SEC v. Daniel H. Mudd; Enrico Dallavecchia; and Thomas A. Lund, Southern District of New York (Dec. 16, 2011) — Complaint

11 eIV 9202 

ECFCase 
Jury Trial Demanded 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
UNITED STATES SECURITIES 

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff, 

-v.­
DANIEL 
H. MUDD, 

ENRICO DALLAVECCHIA, and 

THOMAS A. LUND, 

Defendants. 

COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") for 
its Complaint alleges as follows: 
SUMMARY 
OF ALLEGATIONS 
1. This action arises out of a series of materially false and misleading public 
disclosures 
by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae" or the "Company") 
and certain 
of its former senior executives concerning the Company's exposure to subprime 
mortgage and reduced documentation Alt-A loans. Eager to promote the impression that Fannie 
Mae had limited exposure 
to· subprime and Alt-A loans during a  period of heightened investor 
interest in the credit risks associated with these loans, Fannie Mae and its executives misled 
investors into believing that the Company had far less exposure to these riskier mortgages than in 
fact existed. 
2. Between December 6, 2006, and August 8, 2008, (the "Relevant Period"), Daniel 
H. Mudd ("Mudd"), Enrico Dallavecchia ("Dallavecchia") and Thomas A. Lund ("Lund") 

(collectively, "Defendants"), made or substantially assisted others in making materially false and 
misleading statements regarding Fannie Mae's exposure to subprime and Alt-A loans. 
3. For example, in a  February 2007 public filing, Fannie Mae described subprime 
loans as loans "made to borrowers with weaker credit histories" and reported that 0.2%, or 
approximately $4.8 billion, 
of its Single Family credit book of business as of December 31, 
2006, consisted 
of subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae Mortgage Backed 
Securities ("MBS") backed by subprime mortgage loans. 
4. Fannie Mae did not disclose to investors that in calculating the Company's 
reported exposure to subprime loans, Fannie Mae did not include loan products specifically 
targeted by the Company towards borrowers with weaker  credit histories, including Expanded 
Approval ("EA") loans. As 
ofDecember 31, 2006, the amount ofEA loans owned or securitized 
in the Company's single-family credit business was approximately $43.3 billion, yet none of 
these loans were included in the Company's disclosed subprime exposure. 
5. Fannie Mae's exclusion of loans such as EA from its subprime disclosures was 
particularly misleading because EA loans were exactly the type 
of loans that investors would 
reasonably believe Fannie Mae included when calculating its exposure to subprime loans. 
In fact, 
the Company identified EA as its "most significant initiative to serve credit· impaired borrowers" 
in response to regulatory requests for information on its subprime loans. In addition, all of the 
Defendants knew that EA loans had higher average serious delinquency rates, higher credit 
losses, and lower average credit scores than the loans Fannie Mae included when calculating its 
disclosed subprime loan exposure. 
6. In a November 2007 public filing, Fannie Mae described subprime loans as a loan 
to a borrower with a "weaker credit profile than that 
of a prime borrower," classified mortga~e 
2 

loans as "subprime" if the mortgage loans were originated by a "specialty" subprime lender or a 

"subprime division 
of a  large lender," and again represented that only 0.2%, or approximately 

. $4.8 billion, 
of its Single Family credit book of business consisted of subprime mortgage loans 

or structured Fannie Mae MBS backed by subprime mortgage loans as 
of both March 31, 2007, 

. and June 30, 2007. 
7. Fannie Mae did not tell investors that in calculating the Company's exposure to 
subprime loans reported in this filing, Fannie Mae again did not include at least $43 billion 
of 
EA loans, included loans from only fifteen loan originators of the approximately 210 lenders 
listed on the HUD Subprime Lender list, and did not even have the capacity to track whether 
loans were originated by a subprime division 
of a large lender. 
8. Fannie Mae made similarly misleading disclosures concerning its exposure to 
subprime loans 
in public filings throughout the Relevant Period. The result of these disclosures 
was to mislead investors into seriously underestimating Fannie Mae's exposure to subprime 
loans. 
9. Similarly, Fannie Mae misled investors concerning its exposure to Alt-A loans 
with reduced 
or alternative documentation requirements. Fannie Mae did not disclose the total 
percentage 
of its Single Family mortgage guarantee business consisting of reduced 
documentation loans as reflected 
in its own internal reporting, which Defendants routinely 
received throughout the Relevant Period. 
10. Instead, in its public disclosures, Fannie Mae described Alt-A loans as loans with 
lower or alternative documentation requirements, and then further stated that it classified loans as 
"Alt-A 
if the lenders that deliver the mortgage loans to us have classified the loans as Alt-A 
based on documentation or other product features." 
3 

11. Based on this reporting construct, for example, in a May 2007 filing, Fannie Mae 
publicly reported that approximately 11% 
of its total Single Family mortgage credit book of 
business as of March 31, 2007, consisted of Alt-A mortgage loans or Fannie Mae mortgage 
securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans. This filing materially underreported the extent 
of 
Fannie Mae's total exposure to low documentation loans, which was approximately 17.9% as of 
March 31,2007, based on Fannie Mae's own internal records. 
12. Fannie Mae also did not disclose to investors that certain reduced documentation 
loans it  received from lenders were not included in the calculation of Fannie Mae's publicly 
disclosed Alt-A loan exposure 
if the reduced documentation requirements were internally 
deSignated as Lender-Selected. Despite this exclusion, during· the Relevant Period,. 
Lender.;. 
Selected Reduced· Documentation Loans had a  serious delinquency rate that was substantially 
higher than Fannie 
Mae's full documentation loans with a  similar credit risk profile. Further, 
Fannie Mae did not tell investors that the Company itself provided 
lenders-in advance-with 
the coding designations for Alt-A versus Lender-Selected. 
13~ The result of these disclosures was to mislead investors into materially 
underestimating Fannie Mae's exposure to reduced documentation loans. Fannie Mae made 
similarly misleading disclosures concerning its exposure to reduced documentation loans 
in 
public filings throughout the Relevant Period. 
14. Mudd, Lund and Dallvecchia each knew, based on reports and internal data they 
received on a  regular basis, that the Company's reported exposure to subprime and Alt-A loans 
was inaccurate. The misleading statements describing subprime and Alt-A loans occurred 
in 
periodic and other filings with the Commission, and public settings, including investor and 
analyst calls and media interviews. Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia reviewed and approved each 
4 

ofthe false public filings. Mudd and Dallavecchia each made public statements falsely claiming 
that the Company's exposure to subprime loans was minimal. 
15. By engaging in the misconduct described herein, Mudd violated and aided and 
abetted the violation 
of the antifraud and reporting provisions of the federal securities laws; 
Dallavecchia violated the antifraud provisions and aided and abetted the violation 
of the 
antifraud and reporting provisions 
of the federal securities laws; and Lund aided and abetted 
violations 
of the antifraud and reporting provisions of the federal securities . laws. The 
Commission seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement 
ofprofits, prejudgment interest, civil penalties 
and other appropriate and necessary equitable relief from both defendants. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
16. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections 20(b) and 22(a) of 
the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b) and 77v(a)] and Sections 21(d), 21(e) and 27 of the 
Exchange Act 
[15 U.S.c. §§ 78u(d), 78u(e), and 78aa)], and 28 U.S.C. § l331. 
17. Venue is proper in the Court pursuant to Section 22(a) of the Securities Act, [15 
U.S.C. §77v(a)], and Section 27 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78aa] because certain of the 
acts, practices, transactions and courses 
of business constituting the violations alleged herein 
occurred within this judicial district. 
J 
8. Defendants Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund directly or indirectly made use of the 
means or instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, the mails, and the facilities of a  national· 
securities exchange 
in connection with the transactions, acts, practices and courses of business 
alleged 
in this Complaint. 
5 

DEFENDANTS 

19. Daniel Mudd, age 53, was Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Fannie Mae from 
June 2005 until September 2008, interim CEO from December 2004 until June 2005,and Chief 
Operating Officer ("COO") from February 2000 until November 2004. Ultimately, Mudd was 
removed as CEO 
of Fannie Mae after its regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
("FHFA"), placed Fannie Mae into conservatorship 
in September 2008. Mudd is a resident of 
Greenwich, Connecticut. Mudd certified Fannie Mae's Forms lO-K and Forms lO-Q during the 
Relevant Period, including Fannie 
Mae's 2005 10-K filed May 2, 2007, its 2006 10-K filed 
August 16,2007, its 2007 Form 10-Qs filed November 
9, 2007, and its 2007 Form 10-K filed 
February 27, 2008. Mudd reviewed and approved Fannie Mae's Forms 12b-25 filed February 
27,2007, and May 9,  2007. 
20. 
Enrico Dallavecchia, age 50, was Chief Risk Officer ("CRO") of Fannie Mae 
from June 2006 until August 2008 when he was removed by the Board along with two other 
executives. As CRO, Dallavecchia sub-certified all 
of Fannie Mae's Annual Forms 10-K and 
quarterly Forms 10-Q. He also reviewed and approved Fannie Mae's Forms 12b-25 dated 
February 27,2007 and May 
9, 2007. Dallavecchia isa resident ofPotomac, Maryland. 
21. 
Thomas Lund, age 53, was a  Fannie Mae employee since 1995 who served as 
Executive Vice-President ("EVP") of Fannie Mae's Single Family Credit Guarantee ("Single 
Family") business from July 2005 until June 2009. As EVP 
ofthe Single Family business, Lund 
sub-certified all 
of Fannie Mae's Annual Forms 10-K and quarterly Forms lO-Q. He also 
reviewed and approved Fannie Mae's Forms 12b-25 dated February 27, 2007, and May 
9, 2007. 
Lund 
is a resident of Cabin John, Maryland. 
6 

RELEVANT ENTITY 

22. 
Fannie Mae was, at all times relevant to this Complaint, a  shareholder-owned 
Government Sponsored Enterprise ("GSE") established by the 
u.S. Congress in 1938 to support 
liquidity, stability and affordability 
in the secondary mortgage market, where existing mortgage­
related assets are purchased and sold. Fannie Mae provides market liquidity by securitizing 
mortgage loans originated by lenders 
in the primary mortgage market into Fannie Mae MBS, and 
purchasing mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities 
in the secondary market for Fannie 
Mae's mortgage portfolio. By law, securities issued by Fannie Mae are "exempted securities." 
Accordingly, registration statements with respect to Fannie Mae's offerings are not filed with the 
Commission. 
23. In March 2003, Fannie 
Mae voluntarily registered its common stock with the SEC 
under Section 12(g) 
of the Exchange Act and has, since then, been required to file periodic and 
current reports with the SEC, including annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 
10-Q and current reports on Form 8-K. 
24. Throughout the Relevant 
Period, Fannie Mae's common stock traded publicly 
on 
the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). Its principal place of business was and is in 
Washington, D.C. 
25. On July 30, 2008, when the President signed into law the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act 
of 2008 ("HERA"), the Federal Housing Finance Agency· ("FHF A") became 
Fannie Mae's primary regulator. 
26. On August 
8, 2008, Fannie Mae announced a net loss of $2.3 billion. Fannie Mae 
stated that it was no longer certain that it would have enough capital to carry it through its losses. 
At this time, the Company announced that the main cause 
for its increased credit losses was the 
7 

deterioration in the credit performance of a small number of higher risk loan products, induding 
Alt-A loans. As 
ofthe third quarter of2008, more than 70% of Fannie Mae's credit losses were 
caused by its subprime and Alt-A loans. 
27. 
On September 
6, 2008, FHF A placed Fannie Mae into conservatorship and, as 
conservator, FHF A succeeded to all the rights, titles, powers and privileges of Fannie Mae, its 
shareholders, and the officers or directors 
of Fannie Mae with respect to the Company and its 
assets. 
BACKGROUND 
Fannie 
Mae Single Family Mortgage Guarantee Business 
28. Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book 
of business was $2.34 trillion 
in 2006, $2.65 trillion in 2007, and $2.8 trillion in September 2008 when the Company was 
placed into Conservatorship. 
29. During the Relevant Period, Fannie Mae operated three business segments-{i) 
Single Family; (ii) Multi-Family; and, (iii) Capital Markets. 
30. Fannie Mae's primary business segment is the Single Family business, which 
works with lender customers to securitize Single Family mortgage loans (relating to properties 
with four or fewer residential units) into Fannie Mae MBS and to facilitate the purchase 
of 
Single Family mortgage loans for Fannie Mae's portfolio. Revenues in Fannie Mae's Single 
Family business are derived primarily from fees received as compensation for guaranteeing the 
timely payment 
of principal and interest on mortgage loans underlying Fannie Mae's Single 
Family MBS. During the Relevant Period, the Single Family business comprised approximately 
51 %,64% and 54% ofFannie Mae's net revenues in each of2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. 
31. Fannie Mae's Single Family business principally acquired loans through one 
of 
two channels: (i) the Lender (or flow) channel, which obtained loans from lenders on a going­
8 

forward or contractual basis through agreements to purchase loans from lenders before those 
loans were originated based on certain terms and conditions; and, (ii) the Investor (or bulk) 
channel, which acquired from lenders loans that had already been originated based on data files 
for those loans that were provided by lenders to Fannie Mae for review prior to purchase. 
32. Fannie Mae's Single Family business had a  proprietary automated underwriting 
system called Desktop Underwriter 
("DU"). DU was used by the Single Family business to 
assess the primary risk factors 
of a  loan in order to measure that loan's default risk. Customers 
ofFannie Mae also used DU to originate and underwrite loans so those customers would know­
in advance-whether any given loan was eligible for sale to Fannie Mae. When DU provided a 
Fannie Mae customer with an "approve" f9r a  loan application, that customer knew that Fannie 
Mae would agree to acquire that loan and waive gertain warrants and representations so long as 
the loan 
is originated in accordance with information originally submitted via DU. 
33. At various times during the Relevant Period, Fannie Mae adjusted and 
recalibrated the risk assessment models within its DU system. For instance, 
in 2006, in 
connection with its Say Yes strategy to regain market share, Fannie Mae employed a "DU Bump" 
wherein eligibility parameters were expanded to provide more "approve" messages 
in DU for 
larger volumes 
of loans with lower FICO scores and higher LTV s than previously permitted. By 
adjusting and recalibrating the risk assessment models within its DU system, Fannie Mae took 
on 
increasingly risky loans during the Relevant Period. 
34. While many mortgage originators used Fannie Mae's DU system 
as part of the 
underwriting process, many large mortgage lenders also had their own automated origination and 
underwriting platforms. For instance, during the Relevant Period, Countrywide Financial 
9 

Corporation's (Countrywide) proprietary underwriting system was called Clues, and Freddie 
Mac had a system similar to DU that was called 
Loan Prospector. 
35. Not all loans acquired by Fannie Mae were underwritten using DU. During the 
Relevant Period, Fannie Mae acquired and securitized mortgage loans that were underwritten 
through other automated underwriting systems or simply by agreed-upon standards 
in a manual 
process. For instance, Fannie Mae acquired loans under Countrywide Financials 
Fast and Easy 
loan program that were underwritten using Countrywide's Clues system. Similarly, most of the 
My Community Mortgage ("MCM") loans Fannie Mae acquired during the Relevant Period 
were manually underwritten by loan officers and mortgage brokers at various companies 
nationwide and not evaluated using DU. 
Mudd's Role at Fannie Mae and his Disclosure Responsibilities 
36. As COO and then CEO from 2000 until September 2008, Mudd oversaw all three 
Fannie Mae business units, including the Single Family business. Additionally, during the 
Relevant Period Mudd was a member 
of the Board of Directors, the Audit Committee, a regular 
attendee at the Board's Risk Policy and Capital Committee meetings, held regular weekly 
meetings with his direct reports the business units, and attended quarterly business unit briefings. 
Mudd regularly read, reviewed and marked-up draft periodic filings and met with individuals 
who provided sub-certifications prior to certifying Forms 
10-K and Forms 
lO-Q.. 
37. As CEO, and based on his prior r()le as COO, Mudd possessed detailed 
operational knowledge concerning Fannie Mae's subprime and reduced documentation loan 
exposure. Further, during the Relevant Period, Mudd routinely received acquisition, delinquency 
and credit loss data concerning subprime and Alt-A loans. Mudd certified filings and made 
10 

public statements describing Fannie Mae's subprime and reduced documentation loan exposure 
knowing that those public statements were false and misleading. 
38. With regard to sUbprime-quality and reduced documentation loans, he received at 
least quarterly risk briefings on the Single Family business 
in which data showing Fannie Mae's 
total subprime and reduced documentation loan exposure was presented. Additionally, Mudd 
met weekly with his direct reports, who, among other things, informed him about Single Family 
loan acquisitions, trends and status with respect to market share targets. 
39. Mudd   was well aware 
of the Company's increased acquisition of reduced 
documentation loans-indeed, Mudd himself directed the company to pursue that market. For 
instance, 
in an April 2?, 2006, Credit Risk meeting following a  presentation on reduced 
documentation loans and their risks by the Single Family credit officer (who noted low 
documentation loans were riskier), Mudd stated that "the market 
is moving to low documentation 
and 
we need to actively pursue the keys to this market." 
40. Mudd oversaw Fannie Mae's 2006 market share increase during which the Single 
Family business grew its market share from 20% 
of total mortgage loan originations to 25% by 
acquiring  more subprime and reduced documentation loans. In part as a result of Fannie Mae's 
successful market share growth and timely filing 
of the company's periodic reports, Mudd's 
taxable compensation grew from $6.16 million in 2006 to $10.64 million 
in 2007. 
41. Throughout the Relevant Period, 
in addition to wages earned, Mudd-like all 
Fannie Mae executives-received an Annual Incentive Plan ("AlP") bonus that was tied to two 
things: (i) Company performance, measured by attaining corporate year-end goals; and, (ii) 
personal performance, measured by attaining individual year-end goals. The AlP program was 
designed 
to "put part of the participants' total compensation package at risk, based on the 
11 

achievement of one-year goals for both the participant and the corporation" with individual 
performance  driving the 
AlP payout each year, adjusted for corporate goal performance. The 
AlP bonus for a  given year's performance was paid out in the following fiscal year such that an 
AlP bonus for performance in 2006 was received in 2007. 
42. In his 2006 year-end report to the Board, Mudd noted that the Single Family 
business increased its market share, in part by entering new markets "especially Alt-A and 
subprime," that in response to filing the Company's 2004 Form 10-K, "the market and ratings 
agency reactions generally were 
positive-there were no big surprises," and that the Company's 
stock price improved by more than 20%. Mudd's 2006 taxable compensation was more than $6 
million with approximately $2.5 million from his 
AlP bonus. In 2007, Fannie Mae's corporate 
goals included growing revenue, which the Single Family business set about doing by increasing 
it~ book by 5.6% with a  plan to acquire more Alt-A and subprime loans. In 2007, Mudd's 
taxable compensation was more than $10. 
million-with $3.5 million from his AlP bonus alone. 
Mudd served as CEO for only eight full months in 2008, but his taxable compensation in 2008 
was $7.4 
million-with more than $2. 2  million from his AlP bonus based on his personal 
performance for 2007. 
43. Mudd was also well aware that investors were increasingly focused on subprime 
loans. In a  February 
6, 2007 memo to the Board of Directors of Fannie Mae, Mudd wrote that 
investors and analysts were "focused on our market share, subptime risk and our portfolio 
strategy." As CEO 
of Fannie Mae, Mudd routinely interacted with investors and the media. 
During the Relevant Period, as investors and the media increasingly focused their attention on 
the credit risks associated with subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans, Mudd made numerous false 
and misleading statements that downplayed the Company's exposure to such loans and provided 
12 


false assurance to the market that Fannie Mae was participating in a  safer segment of the 
mortgage market. Indeed, Mudd created the false perception that Fannie Mae's participation in 
high credit risk loans such as Alt-A and sUbprime was small and contained, and reinforced this 
false and misleading impression, telling investors thafFannie Mae was 
in the prime-not the 
subprime-market with a different; higher set 
of standards and underwriting. 
44. Mudd was knowledgeable about the mortgage markets. While CEO 
of Fannie 
Mae, Mudd made numerous appearances before Congress to testify about the mortgage markets, 
the role 
of the GSEs and the subprime market. In that setting, Mudd repeatedly minimized 
Fannie Mae's reported exposure, falsely claiming it was less than 2% 
ofthe Company's book or 
that Fannie Mae held about zero percent subprime. 
45. During the Relevant Period, Mudd received, reviewed and commented on (often 
in handwritten notes) multiple draft versions 
of each of Fannie Mae's periodic and other filings 
with the Commission. Prior to certification, Mudd 
met-seriatim-with officers ofthe Company 
who had provided sub-certifications to discuss issues presented by upcoming public filings. 
Also, as a  member 
of the Audit Committee at Fannie Mae and the Board of Directors, Mudd 
participated in final committee and board reviews 
of Fannie Mae's Forms lO-K and Forms 10-Q 
during the Relevant Period prior to certifying. 
Lund's Role at Fannie Mae and his Disclosure Responsibilities 
46. Lund served as an officer 
at Fannie Mae for fourteen years, from 1995 until his 
retirement 
in 2009, and was EVP of the Single Family business at Fannie Mae from 2005 
forward. Lund was a member 
of the Executive Committee and was the senior-most executive in 
charge of the Single Family business. He received and provided regular reports on the actual 
13 

volumes of Single Family subprime and reduced documentation loan acquisitions, the associated 
delinquency rates, and credit losses for all subprime-quality and reduced documentation loans. 
47. Lund received Single Family acquisition data on at least a monthly basis detailing 
acquisitions 
of reduced documentation and subprime-quality loans. As the senior executive in 
charge of the Single Family business, Lund was knowledgeable about Fannie Mae's loan 
acquisitions and the performance 
ofFannie Mae's high credit risk loan portfolio . 
.48. At Mudd's weekly direct reports meetings, Lund provided Single Family business 
overviews to the CEO and others. Lund also held weekly meetings with his direct reports. The 
SVP for the Western Business Office 
of Fannie Mae routinely updated Lund on that region's 
then-most significant customers: Countrywide, IndyMac and WAMV. 
49. Lund was also a member 
of Fannie Mae's Disclosure Committee, which oversaw 
the preparation 
of the Company's periodic (and other) filings with the Commission. During the 
Relevant Period, Lund was the only Single Family business executive that sat on Fannie Mae's 
Disclosure Committee and was, therefore, uniquely positioned to inform that Committee about 
the Single Family loan portfolio. Fannie Mae attendance records from the Relevant Period 
reflect that Lund routinely attended Disclosure Committee meetings. where  contemplated draft 
filings with the Commission were reviewed and issues discussed. 
50. During the Relevant Period, Lund also received and reviewed draft versions 
of 
Fannie Mae'speriodic and other filings with the Commission before they were publicly filed. 
While 
he knew the difference between the actual and the reported volumes of subprime and 
reduced documentation loans, Lund did not. ensure that investors were likewise informed. 
Instead, he sub-certified as to the accuracy 
of the Company's materially false and misleading 
14 


disclosures concerning its exposure to subprime and Alt-A loans, which were directly within his 
area 
ofknowledge and responsibility. 
51. During his tenure as 
EVP of the Single Family business, Lund oversaw Fannie 
Mae's 2006 market share growth, and, in part as a  result 
of its success and timely filing of the 
company's periodic reports, Lund's taxable compensation grew from $833,658 
in 2006 to $1.9 
million in 2007. 
52. Throughout the Relevant Period, in addition to wages earned, Lund received 
an 
AlP bonus tied to attaining corporate and personal goals. In 2006, Fannie Mae's corporate goals 
included filing its 2004 Form lO-K, hitting Single Family MBS issuance targets, increasing 
profitability 
in the Single Family business, and reintroducing the Company to investors. In 2006, 
owing to its 
Say Yes business strategy, the Single Family business exceeded its goal of increasing 
market share from 20% to 25.4%, and on a  corporate level, the Company grew its stock price 
more than 
20O/o---from just under $49 to over $60 per share. Lund's 2006 taxable compensation 
was $833,658 with $792,960 from his AlP bonus. By contrast, 
in 2005, Lund's wages totaled 
$497,285. This represented a 67% increase in compensation between 2005 and 2006. 
Dallavecchia's Role at Fannie Mae and his Disclosure Responsibilities 
53. Enrico Dallavecchia served as Fannie Mae's EVP and Chief Risk Officer from 
June 2006 through August 2008. In that position, Dallavecchia reported directly to Mudd and 
was responsible for credit, market, counterparty, and operational risk oversight for 
'all business 
units within Fannie Mae, which included measuring, reporting, and monitoring Fannie Mae's 
risk profile and formulating the Company's risk policies. As the senior-most executive 
in charge 
of credit risk, Dallavecchia received and provided regular reports on the actual volumes of 
15 


subprime and reduced documentation loan acquisitions, the associated delinquency rates, and 
credit losses for those loans at Fannie Mae. 
54. Dallavecchia was also a  member 
of Fannie Mae's Disclosure Committee, which 
oversaw the preparation 
of the Company's periodic (and other) filings with the Commission. 
During the Relevant Period, Dallavecchia was the only  executive from the Chief Risk Office 
who sat 
on Fannie Mae's Disclosure Committee. As CRO, Dallavecchia was uniquely 
positioned to recognize and inform others about the  overall credit risks presented by. Fannie 
Mae's loan portfolio. 
55. Fannie Mae attendance records from the Relevant Period 
refleCt that Dallavecchia 
routinely attended Disclosure Committee meetings where contemplated draft filings with the 
Commission were reviewed and issues discussed. Dallavecchia personally received 
and 
reviewed draft versions 
of Fannie Mae's periodic and other filings with the Commission. 
Dallavecchia sub-certified as to the accuracy 
of the Company's materially false and misleading· 
disclosures concerning its exposure to subprime and Alt-A loans, thereby substantially assisting 
the Company's fraud. 
56. Dallavecchia and the 
Single Family CRO team assisted 
in drafting the definition 
of subprime contained in the February 27, 2007, Form 12b-25 in which Fannie Mae first 
quantified its subprime exposure. 
57. Dallavecchia occasionally led the Board's Risk, Policy and Capital Committee 
meetings and attended Executive Committee meetings. In those roles, Dallavecchia received . 
information and data concerning Fannie Mae's total 
expmmre to reduced documentation and 
subprime loans. 
16 


