance Comes of Age, S&P Global Market Intelligence, April 26, 2017,
available at:
https://www.globalcreditportal.com/ratingsdirect/renderArticle.do?articleId=1837902&SctArtId=423549&from=
CM&nsl_code=LIME&sourceObjectId=10049685&sourceRevId=2&fee_ind=N&exp_date=20270426-14:09:23);
Global green bond issuance could rise to USD206B in 2017 after record in 2016, Moody’s Investors Service,
January 18, 2017, available at https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Global-green-bond-issuance-could-
rise-to-USD206B-in--PR_360880. Specifically with respect to PACE securitizations, the Asset-Backed Alert
database shows a significant growth in issuance in recent years. In 2014, there were two transactions totaling
approximately $233 million; in 2015, there were four transactions totaling approximately $651 million; and in
2016, there were eleven transactions totaling approximately $1.8 billion. In the first half of 2017, there were three
transactions totaling approximately $662 million.

63
See Asset-Backed Alert database.
64
See id. The Asset-Backed Alert database indicates that eleven aircraft lease receivable transactions totaling $5.9
billion priced during the period beginning on January 1, 2016 and ending on June 30, 2017.

all NRSROs during this period.
65
DBRS also rated a sizable minority of two of the largest asset-
backed securities asset classes, prime auto loan and credit card transactions.
66
DBRS rated 13.4% and
15.9% of the prime auto loan asset-backed securities and credit card asset-backed securities,
respectively, priced during the Report Period.
67

In addition to DBRS, other smaller NRSROs continue to pursue expansion in more traditional
types of asset-backed securities. For example, Morningstar issued its first credit rating with respect to
a CLO transaction in November 2016 and issued credit ratings with respect to seven CLO transactions
that closed during the Report Period.
68
Also during the Report Period, KBRA has focused on efforts
to expand into more traditional types of asset-backed securities, such as prime auto loans and credit
card securitizations.
69

Smaller NRSROs continue to pursue opportunities in rating categories other than asset-backed
securities as well. For example, as discussed in Section II. of this Report, Morningstar and HR
Ratings registered as NRSROs in the financial institutions and corporate issuers rating categories
during the Report Period. The introduction of Morningstar and HR Ratings operating as NRSROs in
these rating categories may give market participants more sources of credit opinions and could present
market share opportunities for the NRSROs so registered; however, it may take several years before
the effects on competition can be fully observed. In addition, DBRS announced during the Report
Period plans to expand its ratings coverage of non-bank financial institutions.
70
As discussed above,
DBRS is one of the most active NRSROs with respect to credit ratings of marketplace lending
securitizations. DBRS indicated that increased coverage of the sponsors of these transactions on the
corporate side could further enhance its position rating individual structured product transactions.
71

Another example from the Report Period i s KBRA’s announcement that it hired a Senior Director of

65
See id. The Asset-Backed Alert database shows that Moody’s rated 79.0% of the student loan transactions priced
during the Report Period.
66
The Asset-Backed Alert database lists 87 prime auto loan transactions totaling $67.4 billion and 66 credit card
transactions totaling $51.2 billion during the Report Period. These are the third and fourth largest asset classes
shown on the database, behind only CLOs and non-U.S. residential loans.
67
See Asset-Backed Alert database. DBRS also rates other auto-related asset-backed securities. During the Report
Period, DBRS rated 36.2% of the auto-fleet lease transactions, 30.6% of the subprime auto loan transactions,
18.5% of the auto lease transactions, and 10.7% of the floorplan loan transactions. See id.
68
See https://ratingagency.morningstar.com/mcr/ratings-surveillance/structured-finance (listing rated structured
finance transactions and providing links to more detailed information). See also Glen Fest, Morningstar Adds
CLO Ratings to Structured Finance Menu, Asset Securitization Report, November 15, 2016. Such ratings were
determined in accordance with Morningstar’s U.S. Asset-Backed Securitization General Ratings Methodology.
Morningstar has since adopted a methodology specific to U.S. CLOs. See U.S. CLO Ratings Methodology,
Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC, October 2017, available at:
https://ratingagency.morningstar.com/PublicDocDisplay.aspx?i=6B9mipsY8sY%3d&m=i0Pyc%2bx7qZZ4%2bs
XnymazBA%3d%3d&s=LviRtUKXqs8kml5dHt7FTeE2SZmY0Fvqd4iX49Mk%2f9UapyiFTEO6TA%3d%3d.
69
See Fitch’s Dean to Aid Kroll’s Growth Effort, Asset-Backed Alert, May 12, 2017.
70
See DBRS Announces Plans to Expand Coverage within the Non-Bank Financial Institution Sector, September
19, 2016, available at: https://www.dbrs.com/research/299535/dbrs-announces-plans-to-expand-coverage-within-
the-non-bank-financial-institution-sector.html.
71
See id.

