2014-12-18 DOJ SDNY complaint 128 KB 65,975 chars

United States v. City Of New York; and New York City Department Of Correction, Southern District of New York (Dec. 18, 2014) — Complaint

raw: United States’ Proposed Complaint In Intervention City Of New York And New York City Department Of Correction

United States’ Proposed Complaint In Intervention City Of New York And New York City Department Of Correction (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2014)

Caption
United States v. City Of New York, et al.

Enriched metadata

Scheme
non-corporate (100%)
Court
Southern District of New York
Classified non-corporate(confidence 100%). No EDGAR filing fingerprint (criminal/DOJ-side scheme). detection rule →
Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 199742 U.S.C. § 1414142 U.S.C. § 1997c28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
Parties
United States of AmericaCity Of New YorkNew York City Department Of Correction
Keywords
nunez citynunezcitynewintervention

Extracted insights

Entities 5
  • person Attorney General
  • person Mark Nunez
  • agency New York City Department Of Correction
  • person Preet Bharara
  • location United States
Triples 5
  • United States alleges Defendants City of New York and the New York City Department of Correction have violated constitutional rights of male inmates
  • Defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of subjecting the Subject Inmates to excessive and unnecessary use of force by DOC staff
  • Defendants have failed to take meaningful action to correct the problem of violence against Subject Inmates
  • Defendants are well aware of the profound impact that solitary confinement can have on youth
  • DOC announced its intention to stop placing 16- and 17-year olds in punitive segregation by the end of 2014
Text layers
Extracted body text (65,975c)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

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MARK NUNEZ, et al.,  
 
                                     Plaintiffs,    
 

    - against - 
 
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., 
 
                                    Defendants. 
 
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11 Civ. 5845 (LTS)(JCF) 
 
UNITED STATES’ PROPOSED 
COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
                 Plaintiff-Intervenor, 
 
 - against - 
 
CITY OF NEW YORK and NEW YORK CITY 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, 
 
                 Defendants. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 

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 Plaintiff United States of America (the “United States”), by and through its attorney, 

Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, alleges upon 

information and belief as follows:  

INTRODUCTION 

1. Defendants City of New York and the New York City Department of 

Correction (the “Department” or “DOC”) have engaged in a pattern and practice of violating the 

constitutional rights of male inmates—ages 16, 17, and 18—incarcerated at the jails on Rikers 

Island (the “Subject Inmates”).   Defendants’ deliberate indifference to these constitutional rights 

has caused the Subject Inmates serious physical, psychological, and emotional harm. 



   
 

2 
 

2. Specifically, Defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of subjecting 

the Subject Inmates to excessive and unnecessary use of force by DOC staff, and failing to 

adequately protect the Subject Inmates from violence inflicted by other inmates.  For years, 

Defendants have been aware of the extraordinarily high level of violence perpetuated against the 

Subject Inmates, but have failed to take meaningful action to correct the problem, including by 

(a) failing to meaningfully address an organizational culture that tolerates unnecessary and 

excessive force; (b) failing to ensure that use of force by DOC staff is properly reported and 

investigated; (c) failing to appropriately discipline correction officers who utilize unnecessary 

and excessive force, as well as those who supervise such officers; (d) failing to implement 

measures to ensure that the Subject Inmates are appropriately supervised by experienced, 

qualified, and well-trained staff; and (e) failing to maintain an effective and age-appropriate 

classification system and inmate grievance system.  

3. In addition, Defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of placing the 

Subject Inmates in punitive segregation at an alarming rate and for excessive periods of time, 

which has resulted in significant psychological, physical, and developmental harm.  Defendants 

are well aware of the profound impact that solitary confinement can have on youth due to their 

stage of growth and development, but for years have failed to develop an adequate continuum of 

alternative disciplinary sanctions for rule violations that do not involve lengthy isolation.  

Although DOC recently announced its intention to stop placing 16- and 17-year olds in punitive 

segregation by the end of 2014, several 16- and 17-year olds remained in punitive segregation as 

of the middle of November 2014.  Defendants also continue to routinely place 18-year old 

inmates, including many with mental illnesses, in punitive segregation for excessive periods. 



   
 

3 
 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

4. The United States is authorized to bring this action pursuant to the Civil Rights 

of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, and Section 14141 of the Violent 

Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Section 14141”).  

5. The Attorney General certifies that all pre-filing requirements specified by  

42 U.S.C. § 1997c have been met.  The Attorney General’s certification is included in the United 

States’ Notice of Motion, and is incorporated by reference herein. 

6. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 

1345. 

7. Venue is proper in the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(b) because Defendants are located in this District and the events, actions, or omissions 

giving rise to the claims herein occurred in the Southern District of New York. 

THE DEFENDANTS  

8. Defendant City of New York (the “City”) is a municipal corporation that 

oversees the operation of the jails located on Rikers Island where the Subject Inmates are 

incarcerated.   

9. Defendant New York City Department of Correction manages and operates the 

jails where the Subject Inmates are incarcerated.  The City and DOC are responsible for the 

safety, care, custody, and control of the Subject Inmates and others incarcerated on Rikers Island. 

10. At all relevant times, Defendants have acted or failed to act, as alleged herein, 

under the color of state law. 



   
 

4 
 

11. The claims of the United States are asserted solely against the City of New 

York and the Department, and not against the individual defendants named in the Amended 

Complaint filed in Nunez et al. v. City of New York et al., 11 Civ. 5845 (LTS)(JCF).   

FACTS 

BACKGROUND 

12. The jails where the Subject Inmates are incarcerated are institutions within the 

meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1997. 

13. Defendants are political subdivisions of New York State, or agents thereof, 

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1997.  Defendants are governmental authorities, or agents 

thereof, with the responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice and the incarceration of 

juveniles within the meaning of Section 14141. 

14. New York is one of only two states in the United States that automatically 

charges all individuals aged 16 and older as adults. 

15. The vast majority of the Subject Inmates are pre-trial detainees.  Pre-trial 

detainees aged 16 and 17 are housed in the Robert N. Davoren Center (“RNDC”).  Until 

recently, 18-year old pre-trial detainees were housed in RNDC as well.  In or around September 

2014, DOC began housing most 18-year old pre-trial detainees in the George Motchan Detention 

Center (“GMDC”), although some are housed in the George R. Vierno Center (“GRVC”) and 

some in the Central Punitive Segregation Unit (“CPSU”) in the Otis Bantum Correctional Center.  

Approximately half of the Subject Inmates are 18-year olds. 

16. Until recently, all sentenced Subject Inmates were placed at the Eric M. Taylor 

Center (“EMTC”), which houses inmates sentenced to serve one year or less.  Within the last few 

months, the Department began housing sentenced 16- and 17-year old inmates in RNDC.   



   
 

5 
 

17. The average daily population for inmates aged 16-18 was 489 in FY 2014, 682 

in FY 2013, and 791 in FY 2012.  These inmates’ average length of stay at Rikers tends to be 

longer than the adult population.  In FY 2013, their average length of stay was 74.6 days. 1 

18. Approximately half of the Subject Inmates are diagnosed with some form of 

mental illness.   Many have significant mental health impairments that can limit their impulse 

control. 

19. The United States sent Defendants a findings letter on August 4, 2014 

(“Findings Letter”) that set forth the unconstitutional conditions at the jails where the Subject 

Inmates are housed and concluded that there was a pattern and practice of conduct at Rikers that 

violated the constitutional rights of the Subject Inmates.  In particular, the Findings Letter 

asserted that DOC frequently subjects the Subject Inmates to the excessive and unnecessary use 

of force, fails to adequately protect the Subject Inmates from violence inflicted by other inmates, 

and places the Subject Inmates in punitive segregation at an alarming rate and for excessive 

periods of time.  The Findings Letter notified the Defendants of the minimum measures the 

United States believes may remedy the unconstitutional conditions.  The Findings Letter is 

appended to this Complaint-in-Intervention as Exhibit A and is incorporated by reference herein.    

STAFF USE OF FORCE AND INMATE-ON-INMATE VIOLENCE 
 

A. Defendants Have Failed to Protect the Subject Inmates from Harm Caused By 
Excessive and Unnecessary Use of Force by Staff and High Levels of Inmate-on-
Inmate Violence.  

 
20. The Constitution requires Defendants to protect inmates from the use of 

excessive and unnecessary force by staff as well as violence inflicted by other inmates. 

Defendants have failed to take minimum reasonable measures to fulfill this fundamental 

                                                           
1 These figures include female inmates aged 16-18, who represent approximately 10% of the admissions for this age 
group.  The fiscal year runs from July through June of the following year. 



   
 

6 
 

responsibility, and for several years have been deliberately indifferent to the obvious and 

substantial risk of harm to the Subject Inmates resulting from staff use of force and inmate-on-

inmate violence.   As a result of Defendants’ systemic and widespread pattern, practice, and 

custom of utilizing unnecessary and excessive force, the Subject Inmates have sustained serious 

injuries in violation of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 

Constitution. 

1. The Extraordinary Frequency of Use of Force and Violence 
 

21.  The Subject Inmates face pervasive violence at Rikers and are at constant risk 

of physical harm during their incarceration.  DOC staff have routinely used force unnecessarily 

as a means to control the population and punish disobedient or disrespectful inmates.  Even when 

some level of force is necessary, the force used is often disproportionate to the risk posed by the 

inmate.  In addition, inmate-on-inmate fights and assaults are commonplace.   

22. Emergency alarms often sound in the Subject Inmates’ housing areas signaling 

some altercation or disturbance.  As a result, the facility frequently is placed in locked down 

status and inmates are confined to their cells.  In FY 2014 alone, there were 1,303 responses to 

emergency alarms at RNDC and EMTC, up from 1,118 in FY 2013.   

23. Staff use force against the Subject Inmates with alarming frequency.  

According to DOC data, in FY 2014, there were 553 reported staff use of force incidents 

involving the Subject Inmates in RNDC and EMTC, resulting in 1,088 injuries.2  There were 565 

reported staff use of force incidents in FY 2013 (resulting in 1,057 injuries), and 517 incidents in 

FY 2012 (resulting in 1,059 injuries).  In addition, 308 (or 43.7%) of the 705 Subject Inmates in 

                                                           
2 These use of force figures exclude “use of force allegations,” which refer to instances when sources other than 
DOC personnel report that force was used on an inmate.  There were 32 use of force allegations at RNDC or EMTC 
in FY 2014, 56 in FY 2013, and 45 in FY 2012.   
 



   
 

7 
 

custody as of October 30, 2012, had been subjected to use of force by staff on at least one 

occasion.   

24. The actual use of force numbers are likely even higher than DOC’s data 

suggest because many incidents go unreported.  As discussed infra, correction officers often do 

not accurately report incidents, and warn inmates to “hold it down” (code for “don’t report what 

happened”) or otherwise pressure them not to report use of force incidents. 

25. The number of reported inmate-on-inmate fights and assaults is also striking, 

and further demonstrates that the Department is not fulfilling its obligation to ensure the safety 

and well-being of the Subject Inmates.  There were 657 reported inmate-on-inmate fights 

involving the Subject Inmates in RNDC and EMTC in FY 2014.  This marked a modest decrease 

from the 845 reported inmate-on-inmate fights in FY 2013, and the 795 reported inmate-on-

inmate fights in FY 2012.3  In the first half of FY 2014, the Subject Inmates received a total of 

775 infractions for fighting.   

26. Inmate-on-inmate fights are likely even more prevalent than reflected in 

DOC’s data due in part to the inconsistent manner in which staff report inmate altercations.  For 

example, according to the results of an internal Department audit, RNDC failed to report 375 

fights during calendar year 2011 alone, due in part to the lack of a codified definition of “inmate 

fight,” and inconsistencies in how staff recorded and reported inmate altercations.  As discussed 

in more detail infra, the initial version of the audit report, prior to being revised at the direction 

of then DOC Commissioner Dora Schriro, concluded that the dramatic underreporting was due to 

RNDC management’s failure “to supervise, manage, or oversee the facility’s reporting of 

violence statistics, statistics that RNDC was obligated to report pursuant to department policy.” 

                                                           
3 From April 2012 through April 2013, fights resulted in 430 visible inmate injuries, according to data provided by 
the Department of Health and Mental Health.   
 



   
 

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27. Inmate-on-inmate violence is pervasive in the jails that house the Subject 

Inmates in large part because the inmates are inadequately supervised by inexperienced and 

poorly trained correction officers, who fail to closely and adequately monitor inmate conduct.   

28. Staff uses of force and inmate-on-inmate fights and assaults have resulted in an 

alarming number of serious injuries to the Subject Inmates, including broken jaws, broken orbital 

bones, broken noses, long bone fractures, and lacerations requiring stitches.  The Department has 

failed to ensure that these injured inmates consistently receive prompt medical care.  

29. The Subject Inmates have sustained injuries at a staggering rate.  For instance, 

during the period April 2012 through April 2013, the Subject Inmates sustained a total of 754 

visible injuries, according to data maintained by the Department of Health and Mental Health 

(“DOHMH”), which is responsible for providing medical services to inmates at Rikers.  The 

prevalence of head injuries is particularly striking.  From June 2012 through early July 2013, the 

Subject Inmates suffered a total of 239 head injuries, and were twice as likely to sustain such 

injuries as was the adult population.   