58. As Fannie Mae's CRO, Dallavecchia had credit risk oversight for Fannie Mae's 
2006 market share growth, and, in part as a  result 
of its success and timely filing of the 
company's periodic reports, Dallavecchia's taxable compensation more than doubled from 
$617,886 for 7 months 
ofservice in 2006 to $2.68 million in 2007. 
59. Throughout the Relevant Period, in addition to wages earned, Dallavecchia 
received an AlP bonus tied to attaining corporate and personal goals. When Dallavecchia began 
as Fannie 
M~e's CRO, the then-Chairman ofthe Board ofDirectors noted in an address to Senior 
Management, "We have to 
think differently and creatively about risk ... Enrico Dallavecchia 
was not brought on-board to be a  business dampener." In 2006, Fannie Mae's corporate  goals 
included filing its 2004 Form 10-K, increasing its earnings per share, profitability, and subprime 
penetration while building a CRO function and implementing business unit risk officers. In his 
year-end 2006 self-assessment, Dallavecchia noted that the most significant achievement was his 
office playing a  role "from both a  risk perspective and also from a  business perspective." 
Dallavecchia further noted that his office "authored the Risk Section 
ofthe 2004 10-K." 
60. In 2007, Fannie Mae's corporate goals included growing revenue and timely 
periodic filings with the Commission. 
In addition to Fannie Mae meeting most of its 2007 
corporate goals with respect to growing revenue, Mudd's year-end 2007 review 
of Dalla vee chi a 
noted that he completed the build out 
of the CRO structure, developed risk limits and did good 
work on the Board Risk Policy and Capital Committee. Dallavecchia's 2007 taxable 
compensation was more 
tha.n $2.6 million with $1.04 million from his AlP bonus. 
61. One month prior to conservatorship, in August 2008, Dallavecchia was terminated 
as CRO. Accordingly, Dallavecchia served as CRO for only seven full months 
in 2008; his 2008 
taxable compensation was $2.3 million with $923,780 from his AlP bonus. 
17 

OVERVIEW OF FANNIE MAE LOAN PROGRAMS 

Fannie Mae's Reduced Documentation Loan Programs 
62. During the 1990s, Fannie Mae had limited market presence in Alt-A mortgage 
loans, which were not a large part 
ofmortgage originations nationwide. 
63. 
In July 1999, Fannie Mae and Countrywide Home Loans entered into an alliance 
agreement, which included a  reduced documentation loan program called the "internet loan," 
which was soon thereafter re-branded by Countrywide as the 
Fast and Easy loan. This loan 
program featured a streamlined documentation process, which allowed mortgage-loan applicants 
with a  qualifying FICO credit score to be preapproved for a  mortgage loan without providing 
documentation to verify income or assets. 
64. The Fast and Easy loan program was popular. Fannie Mae executives referred to 
it as Countrywide's "signature" or "flagship" mortgage product. By the mid-2000s, other 
. mortgage lenders developed similar reduced documentation loan programs such 	
as Mortgage 
Express and PaperS 
aver-many of which Fannie Mae acquired in ever-increasing volumes 
throughout the Relevant Period. 
65. Alt-A loans proliferated in the marketplace, and during the Relevant Period 
Fannie Mae's Single Family business pushed to increase its acquisitions 
of those Alt-A loans. 
By year-end 2006, 35% 
of Fannie Mae's Single Family loan acquisitions were Alt-A loans. By 
year-end 2007, that number increased to 37%, and 
by June 30, 2008, 26% of its Single Family 
loan acquisitions were Alt-A loans. 
Fannie Mae's Subprime Loan ProgramS 
66. Since the late 1990s, Fannie Mae acquired and guaranteed subprime mortgage 
loans described 
in Fannie Mae periodic filings during the Relevant Period as loans made to 
18 


"borrowers with weaker credit histories" or ''weaker credit profile [ s]" that "have a  higher 
likelihood 
of default than prime loans" as part of the Company's two primary programs for 
borrowers with weaker credit histories: Expanded ApprovallTimely Payment Rewards ("EA") 
and MyCommunityMortgage ("MCM"). 
67. The credit risks posed by these programs were well understood by senior 
management at Fannie Mae. Mudd was familiar with the EA and MCM loan programs and the 
credit risks those loan programs entailed. Throughout the Relevant Period all the Defendants 
received reports, briefings and presentations containing acquisition volume, Serious Delinquency 
Rates 
("SDQ Rates") and credit loss data with respect to Fannie Mae's EA and MCM loans. 
Throughout the Relevant Period, Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia knew that 
EA loans were-on 
average-the highest credit risk loans on Fannie Mae's book of business, and knew that EA 
loans contributed disproportionately to Fannie Mae's credit losses. 
68. Indeed, 
inMay 2001, Mudd wrote a memo to the then-CEO noting that EA loans 
"are the highest default risk loans we have ever done." 
69. Traditionally, Fannie Mae treated EA loans 
as part of its subprime exposure. For 
example, a  March 2002 Report prepared for the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban 
Development ("HUD") with the participation 
of Fannie Mae, entitled "Subprime Markets, the 
Role 
of GSEs and Risk-Based Pricing," stated under a  section entitled 'Agency Subprime 
Lending Products' 
that 
The agencies are increasing their presence in the subprime market by rolling-out 
new subprime mortgage products through updated versions 
of their automated 
underwriting systems. . Fannie Mae sellerlservicers now offer loan products to· 
three groups 
of credit-impaired borrowers under two new programs. Fannie 
Mae's Expanded Approval program allows lenders to approve borrowers who 
would have been formerly classified as 'Refer with Caution' ... by Fannie Mae's 
Desktop Underwriter (DU) 
.... The Expanded Approval products are recent 
innovations, and, according to Fannie Mae representatives, account 
for a 
19 


relatively small portion ofthat GSE's book ofbusiness ... At most, according to a 
Fannie Mae stock analyst, these subprime loan purchases will account for 
no 
more than five percent ofthat GSE's purchase volumes. (Emphasis added). 
70. Similarly, in its annual exam process 
in 2004 and 2005, Fannie Mae's then-
primary regulator, the Office 
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight's ("OFHEO") asked for 
information on Fannie Mae's total Single Family subprime loan exposure, specifically 
requesting: "[t]he volume 
of loans purchased in 2004 [and 2005] defined as CE structured 
subprime 
... or sub-prime as otherwise. defined." In March of 2005 and April of 2006, 
respectively, Fannie Mae responded by providing OFHEO with information on mortgage loan 
purchases and mortgage-backed securities under the EA program, describing the EA program as, 
"our most significant initiative to serve credit-impaired borrowers." 
71. Moreover, before December 2006, various internal Fannie Mae reports, including 
reports to the Board, identified subprime loans as including: 
(i) investor channel subprime loans 
acquired as part 
of its Subprime NBI; (ii) A-Deal loans that pre-date December 2005; and, (iii) 
EA loans. 
Fannie Mae Excluded EA and MCM Loansfrom its Sub prime Disclosure 
72. When Fannie Mae first reported its quantitative exposure to subprime loans in a 
filing with the Commission on February 27, 2007, the Company broadly defined subprime 
as 
loans to "borrowers with weaker credit histories." EA and MCM loans fell squarely within this 
definition, but were not included 
in the accompanying quantification of Fannie Mae's subprime 
exposure. 
73. Instead, the quantification consisted primarily 
of private label securities it  held 
that were marketed as being backed by subprime loans, certain "A-" loans that the company 
acquired prior to 2005, and certain loans that had been acquired through a  limited new business 
20 

initiative beginning in 2006.. Fannie Mae's subprime quantification did not include significant 
numbers 
of other loans that fell within its published subprime definition of loans to "borrowers 
with weaker credit histories." 
74. Throughout the Relevant Period, EA loans had, on average, higher SDQ rates 
than the loans Faimie Mae used in calculating its disclosed subprime exposure. Senior 
management at Fannie Mae, including the Defendants, were aware 
of this fact, as SDQ rates 
were tracked and regularly included in reports and other internal presentations. For example, in 
a meeting 
ofthe Risk Policy and Capital Committee ("RPCC") ofFannie Mae's Board, the CRO 
reported that as 
of July 2007 Fannie Mae's SDQ rates for EA were 5.57% (the highest on its 
book); by contrast, the SDQ rate 
ofits disclosed subprime loans were 4.95 %. 
75. Throughout the Relevant Period, the credit risk associated with Fannie Mae's EA 
and MCM acquisitions was reported to and tracked by senior management, including 
Defendants, in terms 
of acquisition volume, delinquencies, and credit losses-alongside those 
loans that were included when quantifying its disclosed "subprime" exposure in its public filings, 
EA and MCM loans were routinely included in reports tracking Fannie Mae's high risk loan 
products (which ranged from three to five or more loan types during the Relevant Period) that 
were received by the Defendants. 
76. Also during the Relevant Period, senior executives, including the Defendants, 
were provided with credit loss data that showed that the greatest amount 
of credit losses 
attributable to 
anyone loan type or product on Fannie Mae's Single Family book were 
attributable to the EA product. F or instance, in an October 26, 2007, Disclosure Committee 
report, it  is  noted that EA loans were responsible for $188.9 million in losses and MCM loans 
21 


were responsible for $16 million in losses--compared to $5.5 million in losses for the loan 
population Fannie Mae disclosed as its subprime exposure. 
77. As a  portion 
of Fannie Mae's book of business, EA loans increased in volume 
between 2006 and 2008 from $43.3 billion to $58.3 billion, totaling approximately 
2% of the 
company's book 
of business during the Relevant Period. MCM loans, which were intended for 
low-to-moderate income borrowers, accounted for between 0.3% and 1.5% of Fannie Mae's 
book 
of business over the same period. None of these loans were included in Fannie Mae's 
calculation 
of its publicly disclosed subprime exposure. 
FANNIE MAE'S DISCLOSURES 
Overview 
78. Since 2003 in its annual Form lO-K filings, Fannie Mae included a table of credit 
risk characteristics for Single Family loans ("Credit 
Risk Tables"). Those Credit Risk Tables 
contain  information describing risk characteristics such as original LTV, Product Type, Property 
Type, Occupancy Type,FICO Credit Score bands, Loan Purpose, Geographic Concentration, 
, 
and Origination Year. The tables did not include any statement or representation as to whether 
Fannie Mae held subprime and Alt-A loans. 
79. During the Relevant Period, Fannie Mae also provided narrative disclosures 
in its 
periodic filings concerning the company's expectation 
of credit losses, delinquencies, market 
environment and economic factors that could  impact the company's business. These narrative 
disclosures repeatedly contained materially false and misleading statements and representations 
regarding Fannie Mae's Alt-A and subprime exposure. 
80. During part 
of the Relevant Period, Fannie Mae also filed supplemental Form 8­
Ks filed simultaneously with various Forms 10-K and Forms lO-Q that contained credit 
characteristic information concerning its Single Family book 
of business, along with a purported 
22 

tabular description of Fannie Mae's subprime and Alt-A holdings. None of the information 
contained in those supplement Form8-Ks provided investors with an accurate description 
ofthe 
Company's subprime or Alt-A holdings. Although Fannie Mae claimed to provide additional 
information to investors, labeling a  portion 
of loans "subprime" and "A It-A" in a  disclosure 
table, those tables included only a  fraction 
of the loans that met Fannie Mae's own public 
definition 
of "subprime" or "Alt-A" in the quantification under each category. These 
supplemental disclosures deliberately gave investors false comfort thatthe Company's exposure 
to subprime and Alt-A loans was dramatically smaller than 
it, in fact, was. 
Fannie Mae's Initial Quantification ofSubprime Exposure Was Falseand Misleading 
81. By February 2007, following S&P's downgrade of high-profile subprime lender, 
New Century Financial Corporation, and other indicia 
of subprime market turmoil-including 
HSBC HoldingsPLC's announcement that the 
u.s. subprime market was unstable-investors 
were increasingly focused on subprime loans and the risks associated with these loans. 
82. In a  February 6, 2007 memo to the Board of Directors of Fannie Mae, Mudd 
wrote that investors and analysts were "focused on our market share, subprime risk and our 
portfolio strategy." With this backdrop, Fannie Mae's Disclosure Committee, which included 
Lund and Dallavecchia as members, decided to include a quantitative disclosure 
ofFannie Mae's 
exposure to subprime loans in the Company's public filings. 
83. According to an internal e-mail sent to both Lund and Dallavecchia, "Enrico 
[Dallavechia]'s team has been tasked with developing a  definition 
of 'sub-prime,' as well as 
providing the numbers for the 12b-25." 
23 


84. On February 23, 2007 in a call with investors Mudd stated: "Subprime mortgages 
are those offered to borrowers with damaged credit" and Fannie Mae's "subprime investment 
constitutes well below 2 percent 
of our book." 
85. Four days later on February 27, 2007, 
in a Form 12b-25 filing with the 
Commission, the Company disclosed the following regarding Fannie Mae's subprime exposure: 
Although there is no uniform definition for sub-prime . .. loans across the 
mortgage industry... sub-prime loans typically are made to borrowers with 
weaker credit histories 
... We estimate that approximately 0.2% of our single­
family mortgage credit book 
of business as of December 3J, 2006 consisted of 
sub-prime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS backed by sub-prime 
mortgage loans 
... We estimate that approximately 2% of our single-family 
mortgage credit book 
of business as of December 31, 2006 consisted of private­
label mortgage-related securities backed by sub-prime mortgage loans and, to a 
lesser extent, resecuritizations 
of private-label mortgage-related securities backed 
by sub-prime mortgage loans. (Emphasis added.) 
86. The percentage 
of subprime loans disclosed by Fannie Mae did not include a 
material number 
of subprime-quality loans in the Fannie Mae Single Family mortgage credit 
book 
of business as ofDecember 31, 2006, made to "borrowers with weaker credit histories." In 
particular, the percentage of sub prime loans disclosed by Fannie Mae did not include the EA and 
MCM loans, which were the very types 
of loans that investors (and analysts) believed were the 
company's primary subprime exposure. 
87. Fannie Mae's exposure to EA loans 
in its Single Family mortgage credit book of 
business was approximately $43.3 billion as of December 31, 2006-approximately 10 times 
greater than the 0.2% ($4.8 billion) disclosed as "sub-prime mortgage loans or structured Fannie 
Mae MBS back by subprime loans" 
as ofDecember 31; 2006. 
88. The February 27,2007, disclosure falsely stated that Fannie Mae's total exposure 
to loans made to borrowers with weaker credit histories (subprime) was 2.2% 
of its total 
24 

mortgage credit book of business, when in fact its exposure was at least 4.64% (as of December 
31,2006). 
89. Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors that it  held a  much 
larger volume ofloans that matched the Company's description 
of subprime loans but were not 
included 
in the reported subprime number. 
90. Although Fannie Mae excluded EA from its subprime reporting, Fannie Mae's 
EA loans had, on average throughout the Relevant Period, SDQ rates higher than those loans 
Fannie Mae actually included in calculating its disclosed exposure to subprime loans. As 
of 
January 2007, EA loans had an SDQ rate of 5.69%; disclosed Subprime loans (as-quantified in 
Fannie Mae's filings) had an SDQ rate of4.82%. 
91. EA and MCM loans accounted for a  higher percentage 
of Single Family credit 
losses (20.4%) at year-end 2006 than loans Fannie reported as its subprime exposure, which at 
the time were responsible for no credit losses. 
92. Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia each reviewed and approved the February 27, 
2007, Form 12b-25 statement before it  was released by the Company, knowing its quantified 
subprime disclosure excluded EA and MCM loans. 
Dallavecchia's False and Misleading Statement 
93. That same day, February 27; 2007, Dallavecchia spoke directly to investors on a 
conference call and explained: 
In our filing today, we also indicate that we have increased our participation 
in 
subprime product in 2006. Our purchases have been prudent and have been made 
when 
we concluded that they would contribute to our mission objectives or they 
would general a  profitable return. Given our view 
of the subprime market 
generally, let me offers [sic] some insight into our approach to this segment and 
the exposure to the risk. The first point, as per our filing, 
is that our exposure is 
modest. Approximately 0.2% of our single-family credit book of business 
consisted 
of subprime loans or Fannie Mae MBS backed by subprime loans ... to 
25 


conclude my thoughts on credit risk, I  anticipate our credit losses will trend 
upward 
as a result of the general softening· of the housing market ... At the same 
time, I would advise that you consider our exposure 
in. light of the strength of the 
risk characteristics I have described and the immaterial size 
of our participation in 
the subprime market. (Emphasis added.) . 
94. Despite  knowledge that the Company had exposure to approximately $43.3 
billion worth 
ofEAloans and $13.8 billion in MCM loans as of December 31,2006, which fell 
squarely within Fannie Mae's publicly stated definition 
of subprime, Dallavecchia falsely 
represented that only "0.2% 
of [Fannie Mae's] Single Family credit book of business consisted 
of subprime loans," 
95. Moreover, Dallavecchia further misled investors regarding Fannie Mae's 
subprime exposure by emphasizing that Fannie Mae's subprime was "modest," "prudent" and 
"immaterial." He gave the public these assurances knowing Fannie Mae's exposure to EA loans 
was at least ten times greater than 
"0.2% of [Fannie Mae's] single-family credit book of 
business." His purpose was clear. As Dallavecchia explained in an internal email on February 
23,2007, in preparing for the investor call, "I 
am trying to say that if you look at our guarantee 
book 
of business we have an insignificant exposure in subprime loans." 
Mudd's False and Misleading Testimony Before Congress 
96. On March 15, 2007, Mudd appeared before the House Financial Services 
Committee and gave testimony 
in a  hearing on Legislative Proposals on GSE Reform. Mudd 
was asked: "And you have not engaged in the subprime market. You hadn't gone there to a great 
extent is that right?" In response, Mudd testified: 
The answer for Fannie Mae on behalf 
of subprime is that it's important to 
remember there 
is subprime and there is predatory. Subprime simply means ... 
that you have a credit blemish, and we think those people are part of the market. 
It's less than 2 percent of our book. It's 80 percent insured. It's highly 
subordinated. We've been 
in it  very carefully, consistent with some very strong 
anti-predatory lending guidelines 
we have. 
26 

97. At the time that Mudd gave this testimony, he knew that Fannie Mae EA loans 
were designed 
to provide loans to borrowers with weaker credit histories, i.e., "credit 
blemish[ed]" borrowers, and that the quantification 
of Fannie Mae's subprime holding as "less 
than 2 percent 
of our book" did not include EA or MCM loans. The following month, on April 
17, 2007, Mudd again appeared before the Committee on Financial Services to provide 
testimony 
in a  hearing on solutions to the subprime market turmoil. Mudd again testified: 
'''Subprime' is, after all, simply the description 
of a borrower who doesn't have perfect credit." 
He provided a broad description of Fannie Mae's efforts to reach "borrower[s] who do[n't] have 
perfect credit": 
We see it as part of our mission and our charter to make safe mortgages available 
to people who don't have perfect credit. In the past several years, for example, we 
have designed mortgage options to give borrowers with blemished credit access to 
high-quality, low-cost, non-predatory loans. 
We also set conservative 
underwriting standards for loans we finance to ensure the homebuyers can afford 
their loans over the long term .  .  . we continued our careful entry into the 
subprime market, by and large supporting lenders, products and practices that met 
our standards, and which helped 
us meet our HUD affordable housing 
requirements. 
98. Having broadly defined "subprime" and described Fannie Mae's outreach to the 
market for borrowers without perfect credit, Mudd testified as to the amount 
of subprime held by 
Fannie Mae: "Today, our exposure remains relatively minimal -   less than 2.5 percent of our 
book 
ofbusiness can be defined as subprime." 
99. Mudd knew EA loans were loans specifically designed for "people who don't 
have perfect 
credit" -his own definition for subprime-and that the 2.5 percent figure he used 
did not include billions 
of dollars ofEA and MCM loans. As such, his statement was knowingly 
false and misleading when made. . 
Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Sub prime Disclosures in its 2005 10-K Filing 
27 

100. In May 2007, Fannie Mae filed its 2005 Form lO-K, in which it  supplemented its 
prior public definition 
of subprime. In addition to asserting that "subprime" generally refers to 
loans made to borrowers ''with a  weaker credit profile" and "borrowers [who] have a  higher 
likelihood 
of default," Fannie Mae now disclosed that it classified loans as subprime if the loans 
were originated from a specialty subprime lender. 
101. 
On May 
2, 2007, Fannie Mae filed its 2005 Form 10-K and stated: 
"Sub prime mortgage" generally refers to a  mortgage loan made to a  borrower 
with a  weaker credit profile than that 
of a  prime borrower. As a  result of the 
weaker credit profile, sUbprime borrowers have a higher likelihood of default than 
prime borrowers. Subprime mortgage loans are often originated by lenders 
specializing in this type 
of business, using processes unique to subprime loans. In 
reporting our subprime exposure, we have classified mortgage loans as subprime 
if the mortgage loans are originated by one of these specialty lenders or, for the 
original or resecuritized private-label, mortgage-related securities that we hold 
in 
our· portfolio, if the securities were labeled as subprime when sold ...We also 
estimate that subprime loans represented approximately 2.2% 
of our single-family 
mortgage credit book 
of business as of. December 31, 2006, of wh,ich 
approximately 0.2% consisted of subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie 
Mae MBS backed by subprime mortgage loans and approximately 2% consisted 
of private-label mortgage-related  securities backed by subprime mortgage loans 
and, to a lesser extent, resecuritizations 
of private-label mortgage-related 
securities backed by subprime mortgage loans. 
102. Fannie Mae's reporting 
of its subprime exposure omitted approximately $43.3 
billion worth 
of EA loans and $13.8 billion in MCM loans in Fannie Mae's Single Family 
mortgage credit 
book. of business as ofDecember31, 2006--approximately 12 times greater than 
the 0.2% 
($4.,8 billion) disclosed as "subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS 
back by subprime loans" as 
ofDecember 31, 2006. 
103. Nothing 
in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors that this much larger 
volume ofloans matched the Company's description of subprime loans but were not included in 
the reported quantitative number. 
28 