Insurance Business Development, to “further solidif[y] [its] commitment to provide a dependable
rating alternative to the insurance industry.”
72

Efforts by smaller NRSROs to grow their businesses across rating categories, such as those
discussed above, may benefit from the broader acceptance of NRSROs in the investment guidelines of
institutional investors, as discussed in Section IV.C. of this Report.
C. Barriers to Entry
Despite the notable progress made by smaller NRSROs in gaining market share in some
types of asset-backed securities over the past few years (see Section IV.B . of this Report),
barriers to entry continue to exist in the credit ratings industry, presenting competitive challenges
for the smaller NRSROs.
73

There have, however, been reports of progress with respect to one such barrier—minimum
ratings requirements that specify use of the ratings of particular rating agencies (traditionally, one or
more of the larger NRSROs) in the investment management contracts of institutional fund managers
and the investment guidelines of fixed income mutual fund managers, pension plan sponsors, and
endowment fund managers.
74
The effect of these requirements can be to increase the demand and
liquidity for securities bearing the ratings of the specified rating agencies.
75

An article published during the Report Period indicates that investors are increasingly changing
their guidelines to allow for investments in securities rated by a wider group of NRSROs.
76
The
article discusses efforts by Fitch and certain smaller NRSROs to encourage investors to expand their
guidelines. For example, smaller NRSROs have asserted that expansion would give investors the
flexibility to invest in asset classes (including certain types of esoteric asset-backed securities) that
may not typically carry credit ratings from the larger NRSROs.
77
Although the article reports that
headway has been made in alleviating this barrier to entry, it also notes that challenges persist.

72
Kroll Bond Rating Agency Announces Addition of Tina Bukow as Senior Director of Insurance Business
Development, January 18, 2017, available at: https://www.krollbondratings.com/announcements/3256.
73
See Shankar Ramakrishnan and Philip Scipio, Big three in credit ratings still dominate business, May 4,
2016, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/uscorpbonds-ratings-idUSL2N17U1L4.
74
See letter from KBRA to the Commission, dated August 19, 2014, available at:
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-11/s71811-88.pdf. This barrier to entry was also mentioned during
the SEC’s Credit Ratings Roundtable held on May 14, 2013. At the roundtable, a representative of
Morningstar mentioned that, according to a study conducted by Morningstar, approximately 42% of the
fixed income funds have investment guidelines referring to ratings of S&P, Moody’s, or a “major
NRSRO.” See Credit Rating Roundtable, May 14, 2013, available at:
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/credit-
ratings-roundtable.shtml.
75
The effect of including particular NRSROs in investment guidelines was highlighted in a past article
concerning a loan securitization. In the article, an issuer referred to the fact that many institutional buyers
are limited to purchasing securities rated by one of the larger NRSROs, and that a larger NRSRO’s rating
expanded the number of entities which could purchase the rated securities. See Tracy Alloway, Peer-to-
Peer Lender Wins Landmark Rating, Fin. Times, July 10, 2014 at Companies and Markets, p. 18.
76
Big Investors Accept More Rating Agencies, Asset-Backed Alert, May 19, 2017.
77
See Section IV.B.2. of this Report for a discussion of certain esoteric asset classes commonly rated by certain
smaller NRSROs.