30. Bone fractures are common as well.  The Subject Inmates housed in RNDC 

and EMTC suffered a total of 96 suspected fractures from September 2011 through August 2012, 

according to DOHMH data.4  In addition, during FY 2013, the Subject Inmates were taken to an 

urgent care facility for emergency medical services 459 times.  

31.   During the first half of 2012, 55% of the Subject Inmates brought to the 

RNDC medical clinic after a use of force incident had a verifiable injury.  This represented a 

higher rate than any other Rikers housing facility, taking into account inmate population.  Even 

more concerning, 48% of those injuries were to the inmate’s head or face, including fractures, 

contusions, and lacerations. 
                                                           
4 RNDC inmates suffered 22 jaw fractures during the first 5 ½ months of 2012 alone.   



   
 

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2. Excessive and Unnecessary Staff Use of Force  

32. As described in more detail below, DOC staff have engaged in a pattern, 

practice, and custom of subjecting the Subject Inmates to excessive and unnecessary force.  For 

years, Defendants have failed to take reasonable measures to adequately address the deep-seated 

culture of violence that has pervaded the jails for years.  As a result, the Subject Inmates have 

been and continue to be harmed.  

a. Headshots 

33. DOC staff frequently punch, strike, or kick the Subject Inmates in their head or 

facial area.  Staff sometimes deliver closed fist punches to an inmate’s facial area as an initial 

response to a volatile situation, without first seeking to control or neutralize the inmate through 

less aggressive techniques.  DOC staff have regularly utilized headshots where no officer or 

other individual was at imminent risk of serious bodily injury and more reasonable methods of 

control could have been used to avoid such injury.    

34. DOC’s 24-hour reports5 from October 2012 through early April 2014 reveal a 

total of 64 incidents involving blows to a Subject Inmate’s head or face.6  This is undoubtedly an 

underestimate of the number of headshots during this period, because 24-hour reports contain 

only initial incident summaries prepared by staff themselves. 

35. Headshots have become so widespread at Rikers that correction officers 

sometimes plainly admit using them.  Officers frequently claim that they struck a Subject Inmate 

in the head or face in self-defense after being first punched by the inmate, when in fact this was 

not the case. 
                                                           
5 24-hour reports include summaries of unusual incidents that occurred during a given day, including use of force 
incidents.   
 
6  The 64 incidents include 25 use of force allegations.  There were 12 additional incidents that do not specifically 
reference a blow to the head or face, but state that the officer punched the inmate and the inmate sustained an injury 
to his head or facial area. 



   
 

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36. In other instances, staff report using only “upper body control holds” to restrain 

inmates, but the evidence—such as statements in the inmates’ medical records describing facial 

swelling, bruising, or lacerations—strongly suggests that the officers in fact used headshots and 

submitted false reports. 

37. Headshots are a long-standing problem at Rikers.  In 2004, Steve Martin, the 

consultant retained in a then-pending class action lawsuit against DOC, issued a report noting the 

frequency with which DOC staff punched inmates in the face.  See Report of Steve J. Martin 

submitted in Ingles v. Toro, 01 Civ. 8279 (DC).  Mr. Martin wrote that “there is utterly no 

question that the Department, by tolerating the routine use of blunt force headstrikes by staff, 

experiences a significantly greater number of injuries to inmates than the other metropolitan jail 

systems with which I am familiar.”  Notwithstanding their awareness of the serious risk of harm 

that headshots present, over the last ten years DOC management has failed to adequately address 

this long-standing problem through improved training, supervision, and staff disciplinary 

measures.   

b. Use of Force as Punishment or Retribution 
 

38. Instead of using force only as a last resort, DOC staff improperly utilize force 

as a means to punish the Subject Inmates for real or perceived misconduct, and as a form of 

retribution.  Correction officers engage in abusive practices that are designed to be punitive and 

inflict pain on the Subject Inmates.   

39. DOC staff have taken inmates to isolated locations with limited or no camera 

coverage to inflict beatings.  Multiple correction officers are often involved in these beatings.  In 

addition, DOC staff have challenged the Subject Inmates to fights at locations with no video 

surveillance, such as stairwells or the RNDC school area. 



   
 

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40. Correction officers also unnecessarily continue to use force against the Subject 

Inmates who already have been restrained.  They often continue to hit, slap, beat, or kick the 

inmates well after they have been placed in flex cuffs or otherwise restrained and no longer 

present any actual threat or safety risk.   

41. In addition, DOC staff punish the Subject Inmates through the use of painful 

escort techniques.  Corrections officers apply flex cuffs excessively tightly and exert intense 

pressure in order to inflict extreme pain.   

c. Use of Force in Response to Verbal Altercations and Failure to 
Follow Instructions  
 

42. DOC staff unnecessarily employ abusive physical force when confronted with 

verbal taunts and insults, noncompliant inmates, and inmate complaints, even though no safety or 

security threat exists.   

43. Due to their poor training and inexperience, correction officers lack adequate 

conflict resolution and de-escalation skills, which are particularly important when interacting 

with volatile youth.  When Subject Inmates talk back to an officer or make a derogatory remark, 

DOC staff frequently escalate the disagreement into a physical confrontation instead of 

exercising patience and seeking to de-escalate the situation.  As a result, force is needlessly 

applied and the Subject Inmates suffer preventable injuries. 



   
 

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d. Use of Force by Specialized Teams  
 

44. Each jail has a designated probe team that consists of a group of correction 

officers and supervisors who respond to disturbances and violent incidents.   Probe team 

members wear helmets, face shields, and protective equipment around their torso.  Inmates 

commonly refer to them as “the Turtles.”  

45.   Upon arriving at the scene of an incident, probe team members often quickly 

resort to the use of significant levels of force that are disproportionate to the threat or risk 

presented.  DOC has received multiple complaints regarding the dangerous conduct of probe 

teams, but has still failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that probe team members receive 

adequate training and are sufficiently qualified and experienced to effectively carry out their 

duties. 

46. Cell extraction teams are called upon to remove resistant or assaultive Subject 

Inmates from their cells.  Before resorting to force, cell extraction teams are required to first try 

to persuade inmates to voluntarily leave their cells through counseling.   Indeed, DOC policy 

requires that mental health staff be summoned to attempt to persuade an inmate to cooperate.  

However, either these efforts regularly fail or DOC policy is not being followed, as extractions 

frequently result in the unnecessary and excessive use of force and injuries to the Subject 

Inmates and DOC staff. 

e. False Claims that Inmate Was Resisting to Justify Use of Force 
 

47. While employing excessive force against the Subject Inmates, DOC staff 

regularly yell “stop resisting” even though the inmate has been completely subdued or, in many 

instances, was never resisting in the first place. 



   
 

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48.  DOC staff engages in this practice to give the impression that the continued 

use of force is necessary to control the inmate, when in fact it is not.  

49.  Correction officers who witness use of force incidents also frequently report 

that the inmate was resisting, even though that is false.   

50. Although DOC supervisors and management are aware of these efforts to 

“cover up” the unjustified use of continued force, they often fail to question whether inmates 

were actually resisting in a manner to warrant the level of force utilized.   

f.   High Levels of Use of Force in Areas Outside of Camera Coverage 
 

51. DOC staff frequently employ excessive and unnecessary force in locations 

without video surveillance to avoid detection.    

52. For years at RNDC, a disproportionate number of the most serious use of force 

incidents occurred in locations that did not have cameras, such as the school area, stairwells, and 

intake holding pens.  Inmates, correction officers, and supervisors are well aware of these 

locations.  Some even have names.  For instance, the RNDC intake cells have been referred to by 

inmates as “forget about me” cells.   

53. DOC management was well aware of the frequency with which staff abused 

the Subject Inmates in these areas, and knew that additional video surveillance would likely deter 

the use of excessive and unnecessary force.  However, for years the Department has failed to 

install a sufficient number of cameras to ensure full coverage throughout RNDC.  Although more 

cameras have been installed since the United States issued the Findings Letter on August 4, 

2014, hundreds of additional cameras are still needed to provide complete video surveillance 

coverage at the facility.   



   
 

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54.   As discussed above, in or around September 2014, DOC transferred most 18-

year old pre-trial detainees from RNDC to GMDC.  Most of the GMDC units that now house 18-

year old inmates have no video surveillance at all.  During September through November 2014, 

there were a total of 71 reported staff use of force incidents involving 18-year olds alone. 

B. Defendants Have Exhibited a Pattern and Practice of Deliberate Indifference to 
Ongoing Serious Harm, and the Risk of Serious Harm, to the Subject Inmates from 
Excessive and Unnecessary Use of Force by Staff and High Levels of Inmate 
Violence. 
 

55. Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the known serious harm, and risk of 

serious harm, to the Subject Inmates is exhibited by the long history of violence at Rikers and 

Defendants’ ongoing failure to, inter alia, select and promote a sufficient number of managers 

and supervisors with the necessary skills and commitment to address the extraordinarily high 

levels of violence perpetrated against and among the Subject Inmates, ensure that use of force 

incidents involving the Subject Inmates are properly documented and investigated, ensure that 

DOC staff are appropriately disciplined for utilizing excessive and unnecessary force and for 

attempting to cover up such use of force, implement measures to ensure that the Subject Inmates 

are appropriately supervised, maintain an effective and age-appropriate classification system, 

maintain an effective inmate grievance system, and ensure that DOC staff working with the 

Subject Inmates have effective training programs on both use of force and managing youth. 

1. The Long History of Violence at Rikers 
 

56. Defendants have been aware of the ongoing harm and risk of serious harm to the 

Subject Inmates for many years, based on a long and troubled history of pervasive staff use of 

force against inmates, yet have failed to correct these known deficiencies.  This history is the 

result of an organizational culture that accepts excessive and unnecessary violence as an inherent 

part of the jail environment.   



   
 

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57. Defendants were put on notice of the systemic use of excessive and inappropriate 

force by DOC staff, and the culture of violence that surrounds it, by a series of use of force-

related class action lawsuits brought by inmates dating back to the early 1980s.  Four of these 

class actions focused on specific facilities, including the jail currently known as EMTC (Fischer 

v. Koehler, 83 Civ. 2128), the Bellevue Prison Psychiatric Ward (Reynolds v. Ward, 81 Civ. 

101), the Brooklyn House of Detention (Jackson v. Montemango, 85 Civ. 2384), and the Central 

Punitive Segregation Unit (Sheppard v. Phoenix, 91 Civ. 4148).  A fifth class action alleged 

system-wide constitutional violations (Ingles v. Toro, 01 Civ. 8279).  These cases all settled by 

either court-ordered or private settlement, instituting limited injunctive relief and certain reforms 

related to use of force policies.  Notwithstanding these reforms, a culture of violence has 

persisted in DOC jails, including the jails that house the Subject Inmates.   

58. In addition, Defendants have been alerted to staff misconduct through several 

criminal prosecutions of individual correction officers.  In 2011, two correction officers pled 

guilty in connection with events that led to the death of an adolescent in October 2008.  The 

inmate died from a punctured lung after he allegedly was beaten by other inmates for refusing to 

participate in “the Program,” a system of extortion among young inmates that was reportedly 

operating at Rikers with the approval of correction officers.   

59. In 2012, a former Assistant Deputy Warden was found guilty of falsifying use of 

force reports and official misconduct, and a Captain was found guilty of falsifying use of force 

reports, official misconduct, and attempted assault, in connection with a beating of an inmate at 

RNDC.   

60. In 2013, ten DOC employees, including the former Assistant Chief for Security, 

two Captains, and seven correction officers, were indicted on a range of charges, including 



   
 

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attempted gang assault, tampering with evidence, and falsifying business records, in connection 

with the beating of an inmate at GRVC.   

61. In March 2014, four correction officers were indicted on charges including 

attempted gang assault, assault, falsifying business records, and official misconduct in 

connection with the beating of an inmate at GMDC.  In July 2014, a Captain and two correction 

officers were indicted on charges including attempted gang assault, assault, falsifying business 

records, and official misconduct in connection with the beating of another inmate at GRVC.   

62. As these criminal prosecutions make clear, Defendants knew that the Subject 

Inmates were being harmed due to excessive force by correction officers and their supervisors, 

and that reports of such incidents were being falsified, and yet Defendants failed to take any 

meaningful action to correct the systemic deficiencies that led to these incidents.   

63. Moreover, for years, Defendants’ own internal data and reporting have shown that 

the Subject Inmates have been subject to an alarming number of use of force incidents and 

inmate-on-inmate fights and assaults that far exceed what one would expect in a correctional 

facility.  DOC management regularly received and reviewed volumes of materials that clearly 

reflected this high level of violence, including 24-hour reports, use of force reports, aggregate 

data on staff use of force and inmate-on-inmate fights and assaults, internal reports, and warnings 

set forth in emails from health officials at DOHMH.  Indeed, information from these sources, and 

others, was analyzed and provided to Defendants in the United States’ Findings Letter.  