104. In addition, while Fannie Mae stated that it  classified loans as subprime if those 
loans were originated by specialty subprime lenders, that statement was materially false and 
misleading as well. Since 1993, the 
U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development 
("BUD") posted a  publicly available BUD Subprime Lender list based on loan data and 
interviews with lenders themselves. Companies 
in the mortgage industry rely on the BUD 
Subprime Lender .list as a proxy for identifying subprime lenders. Internal Fannie Mae 
documents reflect that its personnel, including Lund, were aware 
of the BUD Subprime Lender 
list as 
an accepted source for subprime-lender identification. During the Relevant Period, the 
BUD Subprime Lender list included approximately 
210 lenders. 
105. The Company failed to disclose,however, that, when calculating Fannie Mae's 
subprime exposure, only certain loans that had been originated by 
15 lenders were included. 
Fannie Mae purchased and guaranteed loans from many other lenders on the 
HUD list, but they 
were not included when calculating the Company's subprime exposure. Fannie Mae disclosed 
neither that it  was restricting its definition 
of "specialty lender" to 15 lenders on the. HUD list, 
nor the names 
of those lenders on the HUD list that it included in its calculations. In fact, Fannie 
Mae acquired loans from many other specialty lenders on the HUD Subprime Lender list, and 
EA loans were originated by lenders on the HUD list. 
'106. Although EA was left out ofFannie Mae's subprime reporting, it was well-known 
within Fannie Mae that EA was generally considered subprime 
in the marketplace. For example, 
on April 5, 2007, the SVP of business and strategic development sent an email to a  group of 
Fannie Mae executives including Lund and Dallavecchia, stating "mcm and ea are much deeper 
risks that we take and many (if not all) in the market call EA subprime. They are growing very 
29 


fast." Within a  month, Fannie Mae filed its next public statement concerning its subprime 
exposure, and again omitted its exposure to EA and MCM loans. 
107. On May 
9, 2007, Fannie Mae filed a  Form 12b-25 with the Commission, which 
repeated the disclosure contained 
in the May 2, 2007 filing. 
108. As it  had previously, Fannie Mae's reporting 
of itssubprime disclosure in this 
May 
9, 2007 filing omitted approximately $43.3 billion worth of EA loans and $13.8 billion in 
MCM loans in Fannie Mae's Single Family rriortgage credit book of business as ofDecember 31, 
2006. That undisclosed subprime exposure was approximately 
12 times greater than the 0.2% 
($4.8 billion) disclosed 
as "subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS back by 
subprime loans" as 
ofDecember 31, 2006. 
109. Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia had each reviewed and approved the Form 12b-25 
dated May 9 2007 that was released by the Company. 
Fannie 
Mae's False and Misleading Subprime Disclosures/or Year-End 2006 
110. 
In early August 2007, as Fannie Mae prepared a draft Form 8-K Credit 
Supplement to be filed simultaneous with its upcoming 2006 Form lO-K, Mudd personally 
requested additional basic data concerning the Company's credit book in a  draft version 
of the 
Form 8-K. The additional data Mudd received from the CRO office on August 
5, 2007, 
included details on the total volume 
of EA, MCM, disclosed subprime, and Alt-A loans Fannie 
Mae had on its book 
of business. This draft included SDQ data that clearly showed EA loans 
had a higher rate 
of delinquency (5.38%) than the Company's disclosed subprime loans (4.8%). 
111. The data provided to Mudd also included data on FICO scores that demonstrated 
that the credit quality 
ofEA loans was worse than the credit quality ofthe loans that Fannie Mae 
disclosed as its subprime exposure. Specifically, the document disclosed that 53% 
of EA loans 
30 

had FICO scores below 620; whereas 47% ofFannie Mae's disclosed subprime had FICO scores 
below 620. Further, 26% 
of EA had FICO scores below 580 while 23% of disclosed subprime 
loans had FICO scores that low. 
112. On August 3, 2007, as members of the Disclosure Committee, Dallavecchia and 
Lund both received the same draft credit supplement sent to Mudd. This information concerning 
EA and MCM was not ultimately made public. 
113. Fannie Mae issued its 2006 Form 
lO-K less than two weeks after each of the 
defendants received the draft 8-K disclosure comparing EA and disclosed subprime, and 
documenting that EA loans had a  higher serious delinquency rate than disclosed subprime and 
that EA loans had a  weaker credit profile than disclosed subprime.. The public filing again 
defined "subprime" as "loans to borrowers with riskier credit profiles." Nevertheless, EA and 
MCM loans were not included when quantifying Fannie Mae's subprime exposure; nor was it 
disclosed that there were "loans to borrowers with riskier  credit profiles" that were excluded 
from Fannie Mae's subprime reporting. 
114. 
On August 16,2007 Fannie Mae filed its 2006 Form 10-K and stated: 
In recent years, we have increased our acquisitions 
of loans to borrowers with 
riskier credit profiles, referred to as subprime loans by the industry. Subprime 
mortgage loans that we acquire are generally originated by lenders specializing 
in 
this type of business, using processes unique to subprime loans. Based on data 
published by National Mortgage News and our internal economic analysis 
ofthe 
mortgage market, subprime mortgage loan originations have increased sharply in 
recent years, rising to a  record high of approximately 24% of single-family 
mortgage loan originations in the first quarter 
of 2006 ... Our acquisitions of 
subprime mortgage loans have been significantly less than the overall market's 
share. 
We estimate that approximately 0.2% of our total single-family mortgage 
credit book 
of business as of December 31, 2006 consisted of subprime mortgage 
loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS backed by subprime mortgage loans. 
We 
have also invested in highly rated private-label mortgage-related securities that 
are backed by 
... subprime mortgage loans ... We estimate that ... private-label 
mortgage-related securities backed by subprime mortgage loans, including 
31 

resecuritizations, accounted for approximately ... 2% ... of our single-family 
mortgage credit book 
ofbusiness as ofJune 30, 2007. 
115. Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage  credit book 
of business consisted of 
approximately $43.3 billion worth of EA loans and $13.8 billion worth of MCM loans as of 
December 31, 2006 .,-more than 12 times greater than the 0.2% ($4.8 billion) disclosed as 
"subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS back by subprime loans" 
as of 
December 31, 2006. 
116. Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors that this much larger 
volume 
of loans matched the Company's description of subprime loans but were not included in 
the reported quantitative number. 
117. Mudd certified and Lund and Dallavecchia each sub-certified the 
2006 Form 10­
K even though they knew that the statements regarding the Company's subprime exposure were 
materially misleading. 
Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Subprime Disclosures for First, Second and Third 
Quarters 
of2007 
118. In preparing to review the upcoming Fannie Mae filing, a Disclosure Committee 
Analytical Report was sent on October 26, 2007, to several individuals, including Mudd, 
Dallavecchia and Lund. The report presented data 
on Single Family's "[h]igher risk products," 
including EA, MCM, and disclosed subprime. The data documented that, 
in the two periods 
addressed 
in the document, year-to-date as of September 2006 and year-to-date as of September 
2007, Fannie Mae's credit losses from EA and MCM far outweighed losses compared to the 
loans reported as the company's subprime exposure. As 
of September 2006, Fannie Mae had 
$80.6 million 
in losses from EA and $1.7 million in losses from MCM, compared to no losses 
from loans disclosed 
as subprime. As of September 2007, Fannie Mae had $188.9 million in 
32 


losses fromEA, and $16 million in losses from MCM, compared to $5.5 million in losses from 
loans disclosed as subprime. Fannie Mae's credit losses 
from EA in 2006 and 2007 were 
overwhelmingly greater than any losses it experienced related to·its disclosed subprime holdings 
during the same period. A key observation in the Report showed that the Company's highest risk 
products (which included EA and 
MCM loans) "comprise less than 15% 
of the S[ingle] F[amily] 
book but accounted for 57% 
ofthe $440MM" increase in credit losses. 
119. Within two weeks, on November 
9, 2007, Fannie Mae filed its Forms lO-Q for 
the first, second and third quarters 
of 2007. Even though each of the Defendants knew that EA 
and MCM loans fit Fannie Mae's public definition 
of subprime loans and were a source of credit 
losses far greater than losses triggered by the loans that were disclosed as subprime, EA or MCM 
loans were not included in the quantification 
ofsub prime. The Company stated in its first quarter 
Form 10-Q: 
A subprime mortgage loan generally refers to a mortgage loan made to a borrower 
with a  weaker credit profile than that 
of a  prime borrower. As a  result of the 
weaker credit profile, subprime borrowers have a higher likelihood 
of default than 
prime borrowers. Subprime mortgage loans are typically originated by lenders 
specializing 
in this type of business or by subprime divisions of large lenders; 
using processes unique to subprime loans. In reporting our subprime exposure, we 
have classified mortgage loans as subprime 
if the mortgage loans are originated 
by one 
of these specialty lenders or a  subprime division of a  large lender. ... 
Approximately 0.2% 
of our total single-family mortgage credit book of business 
as 
of March 31, 2007 consisted of subprime mortgage loans or Fannie Mae MBS 
backed by subprime mortgage loans. This percentage increased to approximately 
0.3% as 
of September 30, 2007. Less than 1% of our single-family business 
volume for the nine months ended September 30, 2007 consisted 
of subprime 
mortgage loans or Fannie Mae MBS backed by 
sUbprime mortgage loans. 
(Emphasis added.) 
120. The Company's subprime disclosures 
in its second and third quarter Forms lO-Q 
were comparable. 
33 

121. The quantified subprime exposure omitted at least $43 billion worth ofEA loans 
that were part 
of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business and $17.6 billion 
in MCM loans as of March 31, 2007-approximately 12 times greater than the 0.2% ($4.8 
billion) disclosed as "subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS back by subprime 
'loans" as 
ofMarch 31, 2007. 
122. Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors to this much larger 
volume 
of loans that matched the Company's description of subprime "loans but were" not 
included in the reported subprime exposure. 
123. The November 
9, 2007, Form 10-Q filings supplemented its prior public 
definition 
of subprime. In addition to stating that it classified "mortgage loans as subprime ifthe 
mortgage loans are originated by one 
of these specialty lenders," it also stated that it  classified 
loans as subprime 
ifthe loans are originated by "a subprime division of a large lender." 
124. This statement in the November 9, 2007 Form 10-Q was false. In reality, Fannie 
Mae never tracked loans from the subprime divisions 
of large lenders and, accordingly, the 
Company never included any 
ofthose subprime loans in its reported subprime exposure-despite 
its explicit claim that 
it did so. 
125. Since 
at least 2003, Mudd was aware that subprime divisions of major lenders 
were originating and selling EA loans to Fannie Mae. Nevertheless, the Company  never 
included any EA loans in its subprime reporting. 
126. In February 2007, Mudd traveled to meet with Fannie Mae's then-largest 
customer, Countrywide. At the meeting, Mudd was briefed by the President and COO 
of 
Countrywide Home Loans about the volume of loans Fannie Mae acquired from that customer's 
subprime lending division (Full Spectrum Lending), which between 2004 and 2006 totaled 
34 

$14.23 billion worth of loans. The presentation explicitly referred to Countrywide's subprime 
lending division customers 
as subprime "Fallen Angels." 
127. 
In the Relevant Period alone, Fannie Mae acquired loans totaling approximately 
$28.5 billion from Countrywide's subprime 
division-the subprime division ofa large lender. 
That number is  far greater than the amount 
of "sub-prime mortgage loans or structured Fannie 
Mae MBS back by subprime mortgage loans" that Fannie Mae publicly disclosed to investors at 
any point during the Relevant Period. 
128. Disclosing loans acquired from Countrywide's subprime division alone would 
have more than doubled the disclosed subprime exposure 
in Fannie Mae's Single Family 
guarantee portfolio. However, those loans were not included in the Company's reported 
subprime exposure. 
129. During the Relevant Period, Fannie Mae purchased or securitized loans from 
subprime divisions 
of other large lenders including Citigroup, JPMorgan and GMAC. 
130. Lund's direct reports knew and informed him that subprime divisions 
of large 
lenders sold loans to Fannie 
Mae-including Citi's Argent/Ameriquest, Countrywide'S Full 
Spectrum Lending, and First Franklin's Flagstar bank. 
131. On November 
9, 2007, for the quarter ended September 30, 2007, Fannie Mae 
alSo filed a "credit supplement" on Form 8-K with the Commission. The document contained a 
summary description 
of certain credit risk characteristics of its Single Family book of business in 
chart form. Included in this chart were separate columns identifying Fannie Mae's subprime 
holdings and designating that 0.3% 
of its Single Family holdings were subprime loans. This 
supplemental disclosure did not inform investors 
of the additional subprime exposure from EA 
and MCM loans, or loans originated by the subprime divisions 
of large lenders. Fannie Mae 
35 


continued to issue credit supplements that were, similarly false and misleading throughout the 
Relevant Period. 
Mudd's False and Misleading Subprime Statements to the Media 
132. On December 2, 2007, Mudd spoke about Fannie Mae's subprime holdings in a 
newspaper interview published 
in the San Francisco Gate. 
Q: We know you very well for the fact that you have well-underwritten loans, 
fully amortizing, and that you either keep these loans in portfolio or guarantee 
them. So how are you having involvement with these subprime loans at all? 
A: I'll give you two pieces to understand it. The notion that there is  a delineation 
between a  lower prime loan and a  high subprime loan are incorrect. There's a 
FICO score, there's an LTV (loan to value) and a  bunch 
of other factors. We 
have about 2 percent of our broker's business in total that meets our definition of 
what would be a  subprime loan, not a  predatory loan, but typically a  loan to an 
individual that has had a  credit blemish in the past. We made a  decision a 
few 
years ago that there were lots of creditworthy individuals who had a  credit 
blemish which would have previously either disqualified them from a prime loan, 
or condemn them to a subprime lender. They were probably eligible for what we 
call affordability product. So we have about 2  percent 
of that business on our " 
books, and that is how our involvement happened. 
133. Mudd made these claims when he knew they were false and misleading. At the 
time that he made this statement, Mudd knew that the "2 percent" figure did not include billions 
of dollars in EA or MCM loans held by Fannie Mae. Mudd also knew that those undisclosed 
loans were specifically designed for "credit blemish[ed]" borrowers and that the figure could not 
reflect loans originated by the subprime division 
of large lenders, which by then the Company 
claimed to include in its reported subprime exposure. 
Fannie 
Mae's False andMisleading Subprime Disclosures/or Year-End 2007 
134. In February 27, 2008, Fannie Mae issued its 2007 Form lO-K, which was 
identical to prior disclosures but further included the following statement: 
Subprime mortgage loans, whether held in our portfolio or backing Fannie Mae 
MBS, represented less than 1% 
of our single-family business volume in each of 
2007, 2006 and 200S.We estimate that subprime mortgage loans held in our 
36 

portfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae MBS, excluding 
resecuritized private-label mortgage-related securities backed by subprime 
mortgage loans, represented approximately 0.3% 
of our total single-family 
mortgage credit book 
of business as of December 31,2007, compared with 0.2% 
and 0.1% 
asofDecember 31,2006 and 2005, respectively. 
135. Approximately $55.6 billion worth 
of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage 
credit book 
of business consisted of EA loans as of December 31, 2007, and $38.8 billion in 
MCM loans-approximately 11 times greater than the 0.3% ($8.3 billion) disclosed as "sub­
prime mortgage loans 
held in our portfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae 
MBS" as 
ofDecember 31,2007. 
136. Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors that this much larger 
volume 
of loans matched the Company's description of subprime loans but were not included in 
the reported quantitative number. 
137. As 
of January 31, 2008, the serious delinquency rate of EA was 7.14%­
performance that was worse than the disclosed subprime serious delinquency rate of 6.21 % for 
the same period. By February 2008, it  was clear from reports provided to all three defendants 
that credit losses from EA loans were "disproportionate to the amount 
of the book they 
constitute." 
Fannie Mae's False and Misleadingjirst and second quarter 2008jilings 
138. On May 6, 2008, Fannie Mae filed its Form 10-Q first quarter 2008 and stated: 
Subprime mortgage loans, whether held in our portfolio or backing Fannie Mae 
MBS represented less 
them 1 % of our single-family business volume for the first 
quarter 
of 2008 and 2007. We estimate that subprime mortgage loans held in our 
portfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae MBS, excluding 
private-label mortgage-related securities backed by subprime mortgage loans, 
represented approximately 0.3% 
of our total single-family mortgage credit book 
of business as of both March 31, 2008 and December 31, 2007. (Emphasis 
added.) 
37 

139. Approximately $101 billion worth ofFannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit 
book 
of business of March 31, 2008, consisted of undisclosed loans that fell within the 
company's description 
of subprime, and approximately $94.4 billion worth of Fannie Mae's 
Single Family mortgage credit book 
of business consisted of undisclosed loans as of December 
31, 2007-approximately 
12 times greater than the 0.3% ($8 billion as of March 31, 2008 and 
$8.3 billion as 
of December 31, 2007) disclosed as "subprime mortgage loans  held in our 
portfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae MBS" as 
ofDecember 31,2007. 
140. Nothing 
in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors that this much larger 
volume 
of loans matched the Company's description of subprime loans, but were not included in 
the reported quantitative number. 
141. By July 2008, Dallavecchia was emailing Mudd directly to highlight that EA and 
MCM were generating approximately 20% 
ofthe Company's credit losses. 
142. As 
of the beginning of August 2008, EA and MCM were classified in internal 
Fannie Mae documents as two 
of Fannie Mae's top three highest-risk loan products and Fannie 
Mae made plans to eliminate the EA loan program as part 
of an attempt to improve the overall 
credit quality 
of its Single Family book of business. 
143. This was not disclosed. Instead, on August 
8, 2008, Fannie Mae filed its Form 
10-Q for the second quarter 2008 and explained: 
Subprime mortgage loans, whether held in our portfolio or backing Fannie Mae 
MBS represented less than 1 % 
of our single-family business volume for the first 
six months 
of 2008 and 2007. We estimate that subprime mortgage loans held in 
our portfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae MBS, excluding 
resecuritized private-label mortgage-related securities backed by subprime 
mortgage loans, represented approximately 0.3% 
of our total single-family 
mortgage credit book 
of business as of both June 30, 2008 and December 31, 
2007. 
38 

144. Approximately $60 billion worth of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit 
book 
of business consisted of EA loans and $41.7 billion in MCM loans as of June 30, 2008­
approximately 12 times greater than the 0.3% ($8 billion) disclosed as "subprime mortgage loans 
held 
in our porrfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae MBS" as of both June 30, 
2008 and December 31, 2007. 
145~ Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors to the fact this much 
larger volume 
of loans matched the Company's description of subprime loans but were not 
included in the reported quantitative number. 
Mudd Publicly Declares that Fannie Mae has Zero Subprime 
146. 
On August 20, 2008, Mudd falsely stated in a  radio interview: Fannie Mae has 
"about zero percent".exposure to subprime loans, and "[s]ubprime to Fannie Mae means a  loan 
to a  borrower that has had a  credit problem in the past." When Mudd made this statement, 
he 
knew that Fannie Mae had substantial exposure to loans made to borrowers who have had a 
credit problem 
in the past. 
Post-conservatorship Fannie 
Mae Acknowledges 

Additional 
Subprime Holdings 

147. After Fannie Mae had been placed into conservatorship on September 
6, 2008, the 
Company made a  disclosure that highlights the misleading nature 
of the Company's prior 
subprime reports. At the time this disclosure was made, neither Mudd nor Dallavecchia were at 
Fannie Mae and Lund, who remained EVP 
ofthe Single Family business until June 2009, was no 
. longer a member ofthe Disclosure Committee. 
148. 
On November 10,2008, Fannie Mae filed its Form 10-Q for the third quarter and 
stated: 
39 

We have classified mortgage loans as subprime if the mortgage loan is  originated 
by a  lender specializing in subprime business or by subprime divisions of large 
lenders. We apply these classification criteria in order to determine our ... 
subprime loan exposures; however, we have other loans with some features that 
are similar to 
... subprime loans that we have not classified as ... subprime 
because they do not meet our classification criteria. (Emphasis added). 
149. In this statement, for the first time the Company publicly acknowledged what 
Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia had known throughout the Relevant Period; namely, that Fannie 
Mae held loans squarely within the public definition 
of subprime that it  had not included in 
calculating its publicly disclosed exposure to subprime loans. 
150. Based on the facts alleged above, Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia, knew or were 
reckless 
in not knowing that Fannie Mae's statements disclosing its subprime holdings, and as to 
Mudd and Dallavecchia, their respective statements regarding Fannie Mae's subprime holdings, 
were false and misleading. 
FANNIE 
MAE'S ALT-A DISCLOSURE FRAUD 
Fannie Mae Increases Market Share By Acquiring Reduced Documentation Alt-A Loans 
151. F annie Mae acquired increasing amounts of reduced documentation loans. Prior 
to 2000, Fannie Mae had a limited market presence in purchasing reduced documentation loans, 
and those loans were not a large part 
of mortgage originations nationwide. This changed during 
the 2000s, and by 2007, reduced documentation loans were. surging 
in popularity, representing 
approximately 40% 
ofmortgage loan originations nationwide. 
152. Traditionally, Fannie Mae's MBS dominated the nationwide  mortgage-related 
securities 
market However, by 2005, private label competition for mortgage-backed securities 
overtook Fannie Mae's MBS market dominance; as a  result, Fannie Mae's nationwide share 
of 
mortgage loan originations fell from 40% in 2004 to 20% in 2005. 
40 

153. In response, at the end of 2005, Fannie Mae's board of directors instructed the 
Single Family business to adjust its business plan to gain back market share. The goal was to 
increase Single Family's purchases from 20% 
of total mortgage loan originations to at least 25% 
by the end 
of 2006. In an April 2006 meeting, Mudd directed the Single Family business to 
acquire more reduced documentation loans specifically, saying: "the market is  moving to low 
documentation and we need to actively pursue the keys to this market." 
154. Fannie Mae's push to increase its reduced documentation loans was dramatic. At 
the end 
of 2004, reduced documentation loans constituted 17.8% of Fannie Mae's Single Family 
loan acquisitions: by year-end 2005 that number was 20.2%, and by year-end 2006, 27.8% 
of 
Fannie Mae's Single Family loan acquisitions were reduced documentation loans. This 
represented a nearly 40% increase 
from 2005 and a greater than 50% increase from 2004. 
Fannie 
Mae Internally Tracked Its Loans With Low Or Alternative Documentation 

Requirements 
As Reduced Documentation Loans 

155. As described in internal Company records, documentation level 
is a  key credit 
risk characteristic 
of a loan. Because Alt-A loans do not require that a borrower fully document 
their income, assets and/or employment, Alt-A loans have a  greater risk 
of default than fully 
documented loans. Fannie Mae executives-including Mudd, Lund and 
Dallavecchia­
regularly monitored the total reduced documentation loan acquisition trends at the Company and 
the attendant credit risk those loans presented via internal reports. 
156. Mudd, for example, was well aware 
of the Company's increased acquisition of 
reduced documentation loans. An April 26, 2006 CEO credit risk briefing stated that of all loans 
acquired by Fannie Mae's Single Family business, 20.2% were reduced documentation loans at 
year-end 2005, and this number increased to 23.5% 
of acquisitions by February 2006. That same 
report noted that credit risks (such 
as reduced documentation) are a  strong predictor of serious 
41 


delinquency within the first year of a  loan's acquisition and therefore present significant credit 
risk. 
157. Similarly, at the beginning 
of his tenure as CRO of Fannie Mae in June 2006, 
Dallavecchiawas briefed on Fannie Mae's increasing stake 
in reduced documentation loans. 
Dallavecchia received a credit risk briefing that explained: Fannie Mae's Single Family business 
has seen 
an increase in "potentially riskier products like ... low documentation loans .. .  [and] 
Alt-A loans 
as a percent oftotal acquisitions increased from 11.5% in 2002 to 20.2% in 2005." 
. That same presentation described this increase as 
an acquisition "trend" and noted Fannie Mae's 
Single Family plan for an "Alt-A push. Goal of$60B 
in 2006." 
158. As a member 
of the Disclosure Committee, throughout the fall of 2006, 
Dallavecchia received draft versions 
ofFannie Mae's 2004 Form 10-K, which contained detailed 
acquisition  data concerning reduced documentation mortgages, including quantitative exposure 
data that showed reduced documentation mortgages "represented approximately 18%, 20% and 
24% 
of our single-family acquisitions in 2004, 2005, and the first half of2006." 
159
.. Likewise, throughout the Relevant Period, as EVP of the Single Family business, 
Lund was aware 
of Fannie Mae's increasing exposure to Alt-A loans. He received monthly 
reports that presented Fannie Mae's total reduced documentation loan exposure, which between 
2006 and 2008 ranged from 13% to 21% 
ofthe Single Family mortgage book ofbusiness. Those 
loan acquisition reports were sometimes called the "Tom Lund Report." 
160. During the Relevant Period, Lund's Single Family 
officers-'from his Single 
Family Credit Risk officers to Product Management and Development executives-routinely 
prepared presentations and reports concerning not only Fannie Mae's increasing acquisitions 
of 
reduced documentation loans, but also the credit risks associated with those loans, including their 
42 

expected and actual SDQ rates. As the head of the Single-Family business, Lund had access to 
data and information prepared by his officers, 
as well as Early Warning reports-all of which 
conveyed, as described by his staff: "Low doc is more likely to default than full doc." 
43 