A related barrier to entry is the inclusion requirements of some fixed income indices. To
be included in many of these indices, securities must be rated by specific NRSROs.
78
During the
Report Period, certain smaller NRSROs have reportedly advocated for the broadening of
NRSROs in the inclusion requirements of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Aggregate Index, an
index tracked by fixed income portfolios maintained by many large asset managers.
79

Market participants and academics have identified various other barriers to entry in the
credit rating industry, including economic and regulatory barriers.
80
Among the regulatory
barriers to entry for NRSROs are the costs associated with complying with the statutory
provisions implemented by the Rating Agency Act and the Dodd-Frank Act and the related rules
adopted by the Commission, including the rules and rule amendments that the Commission
adopted pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act (the “NRSRO Amendments”).
81
Commenters on the
proposed NRSRO Amendments expressed concerns that certain of the requirements would be
burdensome for smaller NRSROs to implement and could raise barriers to entry for credit rating
agencies that seek to register as NRSROs.
82
In connection with the NRSRO Amendments, the
Commission acknowledged that, despite efforts to limit the impact on small entities, the Dodd-
Frank Act contained requirements, including those implemented by the NRSRO Amendments,
which impose costs on NRSROs and may consequently create barriers to entry and have
negative impacts on competition.
83
As discussed in more detail in a prior Annual Report, the
NRSRO Amendments as adopted by the Commission include various changes intended to
address concerns regarding barriers to entry, including standards allowing NRSROs to tailor
particular requirements to their business models, size, and rating methodologies.
84

V. TRANSPARENCY
Congress described the Rating Agency Act as an act to improve ratings quality “by
fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating agency industry.”
85

Section 932 of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled “Enhanced regulation, accountability, and
transparency of NRSROs.” Both Acts contain various provisions designed to increase the

78
For example, the rules for inclusion in the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Aggregate Index specify that securities
must be rated investment grade using the middle rating of Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. See US Aggregate
Index, available at: https://www.bbhub.io/indices/sites/2/2016/08/2017-02-08-Factsheet-US-
Aggregate.pdf.
79
Rating Firms Seek Changes to Index, Asset-Backed Alert, May 26, 2017.
80
See, e.g., Section IV.C. of the March 2012 Annual Report, available at:
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency/nrsroannrep0312.pdf.
81
See Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Release No. 34-72936 (Aug. 27, 2014), 79 FR 55077
(Sept. 15, 2014) (“Adopting Release”).
82
See Adopting Release, 79 FR at 55090, 55154, 55161, and 55254-55. See also comment letters received with
respect to the NRSRO Amendments as proposed, available at: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-
11/s71811.shtml.
83
See Adopting Release, 79 FR at 55254.
84
See id. Section IV.C. of the December 2015 Annual Report, available at:
https://www.sec.gov/ocr/reportspubs/annual-reports/2015-annual-report-on-nrsros.pdf.
85
See the preamble to the Rating Agency Act.

transparency—through clear disclosure open to public scrutiny—of, among other things,
NRSROs’ credit rating procedures and methodologies, business practices, and credit ratings
performance.
The NRSRO Amendments improved and expanded the disclosure requirements
applicable to NRSROs. Additional sources of information that can be beneficial to investors and
others are required to be made publicly available under the NRSRO Amendments. These
requirements a re designed to enhance the transparency of NRSRO credit ratings by reducing
information asymmetries that may adversely affect users of credit ratings.
86
Specifically, under
the NRSRO Amendments, NRSROs must disclose:
(1) standardized performance statistics;
87

(2) consolidated and increased information about credit rating histories;
88

(3) information about material changes and significant errors in the procedures and
methodologies used to determine credit ratings;
89

(4) information about specific rating actions;
90
and
(5) clear definitions of each symbol, number, or score in the rating scale used by the
NRSRO.
91

An objective of these requirements is to improve the information provided to users of
credit ratings in order to facilitate external scrutiny of NRSRO activities, enable ratings users to
make more informed investment and credit-related decisions and allow users to compare the
performance of credit ratings by different NRSROs.
92

In accordance with the NRSRO Amendments, each NRSRO must disclose certain
information in connection with each rating action it takes.
93

Such information includes, among
other things, the version of the procedure or methodology used to determine the credit rating, a
description of the types of data that were relied upon for purposes of determining the credit
rating, an assessment of the quality of information available and considered in determining the
credit rating, and information on the sensitivity of the credit ratings to assumptions made by the
NRSRO.
94

These requirements are designed to promote transparency of the process for
determining credit rating actions, allowing users of credit ratings to better understand how credit
ratings are produced and the information content of credit ratings, including how these factors
vary across NRSROs.
95

86
See Adopting Release, 79 FR at 55091.
87
See Instructions for Exhibit 1 to Form NRSRO; Adopting Release, 79 FR at 55295-302.
88
See Rule 17g-7(b); Adopting Release, 79 FR at 55266-67.
89
See Rule 17g-8(a)(4); Adopting Release, 79 FR at 55267-68.
90
See Rule 17g-7(a); Adopting Release, 79 FR at 55264-66.
91
See Rule 17g-8(b)(2); Adopting Release, 79 FR at 55268.
92
See Adopting Release, 79 FR at 55091.
93
See Rule 17g-7(a).
94
See Rule 17g-7(a)(1)(ii).
95
See Adopting Release, 79 FR at 55180.