Nonetheless, Defendants have failed to implement sufficient measures to correct known systemic 

deficiencies that have led and continue to lead to serious harm, and risk of harm, to the Subject 

Inmates.    



   
 

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2. Failure to Put in Place Qualified Managers and Supervisors Who Are 
Committed to and Capable of Reducing the Level of Violence 

 
64. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to appoint a sufficient number of qualified managers and supervisors, including wardens 

and deputy wardens, with the necessary background, experience, and skills to meaningfully 

address the extraordinarily high levels of violence.  This has led to continued unnecessary and 

excessive staff use of force and high levels of inmate fights. 

 65. Defendants have failed to adequately screen and select candidates before 

appointing them to senior positions.  As a result, many managers and supervisors are ill-equipped 

to properly oversee frontline staff and simply tolerate the excessive and unnecessary staff use of 

violence, instead of implementing necessary measures to curb it.   

 66.   For years, DOC managers and supervisors have failed to institute adequate 

systems, procedures, and practices to address widespread noncompliance with DOC policies, 

including use of force and reporting policies, and have failed to consistently hold staff 

accountable for their improper conduct.   

 67. For example, as discussed above, in September 2012, an internal DOC audit 

conducted by DOC’s Investigation Division (“ID”) determined that RNDC management failed to 

report 375 inmate fights during calendar year 2011.  The report specifically found that the RNDC 

Warden and Deputy Warden for Security during that same time period, William Clemons and 

Turhan Gumusdere, had abdicated responsibility for RNDC’s accurate reporting of inmate fights 

and generally failed to supervise, manage, or oversee RNDC’s reporting of violence statistics, 

which the facility was obligated to report pursuant to DOC’s own policies. 

 68. The same September 2012 internal audit recommended that Clemons and 

Gumusdere be demoted for their blatant supervisory failures.  But the then-Commissioner of the 



   
 

18 
 

Department ordered the ID to remove the demotion recommendations from a subsequent version 

of the audit report.  Rather than be demoted, Clemons was in fact promoted more than once, 

most recently in May 2014 to the position of Chief of Department, the highest ranking uniformed 

position.7  Gumusdere also has been promoted, and is currently Warden of the largest jail on 

Rikers Island.   

69. Defendants also have failed to ensure continuity of facility management, making 

it difficult to institute and implement any meaningful reforms.  There have been at least eight 

Wardens over the past eight years at RNDC.  The lack of continuity is also reflected in the 

frequent turnover of RNDC Deputy Wardens.   

3. Failure to Ensure Thorough and Accurate Reporting of Use of Force 
Incidents Involving the Subject Inmates 

 
70. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to ensure that use of force incidents are thoroughly and accurately reported and recorded.  

When use of force reporting is inaccurate or omitted altogether, excessive and unnecessary use 

of force goes undiscovered and unchallenged, which in turn leads to additional unnecessary and 

excessive use of force.   

71. Defendants have failed to take action to overcome a powerful code of silence that 

prevents staff who witness force from reporting it.  For example, staff will frequently report that 

they witnessed an inmate using force against an officer or resisting an officer, but then fail to 

note or describe the force the officer employed in response to the inmate—even when the officer 

himself has reported that he has used force.  Similarly, officers frequently affirmatively state that 

they did not witness any use of force despite other evidence that indicates they were at the scene 

where force was used.  Investigators and supervisors reviewing use of force reports consistently 

                                                           
7 Clemons ultimately retired in late 2014. 



   
 

19 
 

fail to point out these and other obvious omissions and failures to conform the reports to DOC 

policy, reinforcing a perception among staff that it is not important to be forthcoming or 

complete in their reports.   

72. Defendants have failed to prevent correction officers from neglecting to complete 

reports for comparatively “minor” uses of force, such as slapping and hitting the Subject Inmates 

to get them to stop talking, pay attention, or stop playing around in school.   

73. Defendants have failed to prevent correction officers and supervisors from 

pressuring inmates not to report use of force incidents, including by using the phrase “hold it 

down.”  The warning may come from officers immediately following a beating, or sometimes 

days or weeks after an incident.  Correction officers delay taking inmates to clinics for medical 

attention as they try to convince them to “hold it down.”  If the inmate indeed “holds it down” 

and declines to report a use of force, the staff also then do not report it.  Inmates who refuse to 

“hold it down” risk retaliation from officers in the form of additional physical violence and 

disciplinary sanctions.   

 74. Defendants have failed to prevent correction officers and supervisors from 

intimidating non-DOC staff into not reporting use of force by DOC staff.  Non-DOC staff, 

including medical staff and teachers, often fail to report witnessing use of force, due in part to 

fear of retaliation from DOC uniformed staff.  Teachers at the schools on Rikers, where a 

disproportionate amount of violence against the Subject Inmates takes place, have been told to 

look the other way when inmates are being beaten so as not to be witnesses.   

75. DOC staff have engaged in a pattern and practice of submitting false use of force 

reports, and Defendants have frequently ignored or tolerated this fraudulent conduct.  For 

instance: 



   
 

20 
 

 DOC staff submit reports in which they allege that the inmate instigated the 

altercation by punching or hitting the officer, often allegedly in the face or head 

and for “no reason,” “out of nowhere,” “spontaneously,” or “without 

provocation.”  But the officer has no reported injuries—no lacerations or 

fractures or even minor bruises or swelling—that would be commensurate with 

such blows.   

 DOC staff submit reports in which they claim to use only limited physical force, 

such as control holds to subdue the inmate or “guide” him to the floor, but the 

inmate’s injuries indicate a much greater level of force was used.   

 DOC staff submit reports in which they claim injuries to their own hands, but do 

not report punching or hitting inmates, describing the force used as something 

more innocuous such as “control holds” or the use of OC spray.8 

 DOC staff submit reports in which the description of an incident is inconsistent 

with the video recording, and officers later provide an addendum to their report 

or change their story when confronted with the video evidence.     

76. Defendants have failed to properly maintain and safeguard video recordings of 

use of force incidents.  During the course of the United States’ investigation, Defendants advised 

that they had lost or were otherwise unable to locate 35% of the video recordings of incidents 

requested.  Many of Defendants’ own investigative reports also note that although video was 

recorded, video evidence could not be found. 

77. Defendants have failed to ensure that incidents involving anticipated use of force, 

such as cell extractions, are properly and accurately recorded.  In these videotapes, usually shot 

                                                           
8 Oleoresin Capsicum (“OC”) spray, commonly known as pepper spray, is a chemical agent that irritates the eyes 
and respiratory system of a target.21 
 

by correction officers using hand-held video cameras, use of force often is not clearly visible or 

other important information is not captured.   

4. Failure to Properly Investigate Use of Force Incidents Involving the 
Subject Inmates 

 
78. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to conduct thorough and comprehensive investigations of staff use of force incidents.  

Reviews and investigations of use of force incidents are critically important because they are the 

means by which the Department is able to determine whether its own use of force policies are 

being followed and to evaluate the adequacy of staff reporting of incidents.  Rigorous 

investigations, conducted with integrity, are a key part of any system that intends to hold staff 

accountable for their actions, and thus prevent future abuses.   

79. The systemic failure of the investigative process at Rikers has contributed to the 

widespread use of excessive and unnecessary force against the Subject Inmates because staff are 

frequently not held accountable for policy violations, and expect their version of events to be 

accepted at face value with little scrutiny. 

 80. Defendants have failed to ensure that use of force incidents are properly 

investigated by jail personnel (i.e., at the facility level).  This is particularly problematic as the 

majority of use of force incidents and allegations have been subject only to a facility-level 

investigation.  The facilities rarely find that force has been used inappropriately, and nearly 

always conclude that force was justified and in accordance with the Department’s policies—

often despite evidence to the contrary.  Facility investigations are cursory and include the 

following common and systemic deficiencies:   



   
 

22 
 

 General bias toward accepting staff’s version of an event at face value, even 

where there is medical or other evidence to the contrary, and discrediting the 

inmate’s account.  

 Failure to consistently follow up with staff regarding obvious deficiencies in 

their use of force reports.  As discussed above, these deficiencies may include 

accounts that are inconsistent with reported injuries to the inmate or the 

involved officers, accounts that fail to explain why officers did not or could 

not have used a lesser level of force, and suspiciously similar statements and 

language in descriptions of incidents. 

 Failure to identify and reconcile material discrepancies in statements from 

involved officers, statements from staff and inmate witnesses, documentation 

of injuries, and video surveillance tapes (when available).   

 Failure to make sufficient efforts to obtain statements from inmates, including 

the inmate subject to the use of force and inmate witnesses.   

 Where video exists, failure to describe the events on the video.  Often there is 

just a summary statement that the video was reviewed and was consistent with 

officers’ use of force reports.  Because video recordings frequently go 

missing, as described above, without an accurate and detailed description of 

the video recording, there is no longer any objective record of the incident.     

 81. DOC assigns Captains and Tour Commanders to investigate incidents at the 

facility level who have not received adequate specialized training in investigative techniques, 

and show little familiarity with basic investigative skills or procedures.  In most facility-level 

investigations, Captains and Tour Commanders simply summarize the use of force reports 



   
 

23 
 

provided by the officers involved, and the witness statements provided by other correction 

officers and inmates (if any).   

 82. Defendants have failed to ensure that facility investigations are completed in a 

timely manner.  Facility investigations are completed slowly and use of force packages awaiting 

final approval become backlogged, notwithstanding the Department’s policy that such 

investigations be completed within 15 days of the incident.  Facility management give each use 

of force package little more than a cursory review, making it easier for correction officers to 

conceal misconduct.    

83. Defendants have permitted the ID to conduct superficial reviews of facility-level 

investigations, which fail to detect and identify glaring deficiencies.    

 84.  Certain incidents, such as those involving serious injuries, may trigger a full 

investigation by the ID.  However, ID investigations of incidents involving the Subject Inmates 

frequently suffer from the same bias and other shortcomings that characterize the facility-level 

investigations, despite lengthy investigations by ostensibly trained investigators.  The ID 

disregards or is selective about the policy violations that it chooses to note in its reports—

sometimes recommending charges only for some policy violations despite evidence of additional 

violations, and sometimes recommending no charges at all despite substantial evidence of one or 

more policy violation. 

85. Defendants also have failed to ensure that ID investigations are completed in a 

timely manner.  In the first part of 2013, the average completion time for investigation of a Class 

A use of force incident was just over 9 months.9  As of October 2012, 11 percent of the ID’s 

cases had been open for over 350 days, and 42 percent of the ID’s cases had been open for 

                                                           
9 According to the Department’s Use of Force Directive, a Class A use of force is one which requires “medical 
treatment beyond prescription of over-the-counter analgesics or the administration of minor first aid,” including 
lacerations, fractures, sutures, chipped or cracked teeth, or multiple abrasions and/or contusions.   



   
 

24 
 

between 151 and 350 days.  Some investigations of incidents involving serious injuries, 

including broken bones and sutures, have taken well over a year to complete.   

5. Failure to Ensure that Staff Are Appropriately Disciplined 
 
 86. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to appropriately discipline staff for using excessive and unnecessary force against the 

Subject Inmates.  Because most investigations conclude that staff have not violated DOC 

policies, often despite evidence to the contrary as discussed above, staff are rarely disciplined for 

using excessive and unnecessary force.  In those relatively rare cases where a facility or ID 

investigation results in a determination that staff used inappropriate force, the disciplinary 

sanctions are minimal.  The most frequent disciplinary response by the Department is to 

“counsel” a correction officer or send him or her for “re-training.”  The failure to appropriately 

discipline officers and supervisors for excessive or inappropriate use of force against the Subject 

Inmates encourages future abuse, leading to continued harm or risk of harm to the Subject 

Inmates. 

 87. Defendants also have failed to ensure that Captains or other supervisors are 

appropriately disciplined, or disciplined at all, for ineffective or inadequate supervision of the 

correction officers under their command.   

 88. Defendants have allowed officers who have been involved in staggering numbers 

of use of force incidents to continue to work in areas that house the Subject Inmates.  Defendants 

have failed to intervene in any meaningful way or to transfer such officers to jails that house 

more mature inmates, but instead repeatedly “counsel” such officers and allow the behavior to 

continue.  Over one six-year period from 2007 to 2012, there were four officers who had been 

involved in between 50 and 76 use of force incidents at RNDC, and another seven officers who 



   
 

25 
 

had been involved in between 20 and 35 use of force incidents at RNDC.  The officer with the 

highest number of uses of force during the six-year period (76) was disciplined only once during 

this time; most of the others were disciplined once or twice, and some never.      

89. Defendants have failed to put in place a functioning early warning system for 

identifying and effectively intervening with those officers who are involved in an unusually high 

number of use of force incidents and other incidents that may serve as predictors of future 

misconduct.  An appropriate early warning system is an important management and 

accountability tool that allows for early intervention by alerting a facility to a need for additional 

training, insufficient policies, supervision lapses, or possible bad actors. 