Fannie Mae Failed to Report All The Reduced Documentation Loans 

That It Tracked Internally for Credit Risk Monitoring Purposes 

161. In its public filings, when it publicly disclosed the amount 
of reduced or 
alternative documentation loans it held, the Company did not report all 
of the reduced 
documentation loans that it tracked internally 
as one of seven key credit risks. 
162. Each 
of the Defendants knew that approximately half of the reduced 
documentation loans 
in the Single Family book were not included when the Company reported 
its Alt-A loans. 
163. When the Company internally tracked its reduced documentation loans 
it included 
loans that it  referred to 
as "Special Lender Programs" or Lender-Selected loans. These were 
loans in which the lender ostensibly initiated the reduced documentation option for processing 
the loan. The Company 
also tracked "Other LowlNo Doc loans," which are Borrower-Selected 
loans, .or loans 
in which borrowers specifically requested loans for which minimal 
documentation was required. 
164. When the Company reported its Alt-A holdings it failed to disclose all its reduced 
documentation loans: 
it disclosed Borrower-Selected loans but did not report its Lender-Selected 
loans. This limited disclosure misrepresented the extent 
of Fannie Mae's total exposure to 
reduced documentation loans. 
165. On average throughout the Relevant Period, Lender-Selected Reduced 
Documentation 
Loans-the undisclosed Alt-A loans-had SDQ rates that were 1.4 times higher 
than full documentation loans with otherwise similar credit risks. Moreover, during the Relevant 
Period, certain types 
of Lender-Selected Reduced Documentation Loans that Fannie Mae 
acquired, such as Countrywide's Fast 
and Easy loans, had SDQ rates that were 2  times higher 
than full documentation loans with otherwise similar credit risks. 
44 


166. Fannie Mae's Alt-A· disclosure misrepresented the extent of its reduced 
documentation high risk holdings 
as evidenced by the undisclosed loans from a single source of 
Lender-Selected reduced documentation loans. At year-end 2006, Fannie Mae had $102.5 billion 
worth 
of Fast and Easy loans alone on its Single Family book of business, which grew to $129.2 
billion by year-end 2007, and by the end 
of the third quarter of 2008, Fannie Mae had $133.4 
billion worth 
of Fast and Easy loans on its Single Family book ofbusiness. None of these loans, 
or other similar Lender-Selected reduced documentation loans, were ever disclosed to investors 
when the Company quantified its Alt-A exposure. 
167. This single unreported Alt-A product from one 
customer-Countrywide­
accounted for 4.63% of Fannie Mae's 2006 Single Family business, 5.10% in 2007 and 4.94% as 
of September 2008. As one of Lund's officers stated in a  presentation: "CHL [Countrywide] 
sells whatever it can through Fast 
& Easy." 
Fannie Mae Failed To Disclose That 

The Company Directed Lenders When To Classify Loans as A 
It-A 

168. Fannie Mae stated that it classified loans as "Alt-A if the lender that delivers the 
mortgage loans to us has classified the loans as Alt-A based on documentation or other product 
features." This reporting materially understated the extent 
of Fannie Mae's total exposure to' 
reduced documentation loans. 
169. Fannie Mae did not disclose that the Company directed lenders that delivered the 
mortgage loans to Fannie Mae's lender channel whether to label reduced documentation loans 
as 
Alt-A or not. The Alt-A classification, in practice, came from Fannie Mae and was executed by 
the originating lenders; the lenders did not make the coding determination. 
170. Fannie Mae had contractual. agreements with lenders that included instructions on 
when to code reduced documentation loans for delivery through its Lender Channel as Alt-A. 
45 

Occasionally, when a  customer delivered loans to Fannie Mae's Lender channel with an Alt-A 
code that Fapnie Mae had not prescribed for delivery for that loan type, Fannie Mae would 
instruct the customer to re-code its loans to remove the Alt-A code prior to accepting delivery. 
171. Fannie Mae determined whether the lender 
Classified the loan 
as Alt-A rather than 
accepting 
an Alt-A classification as designated by a lender 
Fannie 
Mae Issues a Series ofFalse and Misleading Disclosures on Alt-A 
172. In its 2004 Form 10-K, which was filed on December 6, 2006, the Company 
disclosed that 
ithad increased its holdings of reduced documentation loans, but did not quantify 
those holdings: 
We also have increased the proportion 
of reduced documentation loans that we 
purchase 
... we began to increase our participation in these product types where 
we concluded that it would be economically advantageous or that it would 
contribute to our mission objectives 
... In addition, there has been an increasing 
industry trend towards streamlining the mortgage loan underwriting process by 
reducing the documentation requirements for borrowers. Reduced documentation 
loans in some cases present higher credit risk than loans underwritten with full 
standard documentation. 
173. In its discussion 
of Alt-A, Fannie Mae did not disclose that the amount of "loans 
that are underwritten with lower or alternative documentation" 
in the Single Family mortgage 
credit book 
of business was $390 billion as of September 30, 2006, or the fact that by June 30, 
2006, approximately 24%. 
of Fannie Mae's Single Family loan acquisitions were reduced 
documentation loans. 
174. As Fannie Mae prepared to file its 2005 Form 10-K 
in February 2007, Single 
Family officers working on the credit risk disclosures voiced concern: "Given Alt-A 
is an 
increasing as part of our business [sic] strategy and volume and this is the 2005 disClosure it 
seems to warrant more than a fairly benign reference, as 
is the case in the 2004 disclosure ... The 
decision now may very well be not to include numbers for this segment and just disclose an 
46 


increasing trend in words, but by the time we are done with 2006 we need to reflect the reality of 
the business." 
175. During this time period, senior management at Fannie Mae recognized that 
investors wanted to know the Company's Alt-A exposure. In April 2007, the director ofInvestor 
Relations at Fannie Mae wrote an email acknowledging, "In anticipation 
of IR's 2005 10-K 
briefing with Dan and Bob tomorrow, we would like to get your direction on how management 
should address questions related to FNMs exposure to Alt-A product 
... we expect the question 
to be asked and need to plan for it." (Emphasis added). 
Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Aft-Disclosures in its May 9, 2007 
Form 12b-25 Filing 
176. On May 9, 2007, for the first time, Fannie Mae disclosed a  quantification of its 
Alt-A holdings in its Form 12b-25 filing. The Company defined Alt-A as loans with "lower or 
alternative documentation" and disclosed that it held 
11 % ofAlt-A initsSingle Family mortgage 
credit book 
ofbusiness. Fannie Mae stated: 
Although there is no uniform definition 
of Alt-A ... [AIt-A] loans generally are 
loans that are underwritten with lower or alternative documentation than a  full 
documentation mortgage loan and that also may include other alternative features 
... In reporting our Alt-A exposure, we have classified mortgage loans as Alt-A if 
the lenders that deliver the mortgage loans to us have classified the loans as Alt-A 
based on documentation or other product features, or, for the original or 
resecuritized private-label, mortgage-:related securities that we hold in our 
portfolio, 
if the securities were labeled as Alt-A when sold. We estimate that 
approximately 
11 % of our total single-family mortgage credit book of business as 
of both March 31, 2007 and December 31, 2006 consisted of Alt-A mortgage 
loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS backed by Alt-A mortgage loans .. ;  As 
described below in the discussion 
of our Capital Markets group, we also have 
invested in highly rated private-label mortgage-related securities backed by Alt-A 
loans. We estimate that approximately 1% 
of our total single-family mortgage 
credit book 
of business consisted of private-label mortgage-related securities 
backed by Alt-A mortgage loans as 
of both March 31, 2007 and December 31, 
2006. (Emphasis added.) 
47 


177. The amount ofAlt-A Fannie Mae publicly disclosed did not include the "lower or 
alternative documentation loans" that were internally referred to 
as Lender-Selected reduced 
document loans. Yet nothing in Fannie 
Mae's public disclosures alerted investors to the fact that 
a  much larger volume 
of loans that matched the Company's description of its Alt-A holdings 
were excluded from the amount 
ofAlt-A that the Company disclosed. 
178. Fannie Mae's total exposure to loans with "lower or alternative documentation" 
(A It-A) was actually 20.7% and 20.1% 
of its total Single Family mortgage credit book of 
business at March 31, 2007,  and December 31, 2006, respectively, not 11% as disclosed. Fannie 
Mae's reporting 
of its Alt-A mortgage loans omitted approximately $219 billion and $201 billion 
worth 
of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business which consisted of 
reduced documentation loans as of March 31, 2007,  and December 31, 2006, almost equal to the 
volume 
of Single Family loans ($263 billion and $257 billion) that were disclosed as Alt-A. 
Fannie Mae's False andMisleading Alt-A Disclosures in its 2006 Form 10-K 
179. In June 2007, Lund's Single Family personnel prepared Single Family Credit 
Committee presentation materials, which acknowledged that, for internal Fannie Mae 
calculations, Fannie Mae's undisclosed Alt-A loan programs were treated as reduced 
documentation loans, notfull document loans. 
180. Even though senior management, including Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia, 
recognized that Fannie Mae had 
an increasing  volume of reduced documentation loans that 
performed 
as poorly as some loans disclosed as Alt-A, none of these loans were disclosed. On 
August 16,2007, 
in its 2006 Form 10-K, the Company stated: 
"AIt-A mortgage" generally refers to a loan that can be underwritten with lower 
or alternative documentation than a  full documentation mortgage loan but may 
also include other alternative product features. As a result, Alt-A mortgage loans 
generally have a higher 
risk. of default than non-Alt-A mortgage loans. In 
48 

reporting our Alt-A exposure, we have classified mortgage loans as Alt-A if the 
lenders that deliver the mortgage loans to us have classified the loans as Alt-A 
based on documentation or other product features, or, for the original or 
resecuritized private-label, mortgage-related securities that we hold in our 
portfolio, 
if the securities were labeled as Alt-A when sold ...We estimate that 
approximately 
11 % of our total single-family mortgage credit book of business as 
of December 31, 2006 consisted of Alt-A mortgage loans or structured Fannie 
Mae MBS backed by Alt-A mortgage loans. This percentage increased to 
approximately 12% 
as of June 30, 2007 ... We estimate that private label 
mortgage-related securities backed by Alt-A loans . . . accounted for 
approximately 1 % (and 2% respectively) 
... of our single-family mortgage credit 
book 
of business as ofJune 30, 2007. (Emphasis added.) 
181. At the time 
ofthis disclosure, Fannie Mae's total exposure to loans with "lower or 
alternative documentation" (Alt-A) was actually 22% 
of its total Single Family mortgage credit 
book 
of business, not 12% as disclosed. Farinie Mae's reporting of its Alt-A omitted 
approximately $238 billion worth 
of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of 
business, which consisted of reduced document loans as of June 30, 2007-almost equal to the 
$296 billion that was disclosed as Alt-A. 
Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Alt-A Disclosures in itsjirst, second 
and third quarter 2007 10-Qs 
182. By October 2007, reduced documentation loans comprised 29.1% of Fannie 
Mae's Single Family loan acquisition volume and 22% 
of the Single Family mortgage credit 
book 
of business. 
183. Nevertheless, on November 9,2007, in its 2007 Forms 10-Q for the first quarter, 
the Company disclosed: 
As of March 31, 2007, we estimate that approximately 11 % of our total single­
family mortgage credit book 
of business consisted of Alt-A mortgage loans or 
Fannie Mae MBS backed by Alt-A mortgage loans. This percentage increased to 
approximately 12% as 
of September 30,2007 ... As of March 31, 2007, we held 
in our investment portfolio approximately $34.5 billion 
in private-label mortgage­
related securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans. 
49 


184. On that same day, November 9,2007, Fannie Mae also filed its 2007 Fonns lO-Q 
for the second and third quarter, the Alt-A disclosures for which were comparable to the 2007 
Fonn lO-Q for the first quarter. 
185. Fannie 
Mae's total exposure to loans with "lower or alternative documentation" 
(Alt-A) was actually 22% 
of its total Single Family mortgage credit book ofbusiness, not 12% as 
disclosed. Fannie Mae's reporting of its Alt-A omitted approximately $267 billion worth of 
Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business which consisted of reduced 
document loans as 
of September 30, 2007-almost equal to the $306 billion that was disclosed 
as Alt-A. 
186. On November 
9, 2007, for the quarter ended September 30, 2007, Fannie Mae 
also filed a  Fonn 8-K credit supplement with the Commission. The document contained a 
summary 
deScription 
of certain credit risk characteristics of its Single Family book of business in 
chart fonn. Included 
in this chart was a  separate column identifying Fannie Mae's Alt-A 
holdings, and designating that 12.5% 
of its Single Family mortgage credit book of business were 
Alt-A loans. Nowhere 
in this supplemental disclosure was there any statement to suggest that 
Single Family holdings included billions 
of dollars of additional reduced documentation loans 
that were not reflected in the 12.5% figure. Fannie Mae continued to issue credit supplements 
that were similarly misleading throughout the Relevant Period. 
Fannie 
Mae's False and Misleading Disclosure in its Year-End 2007 10-K Filing 
187. On February 27, 2008, in its 2007 Fonn lO 
..K, the Company repeated its prior 
statement on Alt-A and updated its reporting as follows: 
Alt-A mortgage loans, whether held 
in our portfolio or backing Fannie 

Mae MBS, represented approximately 16% 
of our single-family business 

volume in 2007, compared with approximately 22% and 16% in 2006 and 

2005, respectively. 

50 

188. Fannie Mae's total volume of loans with "lower or alternative documentation" 
(Alt-A) was actually 37% 
of its Single Family acquisitions, not 16% as disclosed. 
189. On May 
6, 2008, in its 2008 Form lO-Q for the first quarter, the Company stated: 
Alt-A mortgage loans, whether held 
in our portfolio or backing Fannie Mae MBS 
represented approximately 4% 
of our single-family business volume for the first 
quarter 
of 2008, compared with approximately 23% for the first quarter of 2007. 
Alt-Amortgage loans held in our portfolio or Alt-A mortgage loans backing 
Fannie Mae MBS, excludingresecuritized private-label mortgage-related 
securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans, represented· approximately 
11 % ofour 
total single-family mortgage credit book 
of business as of March 31, 2008, 
compared with approximately 12% as 
ofDecember 31,2007. 
190. Fannie Mae's total exposure to loans with "lower or alternative documentation" 
(Alt-A) was actually 22% 
of its total Single Family mortgage credit book ofbusiness, not 11 % as 
disclosed. Fannie Mae's reporting 
of its Alt-A loans omitted approximately $323 billion worth 
of mortgage loans in Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business that 
consisted 
ofreduced document loans as ofMarch 31, 2008-more than the $300 billion that was 
disclosed as Alt-A. 
191. As 
of December 2007,23% of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book 
of business consisted ofreduced documentation loans, not the 11% reported in the public filing. 
192. Approximately two and a 
half months after the 2008 Form lO,..Q filing, in July 29, 
2008,· Lund held a staff meeting which addressed issues related to reduced documentation loans. 
Countrywide's 
Fast and Easy program-a Lender-Selected loan program whose loans were 
tracked as a  reduced document high risk loan internally but excluded from Fannie Mae's public 
disclosure 
of its Alt-A exposure-was specifically discussed in the presentation. The briefing 
addressed that these loans performed as poorly as some loans that were disclosed as Alt-A. 
51 


Despite this knowledge, Fast and Easy loans were not disclosed as part of Fannie Mae's Alt-A 
exposure, and Lund continued to sub-certify Fannie Mae's public statements. 
193. By August 2008, and before  the filing 
of its 2008 Form JO-Q for the se~ond 
quarter, Fannie Mae was planning to eliminate its high risk products, including Alt-A. The 
Company still did not disclose its total Alt-A loans. 
194. 
On August 
8, 2008, in its 2008 Form 10-Q for the second quarter, its final filing 
before conservatorship, the Company stated: 
Alt-A mortgage loans, whether held 
in our portfolio or backing Fannie Mae MBS 
represented approximately 4% 
of our single-family  business volume for the first 
six months 
of 2008, compared with approximately 22% for the first six months of 
2007 ... Alt-A mortgage loans held in our portfolio or Alt-A mortgage loans 
backing Fannie Mae MBS, excluding resecuritized private-label mortgage-related 
securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans, represented approximately 
11 % of our 
total single-family mortgage credit book 
of business as of June 30, 2008, 
compared with approximately 12% 
as ofDecember 31,2007. 
195. Fannie Mae's total exposure to loans with "lower or alternative documentation" 
(Alt-A) was actually 23% 
of its total Single Family mortgage credit book ofbusiness, not 11 % as 
disclosed. Fannie Mae's reporting of its Alt-A omitted approximately $341. billion worth of 
Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business which consisted of reduced 
documentation loans as 
of June 30, 2008-more than the $306 billion that was disclosed as Alt-
A to investors on August 
8, 2008. 
Post-conservatorship Fannie Mae Acknowledges Additional Alt-A Holdings 
196. In its first periodic filing post-conservatorship, Fannie Mae made a disclosure that 
highlights the misleading nature 
of the Company's prior Alt-A disclosures. At the time this 
disclosure was made neither Mudd nor Dallavecchia were at Fannie Mae, and Lund, who 
remained EVP 
of the Single Family business, was no longer a  member of the Disclosure 
Committee. The Company explained: 
52 


We have classified mortgage loans as Alt-A if the lender that delivers the 
mortgage to us has classified the loans as Alt-A based on documentation or other 
features 
... We apply these classification criteria in order to determine our Alt-A 
... loan exposure[ 1; however, we have other loans with some features that are 
similar to Alt-A 
... that we have not classified as Alt-A ... because they do not 
meet our classification criteria. (Emphasis added.) 
197. 
In this statement for the first time the Company publicly acknowledged what 
Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia had known throughout the Relevant Period, that it held loans that 
matched its public definition 
of Alt-A, but had not included them when reporting its Alt-A 
exposure: 
198. Based on the facts alleged above, Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia, knew or were 
reckless 
in not knowing that Fannie Mae's statements reporting Alt-A were false and misleading. 
FmST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 O(b) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND RULE 10b-5(b) 

(MUDD) 

1. Paragraphs 1 through 198 are realleged and incorporated by reference as if set 
forth fully herein. 
2. Mudd directly or indirectly, by use 
of the means or instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or by use 
of the mails, or of the facilities of a  national securities exchange, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of Fannie Mae securities, knowingly or recklessly, has 
made untrue statements 
of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to 
make statement made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading. 
3. By reason of the foregoing, Mudd directly or indirectly has violated; and unless 
enjoined will again violate, Section 
lOeb) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and Rules 
10b-5(b) thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)). 
53 


SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

VIOLATION OF SECTION17(A)(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT 

(MUDD AND DALLAVECCHIA) 

4. Paragraphs 1 through 198 are realleged and incorporated by reference as if set 
forth fully herein. 
5. Mudd and Dallavecchia, directly or indirectly, in the offer and sale of Fannie Mae 
securities, by use 
of the means and instruments oftransportation and communication in interstate 
commerce and 
by use of the mails, knowingly, recklessly or negligently have obtained money or 
property by means 
of untrue statements of material fact or omissions to state material facts 
necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading. 
6. By reason the foregoing, Mudd and Dallavecchia have violated, and unless 
enjoined will again violate, Sections 17(a)(2) 
ofthe Securities Act (15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2». 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

AIDING AND ABETTING VIOLATIONS OF SECTION lOeb) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT 

AND RULE10b-5(b) 

(MUDD, DALLAVECCHiA AND LUND) 

7. Paragraphs 1 through 198 are realleged and incorporated by reference as if set 
forth fully herein . 
.
8. Fannie Mae and Mudd, directly or indirectly, by use of the means or 
instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, or by use of the mails, or of the facilities of a national 
securities exchange, 
in connection with the purchase or sale ofFannie Mae securities, knowingly 
or .recklessly, has made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts 
necessary in order to make statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading. 
54 

9. Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund acted knowingly or recklessly and provided 
substantial assistance to and thereby aided and abetted Fannie Mae in its violations 
of Exchange 
Act Section 1 
O(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5(b); [17 C.F.R. §  240.1 Ob-5(b)]; therefore, each is liable 
pursuant to Exchange Act Section 20(e) [15 U.S.c. § 78t(e)]. 
10. Dallavecchia and Lund acted knowingly or recklessly and provided substantial 
assistance to and thereby aided and abetted Mudd in his violations 
of Exchange  Act Section 
lOeb) and Rule 10b-5(b); [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)]; therefore, each is liable pursuant to 
Exchange Act Section 20(e) [15 U.S.C. 
§ 78t(e)]. 
11. Unless restrained and enjoined, Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund will continue to aid 
and abet violations 
of Section lOeb) of the Exchange Act (15 u.s.c. § 78j(b)) and Rules IOb­
5(b) thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)). 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
VIOLATION OF EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13A-14(A) 
(MUDD) 
12. Paragraphs 1 through 198 are realleged and incorporated by reference as if set 
forth fully herein. 
13. On December 6, 2006, May 2, 2007, August 16, 2007, and February 27, 2008, . 
Mudd signed false certifications 
of Fannie Mae Fonns 10"'-K, and on November 9,2007, May 6, 
2008, and August 8, 2008, Mudd signed false certifications of Fannie Mae Fonns 10-Q. Each of 
those Forms ·1O-K and Forms IO-Q certifications Mudd made were pursuant to Section 302 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Rule 13a-J4(a) promulgated thereunder. His certifications 
falsely stated that: he had reviewed each report; based upon his knowledge, the reports did not 
contain any untrue statement 
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make 
the statements made, in light 
of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not 
55 


misleading; and based upon his knowledge, the financial statements and information contained in 
each report fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and 
cash flows 
of the registrant. 
14. By reason 
of the foregoing, Mudd violated, and unless restrained and enjoined 
will continue to violate, 
Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(a) (17 C.F.R. § 240,13a-14) promulgated under 
Section 302 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

AIDING AND ABETTING VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 13(A) OF THE 

EXCHANGE 
ACT AND RULES 12B-20, 13A-l AND 13A-13 

(MUDD, DALLA VECCHIA AND LUND) . 

15. Paragraphs 1 through 198 are realleged and incorporated by reference as if set 
forth fully herein. 
16. Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13a-l and Rule 13a-13 thereunder 
requires issuers 
of registered securities to file with the Commission factually accurate current 
and quarterly reports. Exchange Act Rule 12b-20 provides that in addition to the information 
expressly required to be included in a  statement or report, there shall be added such further 
material information, 
if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading. 
17. Fannie Mae violated Exchange Act §  13(a) 
[15 U.S.C. §  78m(a)] and Exchange 
Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-l and 13a-13 (17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.l2b-20, 240.l3a-l, and 240.l3a-13). 
18. By reason 
of the foregoing, Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund acted knowingly or 
recklessly and provided substantial assistance to and thereby aided and abetted Fannie Mae's 
violations 
of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.c. § 78m(a» and Exchange Act Rules 
12b-20, 13a-l and 13a-13 (17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.l2b-20, 240.l3a-l, and 240.l3a:-13); therefore, each 
is  liable pursuant to Exchange Act Section 20(e) 
[15 U.S.c. § 78t(e)]. 
56 


PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: 
(a) Permanently restrain and enjoin defendant Mudd from violating Section 17(a)(2) 
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.c. §77q(a) (tithe Securities Act
tl
), Section lO(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (tithe Exchange Act
tl
) and Exchange Act 
Rule lOb-5, 
17 C.F.R. §240.l0b-5, Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a), and 
Exchange Act Rules 12b-20 and 13a-13,17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.12b-20, 240.l3a-13 and Exchange 
Act Rule 13a-14(a) (17 C.F.R. § 240. 13a-14), and aiding and abetting Fannie Mae's violation 
of 
Section lO(b) ofthe Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. 
(b) Permanently restrain and enjoin defendant Dallavecchia from violating Section 
17(a)(2) 
of the Securities Act, aiding and abetting Fannie Mae's and Mudd's violations of 
Section lO(b) ofthe Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, and aiding and abetting Fannie 
Mae's violation 
of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-l 
and 13a-13. 
(c) Permanently restrain and enjoin defendant Lund from aiding and abetting Fannie 
Mae's and Mudd's violations ofSectionlO(b) and Rule 10b-5,aiding and abetting Fannie Mae's 
violation 
of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-l and 13a­
13. 
(d) Order defendants Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund to pay disgorgement, together 
with prejudgment interest; . 
(e) Order defendants Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund to pay penalties pursuant to 
Section 20(d) 
of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §  77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange 
Act 
[15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)]; 
57 

.. 