In addition to the disclosures required by rule, NRSROs often issue press releases and
reports at the time of a rating action to describe the rationale behind such rating action,
96
and
make versions of the methodologies for determining credit ratings available on their websites.
The availability of the underlying methodologies, together with a report discussing the analysis
supporting a rating action, provides additional transparency into the credit rating process.
Some NRSROs also offer access on a subscription basis to tools that may provide further
insight into their credit ratings. For example, during the Report Period, Fitch announced the
launch of its Resi Investor tool, which allows investors to conduct analysis on the underlying
loans in rated RMBS transactions, such as by calculating their own expected losses and model-
implied ratings outcomes.
97
Fitch noted in its announcement that this product “provides detailed
insight into the factors behind the rating and allows investors to better understand how Fitch
determines its ratings.”
98
A.M. Best sells access to the model it uses to calculate a capital
adequacy ratio, allowing subscribers to make their own assumptions and assess the impact of
various scenarios using the same tool utilized by A.M. Best’s credit analysts.
99
Other NRSROs
may offer similar tools.
Beyond the disclosures required under Section 15E and the related Commission rules,
and information otherwise made available by NRSROs with respect to their credit ratings,
transparency may be increased if NRSROs that are not hired to rate a security publish their views
of the credit quality of such a security, such as by issuing an unsolicited rating or publishing
unsolicited commentaries.
During the Report Period, several NRSROs published commentaries and research in which
they express their viewpoints on particular securities, ratings, or asset classes. For example, Moody’s
published research comparing the characteristics of the subprime auto loans underlying asset-backed
securities issued by the two largest issuers in this asset class.
100
The research utilized loan-by-loan
data made available in accordance with Regulation AB under the Securities Act
101
to identify a
number of potential contributors to the higher historical losses in the loan pools of one such issuer.

96
The reports accompanying a rating action are frequently available on a paid subscription basis, although some
NRSROs provide access to such reports for free.
97
Fitch Ratings Launches “Resi Investor” Toll for RMBS Market, Fitch Ratings, October 13, 2016, available at:
https://www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/1013050.
98
Id.
99
See Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio Model – Universal, A.M. Best, available at:
http://www.ambest.com/sales/bcaru/productbrochure.pdf; Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio Adjustment System,
A.M. Best, available at: http://www.ambest.com/sales/BCARSystem/brochure.pdf.
100
Announcement: Moody’s: Reg AB II data may shed light on differing performance of US subprime auto ABS
issuers, Global Credit Research, Moody’s Investors Service, May 17, 2017, available at:
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Reg-AB-II- data-may-shed-light-on-differing--PR_366915. See Matt
Scully, Auto Lender Santander Checked Income on Just 8% in Subprime ABS, May 22, 2017, available at:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-22/subprime-auto-giant-checked-income-on-just-8-of-loans-
in-abs.
101
17 CFR 229.1100 et seq. Beginning on November 23, 2016, issuers of residential mortgage-backed securities,
commercial mortgage-backed securities, auto loan asset-backed securities, auto lease asset-backed securities and
debt security asset-backed securities (and resecuritizations of such asset-backed securities) were required to begin
filing asset-level data with the Commission on EDGAR.