6. Failure to Ensure that the Subject Inmates are Adequately Supervised 
 
90. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to adequately supervise them.  For years, staff responsible for managing the Subject 

Inmates have had minimal corrections experience, failed to interact with inmates in a 

professional manner, and failed to adequately monitor inmate conduct.  These failures have led 

to increased violent interactions between DOC staff and the Subject Inmates, as well as increased 

inmate-on-inmate violence. 

91. Defendants historically have placed new correction officers who come straight 

from the DOC Academy at RNDC.  Indeed, 220 (or 90.9%) of the 242 correction officers who 

started working at RNDC during calendar year 2012 came directly from the training Academy.  

In addition, approximately 35% of RNDC correction officers had fewer than two years of 

experience in the Department as of early 2013.  New officers are ill-equipped to cope with the 

Subject Inmates who are often belligerent and suffer from a wide range of mental illnesses and 



   
 

26 
 

behavioral disorders.  As a result, inexperienced officers have quickly resorted to using violence 

as a means to control the inmates.  

92. RNDC also has been historically plagued by an excessive staff turnover rate.  

From January 2011 through April 4, 2013, 282 correction officers transferred out of RNDC, 

while 401 new correction officers were assigned to the facility.  The turnover level at the Captain 

level has been similarly high.  Thus, just as staff members may be developing some of the 

necessary conflict resolution techniques and interpersonal skills to effectively manage the 

population and curb violence, they have left for another facility.   

93. Defendants have failed to ensure basic levels of staff professionalism.  Staff have 

frequently insulted, humiliated, and antagonized the Subject Inmates, often using obscenities and 

abusive language without fear of any reprimand from supervisors.  Such unprofessional conduct 

provokes physical altercations, and leads to unnecessary violence.   

94. Defendants have failed to adequately oversee inmate conduct in jails, which 

contributes to the extremely high level of inmate-on-inmate violence.   Staff do not intervene as 

necessary in order to prevent verbal disagreements from escalating.  When physical altercations 

do occur, staff fail to intervene in a timely manner, exposing inmates to a significant risk of 

serious injuries.   Although the Department reduced the inmate-to-staff  ratio in RNDC after the 

issuance of the Findings Letter in an effort to improve inmate supervision, the ratio is still 

significantly higher than the ratio in many secure juvenile facilities, and no similar increased 

staffing was introduced in the units that house 18-year olds.   



   
 

27 
 

7. Failure to Put in Place an Effective and Age-Appropriate Classification 
System for the Subject Inmates and Failure to Institute an Adequate 
Inmate Grievance System 

 
95. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

utilizing the same classification system for 16- and 17-year olds and adults.  A classification tool 

designed for adults can lead to inappropriate results when applied to youth.  The Department has 

failed to implement an age-appropriate classification system that takes into account the inmate’s 

cognitive and emotional development and physical stature.  The deficiencies in DOC’s 

classification system contribute to the unsafe conditions in the housing areas and increase the 

risk of inmate-on-inmate violence.    

96. Defendants have failed to make sufficient use of protective custody to ensure the 

safety of vulnerable Subject Inmates.  

97. Defendants also have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates 

by failing to maintain an adequate grievance system, thus contributing to the failure to detect and 

address inappropriate or excessive use of force against these inmates.  For example, the 

emergency grievance system is insufficient.  The grievance policy states that inmates with 

grievances requiring immediate attention should submit a regular grievance form to the Captain 

or Tour Commander, who is then required to forward the form to the grievance coordinator 

within one day.  One day is too long for an inmate to wait when he faces an imminent threat to 

his safety or well-being.     

8. Failure to Ensure Effective Staff Training on Use of Force and Youth 
Management 

 
98. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to provide effective training on both use of force and youth management.  The training 

curriculum historically has been poorly designed and repetitive, conveyed via a scripted lecture 



   
 

28 
 

format, and lacking in sufficient demonstrations, discussions, and role playing.  Moreover, the 

training has not been sufficiently focused on some of the most troubling practices at Rikers, such 

as headshots, false reporting, and painful escort techniques.   

99. Defendants have failed to adopt and implement specialized remedial training for 

officers who violate the Department’s use of force policies and procedures.  The remedial 

training has been the same as the standard in-service training, which is less effective than a more 

specialized, focused, and rigorous program designed specifically for officers who already have 

engaged in improper conduct.    

100. In addition, Defendants have failed to provide effective training to staff on how to 

interact with and manage incarcerated youth.   

PUNITIVE SEGREGATION 
 

A. Defendants Have Failed to Protect the Subject Inmates from Harm Caused by 
Prolonged and Excessive Punitive Segregation   

 
101. Defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of placing Subject Inmates 

involved in use of force incidents and inmate-on-inmate fights, as well as Subject Inmates 

charged with committing non-violent rule violations, in punitive segregation at an alarming rate 

and for excessive periods of time, which has resulted in significant psychological, physical, and 

developmental harm.  Defendants’ improper reliance on punitive segregation as a way to manage 

and control disruptive Subject Inmates violates their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the Constitution.   

102. Inmates in punitive segregation are confined in six-by-eight-foot single cells for 

23 hours each day, with one hour of recreation and access to a daily shower.  Recreational time is 

spent in individual chain-link cages, and many inmates choose to remain in their cells due to 

depression or because they do not want to submit to being searched and shackled just to be 



   
 

29 
 

outside in a cage.  Inmates are denied access to most programming and privileges available to the 

general population, and receive meals through slots on the cell doors.  They are not allowed to 

attend school, and are instead given schoolwork on worksheets and are offered educational 

services telephonically.   

103. The Department houses certain infracted inmates with mental health needs in the 

RNDC Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”), which is jointly administered by DOC and DOHMH, 

and offers individual behavioral and group therapy.  The RHU utilizes a three-tiered reward 

system designed to create incentives for good behavior.  Upon being admitted to the RHU, 

inmates start at level zero and are locked in their cells 23 hours a day.  If inmates follow the 

rules, they may earn additional out-of-cell time for programming and leisure activities.  Inmates 

who successfully complete the RHU program—which takes approximately eight weeks—can 

earn up to a 50% reduction in their segregation time.  Those who do not comply with the 

program are transferred out of the RHU into the general population punitive segregation units.  

The RHU, however, is still a punitive segregation setting where inmates are confined in single-

occupancy cells for prolonged periods.  Even those inmates who progress to Level 3 of the 

program can earn only up to three hours of lock-out time.  As of October 1, 2013, only 29 of the 

hundreds of Subject Inmates who have been placed at the RHU had “graduated” from the 

program and received a sentence reduction.   

104. The Subject Inmates have received infractions at an extraordinarily high rate and 

have spent an exorbitant amount of time in punitive segregation.  On any given day in 2013, 

approximately 15-25 percent of the Subject Inmates were in punitive segregation, with sentences 

ranging up to several months.  For instance, on July 23, 2013, 140 Subject Inmates (or 25.7% of 



   
 

30 
 

the total population) were in some form of punitive segregation housing, and 102 (or 73%) of 

those inmates were diagnosed as seriously or moderately mentally ill.   

105. During the 21-month period from March 2012 through November 2013, a total of 

3,158 Subject Inmates received infractions, or an average of more than 150 inmates each month.  

These 3,158 inmates received a total of 8,130 infractions, resulting in a total of 143,823 days 

sentenced to punitive segregation.  Several of the most common infractions were for non-violent 

conduct, such as failure to obey orders from staff (1,671 infractions), verbally harassing or 

abusing staff (561 infractions), failure to obey orders promptly and entirely (713 infractions), and 

shouting abusive-offensive words (392 infractions).  

106. The Subject Inmates have been routinely placed in punitive segregation at Rikers 

for months at a time.  Inmates accrue additional segregation time for offenses committed while in 

punitive segregation, which further extends their time there. 

 Of the 27 Subject Inmates assigned to RNDC punitive segregation units on 

December 16, 2013, 11 had punitive segregation sentences of 60 or more 

days.   

 Of the 22 Subject Inmates assigned to the RHU on December 16, 2013, 14 

had punitive segregation sentences of 60 or more days.  (Of those 14 inmates, 

10 had sentences exceeding 100 days.)  

 Of the 25 Subject Inmates assigned to the now-closed punitive segregation 

unit for mentally ill inmates on April 3, 2013, 23 had punitive segregation 

sentences (including time accrued while in segregation) of 90 or more days 

(15 had between 90 and 194 days still owed, and eight had more than 200 

days still owed).   



   
 

31 
 

107. Shortly after the United States issued the Findings Letter on August 4, 2014,  

DOC announced its intention to eliminate the use of punitive segregation for 16- and 17-year 

olds by the end of the calendar year, including use of the RHU.  Since this announcement, the 

number of 16- and 17-year olds in punitive segregation has been substantially reduced, although 

several inmates remained there as of the middle of November 2014.  Notwithstanding the 

Department’s assurances, there remains a reasonable possibility that, without appropriate court-

ordered injunctive relief, the Department will return to its practice of regularly placing 16- and 

17-year olds in punitive segregation, particularly given the Department’s long history of relying 

on solitary confinement to control this population.   Additionally, the Department continues to 

place 18-year olds, including those diagnosed with mental illnesses, in punitive segregation.  As 

of the middle of November 2014, more than forty 18-year olds were placed in punitive 

segregation housing units at Rikers.  

B. Defendants Have Exhibited a Pattern and Practice of Deliberate Indifference to 
Ongoing Serious Harm, and the Risk of Serious Harm, to the Subject Inmates from 
the Excessive Use of Punitive Segregation   
   

 108. The conditions of confinement in the punitive segregation units pose a risk of 

causing significant psychological, physical, and developmental harm to the Subject Inmates.  

Solitary confinement can have a particularly profound impact on young inmates due to their 

stage of growth and development.  The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 

has found that “[d]ue to their developmental vulnerability juvenile offenders are at particular 

risk” of possible adverse psychiatric consequences from “prolonged solitary confinement.”  

(www.aacap.org/AACAP/Policy_Statements/2012/Solitary_Confinement_of_Juvenile_Offender

s.aspx).  Young inmates can experience symptoms such as paranoia, anxiety, and depression 

after being isolated for only a fairly short period.  This potential harm can be even greater for 



   
 

32 
 

inmates with disabilities or histories of trauma and abuse, who constitute a significant portion of 

the Subject Inmate population.  

 109. For years, Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the known serious 

harm, and risk of serious harm, to the Subject Inmates that is caused by subjecting them for 

excessive periods of time to the conditions that exist in punitive segregation housing.  

Defendants failed to develop and implement a continuum of alternative disciplinary sanctions for 

infractions that did not involve lengthy isolation.    

 110. Although the Department finally took long overdue steps towards eliminating 

punitive segregation for 16- and 17-year olds after the United States issued the Findings Letter, 

as noted above, there is a reasonable possibility that, absent a court order, the Department may 

return to its practice of heavily relying on punitive segregation to control this population.  In 

addition, the Department continues to exhibit deliberate indifference to the safety and well-being 

of dozens of 18-year old inmates, including those who are mentally ill, who still remain in 23-

hour solitary confinement for weeks as their psychological and physical well-being deteriorates.   

CAUSES OF ACTION 
 

FIRST CLAIM: DEFENDANTS’ PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF VIOLATING THE 
SUBJECT INMATES’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (CRIPA) 

 
111. The United States re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set 

forth in paragraphs 1 – 110, above. 

112. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, authorizes 

the United States to seek equitable relief to remedy a pattern or practice of Defendants’ depriving 

the Subject Inmates confined in DOC jails of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 

protected by the Constitution. 



   
 

33 
 

113.  The acts, omissions, and practices alleged in paragraphs 1 – 110 constitute a 

pattern or practice of conduct that violates the rights, privileges, and immunities of the Subject 

Inmates secured by or protected by the Constitution.  See U.S. Const. Amend. VIII & XIV.   

114. Defendants are, have been, or should have been aware of the deficiencies alleged 

in paragraphs 1 – 110.  To date, Defendants have failed to take sufficient and effective measures 

to remedy these deficiencies.  These failures amount to deliberate indifference to the safety and 

health of the Subject Inmates, in violation of the rights, privileges, and immunities of these 

inmates that the Constitution secures and protects.  This deliberate indifference caused and 

continues to cause the violations of constitutional rights alleged.   

115. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will continue to engage in the acts 

and omissions set forth in paragraphs 1 – 110 that deprive the Subject Inmates of the rights, 

privileges, and immunities that the Constitution secures and protects.   

SECOND CLAIM: DEFENDANTS’ PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF VIOLATING THE 
SUBJECT INMATES’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND SECTION 14141 

 
116. The United States re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set 

forth in paragraphs 1 – 110, above. 

117. Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 

42 U.S.C. § 14141, authorizes the Attorney General to initiate a civil action for appropriate 

equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate a pattern and practice of conduct by law enforcement 

officers or by officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for the 

administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 



   
 

34 
 

118.  The acts, omissions, and practices alleged in paragraphs 1 – 110 constitute a 

pattern or practice of conduct that violates the rights, privileges, and immunities of the Subject 

Inmates secured by or protected by the Constitution.  See U.S. Const. Amend. VIII & XIV.   