(f) Permanently bar defendants Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund, pursuant to Section 
20(e) 
of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §77t(e)] and Section 21(d)(2) of the Exchange Act (15 
U.S.C. §  78u(d)(2)), from acting as an officer or director of any issuer that has a  class of 
securities registered under Section 12 ofthe Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 781) or that is required to 
file reports pursuant to 
SeCtion 15(d) ofthe Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 780(d)); and 
58 

•. I ~ 
(g) Grant such other relief as this Court may deem necessary and proper. 
Dated: December 
~, 2011 
Washington, D.C. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
By: 
d41#-f" h So' ~ 
Natasha S. Guinan (4320636) 
Sarah 
L. Levine 
James 
A. Kidney 
Stephen 
L. Cohen 
Charles·E. Cain 
100 F Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20549 

Tel.: (202) 551-4572 (Guinan) 

Fax: (202) 772-9236 (Guinan) 

E-mail: [email protected] 

59 

11 eIV 9202 


ECFCase 

Jury Trial Demanded 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

UNITED STATES SECURITIES 

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 


Plaintiff, 


-v.­

DANIEL H. MUDD, 

ENRICO DALLAVECCHIA, and 

THOMAS A. LUND, 


Defendants. 


COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") for 

its Complaint alleges as follows: 

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 

1. This action arises out of a series of materially false and misleading public 

disclosures by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae" or the "Company") 

and certain of its former senior executives concerning the Company's exposure to subprime 

mortgage and reduced documentation Alt-A loans. Eager to promote the impression that Fannie 

Mae had limited exposure to· subprime and Alt-A loans during a period of heightened investor 

interest in the credit risks associated with these loans, Fannie Mae and its executives misled 

investors into believing that the Company had far less exposure to these riskier mortgages than in 

fact existed. 

2. Between December 6, 2006, and August 8, 2008, (the "Relevant Period"), Daniel 

H. Mudd ("Mudd"), Enrico Dallavecchia ("Dallavecchia") and Thomas A. Lund ("Lund") 



(collectively, "Defendants"), made or substantially assisted others in making materially false and 

misleading statements regarding Fannie Mae's exposure to subprime and Alt-A loans. 

3. For example, in a February 2007 public filing, Fannie Mae described subprime 

loans as loans "made to borrowers with weaker credit histories" and reported that 0.2%, or 

approximately $4.8 billion, of its Single Family credit book of business as of December 31, 

2006, consisted of subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae Mortgage Backed 

Securities ("MBS") backed by subprime mortgage loans. 

4. Fannie Mae did not disclose to investors that in calculating the Company's 

reported exposure to subprime loans, Fannie Mae did not include loan products specifically 

targeted by the Company towards borrowers with weaker credit histories, including Expanded 

Approval ("EA") loans. As ofDecember 31, 2006, the amount ofEA loans owned or securitized 

in the Company's single-family credit business was approximately $43.3 billion, yet none of 

these loans were included in the Company's disclosed subprime exposure. 

5. Fannie Mae's exclusion of loans such as EA from its subprime disclosures was 

particularly misleading because EA loans were exactly the type of loans that investors would 

reasonably believe Fannie Mae included when calculating its exposure to subprime loans. In fact, 

the Company identified EA as its "most significant initiative to serve credit· impaired borrowers" 

in response to regulatory requests for information on its subprime loans. In addition, all of the 

Defendants knew that EA loans had higher average serious delinquency rates, higher credit 

losses, and lower average credit scores than the loans Fannie Mae included when calculating its 

disclosed subprime loan exposure. 

6. In a November 2007 public filing, Fannie Mae described subprime loans as a loan 

to a borrower with a "weaker credit profile than that of a prime borrower," classified mortga~e 

2 



loans as "subprime" if the mortgage loans were originated by a "specialty" subprime lender or a 


"subprime division of a large lender," and again represented that only 0.2%, or approximately 


. $4.8 billion, of its Single Family credit book of business consisted of subprime mortgage loans 


or structured Fannie Mae MBS backed by subprime mortgage loans as of both March 31, 2007, 


. and June 30, 2007. 

7. Fannie Mae did not tell investors that in calculating the Company's exposure to 

subprime loans reported in this filing, Fannie Mae again did not include at least $43 billion of 

EA loans, included loans from only fifteen loan originators of the approximately 210 lenders 

listed on the HUD Subprime Lender list, and did not even have the capacity to track whether 

loans were originated by a subprime division of a large lender. 

8. Fannie Mae made similarly misleading disclosures concerning its exposure to 

subprime loans in public filings throughout the Relevant Period. The result of these disclosures 

was to mislead investors into seriously underestimating Fannie Mae's exposure to subprime 

loans. 

9. Similarly, Fannie Mae misled investors concerning its exposure to Alt-A loans 

with reduced or alternative documentation requirements. Fannie Mae did not disclose the total 

percentage of its Single Family mortgage guarantee business consisting of reduced 

documentation loans as reflected in its own internal reporting, which Defendants routinely 

received throughout the Relevant Period. 

10. Instead, in its public disclosures, Fannie Mae described Alt-A loans as loans with 

lower or alternative documentation requirements, and then further stated that it classified loans as 

"Alt-A if the lenders that deliver the mortgage loans to us have classified the loans as Alt-A 

based on documentation or other product features." 

3 



11. Based on this reporting construct, for example, in a May 2007 filing, Fannie Mae 

publicly reported that approximately 11% of its total Single Family mortgage credit book of 

business as of March 31, 2007, consisted of Alt-A mortgage loans or Fannie Mae mortgage 

securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans. This filing materially underreported the extent of 

Fannie Mae's total exposure to low documentation loans, which was approximately 17.9% as of 

March 31,2007, based on Fannie Mae's own internal records. 

12. Fannie Mae also did not disclose to investors that certain reduced documentation 

loans it received from lenders were not included in the calculation of Fannie Mae's publicly 

disclosed Alt-A loan exposure if the reduced documentation requirements were internally 

deSignated as Lender-Selected. Despite this exclusion, during· the Relevant Period,. Lender.;. 

Selected Reduced· Documentation Loans had a serious delinquency rate that was substantially 

higher than Fannie Mae's full documentation loans with a similar credit risk profile. Further, 

Fannie Mae did not tell investors that the Company itself provided lenders-in advance-with 

the coding designations for Alt-A versus Lender-Selected. 

13~ The result of these disclosures was to mislead investors into materially 

underestimating Fannie Mae's exposure to reduced documentation loans. Fannie Mae made 

similarly misleading disclosures concerning its exposure to reduced documentation loans in 

public filings throughout the Relevant Period. 

14. Mudd, Lund and Dallvecchia each knew, based on reports and internal data they 

received on a regular basis, that the Company's reported exposure to subprime and Alt-A loans 

was inaccurate. The misleading statements describing subprime and Alt-A loans occurred in 

periodic and other filings with the Commission, and public settings, including investor and 

analyst calls and media interviews. Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia reviewed and approved each 

4 



ofthe false public filings. Mudd and Dallavecchia each made public statements falsely claiming 

that the Company's exposure to subprime loans was minimal. 

15. By engaging in the misconduct described herein, Mudd violated and aided and 

abetted the violation of the antifraud and reporting provisions of the federal securities laws; 

Dallavecchia violated the antifraud provisions and aided and abetted the violation of the 

antifraud and reporting provisions of the federal securities laws; and Lund aided and abetted 

violations of the antifraud and reporting provisions of the federal securities . laws. The 

Commission seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement ofprofits, prejudgment interest, civil penalties 

and other appropriate and necessary equitable relief from both defendants. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

16. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections 20(b) and 22(a) of 

the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b) and 77v(a)] and Sections 21(d), 21(e) and 27 of the 

Exchange Act [15 U.S.c. §§ 78u(d), 78u(e), and 78aa)], and 28 U.S.C. § l331. 

17. Venue is proper in the Court pursuant to Section 22(a) of the Securities Act, [15 

U.S.C. §77v(a)], and Section 27 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78aa] because certain of the 

acts, practices, transactions and courses of business constituting the violations alleged herein 

occurred within this judicial district. 

J 8. Defendants Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund directly or indirectly made use of the 

means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the mails, and the facilities of a national· 

securities exchange in connection with the transactions, acts, practices and courses of business 

alleged in this Complaint. 

5 



DEFENDANTS 


19. Daniel Mudd, age 53, was Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Fannie Mae from 

June 2005 until September 2008, interim CEO from December 2004 until June 2005,and Chief 

Operating Officer ("COO") from February 2000 until November 2004. Ultimately, Mudd was 

removed as CEO of Fannie Mae after its regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency 

("FHFA"), placed Fannie Mae into conservatorship in September 2008. Mudd is a resident of 

Greenwich, Connecticut. Mudd certified Fannie Mae's Forms lO-K and Forms lO-Q during the 

Relevant Period, including Fannie Mae's 2005 10-K filed May 2, 2007, its 2006 10-K filed 

August 16,2007, its 2007 Form 10-Qs filed November 9, 2007, and its 2007 Form 10-K filed 

February 27, 2008. Mudd reviewed and approved Fannie Mae's Forms 12b-25 filed February 

27,2007, and May 9, 2007. 

20. Enrico Dallavecchia, age 50, was Chief Risk Officer ("CRO") of Fannie Mae 

from June 2006 until August 2008 when he was removed by the Board along with two other 

executives. As CRO, Dallavecchia sub-certified all of Fannie Mae's Annual Forms 10-K and 

quarterly Forms 10-Q. He also reviewed and approved Fannie Mae's Forms 12b-25 dated 

February 27,2007 and May 9, 2007. Dallavecchia isa resident ofPotomac, Maryland. 

21. Thomas Lund, age 53, was a Fannie Mae employee since 1995 who served as 

Executive Vice-President ("EVP") of Fannie Mae's Single Family Credit Guarantee ("Single 

Family") business from July 2005 until June 2009. As EVP of the Single Family business, Lund 

sub-certified all of Fannie Mae's Annual Forms 10-K and quarterly Forms lO-Q. He also 

reviewed and approved Fannie Mae's Forms 12b-25 dated February 27, 2007, and May 9, 2007. 

Lund is a resident of Cabin John, Maryland. 

6 



RELEVANT ENTITY 


22. Fannie Mae was, at all times relevant to this Complaint, a shareholder-owned 

Government Sponsored Enterprise ("GSE") established by the u.S. Congress in 1938 to support 

liquidity, stability and affordability in the secondary mortgage market, where existing mortgage­

related assets are purchased and sold. Fannie Mae provides market liquidity by securitizing 

mortgage loans originated by lenders in the primary mortgage market into Fannie Mae MBS, and 

purchasing mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities in the secondary market for Fannie 

Mae's mortgage portfolio. By law, securities issued by Fannie Mae are "exempted securities." 

Accordingly, registration statements with respect to Fannie Mae's offerings are not filed with the 

Commission. 

23. In March 2003, Fannie Mae voluntarily registered its common stock with the SEC 

under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act and has, since then, been required to file periodic and 

current reports with the SEC, including annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 

10-Q and current reports on Form 8-K. 

24. Throughout the Relevant Period, Fannie Mae's common stock traded publicly on 

the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). Its principal place of business was and is in 

Washington, D.C. 

25. On July 30, 2008, when the President signed into law the Housing and Economic 

Recovery Act of 2008 ("HERA"), the Federal Housing Finance Agency· ("FHF A") became 

Fannie Mae's primary regulator. 

26. On August 8, 2008, Fannie Mae announced a net loss of $2.3 billion. Fannie Mae 

stated that it was no longer certain that it would have enough capital to carry it through its losses. 

At this time, the Company announced that the main cause for its increased credit losses was the 

7 



deterioration in the credit performance of a small number of higher risk loan products, induding 

Alt-A loans. As of the third quarter of2008, more than 70% of Fannie Mae's credit losses were 

caused by its subprime and Alt-A loans. 

27. On September 6, 2008, FHF A placed Fannie Mae into conservatorship and, as 

conservator, FHF A succeeded to all the rights, titles, powers and privileges of Fannie Mae, its 

shareholders, and the officers or directors of Fannie Mae with respect to the Company and its 

assets. 

BACKGROUND 
Fannie Mae Single Family Mortgage Guarantee Business 

28. Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business was $2.34 trillion 

in 2006, $2.65 trillion in 2007, and $2.8 trillion in September 2008 when the Company was 

placed into Conservatorship. 

29. During the Relevant Period, Fannie Mae operated three business segments-{i) 

Single Family; (ii) Multi-Family; and, (iii) Capital Markets. 

30. Fannie Mae's primary business segment is the Single Family business, which 

works with lender customers to securitize Single Family mortgage loans (relating to properties 

with four or fewer residential units) into Fannie Mae MBS and to facilitate the purchase of 

Single Family mortgage loans for Fannie Mae's portfolio. Revenues in Fannie Mae's Single 

Family business are derived primarily from fees received as compensation for guaranteeing the 

timely payment of principal and interest on mortgage loans underlying Fannie Mae's Single 

Family MBS. During the Relevant Period, the Single Family business comprised approximately 

51 %,64% and 54% ofFannie Mae's net revenues in each of2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. 

31. Fannie Mae's Single Family business principally acquired loans through one of 

two channels: (i) the Lender (or flow) channel, which obtained loans from lenders on a going­

8 



forward or contractual basis through agreements to purchase loans from lenders before those 

loans were originated based on certain terms and conditions; and, (ii) the Investor (or bulk) 

channel, which acquired from lenders loans that had already been originated based on data files 

for those loans that were provided by lenders to Fannie Mae for review prior to purchase. 

32. Fannie Mae's Single Family business had a proprietary automated underwriting 

system called Desktop Underwriter ("DU"). DU was used by the Single Family business to 

assess the primary risk factors of a loan in order to measure that loan's default risk. Customers 

ofFannie Mae also used DU to originate and underwrite loans so those customers would know­

in advance-whether any given loan was eligible for sale to Fannie Mae. When DU provided a 

Fannie Mae customer with an "approve" f9r a loan application, that customer knew that Fannie 

Mae would agree to acquire that loan and waive gertain warrants and representations so long as 

the loan is originated in accordance with information originally submitted via DU. 

33. At various times during the Relevant Period, Fannie Mae adjusted and 

recalibrated the risk assessment models within its DU system. For instance, in 2006, in 

connection with its Say Yes strategy to regain market share, Fannie Mae employed a "DU Bump" 

wherein eligibility parameters were expanded to provide more "approve" messages in DU for 

larger volumes of loans with lower FICO scores and higher LTV s than previously permitted. By 

adjusting and recalibrating the risk assessment models within its DU system, Fannie Mae took on 

increasingly risky loans during the Relevant Period. 

34. While many mortgage originators used Fannie Mae's DU system as part of the 

underwriting process, many large mortgage lenders also had their own automated origination and 

underwriting platforms. For instance, during the Relevant Period, Countrywide Financial 

9 



Corporation's (Countrywide) proprietary underwriting system was called Clues, and Freddie 

Mac had a system similar to DU that was called Loan Prospector. 

35. Not all loans acquired by Fannie Mae were underwritten using DU. During the 

Relevant Period, Fannie Mae acquired and securitized mortgage loans that were underwritten 

through other automated underwriting systems or simply by agreed-upon standards in a manual 

process. For instance, Fannie Mae acquired loans under Countrywide Financials Fast and Easy 

loan program that were underwritten using Countrywide's Clues system. Similarly, most of the 

My Community Mortgage ("MCM") loans Fannie Mae acquired during the Relevant Period 

were manually underwritten by loan officers and mortgage brokers at various companies 

nationwide and not evaluated using DU. 

Mudd's Role at Fannie Mae and his Disclosure Responsibilities 

36. As COO and then CEO from 2000 until September 2008, Mudd oversaw all three 

Fannie Mae business units, including the Single Family business. Additionally, during the 

Relevant Period Mudd was a member of the Board of Directors, the Audit Committee, a regular 

attendee at the Board's Risk Policy and Capital Committee meetings, held regular weekly 

meetings with his direct reports the business units, and attended quarterly business unit briefings. 

Mudd regularly read, reviewed and marked-up draft periodic filings and met with individuals 

who provided sub-certifications prior to certifying Forms 10-K and Forms lO-Q.. 

37. As CEO, and based on his prior r()le as COO, Mudd possessed detailed 

operational knowledge concerning Fannie Mae's subprime and reduced documentation loan 

exposure. Further, during the Relevant Period, Mudd routinely received acquisition, delinquency 

and credit loss data concerning subprime and Alt-A loans. Mudd certified filings and made 

10 



public statements describing Fannie Mae's subprime and reduced documentation loan exposure 

knowing that those public statements were false and misleading. 

38. With regard to sUbprime-quality and reduced documentation loans, he received at 

least quarterly risk briefings on the Single Family business in which data showing Fannie Mae's 

total subprime and reduced documentation loan exposure was presented. Additionally, Mudd 

met weekly with his direct reports, who, among other things, informed him about Single Family 

loan acquisitions, trends and status with respect to market share targets. 

39. Mudd was well aware of the Company's increased acquisition of reduced 

documentation loans-indeed, Mudd himself directed the company to pursue that market. For 

instance, in an April 2?, 2006, Credit Risk meeting following a presentation on reduced 

documentation loans and their risks by the Single Family credit officer (who noted low 

documentation loans were riskier), Mudd stated that "the market is moving to low documentation 

and we need to actively pursue the keys to this market." 

40. Mudd oversaw Fannie Mae's 2006 market share increase during which the Single 

Family business grew its market share from 20% of total mortgage loan originations to 25% by 

acquiring more subprime and reduced documentation loans. In part as a result of Fannie Mae's 

successful market share growth and timely filing of the company's periodic reports, Mudd's 

taxable compensation grew from $6.16 million in 2006 to $10.64 million in 2007. 

41. Throughout the Relevant Period, in addition to wages earned, Mudd-like all 

Fannie Mae executives-received an Annual Incentive Plan ("AlP") bonus that was tied to two 

things: (i) Company performance, measured by attaining corporate year-end goals; and, (ii) 

personal performance, measured by attaining individual year-end goals. The AlP program was 

designed to "put part of the participants' total compensation package at risk, based on the 

11 



achievement of one-year goals for both the participant and the corporation" with individual 

performance driving the AlP payout each year, adjusted for corporate goal performance. The 

AlP bonus for a given year's performance was paid out in the following fiscal year such that an 

AlP bonus for performance in 2006 was received in 2007. 

42. In his 2006 year-end report to the Board, Mudd noted that the Single Family 

business increased its market share, in part by entering new markets "especially Alt-A and 

subprime," that in response to filing the Company's 2004 Form 10-K, "the market and ratings 

agency reactions generally were positive-there were no big surprises," and that the Company's 

stock price improved by more than 20%. Mudd's 2006 taxable compensation was more than $6 

million with approximately $2.5 million from his AlP bonus. In 2007, Fannie Mae's corporate 

goals included growing revenue, which the Single Family business set about doing by increasing 

it~ book by 5.6% with a plan to acquire more Alt-A and subprime loans. In 2007, Mudd's 

taxable compensation was more than $10. million-with $3.5 million from his AlP bonus alone. 

Mudd served as CEO for only eight full months in 2008, but his taxable compensation in 2008 

was $7.4 million-with more than $2. 2 million from his AlP bonus based on his personal 

performance for 2007. 

43. Mudd was also well aware that investors were increasingly focused on subprime 

loans. In a February 6, 2007 memo to the Board of Directors of Fannie Mae, Mudd wrote that 

investors and analysts were "focused on our market share, subptime risk and our portfolio 

strategy." As CEO of Fannie Mae, Mudd routinely interacted with investors and the media. 

During the Relevant Period, as investors and the media increasingly focused their attention on 

the credit risks associated with subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans, Mudd made numerous false 

and misleading statements that downplayed the Company's exposure to such loans and provided 

12 




false assurance to the market that Fannie Mae was participating in a safer segment of the 

mortgage market. Indeed, Mudd created the false perception that Fannie Mae's participation in 

high credit risk loans such as Alt-A and sUbprime was small and contained, and reinforced this 

false and misleading impression, telling investors thafFannie Mae was in the prime-not the 

subprime-market with a different; higher set of standards and underwriting. 

44. Mudd was knowledgeable about the mortgage markets. While CEO of Fannie 

Mae, Mudd made numerous appearances before Congress to testify about the mortgage markets, 

the role of the GSEs and the subprime market. In that setting, Mudd repeatedly minimized 

Fannie Mae's reported exposure, falsely claiming it was less than 2% of the Company's book or 

that Fannie Mae held about zero percent subprime. 

45. During the Relevant Period, Mudd received, reviewed and commented on (often 

in handwritten notes) multiple draft versions of each of Fannie Mae's periodic and other filings 

with the Commission. Prior to certification, Mudd met-seriatim-with officers ofthe Company 

who had provided sub-certifications to discuss issues presented by upcoming public filings. 

Also, as a member of the Audit Committee at Fannie Mae and the Board of Directors, Mudd 

participated in final committee and board reviews of Fannie Mae's Forms lO-K and Forms 10-Q 

during the Relevant Period prior to certifying. 

Lund's Role at Fannie Mae and his Disclosure Responsibilities 

46. Lund served as an officer at Fannie Mae for fourteen years, from 1995 until his 

retirement in 2009, and was EVP of the Single Family business at Fannie Mae from 2005 

forward. Lund was a member of the Executive Committee and was the senior-most executive in 

charge of the Single Family business. He received and provided regular reports on the actual 

13 



volumes of Single Family subprime and reduced documentation loan acquisitions, the associated 

delinquency rates, and credit losses for all subprime-quality and reduced documentation loans. 

47. Lund received Single Family acquisition data on at least a monthly basis detailing 

acquisitions of reduced documentation and subprime-quality loans. As the senior executive in 

charge of the Single Family business, Lund was knowledgeable about Fannie Mae's loan 

acquisitions and the performance ofFannie Mae's high credit risk loan portfolio . 

.48. At Mudd's weekly direct reports meetings, Lund provided Single Family business 

overviews to the CEO and others. Lund also held weekly meetings with his direct reports. The 

SVP for the Western Business Office of Fannie Mae routinely updated Lund on that region's 

then-most significant customers: Countrywide, IndyMac and WAMV. 

49. Lund was also a member of Fannie Mae's Disclosure Committee, which oversaw 

the preparation of the Company's periodic (and other) filings with the Commission. During the 

Relevant Period, Lund was the only Single Family business executive that sat on Fannie Mae's 

Disclosure Committee and was, therefore, uniquely positioned to inform that Committee about 

the Single Family loan portfolio. Fannie Mae attendance records from the Relevant Period 

reflect that Lund routinely attended Disclosure Committee meetings. where contemplated draft 

filings with the Commission were reviewed and issues discussed. 

50. During the Relevant Period, Lund also received and reviewed draft versions of 

Fannie Mae'speriodic and other filings with the Commission before they were publicly filed. 

While he knew the difference between the actual and the reported volumes of subprime and 

reduced documentation loans, Lund did not. ensure that investors were likewise informed. 

Instead, he sub-certified as to the accuracy of the Company's materially false and misleading 

14 




disclosures concerning its exposure to subprime and Alt-A loans, which were directly within his 

area ofknowledge and responsibility. 

51. During his tenure as EVP of the Single Family business, Lund oversaw Fannie 

Mae's 2006 market share growth, and, in part as a result of its success and timely filing of the 

company's periodic reports, Lund's taxable compensation grew from $833,658 in 2006 to $1.9 

million in 2007. 