DBRS has also used data made available in accordance with Regulation AB to develop a monthly
report that provides an aggregate overview and loan-level detail with respect to loans underlying
public U.S. auto loan asset-backed securities.
102
The report is designed to provide insight into the
newly available loan-by-loan data and to make it easier for market participants to compare pools of
auto loans.
103

NRSROs also published commentaries and research during the Report Period that highlighted
differences of opinion they may have with other NRSROs. For instance, KBRA published a research
piece regarding financial guarantors in which it expressed the view that “bond insurance financial
strength ratings should be heavily focused on an assessment of the likelihood a financial guarantor will
meet all its obligations to policyholders when claims come due.”
104
KBRA contrasted its approach
with the “overly prescriptive criteria” of other rating agencies that, according to KBRA, may
overemphasize the market position and future growth of the rated financial guarantors.
105

Another example from the Report Period is Morningstar’s commentary regarding CLO
combination notes.
106
In that commentary, Morningstar expressed its view that refinancing risk does
not present significant additional credit risk for typical CLO combination notes. Although
Morningstar did not contrast its view on CLO combination notes with those of other NRSROs in the
commentary, Moody’s, the NRSRO with the largest market share with respect to CLO ratings,
107
had
recently updated its methodology for rating CLO combination notes to account for risks associated
with potential refinancings.
108

Commentaries and research pieces such as those mentioned above may provide additional
insight into the credit characteristics of certain securities or asset types and/or highlight differences in
opinions and ratings criteria among NRSROs. This type of information can serve to enhance
investors’ understanding of the differences in ratings approaches used by the NRSROs.

102
DBRS Releases Figures on Automotive Securitization Tapes Report for U.S. Auto Loans, DBRS, September 15,
2017, available at: http://www.dbrs.com/research/316114/dbrs-releases-figures-on-automotive-securitization-
tapes-report-for-u-s-auto-loans.html.
103
Id.
104
Rating Risk and the Financial Guarantors: Déjà Vu All Over Again, Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Financial
Guaranty Research, June 13, 2017, available at: https://www.krollbondratings.com/show_report/6996.
105
Id.
106
CLO Commentary, Refinancing Poses Limited Additional Credit Risk to CLO Combinations Notes, Morningstar,
February 2017, available at:
https://ratingagency.morningstar.com/PublicDocDisplay.aspx?i=Css8DdoWLRM%3d&m=i0Pyc%2bx7qZZ4%2
bsXnymazBA%3d%3d&s=LviRtUKXqs8kml5dHt7FTeE2SZmY0Fvqd4iX49Mk%2f9UapyiFTEO6TA%3d%3d.
107
According to the Asset-Backed Alert database, Moody’s rated 93.6% of rated CLO transactions during the Report
Period.
108
See Announcement: Moody’s publishes its updated methodology for rating securities backed by CLO secured
debt and equity tranches, Moody’s Investors Service, October, 7, 2016, available at:
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-publishes-its -updated-methodology-for-rating-securities-backed-by--
PR_355239.

VI. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
NRSROs operate under a combination of two business models, and there are potential
conflicts of interest inherent in both. Most of the NRSROs, including the largest NRSROs,
primarily operate under the “issuer-pay” model, which is subject to a potential conflict in that the
credit rating agency may be influenced to determine more favorable (i.e., higher) ratings than
warranted in order to retain the obligors or issuers as clients.
109
This conflict could affect an
entire asset class if, for example, an NRSRO becomes known for issuing higher credit ratings
with respect to such class, resulting in that NRSRO’s retaining or attracting business from most
or all issuers of securities in such class.
110
The potential for such a conflict to influence the
ratings process may be particularly acute with respect to structured finance products, where
transactions are arranged by a relatively concentrated group of sponsors, underwriters, and
managers, and rating fees are particularly lucrative.
111

The other business model is the “subscriber-pay” model which means that investors pay
the rating agency a subscription fee to access its ratings. This model is also subject to potential
conflicts of interest. For example, an NRSRO may be aware that an influential subscriber holds
a securities position (long or short) that could be advantaged if a credit rating upgrade or
downgrade causes the market value of the security to increase or decrease or that a subscriber
invests in newly issued bonds and would obtain higher yields if the bonds were to have lower
ratings.
Another example of a conflict in a “subscriber-pay” model is that the NRSRO may be
aware that a subscriber wishes to acquire a particular security but is prevented from doing so
because the credit rating of the security is lower than internal investment guidelines or an
applicable contract permit. An upgrade of the credit rating of the security by the NRSRO could
remove this impediment to investing in the security. These potential conflicts could be mitigated