119. Defendants are, have been, or should have been aware of the deficiencies alleged 

in paragraphs 1 – 110.  To date, Defendants have failed to take sufficient and effective measures 

to remedy these deficiencies.  These failures amount to deliberate indifference to the safety and 

health of the Subject Inmates, in violation of the rights, privileges, and immunities of these 

inmates that the Constitution secures and protects.  This deliberate indifference caused and 

continues to cause the violations of constitutional rights alleged, and violates 42 U.S.C. § 14141.     

120. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will continue to engage in the acts 

and omissions set forth in paragraphs 1 – 110 that deprive the Subject Inmates of the rights, 

privileges, and immunities that the Constitution secures and protects, in violation of 42 U.S.C.  

§ 14141.  

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 
 WHEREFORE, the United States prays that the Court will: 
 

(a) Declare that Defendants’ acts, omissions, and practices constitute a pattern 

or practice of conduct within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1997 that 

deprives the Subject Inmates of rights, privileges, and immunities secured 

or protected by the Constitution, and that those acts, omissions, and 

practices violate the Constitution; 

(b)  Declare that such deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured 

or protected by the Constitution are in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 14141;  



   
 

35 
 

(c) Enjoin Defendants and Defendants’ agents from continuing these acts, 

omissions, and practices and order Defendants and Defendants’ agents to 

take such remedial actions as will ensure lawful conditions of confinement 

at the jails that house the Subject Inmates; and 

 (d)  Order such other relief as the interests of justice may require.
OCR text (65,975c · textlayer · 95% conf)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

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MARK NUNEZ, et al.,  
 
                                     Plaintiffs,    
 

    - against - 
 
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., 
 
                                    Defendants. 
 
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11 Civ. 5845 (LTS)(JCF) 
 
UNITED STATES’ PROPOSED 
COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
                 Plaintiff-Intervenor, 
 
 - against - 
 
CITY OF NEW YORK and NEW YORK CITY 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, 
 
                 Defendants. 
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 Plaintiff United States of America (the “United States”), by and through its attorney, 

Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, alleges upon 

information and belief as follows:  

INTRODUCTION 

1. Defendants City of New York and the New York City Department of 

Correction (the “Department” or “DOC”) have engaged in a pattern and practice of violating the 

constitutional rights of male inmates—ages 16, 17, and 18—incarcerated at the jails on Rikers 

Island (the “Subject Inmates”).   Defendants’ deliberate indifference to these constitutional rights 

has caused the Subject Inmates serious physical, psychological, and emotional harm. 



   
 

2 
 

2. Specifically, Defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of subjecting 

the Subject Inmates to excessive and unnecessary use of force by DOC staff, and failing to 

adequately protect the Subject Inmates from violence inflicted by other inmates.  For years, 

Defendants have been aware of the extraordinarily high level of violence perpetuated against the 

Subject Inmates, but have failed to take meaningful action to correct the problem, including by 

(a) failing to meaningfully address an organizational culture that tolerates unnecessary and 

excessive force; (b) failing to ensure that use of force by DOC staff is properly reported and 

investigated; (c) failing to appropriately discipline correction officers who utilize unnecessary 

and excessive force, as well as those who supervise such officers; (d) failing to implement 

measures to ensure that the Subject Inmates are appropriately supervised by experienced, 

qualified, and well-trained staff; and (e) failing to maintain an effective and age-appropriate 

classification system and inmate grievance system.  

3. In addition, Defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of placing the 

Subject Inmates in punitive segregation at an alarming rate and for excessive periods of time, 

which has resulted in significant psychological, physical, and developmental harm.  Defendants 

are well aware of the profound impact that solitary confinement can have on youth due to their 

stage of growth and development, but for years have failed to develop an adequate continuum of 

alternative disciplinary sanctions for rule violations that do not involve lengthy isolation.  

Although DOC recently announced its intention to stop placing 16- and 17-year olds in punitive 

segregation by the end of 2014, several 16- and 17-year olds remained in punitive segregation as 

of the middle of November 2014.  Defendants also continue to routinely place 18-year old 

inmates, including many with mental illnesses, in punitive segregation for excessive periods. 



   
 

3 
 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

4. The United States is authorized to bring this action pursuant to the Civil Rights 

of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, and Section 14141 of the Violent 

Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Section 14141”).  

5. The Attorney General certifies that all pre-filing requirements specified by  

42 U.S.C. § 1997c have been met.  The Attorney General’s certification is included in the United 

States’ Notice of Motion, and is incorporated by reference herein. 

6. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 

1345. 

7. Venue is proper in the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(b) because Defendants are located in this District and the events, actions, or omissions 

giving rise to the claims herein occurred in the Southern District of New York. 

THE DEFENDANTS  

8. Defendant City of New York (the “City”) is a municipal corporation that 

oversees the operation of the jails located on Rikers Island where the Subject Inmates are 

incarcerated.   

9. Defendant New York City Department of Correction manages and operates the 

jails where the Subject Inmates are incarcerated.  The City and DOC are responsible for the 

safety, care, custody, and control of the Subject Inmates and others incarcerated on Rikers Island. 

10. At all relevant times, Defendants have acted or failed to act, as alleged herein, 

under the color of state law. 



   
 

4 
 

11. The claims of the United States are asserted solely against the City of New 

York and the Department, and not against the individual defendants named in the Amended 

Complaint filed in Nunez et al. v. City of New York et al., 11 Civ. 5845 (LTS)(JCF).   

FACTS 

BACKGROUND 

12. The jails where the Subject Inmates are incarcerated are institutions within the 

meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1997. 

13. Defendants are political subdivisions of New York State, or agents thereof, 

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1997.  Defendants are governmental authorities, or agents 

thereof, with the responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice and the incarceration of 

juveniles within the meaning of Section 14141. 

14. New York is one of only two states in the United States that automatically 

charges all individuals aged 16 and older as adults. 

15. The vast majority of the Subject Inmates are pre-trial detainees.  Pre-trial 

detainees aged 16 and 17 are housed in the Robert N. Davoren Center (“RNDC”).  Until 

recently, 18-year old pre-trial detainees were housed in RNDC as well.  In or around September 

2014, DOC began housing most 18-year old pre-trial detainees in the George Motchan Detention 

Center (“GMDC”), although some are housed in the George R. Vierno Center (“GRVC”) and 

some in the Central Punitive Segregation Unit (“CPSU”) in the Otis Bantum Correctional Center.  

Approximately half of the Subject Inmates are 18-year olds. 

16. Until recently, all sentenced Subject Inmates were placed at the Eric M. Taylor 

Center (“EMTC”), which houses inmates sentenced to serve one year or less.  Within the last few 

months, the Department began housing sentenced 16- and 17-year old inmates in RNDC.   



   
 

5 
 

17. The average daily population for inmates aged 16-18 was 489 in FY 2014, 682 

in FY 2013, and 791 in FY 2012.  These inmates’ average length of stay at Rikers tends to be 

longer than the adult population.  In FY 2013, their average length of stay was 74.6 days. 1 

18. Approximately half of the Subject Inmates are diagnosed with some form of 

mental illness.   Many have significant mental health impairments that can limit their impulse 

control. 

19. The United States sent Defendants a findings letter on August 4, 2014 

(“Findings Letter”) that set forth the unconstitutional conditions at the jails where the Subject 

Inmates are housed and concluded that there was a pattern and practice of conduct at Rikers that 

violated the constitutional rights of the Subject Inmates.  In particular, the Findings Letter 

asserted that DOC frequently subjects the Subject Inmates to the excessive and unnecessary use 

of force, fails to adequately protect the Subject Inmates from violence inflicted by other inmates, 

and places the Subject Inmates in punitive segregation at an alarming rate and for excessive 

periods of time.  The Findings Letter notified the Defendants of the minimum measures the 

United States believes may remedy the unconstitutional conditions.  The Findings Letter is 

appended to this Complaint-in-Intervention as Exhibit A and is incorporated by reference herein.    

STAFF USE OF FORCE AND INMATE-ON-INMATE VIOLENCE 
 

A. Defendants Have Failed to Protect the Subject Inmates from Harm Caused By 
Excessive and Unnecessary Use of Force by Staff and High Levels of Inmate-on-
Inmate Violence.  

 
20. The Constitution requires Defendants to protect inmates from the use of 

excessive and unnecessary force by staff as well as violence inflicted by other inmates. 

Defendants have failed to take minimum reasonable measures to fulfill this fundamental 

                                                           
1 These figures include female inmates aged 16-18, who represent approximately 10% of the admissions for this age 
group.  The fiscal year runs from July through June of the following year. 



   
 

6 
 

responsibility, and for several years have been deliberately indifferent to the obvious and 

substantial risk of harm to the Subject Inmates resulting from staff use of force and inmate-on-

inmate violence.   As a result of Defendants’ systemic and widespread pattern, practice, and 

custom of utilizing unnecessary and excessive force, the Subject Inmates have sustained serious 

injuries in violation of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 

Constitution. 

1. The Extraordinary Frequency of Use of Force and Violence 
 

21.  The Subject Inmates face pervasive violence at Rikers and are at constant risk 

of physical harm during their incarceration.  DOC staff have routinely used force unnecessarily 

as a means to control the population and punish disobedient or disrespectful inmates.  Even when 

some level of force is necessary, the force used is often disproportionate to the risk posed by the 

inmate.  In addition, inmate-on-inmate fights and assaults are commonplace.   

22. Emergency alarms often sound in the Subject Inmates’ housing areas signaling 

some altercation or disturbance.  As a result, the facility frequently is placed in locked down 

status and inmates are confined to their cells.  In FY 2014 alone, there were 1,303 responses to 

emergency alarms at RNDC and EMTC, up from 1,118 in FY 2013.   

23. Staff use force against the Subject Inmates with alarming frequency.  

According to DOC data, in FY 2014, there were 553 reported staff use of force incidents 

involving the Subject Inmates in RNDC and EMTC, resulting in 1,088 injuries.2  There were 565 

reported staff use of force incidents in FY 2013 (resulting in 1,057 injuries), and 517 incidents in 

FY 2012 (resulting in 1,059 injuries).  In addition, 308 (or 43.7%) of the 705 Subject Inmates in 

                                                           
2 These use of force figures exclude “use of force allegations,” which refer to instances when sources other than 
DOC personnel report that force was used on an inmate.  There were 32 use of force allegations at RNDC or EMTC 
in FY 2014, 56 in FY 2013, and 45 in FY 2012.   
 



   
 

7 
 

custody as of October 30, 2012, had been subjected to use of force by staff on at least one 

occasion.   

24. The actual use of force numbers are likely even higher than DOC’s data 

suggest because many incidents go unreported.  As discussed infra, correction officers often do 

not accurately report incidents, and warn inmates to “hold it down” (code for “don’t report what 

happened”) or otherwise pressure them not to report use of force incidents. 

25. The number of reported inmate-on-inmate fights and assaults is also striking, 

and further demonstrates that the Department is not fulfilling its obligation to ensure the safety 

and well-being of the Subject Inmates.  There were 657 reported inmate-on-inmate fights 

involving the Subject Inmates in RNDC and EMTC in FY 2014.  This marked a modest decrease 

from the 845 reported inmate-on-inmate fights in FY 2013, and the 795 reported inmate-on-

inmate fights in FY 2012.3  In the first half of FY 2014, the Subject Inmates received a total of 

775 infractions for fighting.   

26. Inmate-on-inmate fights are likely even more prevalent than reflected in 

DOC’s data due in part to the inconsistent manner in which staff report inmate altercations.  For 

example, according to the results of an internal Department audit, RNDC failed to report 375 

fights during calendar year 2011 alone, due in part to the lack of a codified definition of “inmate 

fight,” and inconsistencies in how staff recorded and reported inmate altercations.  As discussed 

in more detail infra, the initial version of the audit report, prior to being revised at the direction 

of then DOC Commissioner Dora Schriro, concluded that the dramatic underreporting was due to 

RNDC management’s failure “to supervise, manage, or oversee the facility’s reporting of 

violence statistics, statistics that RNDC was obligated to report pursuant to department policy.” 

                                                           
3 From April 2012 through April 2013, fights resulted in 430 visible inmate injuries, according to data provided by 
the Department of Health and Mental Health.   
 



   
 

8 
 

27. Inmate-on-inmate violence is pervasive in the jails that house the Subject 

Inmates in large part because the inmates are inadequately supervised by inexperienced and 

poorly trained correction officers, who fail to closely and adequately monitor inmate conduct.   

28. Staff uses of force and inmate-on-inmate fights and assaults have resulted in an 

alarming number of serious injuries to the Subject Inmates, including broken jaws, broken orbital 

bones, broken noses, long bone fractures, and lacerations requiring stitches.  The Department has 

failed to ensure that these injured inmates consistently receive prompt medical care.  