52. Throughout the Relevant Period, in addition to wages earned, Lund received an 

AlP bonus tied to attaining corporate and personal goals. In 2006, Fannie Mae's corporate goals 

included filing its 2004 Form lO-K, hitting Single Family MBS issuance targets, increasing 

profitability in the Single Family business, and reintroducing the Company to investors. In 2006, 

owing to its Say Yes business strategy, the Single Family business exceeded its goal of increasing 

market share from 20% to 25.4%, and on a corporate level, the Company grew its stock price 

more than 20O/o---from just under $49 to over $60 per share. Lund's 2006 taxable compensation 

was $833,658 with $792,960 from his AlP bonus. By contrast, in 2005, Lund's wages totaled 

$497,285. This represented a 67% increase in compensation between 2005 and 2006. 

Dallavecchia's Role at Fannie Mae and his Disclosure Responsibilities 

53. Enrico Dallavecchia served as Fannie Mae's EVP and Chief Risk Officer from 

June 2006 through August 2008. In that position, Dallavecchia reported directly to Mudd and 

was responsible for credit, market, counterparty, and operational risk oversight for 'all business 

units within Fannie Mae, which included measuring, reporting, and monitoring Fannie Mae's 

risk profile and formulating the Company's risk policies. As the senior-most executive in charge 

of credit risk, Dallavecchia received and provided regular reports on the actual volumes of 

15 




subprime and reduced documentation loan acquisitions, the associated delinquency rates, and 

credit losses for those loans at Fannie Mae. 

54. Dallavecchia was also a member of Fannie Mae's Disclosure Committee, which 

oversaw the preparation of the Company's periodic (and other) filings with the Commission. 

During the Relevant Period, Dallavecchia was the only executive from the Chief Risk Office 

who sat on Fannie Mae's Disclosure Committee. As CRO, Dallavecchia was uniquely 

positioned to recognize and inform others about the overall credit risks presented by. Fannie 

Mae's loan portfolio. 

55. Fannie Mae attendance records from the Relevant Period refleCt that Dallavecchia 

routinely attended Disclosure Committee meetings where contemplated draft filings with the 

Commission were reviewed and issues discussed. Dallavecchia personally received and 

reviewed draft versions of Fannie Mae's periodic and other filings with the Commission. 

Dallavecchia sub-certified as to the accuracy of the Company's materially false and misleading· 

disclosures concerning its exposure to subprime and Alt-A loans, thereby substantially assisting 

the Company's fraud. 

56. Dallavecchia and the Single Family CRO team assisted in drafting the definition 

of subprime contained in the February 27, 2007, Form 12b-25 in which Fannie Mae first 

quantified its subprime exposure. 

57. Dallavecchia occasionally led the Board's Risk, Policy and Capital Committee 

meetings and attended Executive Committee meetings. In those roles, Dallavecchia received . 

information and data concerning Fannie Mae's total expmmre to reduced documentation and 

subprime loans. 

16 




58. As Fannie Mae's CRO, Dallavecchia had credit risk oversight for Fannie Mae's 

2006 market share growth, and, in part as a result of its success and timely filing of the 

company's periodic reports, Dallavecchia's taxable compensation more than doubled from 

$617,886 for 7 months ofservice in 2006 to $2.68 million in 2007. 

59. Throughout the Relevant Period, in addition to wages earned, Dallavecchia 

received an AlP bonus tied to attaining corporate and personal goals. When Dallavecchia began 

as Fannie M~e's CRO, the then-Chairman ofthe Board ofDirectors noted in an address to Senior 

Management, "We have to think differently and creatively about risk ... Enrico Dallavecchia 

was not brought on-board to be a business dampener." In 2006, Fannie Mae's corporate goals 

included filing its 2004 Form 10-K, increasing its earnings per share, profitability, and subprime 

penetration while building a CRO function and implementing business unit risk officers. In his 

year-end 2006 self-assessment, Dallavecchia noted that the most significant achievement was his 

office playing a role "from both a risk perspective and also from a business perspective." 

Dallavecchia further noted that his office "authored the Risk Section ofthe 2004 10-K." 

60. In 2007, Fannie Mae's corporate goals included growing revenue and timely 

periodic filings with the Commission. In addition to Fannie Mae meeting most of its 2007 

corporate goals with respect to growing revenue, Mudd's year-end 2007 review of Dalla vee chi a 

noted that he completed the build out of the CRO structure, developed risk limits and did good 

work on the Board Risk Policy and Capital Committee. Dallavecchia's 2007 taxable 

compensation was more tha.n $2.6 million with $1.04 million from his AlP bonus. 

61. One month prior to conservatorship, in August 2008, Dallavecchia was terminated 

as CRO. Accordingly, Dallavecchia served as CRO for only seven full months in 2008; his 2008 

taxable compensation was $2.3 million with $923,780 from his AlP bonus. 

17 



OVERVIEW OF FANNIE MAE LOAN PROGRAMS 


Fannie Mae's Reduced Documentation Loan Programs 

62. During the 1990s, Fannie Mae had limited market presence in Alt-A mortgage 

loans, which were not a large part ofmortgage originations nationwide. 

63. In July 1999, Fannie Mae and Countrywide Home Loans entered into an alliance 

agreement, which included a reduced documentation loan program called the "internet loan," 

which was soon thereafter re-branded by Countrywide as the Fast and Easy loan. This loan 

program featured a streamlined documentation process, which allowed mortgage-loan applicants 

with a qualifying FICO credit score to be preapproved for a mortgage loan without providing 

documentation to verify income or assets. 

64. The Fast and Easy loan program was popular. Fannie Mae executives referred to 

it as Countrywide's "signature" or "flagship" mortgage product. By the mid-2000s, other 

. mortgage lenders developed similar reduced documentation loan programs such 	as Mortgage 

Express and PaperS aver-many of which Fannie Mae acquired in ever-increasing volumes 

throughout the Relevant Period. 

65. Alt-A loans proliferated in the marketplace, and during the Relevant Period 

Fannie Mae's Single Family business pushed to increase its acquisitions of those Alt-A loans. 

By year-end 2006, 35% of Fannie Mae's Single Family loan acquisitions were Alt-A loans. By 

year-end 2007, that number increased to 37%, and by June 30, 2008, 26% of its Single Family 

loan acquisitions were Alt-A loans. 

Fannie Mae's Subprime Loan ProgramS 

66. Since the late 1990s, Fannie Mae acquired and guaranteed subprime mortgage 

loans described in Fannie Mae periodic filings during the Relevant Period as loans made to 

18 




"borrowers with weaker credit histories" or ''weaker credit profile [ s]" that "have a higher 

likelihood of default than prime loans" as part of the Company's two primary programs for 

borrowers with weaker credit histories: Expanded ApprovallTimely Payment Rewards ("EA") 

and MyCommunityMortgage ("MCM"). 

67. The credit risks posed by these programs were well understood by senior 

management at Fannie Mae. Mudd was familiar with the EA and MCM loan programs and the 

credit risks those loan programs entailed. Throughout the Relevant Period all the Defendants 

received reports, briefings and presentations containing acquisition volume, Serious Delinquency 

Rates ("SDQ Rates") and credit loss data with respect to Fannie Mae's EA and MCM loans. 

Throughout the Relevant Period, Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia knew that EA loans were-on 

average-the highest credit risk loans on Fannie Mae's book of business, and knew that EA 

loans contributed disproportionately to Fannie Mae's credit losses. 

68. Indeed, inMay 2001, Mudd wrote a memo to the then-CEO noting that EA loans 

"are the highest default risk loans we have ever done." 

69. Traditionally, Fannie Mae treated EA loans as part of its subprime exposure. For 

example, a March 2002 Report prepared for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 

Development ("HUD") with the participation of Fannie Mae, entitled "Subprime Markets, the 

Role of GSEs and Risk-Based Pricing," stated under a section entitled 'Agency Subprime 

Lending Products' that 

The agencies are increasing their presence in the subprime market by rolling-out 
new subprime mortgage products through updated versions of their automated 
underwriting systems. . Fannie Mae sellerlservicers now offer loan products to· 
three groups of credit-impaired borrowers under two new programs. Fannie 
Mae's Expanded Approval program allows lenders to approve borrowers who 
would have been formerly classified as 'Refer with Caution' ... by Fannie Mae's 
Desktop Underwriter (DU) .... The Expanded Approval products are recent 
innovations, and, according to Fannie Mae representatives, account for a 

19 




relatively small portion ofthat GSE's book ofbusiness ... At most, according to a 
Fannie Mae stock analyst, these subprime loan purchases will account for no 
more than five percent ofthat GSE's purchase volumes. (Emphasis added). 

70. Similarly, in its annual exam process in 2004 and 2005, Fannie Mae's then-

primary regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight's ("OFHEO") asked for 

information on Fannie Mae's total Single Family subprime loan exposure, specifically 

requesting: "[t]he volume of loans purchased in 2004 [and 2005] defined as CE structured 

subprime ... or sub-prime as otherwise. defined." In March of 2005 and April of 2006, 

respectively, Fannie Mae responded by providing OFHEO with information on mortgage loan 

purchases and mortgage-backed securities under the EA program, describing the EA program as, 

"our most significant initiative to serve credit-impaired borrowers." 

71. Moreover, before December 2006, various internal Fannie Mae reports, including 

reports to the Board, identified subprime loans as including: (i) investor channel subprime loans 

acquired as part of its Subprime NBI; (ii) A- Deal loans that pre-date December 2005; and, (iii) 

EA loans. 

Fannie Mae Excluded EA and MCM Loansfrom its Sub prime Disclosure 

72. When Fannie Mae first reported its quantitative exposure to subprime loans in a 

filing with the Commission on February 27, 2007, the Company broadly defined subprime as 

loans to "borrowers with weaker credit histories." EA and MCM loans fell squarely within this 

definition, but were not included in the accompanying quantification of Fannie Mae's subprime 

exposure. 

73. Instead, the quantification consisted primarily of private label securities it held 

that were marketed as being backed by subprime loans, certain "A-" loans that the company 

acquired prior to 2005, and certain loans that had been acquired through a limited new business 

20initiative beginning in 2006.. Fannie Mae's subprime quantification did not include significant 

numbers of other loans that fell within its published subprime definition of loans to "borrowers 

with weaker credit histories." 

74. Throughout the Relevant Period, EA loans had, on average, higher SDQ rates 

than the loans Faimie Mae used in calculating its disclosed subprime exposure. Senior 

management at Fannie Mae, including the Defendants, were aware of this fact, as SDQ rates 

were tracked and regularly included in reports and other internal presentations. For example, in 

a meeting ofthe Risk Policy and Capital Committee ("RPCC") ofFannie Mae's Board, the CRO 

reported that as of July 2007 Fannie Mae's SDQ rates for EA were 5.57% (the highest on its 

book); by contrast, the SDQ rate ofits disclosed subprime loans were 4.95 %. 

75. Throughout the Relevant Period, the credit risk associated with Fannie Mae's EA 

and MCM acquisitions was reported to and tracked by senior management, including 

Defendants, in terms of acquisition volume, delinquencies, and credit losses-alongside those 

loans that were included when quantifying its disclosed "subprime" exposure in its public filings, 

EA and MCM loans were routinely included in reports tracking Fannie Mae's high risk loan 

products (which ranged from three to five or more loan types during the Relevant Period) that 

were received by the Defendants. 

76. Also during the Relevant Period, senior executives, including the Defendants, 

were provided with credit loss data that showed that the greatest amount of credit losses 

attributable to anyone loan type or product on Fannie Mae's Single Family book were 

attributable to the EA product. F or instance, in an October 26, 2007, Disclosure Committee 

report, it is noted that EA loans were responsible for $188.9 million in losses and MCM loans 

21 




were responsible for $16 million in losses--compared to $5.5 million in losses for the loan 

population Fannie Mae disclosed as its subprime exposure. 

77. As a portion of Fannie Mae's book of business, EA loans increased in volume 

between 2006 and 2008 from $43.3 billion to $58.3 billion, totaling approximately 2% of the 

company's book of business during the Relevant Period. MCM loans, which were intended for 

low-to-moderate income borrowers, accounted for between 0.3% and 1.5% of Fannie Mae's 

book of business over the same period. None of these loans were included in Fannie Mae's 

calculation of its publicly disclosed subprime exposure. 

FANNIE MAE'S DISCLOSURES 
Overview 

78. Since 2003 in its annual Form lO-K filings, Fannie Mae included a table of credit 

risk characteristics for Single Family loans ("Credit Risk Tables"). Those Credit Risk Tables 

contain information describing risk characteristics such as original LTV, Product Type, Property 

Type, Occupancy Type,FICO Credit Score bands, Loan Purpose, Geographic Concentration, 
, 

and Origination Year. The tables did not include any statement or representation as to whether 

Fannie Mae held subprime and Alt-A loans. 

79. During the Relevant Period, Fannie Mae also provided narrative disclosures in its 

periodic filings concerning the company's expectation of credit losses, delinquencies, market 

environment and economic factors that could impact the company's business. These narrative 

disclosures repeatedly contained materially false and misleading statements and representations 

regarding Fannie Mae's Alt-A and subprime exposure. 

80. During part of the Relevant Period, Fannie Mae also filed supplemental Form 8­

Ks filed simultaneously with various Forms 10-K and Forms lO-Q that contained credit 

characteristic information concerning its Single Family book of business, along with a purported 

22 



tabular description of Fannie Mae's subprime and Alt-A holdings. None of the information 

contained in those supplement Form8-Ks provided investors with an accurate description ofthe 

Company's subprime or Alt-A holdings. Although Fannie Mae claimed to provide additional 

information to investors, labeling a portion of loans "subprime" and "A It-A" in a disclosure 

table, those tables included only a fraction of the loans that met Fannie Mae's own public 

definition of "subprime" or "Alt-A" in the quantification under each category. These 

supplemental disclosures deliberately gave investors false comfort thatthe Company's exposure 

to subprime and Alt-A loans was dramatically smaller than it, in fact, was. 

Fannie Mae's Initial Quantification ofSubprime Exposure Was Falseand Misleading 

81. By February 2007, following S&P's downgrade of high-profile subprime lender, 

New Century Financial Corporation, and other indicia of subprime market turmoil-including 

HSBC HoldingsPLC's announcement that the u.s. subprime market was unstable-investors 

were increasingly focused on subprime loans and the risks associated with these loans. 

82. In a February 6, 2007 memo to the Board of Directors of Fannie Mae, Mudd 

wrote that investors and analysts were "focused on our market share, subprime risk and our 

portfolio strategy." With this backdrop, Fannie Mae's Disclosure Committee, which included 

Lund and Dallavecchia as members, decided to include a quantitative disclosure ofFannie Mae's 

exposure to subprime loans in the Company's public filings. 

83. According to an internal e-mail sent to both Lund and Dallavecchia, "Enrico 

[Dallavechia]'s team has been tasked with developing a definition of 'sub-prime,' as well as 

providing the numbers for the 12b-25." 

23 




84. On February 23, 2007 in a call with investors Mudd stated: "Subprime mortgages 

are those offered to borrowers with damaged credit" and Fannie Mae's "subprime investment 

constitutes well below 2 percent of our book." 

85. Four days later on February 27, 2007, in a Form 12b-25 filing with the 

Commission, the Company disclosed the following regarding Fannie Mae's subprime exposure: 

Although there is no uniform definition for sub-prime . .. loans across the 
mortgage industry... sub-prime loans typically are made to borrowers with 
weaker credit histories ... We estimate that approximately 0.2% of our single­
family mortgage credit book of business as of December 3J, 2006 consisted of 
sub-prime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS backed by sub-prime 
mortgage loans ... We estimate that approximately 2% of our single-family 
mortgage credit book of business as of December 31, 2006 consisted of private­
label mortgage-related securities backed by sub-prime mortgage loans and, to a 
lesser extent, resecuritizations of private-label mortgage-related securities backed 
by sub-prime mortgage loans. (Emphasis added.) 

86. The percentage of subprime loans disclosed by Fannie Mae did not include a 

material number of subprime-quality loans in the Fannie Mae Single Family mortgage credit 

book of business as ofDecember 31, 2006, made to "borrowers with weaker credit histories." In 

particular, the percentage of sub prime loans disclosed by Fannie Mae did not include the EA and 

MCM loans, which were the very types of loans that investors (and analysts) believed were the 

company's primary subprime exposure. 

87. Fannie Mae's exposure to EA loans in its Single Family mortgage credit book of 

business was approximately $43.3 billion as of December 31, 2006-approximately 10 times 

greater than the 0.2% ($4.8 billion) disclosed as "sub-prime mortgage loans or structured Fannie 

Mae MBS back by subprime loans" as ofDecember 31; 2006. 

88. The February 27,2007, disclosure falsely stated that Fannie Mae's total exposure 

to loans made to borrowers with weaker credit histories (subprime) was 2.2% of its total 

24 



mortgage credit book of business, when in fact its exposure was at least 4.64% (as of December 

31,2006). 

89. Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors that it held a much 

larger volume ofloans that matched the Company's description of subprime loans but were not 

included in the reported subprime number. 

90. Although Fannie Mae excluded EA from its subprime reporting, Fannie Mae's 

EA loans had, on average throughout the Relevant Period, SDQ rates higher than those loans 

Fannie Mae actually included in calculating its disclosed exposure to subprime loans. As of 

January 2007, EA loans had an SDQ rate of 5.69%; disclosed Subprime loans (as-quantified in 

Fannie Mae's filings) had an SDQ rate of4.82%. 

91. EA and MCM loans accounted for a higher percentage of Single Family credit 

losses (20.4%) at year-end 2006 than loans Fannie reported as its subprime exposure, which at 

the time were responsible for no credit losses. 

92. Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia each reviewed and approved the February 27, 

2007, Form 12b-25 statement before it was released by the Company, knowing its quantified 

subprime disclosure excluded EA and MCM loans. 

Dallavecchia's False and Misleading Statement 

93. That same day, February 27; 2007, Dallavecchia spoke directly to investors on a 

conference call and explained: 

In our filing today, we also indicate that we have increased our participation in 
subprime product in 2006. Our purchases have been prudent and have been made 
when we concluded that they would contribute to our mission objectives or they 
would general a profitable return. Given our view of the subprime market 
generally, let me offers [sic] some insight into our approach to this segment and 
the exposure to the risk. The first point, as per our filing, is that our exposure is 
modest. Approximately 0.2% of our single-family credit book of business 
consisted of subprime loans or Fannie Mae MBS backed by subprime loans ... to 

25 




conclude my thoughts on credit risk, I anticipate our credit losses will trend 
upward as a result of the general softening· of the housing market ... At the same 
time, I would advise that you consider our exposure in. light of the strength of the 
risk characteristics I have described and the immaterial size of our participation in 
the subprime market. (Emphasis added.) . 

94. Despite knowledge that the Company had exposure to approximately $43.3 

billion worth ofEAloans and $13.8 billion in MCM loans as of December 31,2006, which fell 

squarely within Fannie Mae's publicly stated definition of subprime, Dallavecchia falsely 

represented that only "0.2% of [Fannie Mae's] Single Family credit book of business consisted 

of subprime loans," 

95. Moreover, Dallavecchia further misled investors regarding Fannie Mae's 

subprime exposure by emphasizing that Fannie Mae's subprime was "modest," "prudent" and 

"immaterial." He gave the public these assurances knowing Fannie Mae's exposure to EA loans 

was at least ten times greater than "0.2% of [Fannie Mae's] single-family credit book of 

business." His purpose was clear. As Dallavecchia explained in an internal email on February 

23,2007, in preparing for the investor call, "I am trying to say that if you look at our guarantee 

book of business we have an insignificant exposure in subprime loans." 

Mudd's False and Misleading Testimony Before Congress 

96. On March 15, 2007, Mudd appeared before the House Financial Services 

Committee and gave testimony in a hearing on Legislative Proposals on GSE Reform. Mudd 

was asked: "And you have not engaged in the subprime market. You hadn't gone there to a great 

extent is that right?" In response, Mudd testified: 

The answer for Fannie Mae on behalf of subprime is that it's important to 
remember there is subprime and there is predatory. Subprime simply means ... 
that you have a credit blemish, and we think those people are part of the market. 
It's less than 2 percent of our book. It's 80 percent insured. It's highly 
subordinated. We've been in it very carefully, consistent with some very strong 
anti-predatory lending guidelines we have. 

26 



97. At the time that Mudd gave this testimony, he knew that Fannie Mae EA loans 

were designed to provide loans to borrowers with weaker credit histories, i.e., "credit 

blemish[ed]" borrowers, and that the quantification of Fannie Mae's subprime holding as "less 

than 2 percent of our book" did not include EA or MCM loans. The following month, on April 

17, 2007, Mudd again appeared before the Committee on Financial Services to provide 

testimony in a hearing on solutions to the subprime market turmoil. Mudd again testified: 

'''Subprime' is, after all, simply the description of a borrower who doesn't have perfect credit." 

He provided a broad description of Fannie Mae's efforts to reach "borrower[s] who do[n't] have 

perfect credit": 

We see it as part of our mission and our charter to make safe mortgages available 
to people who don't have perfect credit. In the past several years, for example, we 
have designed mortgage options to give borrowers with blemished credit access to 
high-quality, low-cost, non-predatory loans. We also set conservative 
underwriting standards for loans we finance to ensure the homebuyers can afford 
their loans over the long term . . . we continued our careful entry into the 
subprime market, by and large supporting lenders, products and practices that met 
our standards, and which helped us meet our HUD affordable housing 
requirements. 

98. Having broadly defined "subprime" and described Fannie Mae's outreach to the 

market for borrowers without perfect credit, Mudd testified as to the amount of subprime held by 

Fannie Mae: "Today, our exposure remains relatively minimal - less than 2.5 percent of our 

book ofbusiness can be defined as subprime." 

99. Mudd knew EA loans were loans specifically designed for "people who don't 

have perfect credit" -his own definition for subprime-and that the 2.5 percent figure he used 

did not include billions of dollars ofEA and MCM loans. As such, his statement was knowingly 

false and misleading when made. . 

Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Sub prime Disclosures in its 2005 10-K Filing 

27 



100. In May 2007, Fannie Mae filed its 2005 Form lO-K, in which it supplemented its 

prior public definition of subprime. In addition to asserting that "subprime" generally refers to 

loans made to borrowers ''with a weaker credit profile" and "borrowers [who] have a higher 

likelihood of default," Fannie Mae now disclosed that it classified loans as subprime if the loans 

were originated from a specialty subprime lender. 

101. On May 2, 2007, Fannie Mae filed its 2005 Form 10-K and stated: 

"Sub prime mortgage" generally refers to a mortgage loan made to a borrower 
with a weaker credit profile than that of a prime borrower. As a result of the 
weaker credit profile, sUbprime borrowers have a higher likelihood of default than 
prime borrowers. Subprime mortgage loans are often originated by lenders 
specializing in this type of business, using processes unique to subprime loans. In 
reporting our subprime exposure, we have classified mortgage loans as subprime 
if the mortgage loans are originated by one of these specialty lenders or, for the 
original or resecuritized private-label, mortgage-related securities that we hold in 
our· portfolio, if the securities were labeled as subprime when sold ...We also 
estimate that subprime loans represented approximately 2.2% of our single-family 
mortgage credit book of business as of. December 31, 2006, of wh,ich 
approximately 0.2% consisted of subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie 
Mae MBS backed by subprime mortgage loans and approximately 2% consisted 
of private-label mortgage-related securities backed by subprime mortgage loans 
and, to a lesser extent, resecuritizations of private-label mortgage-related 
securities backed by subprime mortgage loans. 

102. Fannie Mae's reporting of its subprime exposure omitted approximately $43.3 

billion worth of EA loans and $13.8 billion in MCM loans in Fannie Mae's Single Family 

mortgage credit book. of business as ofDecember31, 2006--approximately 12 times greater than 

the 0.2% ($4.,8 billion) disclosed as "subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS 

back by subprime loans" as ofDecember 31, 2006. 

103. Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors that this much larger 

volume ofloans matched the Company's description of subprime loans but were not included in 

the reported quantitative number. 