109
For example, during the Report Period, the U.S. Department of Justice and 21 states and the District of
Columbia announced that they had entered into a settlement agreement with Moody’s to resolve certain
allegations regarding Moody’s ratings on residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations. The conduct covered by the settlement agreement included statements made by Moody’s
concerning the integrity, objectivity, independence, and lack of influence from business concerns in
connection with the issuance and maintenance of credit ratings of structured finance instruments. See
Justice Department and State Partners Secure Nearly $864 Million Settlement With Moody’s From
Conduct in the Lead up to the Financial Crisis, January 13, 2017, available at:
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-state-partners-secure-nearly-864-million-settlement-
moody-s-arising. The U.S. Department of Justice and several states entered into a similar settlement
agreement with S&P in 2015. See Justice Department and State Partners Secure $1.375 Billion Settlement
with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the Financial Crisis, February 3, 2015, available at:
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-state-partners-secure-1375-billion-settlement-sp-
defrauding-investors.
110
Some authors, however, have written about the effect of reputational concerns on the motivation of rating
agencies to provide accurate ratings. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The
Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2002); Harold Cole and Thomas F. Cooley, Rating Agencies,
NBER working paper No. 19972 (Mar. 2014).
111
A Senate Report related to the Dodd-Frank Act noted, for instance, that conflicts of interest in the process
of rating structured financial products contributed to the issuance of inaccurate ratings by rating agencies
and, accordingly, to the mismanagement of risks by financial institutions and investors. See S. Report No.
111-176 (2010).

to the extent that an NRSRO has a wide subscriber base and subscribers have different interests
with respect to an upgrade or downgrade of a particular security.
Section 15E and the related Commission rules contain provisions addressing conflicts of
interest. For example, Rule 17g-5 identifies certain conflicts of interest that are prohibited
under all circumstances
112
and other conflicts of interest that are prohibited unless an NRSRO
has publicly disclosed the existence of the conflict and has implemented policies and procedures
reasonably designed to address and manage such conflict.
113
One such flatly prohibited conflict
of interest is Rule 17g-5(c)(8), which was added by the NRSRO Amendments. In accordance
with this rule, an NRSRO is prohibited from issuing or maintaining a credit rating where a
person within the NRSRO who participates in determining or monitoring the rating, or
developing or approving procedures or methodologies used for determining the rating, also (a)
participates in sales or marketing activities of the NRSRO or its affiliate or (b) is influenced by
sales or marketing considerations.
114

Other statutory provisions and Commission rules address potential conflicts of interest
that may arise when a credit analyst seeks employment outside the NRSRO. Each NRSRO is
required to have policies and procedures in place to provide for an internal “look-back” review
process in order to determine whether any conflict of interest of a former employee influenced a
credit rating in certain instances.
115
During the Report Period, OCR Staff issued letters to the
designated compliance officers of the NRSROs to provide the Staff’s view that an NRSRO’s
policies and procedures should provide for a look-back review in those instances where a former
analyst participated in determining credit ratings with respect to his or her new employer during
the one-year period preceding the most recent rating action taken by the NRSRO prior to the
analyst’s departure.
116

The annual examinations conducted by Staff in accordance with Section 15E(p) are
required to include, among other things, a review of the management of conflicts of interest by
the NRSRO and the policies of the NRSRO governing post-employment activities of its former
personnel.
117
Information regarding the examinations, including any essential findings with
respect to these review areas, is included in OCR’s annual examination reports.
118

112
See Rule 17g-5(c).
113
See Rule 17g-5(a)(1)-(2); Rule 17g-5(b); and Form NRSRO, Exhibits 6-7. Additional requirements apply
to the “issuer-pay” conflict of interest in the context of credit ratings of asset-backed securities. See Rule
17g-5(a)(3).
114
See Rule 17g-5(c)(8).
115
See Section 15E(h)(4)(A).
116
The content of these letters was also published on the OCR page of the Commission’s website. See “Dear
DCO” Letter, July 2016, available at https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocr/dear-dco-letter-15eh4a-
071816.pdf.
117
See Section 15E(p)(3)(B).
118
The examination reports can be found under “Summary Examination Reports” in the “Reports and Studies”
section of the OCR webpage, available at http://www.sec.gov/ocr.

VII. CONCLUSION
The Staff will continue to conduct its oversight function with respect to NRSROs, including
the performance of Staff examinations, and engage in other initiatives with respect to NRSROs.