29. The Subject Inmates have sustained injuries at a staggering rate.  For instance, 

during the period April 2012 through April 2013, the Subject Inmates sustained a total of 754 

visible injuries, according to data maintained by the Department of Health and Mental Health 

(“DOHMH”), which is responsible for providing medical services to inmates at Rikers.  The 

prevalence of head injuries is particularly striking.  From June 2012 through early July 2013, the 

Subject Inmates suffered a total of 239 head injuries, and were twice as likely to sustain such 

injuries as was the adult population.   

30. Bone fractures are common as well.  The Subject Inmates housed in RNDC 

and EMTC suffered a total of 96 suspected fractures from September 2011 through August 2012, 

according to DOHMH data.4  In addition, during FY 2013, the Subject Inmates were taken to an 

urgent care facility for emergency medical services 459 times.  

31.   During the first half of 2012, 55% of the Subject Inmates brought to the 

RNDC medical clinic after a use of force incident had a verifiable injury.  This represented a 

higher rate than any other Rikers housing facility, taking into account inmate population.  Even 

more concerning, 48% of those injuries were to the inmate’s head or face, including fractures, 

contusions, and lacerations. 
                                                           
4 RNDC inmates suffered 22 jaw fractures during the first 5 ½ months of 2012 alone.   



   
 

9 
 

2. Excessive and Unnecessary Staff Use of Force  

32. As described in more detail below, DOC staff have engaged in a pattern, 

practice, and custom of subjecting the Subject Inmates to excessive and unnecessary force.  For 

years, Defendants have failed to take reasonable measures to adequately address the deep-seated 

culture of violence that has pervaded the jails for years.  As a result, the Subject Inmates have 

been and continue to be harmed.  

a. Headshots 

33. DOC staff frequently punch, strike, or kick the Subject Inmates in their head or 

facial area.  Staff sometimes deliver closed fist punches to an inmate’s facial area as an initial 

response to a volatile situation, without first seeking to control or neutralize the inmate through 

less aggressive techniques.  DOC staff have regularly utilized headshots where no officer or 

other individual was at imminent risk of serious bodily injury and more reasonable methods of 

control could have been used to avoid such injury.    

34. DOC’s 24-hour reports5 from October 2012 through early April 2014 reveal a 

total of 64 incidents involving blows to a Subject Inmate’s head or face.6  This is undoubtedly an 

underestimate of the number of headshots during this period, because 24-hour reports contain 

only initial incident summaries prepared by staff themselves. 

35. Headshots have become so widespread at Rikers that correction officers 

sometimes plainly admit using them.  Officers frequently claim that they struck a Subject Inmate 

in the head or face in self-defense after being first punched by the inmate, when in fact this was 

not the case. 
                                                           
5 24-hour reports include summaries of unusual incidents that occurred during a given day, including use of force 
incidents.   
 
6  The 64 incidents include 25 use of force allegations.  There were 12 additional incidents that do not specifically 
reference a blow to the head or face, but state that the officer punched the inmate and the inmate sustained an injury 
to his head or facial area. 



   
 

10 
 

36. In other instances, staff report using only “upper body control holds” to restrain 

inmates, but the evidence—such as statements in the inmates’ medical records describing facial 

swelling, bruising, or lacerations—strongly suggests that the officers in fact used headshots and 

submitted false reports. 

37. Headshots are a long-standing problem at Rikers.  In 2004, Steve Martin, the 

consultant retained in a then-pending class action lawsuit against DOC, issued a report noting the 

frequency with which DOC staff punched inmates in the face.  See Report of Steve J. Martin 

submitted in Ingles v. Toro, 01 Civ. 8279 (DC).  Mr. Martin wrote that “there is utterly no 

question that the Department, by tolerating the routine use of blunt force headstrikes by staff, 

experiences a significantly greater number of injuries to inmates than the other metropolitan jail 

systems with which I am familiar.”  Notwithstanding their awareness of the serious risk of harm 

that headshots present, over the last ten years DOC management has failed to adequately address 

this long-standing problem through improved training, supervision, and staff disciplinary 

measures.   

b. Use of Force as Punishment or Retribution 
 

38. Instead of using force only as a last resort, DOC staff improperly utilize force 

as a means to punish the Subject Inmates for real or perceived misconduct, and as a form of 

retribution.  Correction officers engage in abusive practices that are designed to be punitive and 

inflict pain on the Subject Inmates.   

39. DOC staff have taken inmates to isolated locations with limited or no camera 

coverage to inflict beatings.  Multiple correction officers are often involved in these beatings.  In 

addition, DOC staff have challenged the Subject Inmates to fights at locations with no video 

surveillance, such as stairwells or the RNDC school area. 



   
 

11 
 

40. Correction officers also unnecessarily continue to use force against the Subject 

Inmates who already have been restrained.  They often continue to hit, slap, beat, or kick the 

inmates well after they have been placed in flex cuffs or otherwise restrained and no longer 

present any actual threat or safety risk.   

41. In addition, DOC staff punish the Subject Inmates through the use of painful 

escort techniques.  Corrections officers apply flex cuffs excessively tightly and exert intense 

pressure in order to inflict extreme pain.   

c. Use of Force in Response to Verbal Altercations and Failure to 
Follow Instructions  
 

42. DOC staff unnecessarily employ abusive physical force when confronted with 

verbal taunts and insults, noncompliant inmates, and inmate complaints, even though no safety or 

security threat exists.   

43. Due to their poor training and inexperience, correction officers lack adequate 

conflict resolution and de-escalation skills, which are particularly important when interacting 

with volatile youth.  When Subject Inmates talk back to an officer or make a derogatory remark, 

DOC staff frequently escalate the disagreement into a physical confrontation instead of 

exercising patience and seeking to de-escalate the situation.  As a result, force is needlessly 

applied and the Subject Inmates suffer preventable injuries. 



   
 

12 
 

d. Use of Force by Specialized Teams  
 

44. Each jail has a designated probe team that consists of a group of correction 

officers and supervisors who respond to disturbances and violent incidents.   Probe team 

members wear helmets, face shields, and protective equipment around their torso.  Inmates 

commonly refer to them as “the Turtles.”  

45.   Upon arriving at the scene of an incident, probe team members often quickly 

resort to the use of significant levels of force that are disproportionate to the threat or risk 

presented.  DOC has received multiple complaints regarding the dangerous conduct of probe 

teams, but has still failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that probe team members receive 

adequate training and are sufficiently qualified and experienced to effectively carry out their 

duties. 

46. Cell extraction teams are called upon to remove resistant or assaultive Subject 

Inmates from their cells.  Before resorting to force, cell extraction teams are required to first try 

to persuade inmates to voluntarily leave their cells through counseling.   Indeed, DOC policy 

requires that mental health staff be summoned to attempt to persuade an inmate to cooperate.  

However, either these efforts regularly fail or DOC policy is not being followed, as extractions 

frequently result in the unnecessary and excessive use of force and injuries to the Subject 

Inmates and DOC staff. 

e. False Claims that Inmate Was Resisting to Justify Use of Force 
 

47. While employing excessive force against the Subject Inmates, DOC staff 

regularly yell “stop resisting” even though the inmate has been completely subdued or, in many 

instances, was never resisting in the first place. 



   
 

13 
 

48.  DOC staff engages in this practice to give the impression that the continued 

use of force is necessary to control the inmate, when in fact it is not.  

49.  Correction officers who witness use of force incidents also frequently report 

that the inmate was resisting, even though that is false.   

50. Although DOC supervisors and management are aware of these efforts to 

“cover up” the unjustified use of continued force, they often fail to question whether inmates 

were actually resisting in a manner to warrant the level of force utilized.   

f.   High Levels of Use of Force in Areas Outside of Camera Coverage 
 

51. DOC staff frequently employ excessive and unnecessary force in locations 

without video surveillance to avoid detection.    

52. For years at RNDC, a disproportionate number of the most serious use of force 

incidents occurred in locations that did not have cameras, such as the school area, stairwells, and 

intake holding pens.  Inmates, correction officers, and supervisors are well aware of these 

locations.  Some even have names.  For instance, the RNDC intake cells have been referred to by 

inmates as “forget about me” cells.   

53. DOC management was well aware of the frequency with which staff abused 

the Subject Inmates in these areas, and knew that additional video surveillance would likely deter 

the use of excessive and unnecessary force.  However, for years the Department has failed to 

install a sufficient number of cameras to ensure full coverage throughout RNDC.  Although more 

cameras have been installed since the United States issued the Findings Letter on August 4, 

2014, hundreds of additional cameras are still needed to provide complete video surveillance 

coverage at the facility.   



   
 

14 
 

54.   As discussed above, in or around September 2014, DOC transferred most 18-

year old pre-trial detainees from RNDC to GMDC.  Most of the GMDC units that now house 18-

year old inmates have no video surveillance at all.  During September through November 2014, 

there were a total of 71 reported staff use of force incidents involving 18-year olds alone. 

B. Defendants Have Exhibited a Pattern and Practice of Deliberate Indifference to 
Ongoing Serious Harm, and the Risk of Serious Harm, to the Subject Inmates from 
Excessive and Unnecessary Use of Force by Staff and High Levels of Inmate 
Violence. 
 

55. Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the known serious harm, and risk of 

serious harm, to the Subject Inmates is exhibited by the long history of violence at Rikers and 

Defendants’ ongoing failure to, inter alia, select and promote a sufficient number of managers 

and supervisors with the necessary skills and commitment to address the extraordinarily high 

levels of violence perpetrated against and among the Subject Inmates, ensure that use of force 

incidents involving the Subject Inmates are properly documented and investigated, ensure that 

DOC staff are appropriately disciplined for utilizing excessive and unnecessary force and for 

attempting to cover up such use of force, implement measures to ensure that the Subject Inmates 

are appropriately supervised, maintain an effective and age-appropriate classification system, 

maintain an effective inmate grievance system, and ensure that DOC staff working with the 

Subject Inmates have effective training programs on both use of force and managing youth. 

1. The Long History of Violence at Rikers 
 

56. Defendants have been aware of the ongoing harm and risk of serious harm to the 

Subject Inmates for many years, based on a long and troubled history of pervasive staff use of 

force against inmates, yet have failed to correct these known deficiencies.  This history is the 

result of an organizational culture that accepts excessive and unnecessary violence as an inherent 

part of the jail environment.   



   
 

15 
 

57. Defendants were put on notice of the systemic use of excessive and inappropriate 

force by DOC staff, and the culture of violence that surrounds it, by a series of use of force-

related class action lawsuits brought by inmates dating back to the early 1980s.  Four of these 

class actions focused on specific facilities, including the jail currently known as EMTC (Fischer 

v. Koehler, 83 Civ. 2128), the Bellevue Prison Psychiatric Ward (Reynolds v. Ward, 81 Civ. 

101), the Brooklyn House of Detention (Jackson v. Montemango, 85 Civ. 2384), and the Central 

Punitive Segregation Unit (Sheppard v. Phoenix, 91 Civ. 4148).  A fifth class action alleged 

system-wide constitutional violations (Ingles v. Toro, 01 Civ. 8279).  These cases all settled by 

either court-ordered or private settlement, instituting limited injunctive relief and certain reforms 

related to use of force policies.  Notwithstanding these reforms, a culture of violence has 

persisted in DOC jails, including the jails that house the Subject Inmates.   

58. In addition, Defendants have been alerted to staff misconduct through several 

criminal prosecutions of individual correction officers.  In 2011, two correction officers pled 

guilty in connection with events that led to the death of an adolescent in October 2008.  The 

inmate died from a punctured lung after he allegedly was beaten by other inmates for refusing to 

participate in “the Program,” a system of extortion among young inmates that was reportedly 

operating at Rikers with the approval of correction officers.   

59. In 2012, a former Assistant Deputy Warden was found guilty of falsifying use of 

force reports and official misconduct, and a Captain was found guilty of falsifying use of force 

reports, official misconduct, and attempted assault, in connection with a beating of an inmate at 

RNDC.   

60. In 2013, ten DOC employees, including the former Assistant Chief for Security, 

two Captains, and seven correction officers, were indicted on a range of charges, including 



   
 

16 
 

attempted gang assault, tampering with evidence, and falsifying business records, in connection 

with the beating of an inmate at GRVC.   

61. In March 2014, four correction officers were indicted on charges including 

attempted gang assault, assault, falsifying business records, and official misconduct in 

connection with the beating of an inmate at GMDC.  In July 2014, a Captain and two correction 

officers were indicted on charges including attempted gang assault, assault, falsifying business 

records, and official misconduct in connection with the beating of another inmate at GRVC.   

62. As these criminal prosecutions make clear, Defendants knew that the Subject 

Inmates were being harmed due to excessive force by correction officers and their supervisors, 

and that reports of such incidents were being falsified, and yet Defendants failed to take any 

meaningful action to correct the systemic deficiencies that led to these incidents.   