28 



104. In addition, while Fannie Mae stated that it classified loans as subprime if those 

loans were originated by specialty subprime lenders, that statement was materially false and 

misleading as well. Since 1993, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 

("BUD") posted a publicly available BUD Subprime Lender list based on loan data and 

interviews with lenders themselves. Companies in the mortgage industry rely on the BUD 

Subprime Lender .list as a proxy for identifying subprime lenders. Internal Fannie Mae 

documents reflect that its personnel, including Lund, were aware of the BUD Subprime Lender 

list as an accepted source for subprime-lender identification. During the Relevant Period, the 

BUD Subprime Lender list included approximately 210 lenders. 

105. The Company failed to disclose,however, that, when calculating Fannie Mae's 

subprime exposure, only certain loans that had been originated by 15 lenders were included. 

Fannie Mae purchased and guaranteed loans from many other lenders on the HUD list, but they 

were not included when calculating the Company's subprime exposure. Fannie Mae disclosed 

neither that it was restricting its definition of "specialty lender" to 15 lenders on the. HUD list, 

nor the names of those lenders on the HUD list that it included in its calculations. In fact, Fannie 

Mae acquired loans from many other specialty lenders on the HUD Subprime Lender list, and 

EA loans were originated by lenders on the HUD list. 

'106. Although EA was left out ofFannie Mae's subprime reporting, it was well-known 

within Fannie Mae that EA was generally considered subprime in the marketplace. For example, 

on April 5, 2007, the SVP of business and strategic development sent an email to a group of 

Fannie Mae executives including Lund and Dallavecchia, stating "mcm and ea are much deeper 

risks that we take and many (if not all) in the market call EA subprime. They are growing very 

29 




fast." Within a month, Fannie Mae filed its next public statement concerning its subprime 

exposure, and again omitted its exposure to EA and MCM loans. 

107. On May 9, 2007, Fannie Mae filed a Form 12b-25 with the Commission, which 

repeated the disclosure contained in the May 2, 2007 filing. 

108. As it had previously, Fannie Mae's reporting of itssubprime disclosure in this 

May 9, 2007 filing omitted approximately $43.3 billion worth of EA loans and $13.8 billion in 

MCM loans in Fannie Mae's Single Family rriortgage credit book of business as ofDecember 31, 

2006. That undisclosed subprime exposure was approximately 12 times greater than the 0.2% 

($4.8 billion) disclosed as "subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS back by 

subprime loans" as ofDecember 31, 2006. 

109. Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia had each reviewed and approved the Form 12b-25 

dated May 9 2007 that was released by the Company. 

Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Subprime Disclosures/or Year-End 2006 

110. In early August 2007, as Fannie Mae prepared a draft Form 8-K Credit 

Supplement to be filed simultaneous with its upcoming 2006 Form lO-K, Mudd personally 

requested additional basic data concerning the Company's credit book in a draft version of the 

Form 8-K. The additional data Mudd received from the CRO office on August 5, 2007, 

included details on the total volume of EA, MCM, disclosed subprime, and Alt-A loans Fannie 

Mae had on its book of business. This draft included SDQ data that clearly showed EA loans 

had a higher rate of delinquency (5.38%) than the Company's disclosed subprime loans (4.8%). 

111. The data provided to Mudd also included data on FICO scores that demonstrated 

that the credit quality ofEA loans was worse than the credit quality ofthe loans that Fannie Mae 

disclosed as its subprime exposure. Specifically, the document disclosed that 53% of EA loans 

30 



had FICO scores below 620; whereas 47% ofFannie Mae's disclosed subprime had FICO scores 

below 620. Further, 26% of EA had FICO scores below 580 while 23% of disclosed subprime 

loans had FICO scores that low. 

112. On August 3, 2007, as members of the Disclosure Committee, Dallavecchia and 

Lund both received the same draft credit supplement sent to Mudd. This information concerning 

EA and MCM was not ultimately made public. 

113. Fannie Mae issued its 2006 Form lO-K less than two weeks after each of the 

defendants received the draft 8-K disclosure comparing EA and disclosed subprime, and 

documenting that EA loans had a higher serious delinquency rate than disclosed subprime and 

that EA loans had a weaker credit profile than disclosed subprime.. The public filing again 

defined "subprime" as "loans to borrowers with riskier credit profiles." Nevertheless, EA and 

MCM loans were not included when quantifying Fannie Mae's subprime exposure; nor was it 

disclosed that there were "loans to borrowers with riskier credit profiles" that were excluded 

from Fannie Mae's subprime reporting. 

114. On August 16,2007 Fannie Mae filed its 2006 Form 10-K and stated: 

In recent years, we have increased our acquisitions of loans to borrowers with 
riskier credit profiles, referred to as subprime loans by the industry. Subprime 
mortgage loans that we acquire are generally originated by lenders specializing in 
this type of business, using processes unique to subprime loans. Based on data 
published by National Mortgage News and our internal economic analysis ofthe 
mortgage market, subprime mortgage loan originations have increased sharply in 
recent years, rising to a record high of approximately 24% of single-family 
mortgage loan originations in the first quarter of 2006 ... Our acquisitions of 
subprime mortgage loans have been significantly less than the overall market's 
share. We estimate that approximately 0.2% of our total single-family mortgage 
credit book of business as of December 31, 2006 consisted of subprime mortgage 
loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS backed by subprime mortgage loans. We 
have also invested in highly rated private-label mortgage-related securities that 
are backed by ... subprime mortgage loans ... We estimate that ... private-label 
mortgage-related securities backed by subprime mortgage loans, including 

31 



resecuritizations, accounted for approximately ... 2% ... of our single-family 
mortgage credit book ofbusiness as ofJune 30, 2007. 

115. Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business consisted of 

approximately $43.3 billion worth of EA loans and $13.8 billion worth of MCM loans as of 

December 31, 2006 .,- more than 12 times greater than the 0.2% ($4.8 billion) disclosed as 

"subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS back by subprime loans" as of 

December 31, 2006. 

116. Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors that this much larger 

volume of loans matched the Company's description of subprime loans but were not included in 

the reported quantitative number. 

117. Mudd certified and Lund and Dallavecchia each sub-certified the 2006 Form 10­

K even though they knew that the statements regarding the Company's subprime exposure were 

materially misleading. 

Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Subprime Disclosures for First, Second and Third 
Quarters of2007 

118. In preparing to review the upcoming Fannie Mae filing, a Disclosure Committee 

Analytical Report was sent on October 26, 2007, to several individuals, including Mudd, 

Dallavecchia and Lund. The report presented data on Single Family's "[h]igher risk products," 

including EA, MCM, and disclosed subprime. The data documented that, in the two periods 

addressed in the document, year-to-date as of September 2006 and year-to-date as of September 

2007, Fannie Mae's credit losses from EA and MCM far outweighed losses compared to the 

loans reported as the company's subprime exposure. As of September 2006, Fannie Mae had 

$80.6 million in losses from EA and $1.7 million in losses from MCM, compared to no losses 

from loans disclosed as subprime. As of September 2007, Fannie Mae had $188.9 million in 

32 




losses fromEA, and $16 million in losses from MCM, compared to $5.5 million in losses from 

loans disclosed as subprime. Fannie Mae's credit losses from EA in 2006 and 2007 were 

overwhelmingly greater than any losses it experienced related to·its disclosed subprime holdings 

during the same period. A key observation in the Report showed that the Company's highest risk 

products (which included EA and MCM loans) "comprise less than 15% of the S[ingle] F[amily] 

book but accounted for 57% ofthe $440MM" increase in credit losses. 

119. Within two weeks, on November 9, 2007, Fannie Mae filed its Forms lO-Q for 

the first, second and third quarters of 2007. Even though each of the Defendants knew that EA 

and MCM loans fit Fannie Mae's public definition of subprime loans and were a source of credit 

losses far greater than losses triggered by the loans that were disclosed as subprime, EA or MCM 

loans were not included in the quantification ofsub prime. The Company stated in its first quarter 

Form 10-Q: 

A subprime mortgage loan generally refers to a mortgage loan made to a borrower 
with a weaker credit profile than that of a prime borrower. As a result of the 
weaker credit profile, subprime borrowers have a higher likelihood of default than 
prime borrowers. Subprime mortgage loans are typically originated by lenders 
specializing in this type of business or by subprime divisions of large lenders; 
using processes unique to subprime loans. In reporting our subprime exposure, we 
have classified mortgage loans as subprime if the mortgage loans are originated 
by one of these specialty lenders or a subprime division of a large lender. ... 
Approximately 0.2% of our total single-family mortgage credit book of business 
as of March 31, 2007 consisted of subprime mortgage loans or Fannie Mae MBS 
backed by subprime mortgage loans. This percentage increased to approximately 
0.3% as of September 30, 2007. Less than 1% of our single-family business 
volume for the nine months ended September 30, 2007 consisted of subprime 
mortgage loans or Fannie Mae MBS backed by sUbprime mortgage loans. 
(Emphasis added.) 

120. The Company's subprime disclosures in its second and third quarter Forms lO-Q 

were comparable. 

33 



121. The quantified subprime exposure omitted at least $43 billion worth ofEA loans 

that were part of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business and $17.6 billion 

in MCM loans as of March 31, 2007-approximately 12 times greater than the 0.2% ($4.8 

billion) disclosed as "subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS back by subprime 

'loans" as ofMarch 31, 2007. 

122. Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors to this much larger 

volume of loans that matched the Company's description of subprime "loans but were" not 

included in the reported subprime exposure. 

123. The November 9, 2007, Form 10-Q filings supplemented its prior public 

definition of subprime. In addition to stating that it classified "mortgage loans as subprime if the 

mortgage loans are originated by one of these specialty lenders," it also stated that it classified 

loans as subprime if the loans are originated by "a subprime division of a large lender." 

124. This statement in the November 9, 2007 Form 10-Q was false. In reality, Fannie 

Mae never tracked loans from the subprime divisions of large lenders and, accordingly, the 

Company never included any of those subprime loans in its reported subprime exposure-despite 

its explicit claim that it did so. 

125. Since at least 2003, Mudd was aware that subprime divisions of major lenders 

were originating and selling EA loans to Fannie Mae. Nevertheless, the Company never 

included any EA loans in its subprime reporting. 

126. In February 2007, Mudd traveled to meet with Fannie Mae's then-largest 

customer, Countrywide. At the meeting, Mudd was briefed by the President and COO of 

Countrywide Home Loans about the volume of loans Fannie Mae acquired from that customer's 

subprime lending division (Full Spectrum Lending), which between 2004 and 2006 totaled 

34 



$14.23 billion worth of loans. The presentation explicitly referred to Countrywide's subprime 

lending division customers as subprime "Fallen Angels." 

127. In the Relevant Period alone, Fannie Mae acquired loans totaling approximately 

$28.5 billion from Countrywide's subprime division-the subprime division ofa large lender. 

That number is far greater than the amount of "sub-prime mortgage loans or structured Fannie 

Mae MBS back by subprime mortgage loans" that Fannie Mae publicly disclosed to investors at 

any point during the Relevant Period. 

128. Disclosing loans acquired from Countrywide's subprime division alone would 

have more than doubled the disclosed subprime exposure in Fannie Mae's Single Family 

guarantee portfolio. However, those loans were not included in the Company's reported 

subprime exposure. 

129. During the Relevant Period, Fannie Mae purchased or securitized loans from 

subprime divisions of other large lenders including Citigroup, JPMorgan and GMAC. 

130. Lund's direct reports knew and informed him that subprime divisions of large 

lenders sold loans to Fannie Mae-including Citi's Argent/Ameriquest, Countrywide'S Full 

Spectrum Lending, and First Franklin's Flagstar bank. 

131. On November 9, 2007, for the quarter ended September 30, 2007, Fannie Mae 

alSo filed a "credit supplement" on Form 8-K with the Commission. The document contained a 

summary description of certain credit risk characteristics of its Single Family book of business in 

chart form. Included in this chart were separate columns identifying Fannie Mae's subprime 

holdings and designating that 0.3% of its Single Family holdings were subprime loans. This 

supplemental disclosure did not inform investors of the additional subprime exposure from EA 

and MCM loans, or loans originated by the subprime divisions of large lenders. Fannie Mae 

35 




continued to issue credit supplements that were, similarly false and misleading throughout the 

Relevant Period. 

Mudd's False and Misleading Subprime Statements to the Media 

132. On December 2, 2007, Mudd spoke about Fannie Mae's subprime holdings in a 

newspaper interview published in the San Francisco Gate. 

Q: We know you very well for the fact that you have well-underwritten loans, 
fully amortizing, and that you either keep these loans in portfolio or guarantee 
them. So how are you having involvement with these subprime loans at all? 

A: I'll give you two pieces to understand it. The notion that there is a delineation 
between a lower prime loan and a high subprime loan are incorrect. There's a 
FICO score, there's an LTV (loan to value) and a bunch of other factors. We 
have about 2 percent of our broker's business in total that meets our definition of 
what would be a subprime loan, not a predatory loan, but typically a loan to an 
individual that has had a credit blemish in the past. We made a decision a few 
years ago that there were lots of creditworthy individuals who had a credit 
blemish which would have previously either disqualified them from a prime loan, 
or condemn them to a subprime lender. They were probably eligible for what we 
call affordability product. So we have about 2 percent of that business on our " 
books, and that is how our involvement happened. 

133. Mudd made these claims when he knew they were false and misleading. At the 

time that he made this statement, Mudd knew that the "2 percent" figure did not include billions 

of dollars in EA or MCM loans held by Fannie Mae. Mudd also knew that those undisclosed 

loans were specifically designed for "credit blemish[ed]" borrowers and that the figure could not 

reflect loans originated by the subprime division of large lenders, which by then the Company 

claimed to include in its reported subprime exposure. 

Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Subprime Disclosures/or Year-End 2007 

134. In February 27, 2008, Fannie Mae issued its 2007 Form lO-K, which was 

identical to prior disclosures but further included the following statement: 

Subprime mortgage loans, whether held in our portfolio or backing Fannie Mae 
MBS, represented less than 1% of our single-family business volume in each of 
2007, 2006 and 200S.We estimate that subprime mortgage loans held in our 

36 



portfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae MBS, excluding 
resecuritized private-label mortgage-related securities backed by subprime 
mortgage loans, represented approximately 0.3% of our total single-family 
mortgage credit book of business as of December 31,2007, compared with 0.2% 
and 0.1% asofDecember 31,2006 and 2005, respectively. 

135. Approximately $55.6 billion worth of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage 

credit book of business consisted of EA loans as of December 31, 2007, and $38.8 billion in 

MCM loans-approximately 11 times greater than the 0.3% ($8.3 billion) disclosed as "sub­

prime mortgage loans held in our portfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae 

MBS" as ofDecember 31,2007. 

136. Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors that this much larger 

volume of loans matched the Company's description of subprime loans but were not included in 

the reported quantitative number. 

137. As of January 31, 2008, the serious delinquency rate of EA was 7.14%­

performance that was worse than the disclosed subprime serious delinquency rate of 6.21 % for 

the same period. By February 2008, it was clear from reports provided to all three defendants 

that credit losses from EA loans were "disproportionate to the amount of the book they 

constitute." 

Fannie Mae's False and Misleadingjirst and second quarter 2008jilings 

138. On May 6, 2008, Fannie Mae filed its Form 10-Q first quarter 2008 and stated: 

Subprime mortgage loans, whether held in our portfolio or backing Fannie Mae 
MBS represented less them 1 % of our single-family business volume for the first 
quarter of 2008 and 2007. We estimate that subprime mortgage loans held in our 
portfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae MBS, excluding 
private-label mortgage-related securities backed by subprime mortgage loans, 
represented approximately 0.3% of our total single-family mortgage credit book 
of business as of both March 31, 2008 and December 31, 2007. (Emphasis 
added.) 

37 



139. Approximately $101 billion worth ofFannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit 

book of business of March 31, 2008, consisted of undisclosed loans that fell within the 

company's description of subprime, and approximately $94.4 billion worth of Fannie Mae's 

Single Family mortgage credit book of business consisted of undisclosed loans as of December 

31, 2007-approximately 12 times greater than the 0.3% ($8 billion as of March 31, 2008 and 

$8.3 billion as of December 31, 2007) disclosed as "subprime mortgage loans held in our 

portfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae MBS" as ofDecember 31,2007. 

140. Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors that this much larger 

volume of loans matched the Company's description of subprime loans, but were not included in 

the reported quantitative number. 

141. By July 2008, Dallavecchia was emailing Mudd directly to highlight that EA and 

MCM were generating approximately 20% ofthe Company's credit losses. 

142. As of the beginning of August 2008, EA and MCM were classified in internal 

Fannie Mae documents as two of Fannie Mae's top three highest-risk loan products and Fannie 

Mae made plans to eliminate the EA loan program as part of an attempt to improve the overall 

credit quality of its Single Family book of business. 

143. This was not disclosed. Instead, on August 8, 2008, Fannie Mae filed its Form 

10-Q for the second quarter 2008 and explained: 

Subprime mortgage loans, whether held in our portfolio or backing Fannie Mae 
MBS represented less than 1 % of our single-family business volume for the first 
six months of 2008 and 2007. We estimate that subprime mortgage loans held in 
our portfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae MBS, excluding 
resecuritized private-label mortgage-related securities backed by subprime 
mortgage loans, represented approximately 0.3% of our total single-family 
mortgage credit book of business as of both June 30, 2008 and December 31, 
2007. 

38 



144. Approximately $60 billion worth of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit 

book of business consisted of EA loans and $41.7 billion in MCM loans as of June 30, 2008­

approximately 12 times greater than the 0.3% ($8 billion) disclosed as "subprime mortgage loans 

held in our porrfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae MBS" as of both June 30, 

2008 and December 31, 2007. 

145~ Nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors to the fact this much 

larger volume of loans matched the Company's description of subprime loans but were not 

included in the reported quantitative number. 

Mudd Publicly Declares that Fannie Mae has Zero Subprime 

146. On August 20, 2008, Mudd falsely stated in a radio interview: Fannie Mae has 

"about zero percent".exposure to subprime loans, and "[s]ubprime to Fannie Mae means a loan 

to a borrower that has had a credit problem in the past." When Mudd made this statement, he 

knew that Fannie Mae had substantial exposure to loans made to borrowers who have had a 

credit problem in the past. 

Post-conservatorship Fannie Mae Acknowledges 

Additional Subprime Holdings 


147. After Fannie Mae had been placed into conservatorship on September 6, 2008, the 

Company made a disclosure that highlights the misleading nature of the Company's prior 

subprime reports. At the time this disclosure was made, neither Mudd nor Dallavecchia were at 

Fannie Mae and Lund, who remained EVP ofthe Single Family business until June 2009, was no 

. longer a member of the Disclosure Committee. 

148. On November 10,2008, Fannie Mae filed its Form 10-Q for the third quarter and 

stated: 

39 



We have classified mortgage loans as subprime if the mortgage loan is originated 
by a lender specializing in subprime business or by subprime divisions of large 
lenders. We apply these classification criteria in order to determine our ... 
subprime loan exposures; however, we have other loans with some features that 
are similar to ... subprime loans that we have not classified as ... subprime 
because they do not meet our classification criteria. (Emphasis added). 

149. In this statement, for the first time the Company publicly acknowledged what 

Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia had known throughout the Relevant Period; namely, that Fannie 

Mae held loans squarely within the public definition of subprime that it had not included in 

calculating its publicly disclosed exposure to subprime loans. 

150. Based on the facts alleged above, Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia, knew or were 

reckless in not knowing that Fannie Mae's statements disclosing its subprime holdings, and as to 

Mudd and Dallavecchia, their respective statements regarding Fannie Mae's subprime holdings, 

were false and misleading. 

FANNIE MAE'S ALT-A DISCLOSURE FRAUD 

Fannie Mae Increases Market Share By Acquiring Reduced Documentation Alt-A Loans 

151. F annie Mae acquired increasing amounts of reduced documentation loans. Prior 

to 2000, Fannie Mae had a limited market presence in purchasing reduced documentation loans, 

and those loans were not a large part of mortgage originations nationwide. This changed during 

the 2000s, and by 2007, reduced documentation loans were. surging in popularity, representing 

approximately 40% ofmortgage loan originations nationwide. 

152. Traditionally, Fannie Mae's MBS dominated the nationwide mortgage-related 

securities market However, by 2005, private label competition for mortgage-backed securities 

overtook Fannie Mae's MBS market dominance; as a result, Fannie Mae's nationwide share of 

mortgage loan originations fell from 40% in 2004 to 20% in 2005. 

40153. In response, at the end of 2005, Fannie Mae's board of directors instructed the 

Single Family business to adjust its business plan to gain back market share. The goal was to 

increase Single Family's purchases from 20% of total mortgage loan originations to at least 25% 

by the end of 2006. In an April 2006 meeting, Mudd directed the Single Family business to 

acquire more reduced documentation loans specifically, saying: "the market is moving to low 

documentation and we need to actively pursue the keys to this market." 

154. Fannie Mae's push to increase its reduced documentation loans was dramatic. At 

the end of 2004, reduced documentation loans constituted 17.8% of Fannie Mae's Single Family 

loan acquisitions: by year-end 2005 that number was 20.2%, and by year-end 2006, 27.8% of 

Fannie Mae's Single Family loan acquisitions were reduced documentation loans. This 

represented a nearly 40% increase from 2005 and a greater than 50% increase from 2004. 

Fannie Mae Internally Tracked Its Loans With Low Or Alternative Documentation 

Requirements As Reduced Documentation Loans 


155. As described in internal Company records, documentation level is a key credit 

risk characteristic of a loan. Because Alt-A loans do not require that a borrower fully document 

their income, assets and/or employment, Alt-A loans have a greater risk of default than fully 

documented loans. Fannie Mae executives-including Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia­

regularly monitored the total reduced documentation loan acquisition trends at the Company and 

the attendant credit risk those loans presented via internal reports. 

156. Mudd, for example, was well aware of the Company's increased acquisition of 

reduced documentation loans. An April 26, 2006 CEO credit risk briefing stated that of all loans 

acquired by Fannie Mae's Single Family business, 20.2% were reduced documentation loans at 

year-end 2005, and this number increased to 23.5% of acquisitions by February 2006. That same 

report noted that credit risks (such as reduced documentation) are a strong predictor of serious 

41 




delinquency within the first year of a loan's acquisition and therefore present significant credit 

risk. 

157. Similarly, at the beginning of his tenure as CRO of Fannie Mae in June 2006, 

Dallavecchiawas briefed on Fannie Mae's increasing stake in reduced documentation loans. 

Dallavecchia received a credit risk briefing that explained: Fannie Mae's Single Family business 

has seen an increase in "potentially riskier products like ... low documentation loans .. . [and] 

Alt-A loans as a percent oftotal acquisitions increased from 11.5% in 2002 to 20.2% in 2005." 

. That same presentation described this increase as an acquisition "trend" and noted Fannie Mae's 

Single Family plan for an "Alt-A push. Goal of$60B in 2006." 

158. As a member of the Disclosure Committee, throughout the fall of 2006, 

Dallavecchia received draft versions ofFannie Mae's 2004 Form 10-K, which contained detailed 

acquisition data concerning reduced documentation mortgages, including quantitative exposure 

data that showed reduced documentation mortgages "represented approximately 18%, 20% and 

24% of our single-family acquisitions in 2004, 2005, and the first half of2006." 

159.. Likewise, throughout the Relevant Period, as EVP of the Single Family business, 

Lund was aware of Fannie Mae's increasing exposure to Alt-A loans. He received monthly 

reports that presented Fannie Mae's total reduced documentation loan exposure, which between 

2006 and 2008 ranged from 13% to 21% ofthe Single Family mortgage book ofbusiness. Those 

loan acquisition reports were sometimes called the "Tom Lund Report." 

160. During the Relevant Period, Lund's Single Family officers-'from his Single 

Family Credit Risk officers to Product Management and Development executives-routinely 

prepared presentations and reports concerning not only Fannie Mae's increasing acquisitions of 

reduced documentation loans, but also the credit risks associated with those loans, including their 

42 



expected and actual SDQ rates. As the head of the Single-Family business, Lund had access to 

data and information prepared by his officers, as well as Early Warning reports-all of which 

conveyed, as described by his staff: "Low doc is more likely to default than full doc." 

43 



Fannie Mae Failed to Report All The Reduced Documentation Loans 

That It Tracked Internally for Credit Risk Monitoring Purposes 


161. In its public filings, when it publicly disclosed the amount of reduced or 

alternative documentation loans it held, the Company did not report all of the reduced 

documentation loans that it tracked internally as one of seven key credit risks. 