63. Moreover, for years, Defendants’ own internal data and reporting have shown that 

the Subject Inmates have been subject to an alarming number of use of force incidents and 

inmate-on-inmate fights and assaults that far exceed what one would expect in a correctional 

facility.  DOC management regularly received and reviewed volumes of materials that clearly 

reflected this high level of violence, including 24-hour reports, use of force reports, aggregate 

data on staff use of force and inmate-on-inmate fights and assaults, internal reports, and warnings 

set forth in emails from health officials at DOHMH.  Indeed, information from these sources, and 

others, was analyzed and provided to Defendants in the United States’ Findings Letter.  

Nonetheless, Defendants have failed to implement sufficient measures to correct known systemic 

deficiencies that have led and continue to lead to serious harm, and risk of harm, to the Subject 

Inmates.    



   
 

17 
 

2. Failure to Put in Place Qualified Managers and Supervisors Who Are 
Committed to and Capable of Reducing the Level of Violence 

 
64. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to appoint a sufficient number of qualified managers and supervisors, including wardens 

and deputy wardens, with the necessary background, experience, and skills to meaningfully 

address the extraordinarily high levels of violence.  This has led to continued unnecessary and 

excessive staff use of force and high levels of inmate fights. 

 65. Defendants have failed to adequately screen and select candidates before 

appointing them to senior positions.  As a result, many managers and supervisors are ill-equipped 

to properly oversee frontline staff and simply tolerate the excessive and unnecessary staff use of 

violence, instead of implementing necessary measures to curb it.   

 66.   For years, DOC managers and supervisors have failed to institute adequate 

systems, procedures, and practices to address widespread noncompliance with DOC policies, 

including use of force and reporting policies, and have failed to consistently hold staff 

accountable for their improper conduct.   

 67. For example, as discussed above, in September 2012, an internal DOC audit 

conducted by DOC’s Investigation Division (“ID”) determined that RNDC management failed to 

report 375 inmate fights during calendar year 2011.  The report specifically found that the RNDC 

Warden and Deputy Warden for Security during that same time period, William Clemons and 

Turhan Gumusdere, had abdicated responsibility for RNDC’s accurate reporting of inmate fights 

and generally failed to supervise, manage, or oversee RNDC’s reporting of violence statistics, 

which the facility was obligated to report pursuant to DOC’s own policies. 

 68. The same September 2012 internal audit recommended that Clemons and 

Gumusdere be demoted for their blatant supervisory failures.  But the then-Commissioner of the 



   
 

18 
 

Department ordered the ID to remove the demotion recommendations from a subsequent version 

of the audit report.  Rather than be demoted, Clemons was in fact promoted more than once, 

most recently in May 2014 to the position of Chief of Department, the highest ranking uniformed 

position.7  Gumusdere also has been promoted, and is currently Warden of the largest jail on 

Rikers Island.   

69. Defendants also have failed to ensure continuity of facility management, making 

it difficult to institute and implement any meaningful reforms.  There have been at least eight 

Wardens over the past eight years at RNDC.  The lack of continuity is also reflected in the 

frequent turnover of RNDC Deputy Wardens.   

3. Failure to Ensure Thorough and Accurate Reporting of Use of Force 
Incidents Involving the Subject Inmates 

 
70. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to ensure that use of force incidents are thoroughly and accurately reported and recorded.  

When use of force reporting is inaccurate or omitted altogether, excessive and unnecessary use 

of force goes undiscovered and unchallenged, which in turn leads to additional unnecessary and 

excessive use of force.   

71. Defendants have failed to take action to overcome a powerful code of silence that 

prevents staff who witness force from reporting it.  For example, staff will frequently report that 

they witnessed an inmate using force against an officer or resisting an officer, but then fail to 

note or describe the force the officer employed in response to the inmate—even when the officer 

himself has reported that he has used force.  Similarly, officers frequently affirmatively state that 

they did not witness any use of force despite other evidence that indicates they were at the scene 

where force was used.  Investigators and supervisors reviewing use of force reports consistently 

                                                           
7 Clemons ultimately retired in late 2014. 



   
 

19 
 

fail to point out these and other obvious omissions and failures to conform the reports to DOC 

policy, reinforcing a perception among staff that it is not important to be forthcoming or 

complete in their reports.   

72. Defendants have failed to prevent correction officers from neglecting to complete 

reports for comparatively “minor” uses of force, such as slapping and hitting the Subject Inmates 

to get them to stop talking, pay attention, or stop playing around in school.   

73. Defendants have failed to prevent correction officers and supervisors from 

pressuring inmates not to report use of force incidents, including by using the phrase “hold it 

down.”  The warning may come from officers immediately following a beating, or sometimes 

days or weeks after an incident.  Correction officers delay taking inmates to clinics for medical 

attention as they try to convince them to “hold it down.”  If the inmate indeed “holds it down” 

and declines to report a use of force, the staff also then do not report it.  Inmates who refuse to 

“hold it down” risk retaliation from officers in the form of additional physical violence and 

disciplinary sanctions.   

 74. Defendants have failed to prevent correction officers and supervisors from 

intimidating non-DOC staff into not reporting use of force by DOC staff.  Non-DOC staff, 

including medical staff and teachers, often fail to report witnessing use of force, due in part to 

fear of retaliation from DOC uniformed staff.  Teachers at the schools on Rikers, where a 

disproportionate amount of violence against the Subject Inmates takes place, have been told to 

look the other way when inmates are being beaten so as not to be witnesses.   

75. DOC staff have engaged in a pattern and practice of submitting false use of force 

reports, and Defendants have frequently ignored or tolerated this fraudulent conduct.  For 

instance: 



   
 

20 
 

 DOC staff submit reports in which they allege that the inmate instigated the 

altercation by punching or hitting the officer, often allegedly in the face or head 

and for “no reason,” “out of nowhere,” “spontaneously,” or “without 

provocation.”  But the officer has no reported injuries—no lacerations or 

fractures or even minor bruises or swelling—that would be commensurate with 

such blows.   

 DOC staff submit reports in which they claim to use only limited physical force, 

such as control holds to subdue the inmate or “guide” him to the floor, but the 

inmate’s injuries indicate a much greater level of force was used.   

 DOC staff submit reports in which they claim injuries to their own hands, but do 

not report punching or hitting inmates, describing the force used as something 

more innocuous such as “control holds” or the use of OC spray.8 

 DOC staff submit reports in which the description of an incident is inconsistent 

with the video recording, and officers later provide an addendum to their report 

or change their story when confronted with the video evidence.     

76. Defendants have failed to properly maintain and safeguard video recordings of 

use of force incidents.  During the course of the United States’ investigation, Defendants advised 

that they had lost or were otherwise unable to locate 35% of the video recordings of incidents 

requested.  Many of Defendants’ own investigative reports also note that although video was 

recorded, video evidence could not be found. 

77. Defendants have failed to ensure that incidents involving anticipated use of force, 

such as cell extractions, are properly and accurately recorded.  In these videotapes, usually shot 

                                                           
8 Oleoresin Capsicum (“OC”) spray, commonly known as pepper spray, is a chemical agent that irritates the eyes 
and respiratory system of a target.21 
 

by correction officers using hand-held video cameras, use of force often is not clearly visible or 

other important information is not captured.   

4. Failure to Properly Investigate Use of Force Incidents Involving the 
Subject Inmates 

 
78. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to conduct thorough and comprehensive investigations of staff use of force incidents.  

Reviews and investigations of use of force incidents are critically important because they are the 

means by which the Department is able to determine whether its own use of force policies are 

being followed and to evaluate the adequacy of staff reporting of incidents.  Rigorous 

investigations, conducted with integrity, are a key part of any system that intends to hold staff 

accountable for their actions, and thus prevent future abuses.   

79. The systemic failure of the investigative process at Rikers has contributed to the 

widespread use of excessive and unnecessary force against the Subject Inmates because staff are 

frequently not held accountable for policy violations, and expect their version of events to be 

accepted at face value with little scrutiny. 

 80. Defendants have failed to ensure that use of force incidents are properly 

investigated by jail personnel (i.e., at the facility level).  This is particularly problematic as the 

majority of use of force incidents and allegations have been subject only to a facility-level 

investigation.  The facilities rarely find that force has been used inappropriately, and nearly 

always conclude that force was justified and in accordance with the Department’s policies—

often despite evidence to the contrary.  Facility investigations are cursory and include the 

following common and systemic deficiencies:   



   
 

22 
 

 General bias toward accepting staff’s version of an event at face value, even 

where there is medical or other evidence to the contrary, and discrediting the 

inmate’s account.  

 Failure to consistently follow up with staff regarding obvious deficiencies in 

their use of force reports.  As discussed above, these deficiencies may include 

accounts that are inconsistent with reported injuries to the inmate or the 

involved officers, accounts that fail to explain why officers did not or could 

not have used a lesser level of force, and suspiciously similar statements and 

language in descriptions of incidents. 

 Failure to identify and reconcile material discrepancies in statements from 

involved officers, statements from staff and inmate witnesses, documentation 

of injuries, and video surveillance tapes (when available).   

 Failure to make sufficient efforts to obtain statements from inmates, including 

the inmate subject to the use of force and inmate witnesses.   

 Where video exists, failure to describe the events on the video.  Often there is 

just a summary statement that the video was reviewed and was consistent with 

officers’ use of force reports.  Because video recordings frequently go 

missing, as described above, without an accurate and detailed description of 

the video recording, there is no longer any objective record of the incident.     

 81. DOC assigns Captains and Tour Commanders to investigate incidents at the 

facility level who have not received adequate specialized training in investigative techniques, 

and show little familiarity with basic investigative skills or procedures.  In most facility-level 

investigations, Captains and Tour Commanders simply summarize the use of force reports 



   
 

23 
 

provided by the officers involved, and the witness statements provided by other correction 

officers and inmates (if any).   

 82. Defendants have failed to ensure that facility investigations are completed in a 

timely manner.  Facility investigations are completed slowly and use of force packages awaiting 

final approval become backlogged, notwithstanding the Department’s policy that such 

investigations be completed within 15 days of the incident.  Facility management give each use 

of force package little more than a cursory review, making it easier for correction officers to 

conceal misconduct.    

83. Defendants have permitted the ID to conduct superficial reviews of facility-level 

investigations, which fail to detect and identify glaring deficiencies.    

 84.  Certain incidents, such as those involving serious injuries, may trigger a full 

investigation by the ID.  However, ID investigations of incidents involving the Subject Inmates 

frequently suffer from the same bias and other shortcomings that characterize the facility-level 

investigations, despite lengthy investigations by ostensibly trained investigators.  The ID 

disregards or is selective about the policy violations that it chooses to note in its reports—

sometimes recommending charges only for some policy violations despite evidence of additional 

violations, and sometimes recommending no charges at all despite substantial evidence of one or 

more policy violation. 

85. Defendants also have failed to ensure that ID investigations are completed in a 

timely manner.  In the first part of 2013, the average completion time for investigation of a Class 

A use of force incident was just over 9 months.9  As of October 2012, 11 percent of the ID’s 

cases had been open for over 350 days, and 42 percent of the ID’s cases had been open for 

                                                           
9 According to the Department’s Use of Force Directive, a Class A use of force is one which requires “medical 
treatment beyond prescription of over-the-counter analgesics or the administration of minor first aid,” including 
lacerations, fractures, sutures, chipped or cracked teeth, or multiple abrasions and/or contusions.   



   
 

24 
 

between 151 and 350 days.  Some investigations of incidents involving serious injuries, 

including broken bones and sutures, have taken well over a year to complete.   

5. Failure to Ensure that Staff Are Appropriately Disciplined 
 
 86. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to appropriately discipline staff for using excessive and unnecessary force against the 

Subject Inmates.  Because most investigations conclude that staff have not violated DOC 

policies, often despite evidence to the contrary as discussed above, staff are rarely disciplined for 

using excessive and unnecessary force.  In those relatively rare cases where a facility or ID 

investigation results in a determination that staff used inappropriate force, the disciplinary 

sanctions are minimal.  The most frequent disciplinary response by the Department is to 

“counsel” a correction officer or send him or her for “re-training.”  The failure to appropriately 

discipline officers and supervisors for excessive or inappropriate use of force against the Subject 

Inmates encourages future abuse, leading to continued harm or risk of harm to the Subject 

Inmates. 

 87. Defendants also have failed to ensure that Captains or other supervisors are 

appropriately disciplined, or disciplined at all, for ineffective or inadequate supervision of the 

correction officers under their command.   

 88. Defendants have allowed officers who have been involved in staggering numbers 

of use of force incidents to continue to work in areas that house the Subject Inmates.  Defendants 

have failed to intervene in any meaningful way or to transfer such officers to jails that house 

more mature inmates, but instead repeatedly “counsel” such officers and allow the behavior to 

continue.  Over one six-year period from 2007 to 2012, there were four officers who had been 

involved in between 50 and 76 use of force incidents at RNDC, and another seven officers who 



   
 

25 
 

had been involved in between 20 and 35 use of force incidents at RNDC.  The officer with the 

highest number of uses of force during the six-year period (76) was disciplined only once during 

this time; most of the others were disciplined once or twice, and some never.      