162. Each of the Defendants knew that approximately half of the reduced 

documentation loans in the Single Family book were not included when the Company reported 

its Alt- A loans. 

163. When the Company internally tracked its reduced documentation loans it included 

loans that it referred to as "Special Lender Programs" or Lender-Selected loans. These were 

loans in which the lender ostensibly initiated the reduced documentation option for processing 

the loan. The Company also tracked "Other LowlNo Doc loans," which are Borrower-Selected 

loans, .or loans in which borrowers specifically requested loans for which minimal 

documentation was required. 

164. When the Company reported its Alt-A holdings it failed to disclose all its reduced 

documentation loans: it disclosed Borrower-Selected loans but did not report its Lender-Selected 

loans. This limited disclosure misrepresented the extent of Fannie Mae's total exposure to 

reduced documentation loans. 

165. On average throughout the Relevant Period, Lender-Selected Reduced 

Documentation Loans-the undisclosed Alt-A loans-had SDQ rates that were 1.4 times higher 

than full documentation loans with otherwise similar credit risks. Moreover, during the Relevant 

Period, certain types of Lender-Selected Reduced Documentation Loans that Fannie Mae 

acquired, such as Countrywide's Fast and Easy loans, had SDQ rates that were 2 times higher 

than full documentation loans with otherwise similar credit risks. 

44 




166. Fannie Mae's Alt-A· disclosure misrepresented the extent of its reduced 

documentation high risk holdings as evidenced by the undisclosed loans from a single source of 

Lender-Selected reduced documentation loans. At year-end 2006, Fannie Mae had $102.5 billion 

worth of Fast and Easy loans alone on its Single Family book of business, which grew to $129.2 

billion by year-end 2007, and by the end of the third quarter of 2008, Fannie Mae had $133.4 

billion worth of Fast and Easy loans on its Single Family book ofbusiness. None of these loans, 

or other similar Lender-Selected reduced documentation loans, were ever disclosed to investors 

when the Company quantified its Alt-A exposure. 

167. This single unreported Alt-A product from one customer-Countrywide­

accounted for 4.63% of Fannie Mae's 2006 Single Family business, 5.10% in 2007 and 4.94% as 

of September 2008. As one of Lund's officers stated in a presentation: "CHL [Countrywide] 

sells whatever it can through Fast & Easy." 

Fannie Mae Failed To Disclose That 

The Company Directed Lenders When To Classify Loans as A It-A 


168. Fannie Mae stated that it classified loans as "Alt-A if the lender that delivers the 

mortgage loans to us has classified the loans as Alt-A based on documentation or other product 

features." This reporting materially understated the extent of Fannie Mae's total exposure to' 

reduced documentation loans. 

169. Fannie Mae did not disclose that the Company directed lenders that delivered the 

mortgage loans to Fannie Mae's lender channel whether to label reduced documentation loans as 

Alt-A or not. The Alt-A classification, in practice, came from Fannie Mae and was executed by 

the originating lenders; the lenders did not make the coding determination. 

170. Fannie Mae had contractual. agreements with lenders that included instructions on 

when to code reduced documentation loans for delivery through its Lender Channel as Alt-A. 

45 



Occasionally, when a customer delivered loans to Fannie Mae's Lender channel with an Alt-A 

code that Fapnie Mae had not prescribed for delivery for that loan type, Fannie Mae would 

instruct the customer to re-code its loans to remove the Alt-A code prior to accepting delivery. 

171. Fannie Mae determined whether the lender Classified the loan as Alt-A rather than 

accepting an Alt-A classification as designated by a lender 

Fannie Mae Issues a Series ofFalse and Misleading Disclosures on Alt-A 

172. In its 2004 Form 10-K, which was filed on December 6, 2006, the Company 

disclosed that ithad increased its holdings of reduced documentation loans, but did not quantify 

those holdings: 

We also have increased the proportion of reduced documentation loans that we 
purchase ... we began to increase our participation in these product types where 
we concluded that it would be economically advantageous or that it would 
contribute to our mission objectives ... In addition, there has been an increasing 
industry trend towards streamlining the mortgage loan underwriting process by 
reducing the documentation requirements for borrowers. Reduced documentation 
loans in some cases present higher credit risk than loans underwritten with full 
standard documentation. 

173. In its discussion of Alt-A, Fannie Mae did not disclose that the amount of "loans 

that are underwritten with lower or alternative documentation" in the Single Family mortgage 

credit book of business was $390 billion as of September 30, 2006, or the fact that by June 30, 

2006, approximately 24%. of Fannie Mae's Single Family loan acquisitions were reduced 

documentation loans. 

174. As Fannie Mae prepared to file its 2005 Form 10-K in February 2007, Single 

Family officers working on the credit risk disclosures voiced concern: "Given Alt-A is an 

increasing as part of our business [sic] strategy and volume and this is the 2005 disClosure it 

seems to warrant more than a fairly benign reference, as is the case in the 2004 disclosure ... The 

decision now may very well be not to include numbers for this segment and just disclose an 

46 




increasing trend in words, but by the time we are done with 2006 we need to reflect the reality of 

the business." 

175. During this time period, senior management at Fannie Mae recognized that 

investors wanted to know the Company's Alt-A exposure. In April 2007, the director ofInvestor 

Relations at Fannie Mae wrote an email acknowledging, "In anticipation of IR's 2005 10-K 

briefing with Dan and Bob tomorrow, we would like to get your direction on how management 

should address questions related to FNMs exposure to Alt-A product ... we expect the question 

to be asked and need to plan for it." (Emphasis added). 

Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Aft-Disclosures in its May 9, 2007 
Form 12b-25 Filing 

176. On May 9, 2007, for the first time, Fannie Mae disclosed a quantification of its 

Alt-A holdings in its Form 12b-25 filing. The Company defined Alt-A as loans with "lower or 

alternative documentation" and disclosed that it held 11 % ofAlt-A initsSingle Family mortgage 

credit book ofbusiness. Fannie Mae stated: 

Although there is no uniform definition of Alt-A ... [AIt-A] loans generally are 
loans that are underwritten with lower or alternative documentation than a full 
documentation mortgage loan and that also may include other alternative features 
... In reporting our Alt-A exposure, we have classified mortgage loans as Alt-A if 
the lenders that deliver the mortgage loans to us have classified the loans as Alt-A 
based on documentation or other product features, or, for the original or 
resecuritized private-label, mortgage-:related securities that we hold in our 
portfolio, if the securities were labeled as Alt-A when sold. We estimate that 
approximately 11 % of our total single-family mortgage credit book of business as 
of both March 31, 2007 and December 31, 2006 consisted of Alt-A mortgage 
loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS backed by Alt-A mortgage loans .. ; As 
described below in the discussion of our Capital Markets group, we also have 
invested in highly rated private-label mortgage-related securities backed by Alt-A 
loans. We estimate that approximately 1% of our total single-family mortgage 
credit book of business consisted of private-label mortgage-related securities 
backed by Alt-A mortgage loans as of both March 31, 2007 and December 31, 
2006. (Emphasis added.) 

47 




177. The amount ofAlt-A Fannie Mae publicly disclosed did not include the "lower or 

alternative documentation loans" that were internally referred to as Lender-Selected reduced 

document loans. Yet nothing in Fannie Mae's public disclosures alerted investors to the fact that 

a much larger volume of loans that matched the Company's description of its Alt-A holdings 

were excluded from the amount ofAlt-A that the Company disclosed. 

178. Fannie Mae's total exposure to loans with "lower or alternative documentation" 

(A It-A) was actually 20.7% and 20.1% of its total Single Family mortgage credit book of 

business at March 31, 2007, and December 31, 2006, respectively, not 11% as disclosed. Fannie 

Mae's reporting of its Alt-A mortgage loans omitted approximately $219 billion and $201 billion 

worth of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business which consisted of 

reduced documentation loans as of March 31, 2007, and December 31, 2006, almost equal to the 

volume of Single Family loans ($263 billion and $257 billion) that were disclosed as Alt-A. 

Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Alt-A Disclosures in its 2006 Form 10-K 

179. In June 2007, Lund's Single Family personnel prepared Single Family Credit 

Committee presentation materials, which acknowledged that, for internal Fannie Mae 

calculations, Fannie Mae's undisclosed Alt-A loan programs were treated as reduced 

documentation loans, notfull document loans. 

180. Even though senior management, including Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia, 

recognized that Fannie Mae had an increasing volume of reduced documentation loans that 

performed as poorly as some loans disclosed as Alt-A, none of these loans were disclosed. On 

August 16,2007, in its 2006 Form 10-K, the Company stated: 

"AIt-A mortgage" generally refers to a loan that can be underwritten with lower 
or alternative documentation than a full documentation mortgage loan but may 
also include other alternative product features. As a result, Alt-A mortgage loans 
generally have a higher risk. of default than non-Alt-A mortgage loans. In 

48 



reporting our Alt-A exposure, we have classified mortgage loans as Alt-A if the 
lenders that deliver the mortgage loans to us have classified the loans as Alt-A 
based on documentation or other product features, or, for the original or 
resecuritized private-label, mortgage-related securities that we hold in our 
portfolio, if the securities were labeled as Alt-A when sold ...We estimate that 
approximately 11 % of our total single-family mortgage credit book of business as 
of December 31, 2006 consisted of Alt-A mortgage loans or structured Fannie 
Mae MBS backed by Alt-A mortgage loans. This percentage increased to 
approximately 12% as of June 30, 2007 ... We estimate that private label 
mortgage-related securities backed by Alt-A loans . . . accounted for 
approximately 1 % (and 2% respectively) ... of our single-family mortgage credit 
book of business as ofJune 30, 2007. (Emphasis added.) 

181. At the time ofthis disclosure, Fannie Mae's total exposure to loans with "lower or 

alternative documentation" (Alt-A) was actually 22% of its total Single Family mortgage credit 

book of business, not 12% as disclosed. Farinie Mae's reporting of its Alt-A omitted 

approximately $238 billion worth of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of 

business, which consisted of reduced document loans as of June 30, 2007- almost equal to the 

$296 billion that was disclosed as Alt-A. 

Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Alt-A Disclosures in itsjirst, second 
and third quarter 2007 10-Qs 

182. By October 2007, reduced documentation loans comprised 29.1% of Fannie 

Mae's Single Family loan acquisition volume and 22% of the Single Family mortgage credit 

book of business. 

183. Nevertheless, on November 9,2007, in its 2007 Forms 10-Q for the first quarter, 

the Company disclosed: 

As of March 31, 2007, we estimate that approximately 11 % of our total single­
family mortgage credit book of business consisted of Alt-A mortgage loans or 
Fannie Mae MBS backed by Alt-A mortgage loans. This percentage increased to 
approximately 12% as of September 30,2007 ... As of March 31, 2007, we held 
in our investment portfolio approximately $34.5 billion in private-label mortgage­
related securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans. 

49 




184. On that same day, November 9,2007, Fannie Mae also filed its 2007 Fonns lO-Q 

for the second and third quarter, the Alt-A disclosures for which were comparable to the 2007 

Fonn lO-Q for the first quarter. 

185. Fannie Mae's total exposure to loans with "lower or alternative documentation" 

(Alt-A) was actually 22% of its total Single Family mortgage credit book ofbusiness, not 12% as 

disclosed. Fannie Mae's reporting of its Alt-A omitted approximately $267 billion worth of 

Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business which consisted of reduced 

document loans as of September 30, 2007- almost equal to the $306 billion that was disclosed 

as Alt-A. 

186. On November 9, 2007, for the quarter ended September 30, 2007, Fannie Mae 

also filed a Fonn 8-K credit supplement with the Commission. The document contained a 

summary deScription of certain credit risk characteristics of its Single Family book of business in 

chart fonn. Included in this chart was a separate column identifying Fannie Mae's Alt-A 

holdings, and designating that 12.5% of its Single Family mortgage credit book of business were 

Alt-A loans. Nowhere in this supplemental disclosure was there any statement to suggest that 

Single Family holdings included billions of dollars of additional reduced documentation loans 

that were not reflected in the 12.5% figure. Fannie Mae continued to issue credit supplements 

that were similarly misleading throughout the Relevant Period. 

Fannie Mae's False and Misleading Disclosure in its Year-End 2007 10-K Filing 

187. On February 27, 2008, in its 2007 Fonn lO ..K, the Company repeated its prior 

statement on Alt-A and updated its reporting as follows: 

Alt-A mortgage loans, whether held in our portfolio or backing Fannie 

Mae MBS, represented approximately 16% of our single-family business 

volume in 2007, compared with approximately 22% and 16% in 2006 and 

2005, respectively. 


50 



188. Fannie Mae's total volume of loans with "lower or alternative documentation" 

(Alt-A) was actually 37% of its Single Family acquisitions, not 16% as disclosed. 

189. On May 6, 2008, in its 2008 Form lO-Q for the first quarter, the Company stated: 

Alt-A mortgage loans, whether held in our portfolio or backing Fannie Mae MBS 
represented approximately 4% of our single-family business volume for the first 
quarter of 2008, compared with approximately 23% for the first quarter of 2007. 
Alt-Amortgage loans held in our portfolio or Alt-A mortgage loans backing 
Fannie Mae MBS, excludingresecuritized private-label mortgage-related 
securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans, represented· approximately 11 % ofour 
total single-family mortgage credit book of business as of March 31, 2008, 
compared with approximately 12% as ofDecember 31,2007. 

190. Fannie Mae's total exposure to loans with "lower or alternative documentation" 

(Alt-A) was actually 22% of its total Single Family mortgage credit book ofbusiness, not 11 % as 

disclosed. Fannie Mae's reporting of its Alt-A loans omitted approximately $323 billion worth 

of mortgage loans in Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business that 

consisted of reduced document loans as ofMarch 31, 2008- more than the $300 billion that was 

disclosed as Alt-A. 

191. As of December 2007,23% of Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book 

of business consisted of reduced documentation loans, not the 11% reported in the public filing. 

192. Approximately two and a half months after the 2008 Form lO,..Q filing, in July 29, 

2008,· Lund held a staff meeting which addressed issues related to reduced documentation loans. 

Countrywide's Fast and Easy program-a Lender-Selected loan program whose loans were 

tracked as a reduced document high risk loan internally but excluded from Fannie Mae's public 

disclosure of its Alt-A exposure- was specifically discussed in the presentation. The briefing 

addressed that these loans performed as poorly as some loans that were disclosed as Alt-A. 

51 




Despite this knowledge, Fast and Easy loans were not disclosed as part of Fannie Mae's Alt-A 

exposure, and Lund continued to sub-certify Fannie Mae's public statements. 

193. By August 2008, and before the filing of its 2008 Form JO-Q for the se~ond 

quarter, Fannie Mae was planning to eliminate its high risk products, including Alt-A. The 

Company still did not disclose its total Alt-A loans. 

194. On August 8, 2008, in its 2008 Form 10-Q for the second quarter, its final filing 

before conservatorship, the Company stated: 

Alt-A mortgage loans, whether held in our portfolio or backing Fannie Mae MBS 
represented approximately 4% of our single-family business volume for the first 
six months of 2008, compared with approximately 22% for the first six months of 
2007 ... Alt-A mortgage loans held in our portfolio or Alt-A mortgage loans 
backing Fannie Mae MBS, excluding resecuritized private-label mortgage-related 
securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans, represented approximately 11 % of our 
total single-family mortgage credit book of business as of June 30, 2008, 
compared with approximately 12% as ofDecember 31,2007. 

195. Fannie Mae's total exposure to loans with "lower or alternative documentation" 

(Alt-A) was actually 23% of its total Single Family mortgage credit book ofbusiness, not 11 % as 

disclosed. Fannie Mae's reporting of its Alt-A omitted approximately $341. billion worth of 

Fannie Mae's Single Family mortgage credit book of business which consisted of reduced 

documentation loans as of June 30, 2008-more than the $306 billion that was disclosed as Alt-

A to investors on August 8, 2008. 

Post-conservatorship Fannie Mae Acknowledges Additional Alt-A Holdings 

196. In its first periodic filing post-conservatorship, Fannie Mae made a disclosure that 

highlights the misleading nature of the Company's prior Alt-A disclosures. At the time this 

disclosure was made neither Mudd nor Dallavecchia were at Fannie Mae, and Lund, who 

remained EVP of the Single Family business, was no longer a member of the Disclosure 

Committee. The Company explained: 

52 




We have classified mortgage loans as Alt-A if the lender that delivers the 
mortgage to us has classified the loans as Alt-A based on documentation or other 
features ... We apply these classification criteria in order to determine our Alt-A 
... loan exposure[ 1; however, we have other loans with some features that are 
similar to Alt-A ... that we have not classified as Alt-A ... because they do not 
meet our classification criteria. (Emphasis added.) 

197. In this statement for the first time the Company publicly acknowledged what 

Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia had known throughout the Relevant Period, that it held loans that 

matched its public definition of Alt-A, but had not included them when reporting its Alt-A 

exposure: 

198. Based on the facts alleged above, Mudd, Lund and Dallavecchia, knew or were 

reckless in not knowing that Fannie Mae's statements reporting Alt-A were false and misleading. 

FmST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 O(b) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND RULE 10b-5(b) 


(MUDD) 


1. Paragraphs 1 through 198 are realleged and incorporated by reference as if set 

forth fully herein. 

2. Mudd directly or indirectly, by use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate 

commerce, or by use of the mails, or of the facilities of a national securities exchange, in 

connection with the purchase or sale of Fannie Mae securities, knowingly or recklessly, has 

made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to 

make statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 

misleading. 

3. By reason of the foregoing, Mudd directly or indirectly has violated; and unless 

enjoined will again violate, Section lOeb) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and Rules 

10b-5(b) thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)). 

53 




SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

VIOLATION OF SECTION17(A)(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT 


(MUDD AND DALLAVECCHIA) 


4. Paragraphs 1 through 198 are realleged and incorporated by reference as if set 

forth fully herein. 

5. Mudd and Dallavecchia, directly or indirectly, in the offer and sale of Fannie Mae 

securities, by use of the means and instruments of transportation and communication in interstate 

commerce and by use of the mails, knowingly, recklessly or negligently have obtained money or 

property by means of untrue statements of material fact or omissions to state material facts 

necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 

were made, not misleading. 

6. By reason the foregoing, Mudd and Dallavecchia have violated, and unless 

enjoined will again violate, Sections 17(a)(2) ofthe Securities Act (15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2». 

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

AIDING AND ABETTING VIOLATIONS OF SECTION lOeb) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT 


AND RULE10b-5(b) 


(MUDD, DALLAVECCHiA AND LUND) 


7. Paragraphs 1 through 198 are realleged and incorporated by reference as if set 

forth fully herein . 

.8. Fannie Mae and Mudd, directly or indirectly, by use of the means or 

instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or by use of the mails, or of the facilities of a national 

securities exchange, in connection with the purchase or sale ofFannie Mae securities, knowingly 

or .recklessly, has made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts 

necessary in order to make statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 

were made, not misleading. 

54 



9. Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund acted knowingly or recklessly and provided 

substantial assistance to and thereby aided and abetted Fannie Mae in its violations of Exchange 

Act Section 1 O(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5(b); [17 C.F.R. § 240.1 Ob-5(b)]; therefore, each is liable 

pursuant to Exchange Act Section 20(e) [15 U.S.c. § 78t(e)]. 

10. Dallavecchia and Lund acted knowingly or recklessly and provided substantial 

assistance to and thereby aided and abetted Mudd in his violations of Exchange Act Section 

lOeb) and Rule 10b-5(b); [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)]; therefore, each is liable pursuant to 

Exchange Act Section 20(e) [15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)]. 

11. Unless restrained and enjoined, Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund will continue to aid 

and abet violations of Section lOeb) of the Exchange Act (15 u.s.c. § 78j(b)) and Rules IOb­

5(b) thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)). 

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
VIOLATION OF EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13A-14(A) 

(MUDD) 

12. Paragraphs 1 through 198 are realleged and incorporated by reference as if set 

forth fully herein. 

13. On December 6, 2006, May 2, 2007, August 16, 2007, and February 27, 2008, . 

Mudd signed false certifications of Fannie Mae Fonns 10"'-K, and on November 9,2007, May 6, 

2008, and August 8, 2008, Mudd signed false certifications of Fannie Mae Fonns 10-Q. Each of 

those Forms ·1O-K and Forms IO-Q certifications Mudd made were pursuant to Section 302 of 

the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Rule 13a-J4(a) promulgated thereunder. His certifications 

falsely stated that: he had reviewed each report; based upon his knowledge, the reports did not 

contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make 

the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not 

55 




misleading; and based upon his knowledge, the financial statements and information contained in 

each report fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and 

cash flows of the registrant. 

14. By reason of the foregoing, Mudd violated, and unless restrained and enjoined 

will continue to violate, Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(a) (17 C.F.R. § 240,13a-14) promulgated under 

Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002. 

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

AIDING AND ABETTING VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 13(A) OF THE 


EXCHANGE ACT AND RULES 12B-20, 13A-l AND 13A-13 


(MUDD, DALLA VECCHIA AND LUND) . 


15. Paragraphs 1 through 198 are realleged and incorporated by reference as if set 

forth fully herein. 

16. Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13a-l and Rule 13a-13 thereunder 

requires issuers of registered securities to file with the Commission factually accurate current 

and quarterly reports. Exchange Act Rule 12b-20 provides that in addition to the information 

expressly required to be included in a statement or report, there shall be added such further 

material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the light of 

the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading. 

17. Fannie Mae violated Exchange Act § 13(a) [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] and Exchange 

Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-l and 13a-13 (17 C.F.R. §§ 240.l2b-20, 240.l3a-l, and 240.l3a-13). 

18. By reason of the foregoing, Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund acted knowingly or 

recklessly and provided substantial assistance to and thereby aided and abetted Fannie Mae's 

violations of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.c. § 78m(a» and Exchange Act Rules 

12b-20, 13a-l and 13a-13 (17 C.F.R. §§ 240.l2b-20, 240.l3a-l, and 240.l3a:-13); therefore, each 

is liable pursuant to Exchange Act Section 20(e) [15 U.S.c. § 78t(e)]. 

56 




PRAYER FOR RELIEF 


WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: 

(a) Permanently restrain and enjoin defendant Mudd from violating Section 17(a)(2) 

of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.c. §77q(a) (tithe Securities Act tl
), Section lO(b) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (tithe Exchange Act tl
) and Exchange Act 

Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.l0b-5, Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a), and 

Exchange Act Rules 12b-20 and 13a-13,17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.l3a-13 and Exchange 

Act Rule 13a-14(a) (17 C.F.R. § 240. 13a-14), and aiding and abetting Fannie Mae's violation of 

Section lO(b) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. 

(b) Permanently restrain and enjoin defendant Dallavecchia from violating Section 

17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, aiding and abetting Fannie Mae's and Mudd's violations of 

Section lO(b) ofthe Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, and aiding and abetting Fannie 

Mae's violation of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-l 

and 13a-13. 

(c) Permanently restrain and enjoin defendant Lund from aiding and abetting Fannie 

Mae's and Mudd's violations ofSectionlO(b) and Rule 10b-5,aiding and abetting Fannie Mae's 

violation of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-l and 13a­

13. 

(d) Order defendants Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund to pay disgorgement, together 

with prejudgment interest; . 

(e) Order defendants Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund to pay penalties pursuant to 

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange 

Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)]; 

57 



.. 


(f) Permanently bar defendants Mudd, Dallavecchia and Lund, pursuant to Section 

20(e) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §77t(e)] and Section 21(d)(2) of the Exchange Act (15 

U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)), from acting as an officer or director of any issuer that has a class of 

securities registered under Section 12 ofthe Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 781) or that is required to 

file reports pursuant to SeCtion 15(d) ofthe Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 780(d)); and 

58 



•. I ~ 

(g) Grant such other relief as this Court may deem necessary and proper. 

Dated: December ~ , 2011 

Washington, D.C. 

Respectfully Submitted, 

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

By: d41#- f" h So' ~ 
Natasha S. Guinan (4320636) 
Sarah L. Levine 
James A. Kidney 
Stephen L. Cohen 
Charles·E. Cain 

100 F Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20549 

Tel.: (202) 551-4572 (Guinan) 

Fax: (202) 772-9236 (Guinan) 

E-mail: [email protected] 


59 


mailto:[email protected]