89. Defendants have failed to put in place a functioning early warning system for 

identifying and effectively intervening with those officers who are involved in an unusually high 

number of use of force incidents and other incidents that may serve as predictors of future 

misconduct.  An appropriate early warning system is an important management and 

accountability tool that allows for early intervention by alerting a facility to a need for additional 

training, insufficient policies, supervision lapses, or possible bad actors. 

6. Failure to Ensure that the Subject Inmates are Adequately Supervised 
 
90. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to adequately supervise them.  For years, staff responsible for managing the Subject 

Inmates have had minimal corrections experience, failed to interact with inmates in a 

professional manner, and failed to adequately monitor inmate conduct.  These failures have led 

to increased violent interactions between DOC staff and the Subject Inmates, as well as increased 

inmate-on-inmate violence. 

91. Defendants historically have placed new correction officers who come straight 

from the DOC Academy at RNDC.  Indeed, 220 (or 90.9%) of the 242 correction officers who 

started working at RNDC during calendar year 2012 came directly from the training Academy.  

In addition, approximately 35% of RNDC correction officers had fewer than two years of 

experience in the Department as of early 2013.  New officers are ill-equipped to cope with the 

Subject Inmates who are often belligerent and suffer from a wide range of mental illnesses and 



   
 

26 
 

behavioral disorders.  As a result, inexperienced officers have quickly resorted to using violence 

as a means to control the inmates.  

92. RNDC also has been historically plagued by an excessive staff turnover rate.  

From January 2011 through April 4, 2013, 282 correction officers transferred out of RNDC, 

while 401 new correction officers were assigned to the facility.  The turnover level at the Captain 

level has been similarly high.  Thus, just as staff members may be developing some of the 

necessary conflict resolution techniques and interpersonal skills to effectively manage the 

population and curb violence, they have left for another facility.   

93. Defendants have failed to ensure basic levels of staff professionalism.  Staff have 

frequently insulted, humiliated, and antagonized the Subject Inmates, often using obscenities and 

abusive language without fear of any reprimand from supervisors.  Such unprofessional conduct 

provokes physical altercations, and leads to unnecessary violence.   

94. Defendants have failed to adequately oversee inmate conduct in jails, which 

contributes to the extremely high level of inmate-on-inmate violence.   Staff do not intervene as 

necessary in order to prevent verbal disagreements from escalating.  When physical altercations 

do occur, staff fail to intervene in a timely manner, exposing inmates to a significant risk of 

serious injuries.   Although the Department reduced the inmate-to-staff  ratio in RNDC after the 

issuance of the Findings Letter in an effort to improve inmate supervision, the ratio is still 

significantly higher than the ratio in many secure juvenile facilities, and no similar increased 

staffing was introduced in the units that house 18-year olds.   



   
 

27 
 

7. Failure to Put in Place an Effective and Age-Appropriate Classification 
System for the Subject Inmates and Failure to Institute an Adequate 
Inmate Grievance System 

 
95. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

utilizing the same classification system for 16- and 17-year olds and adults.  A classification tool 

designed for adults can lead to inappropriate results when applied to youth.  The Department has 

failed to implement an age-appropriate classification system that takes into account the inmate’s 

cognitive and emotional development and physical stature.  The deficiencies in DOC’s 

classification system contribute to the unsafe conditions in the housing areas and increase the 

risk of inmate-on-inmate violence.    

96. Defendants have failed to make sufficient use of protective custody to ensure the 

safety of vulnerable Subject Inmates.  

97. Defendants also have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates 

by failing to maintain an adequate grievance system, thus contributing to the failure to detect and 

address inappropriate or excessive use of force against these inmates.  For example, the 

emergency grievance system is insufficient.  The grievance policy states that inmates with 

grievances requiring immediate attention should submit a regular grievance form to the Captain 

or Tour Commander, who is then required to forward the form to the grievance coordinator 

within one day.  One day is too long for an inmate to wait when he faces an imminent threat to 

his safety or well-being.     

8. Failure to Ensure Effective Staff Training on Use of Force and Youth 
Management 

 
98. Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to harm to the Subject Inmates by 

failing to provide effective training on both use of force and youth management.  The training 

curriculum historically has been poorly designed and repetitive, conveyed via a scripted lecture 



   
 

28 
 

format, and lacking in sufficient demonstrations, discussions, and role playing.  Moreover, the 

training has not been sufficiently focused on some of the most troubling practices at Rikers, such 

as headshots, false reporting, and painful escort techniques.   

99. Defendants have failed to adopt and implement specialized remedial training for 

officers who violate the Department’s use of force policies and procedures.  The remedial 

training has been the same as the standard in-service training, which is less effective than a more 

specialized, focused, and rigorous program designed specifically for officers who already have 

engaged in improper conduct.    

100. In addition, Defendants have failed to provide effective training to staff on how to 

interact with and manage incarcerated youth.   

PUNITIVE SEGREGATION 
 

A. Defendants Have Failed to Protect the Subject Inmates from Harm Caused by 
Prolonged and Excessive Punitive Segregation   

 
101. Defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of placing Subject Inmates 

involved in use of force incidents and inmate-on-inmate fights, as well as Subject Inmates 

charged with committing non-violent rule violations, in punitive segregation at an alarming rate 

and for excessive periods of time, which has resulted in significant psychological, physical, and 

developmental harm.  Defendants’ improper reliance on punitive segregation as a way to manage 

and control disruptive Subject Inmates violates their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the Constitution.   

102. Inmates in punitive segregation are confined in six-by-eight-foot single cells for 

23 hours each day, with one hour of recreation and access to a daily shower.  Recreational time is 

spent in individual chain-link cages, and many inmates choose to remain in their cells due to 

depression or because they do not want to submit to being searched and shackled just to be 



   
 

29 
 

outside in a cage.  Inmates are denied access to most programming and privileges available to the 

general population, and receive meals through slots on the cell doors.  They are not allowed to 

attend school, and are instead given schoolwork on worksheets and are offered educational 

services telephonically.   

103. The Department houses certain infracted inmates with mental health needs in the 

RNDC Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”), which is jointly administered by DOC and DOHMH, 

and offers individual behavioral and group therapy.  The RHU utilizes a three-tiered reward 

system designed to create incentives for good behavior.  Upon being admitted to the RHU, 

inmates start at level zero and are locked in their cells 23 hours a day.  If inmates follow the 

rules, they may earn additional out-of-cell time for programming and leisure activities.  Inmates 

who successfully complete the RHU program—which takes approximately eight weeks—can 

earn up to a 50% reduction in their segregation time.  Those who do not comply with the 

program are transferred out of the RHU into the general population punitive segregation units.  

The RHU, however, is still a punitive segregation setting where inmates are confined in single-

occupancy cells for prolonged periods.  Even those inmates who progress to Level 3 of the 

program can earn only up to three hours of lock-out time.  As of October 1, 2013, only 29 of the 

hundreds of Subject Inmates who have been placed at the RHU had “graduated” from the 

program and received a sentence reduction.   

104. The Subject Inmates have received infractions at an extraordinarily high rate and 

have spent an exorbitant amount of time in punitive segregation.  On any given day in 2013, 

approximately 15-25 percent of the Subject Inmates were in punitive segregation, with sentences 

ranging up to several months.  For instance, on July 23, 2013, 140 Subject Inmates (or 25.7% of 



   
 

30 
 

the total population) were in some form of punitive segregation housing, and 102 (or 73%) of 

those inmates were diagnosed as seriously or moderately mentally ill.   

105. During the 21-month period from March 2012 through November 2013, a total of 

3,158 Subject Inmates received infractions, or an average of more than 150 inmates each month.  

These 3,158 inmates received a total of 8,130 infractions, resulting in a total of 143,823 days 

sentenced to punitive segregation.  Several of the most common infractions were for non-violent 

conduct, such as failure to obey orders from staff (1,671 infractions), verbally harassing or 

abusing staff (561 infractions), failure to obey orders promptly and entirely (713 infractions), and 

shouting abusive-offensive words (392 infractions).  

106. The Subject Inmates have been routinely placed in punitive segregation at Rikers 

for months at a time.  Inmates accrue additional segregation time for offenses committed while in 

punitive segregation, which further extends their time there. 

 Of the 27 Subject Inmates assigned to RNDC punitive segregation units on 

December 16, 2013, 11 had punitive segregation sentences of 60 or more 

days.   

 Of the 22 Subject Inmates assigned to the RHU on December 16, 2013, 14 

had punitive segregation sentences of 60 or more days.  (Of those 14 inmates, 

10 had sentences exceeding 100 days.)  

 Of the 25 Subject Inmates assigned to the now-closed punitive segregation 

unit for mentally ill inmates on April 3, 2013, 23 had punitive segregation 

sentences (including time accrued while in segregation) of 90 or more days 

(15 had between 90 and 194 days still owed, and eight had more than 200 

days still owed).   



   
 

31 
 

107. Shortly after the United States issued the Findings Letter on August 4, 2014,  

DOC announced its intention to eliminate the use of punitive segregation for 16- and 17-year 

olds by the end of the calendar year, including use of the RHU.  Since this announcement, the 

number of 16- and 17-year olds in punitive segregation has been substantially reduced, although 

several inmates remained there as of the middle of November 2014.  Notwithstanding the 

Department’s assurances, there remains a reasonable possibility that, without appropriate court-

ordered injunctive relief, the Department will return to its practice of regularly placing 16- and 

17-year olds in punitive segregation, particularly given the Department’s long history of relying 

on solitary confinement to control this population.   Additionally, the Department continues to 

place 18-year olds, including those diagnosed with mental illnesses, in punitive segregation.  As 

of the middle of November 2014, more than forty 18-year olds were placed in punitive 

segregation housing units at Rikers.  

B. Defendants Have Exhibited a Pattern and Practice of Deliberate Indifference to 
Ongoing Serious Harm, and the Risk of Serious Harm, to the Subject Inmates from 
the Excessive Use of Punitive Segregation   
   

 108. The conditions of confinement in the punitive segregation units pose a risk of 

causing significant psychological, physical, and developmental harm to the Subject Inmates.  

Solitary confinement can have a particularly profound impact on young inmates due to their 

stage of growth and development.  The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 

has found that “[d]ue to their developmental vulnerability juvenile offenders are at particular 

risk” of possible adverse psychiatric consequences from “prolonged solitary confinement.”  

(www.aacap.org/AACAP/Policy_Statements/2012/Solitary_Confinement_of_Juvenile_Offender

s.aspx).  Young inmates can experience symptoms such as paranoia, anxiety, and depression 

after being isolated for only a fairly short period.  This potential harm can be even greater for 



   
 

32 
 

inmates with disabilities or histories of trauma and abuse, who constitute a significant portion of 

the Subject Inmate population.  

 109. For years, Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the known serious 

harm, and risk of serious harm, to the Subject Inmates that is caused by subjecting them for 

excessive periods of time to the conditions that exist in punitive segregation housing.  

Defendants failed to develop and implement a continuum of alternative disciplinary sanctions for 

infractions that did not involve lengthy isolation.    

 110. Although the Department finally took long overdue steps towards eliminating 

punitive segregation for 16- and 17-year olds after the United States issued the Findings Letter, 

as noted above, there is a reasonable possibility that, absent a court order, the Department may 

return to its practice of heavily relying on punitive segregation to control this population.  In 

addition, the Department continues to exhibit deliberate indifference to the safety and well-being 

of dozens of 18-year old inmates, including those who are mentally ill, who still remain in 23-

hour solitary confinement for weeks as their psychological and physical well-being deteriorates.   

CAUSES OF ACTION 
 

FIRST CLAIM: DEFENDANTS’ PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF VIOLATING THE 
SUBJECT INMATES’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (CRIPA) 

 
111. The United States re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set 

forth in paragraphs 1 – 110, above. 

112. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, authorizes 

the United States to seek equitable relief to remedy a pattern or practice of Defendants’ depriving 

the Subject Inmates confined in DOC jails of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 

protected by the Constitution. 



   
 

33 
 

113.  The acts, omissions, and practices alleged in paragraphs 1 – 110 constitute a 

pattern or practice of conduct that violates the rights, privileges, and immunities of the Subject 

Inmates secured by or protected by the Constitution.  See U.S. Const. Amend. VIII & XIV.   

114. Defendants are, have been, or should have been aware of the deficiencies alleged 

in paragraphs 1 – 110.  To date, Defendants have failed to take sufficient and effective measures 

to remedy these deficiencies.  These failures amount to deliberate indifference to the safety and 

health of the Subject Inmates, in violation of the rights, privileges, and immunities of these 

inmates that the Constitution secures and protects.  This deliberate indifference caused and 

continues to cause the violations of constitutional rights alleged.   

115. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will continue to engage in the acts 

and omissions set forth in paragraphs 1 – 110 that deprive the Subject Inmates of the rights, 

privileges, and immunities that the Constitution secures and protects.   

SECOND CLAIM: DEFENDANTS’ PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF VIOLATING THE 
SUBJECT INMATES’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND SECTION 14141 

 
116. The United States re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set 

forth in paragraphs 1 – 110, above. 

117. Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 

42 U.S.C. § 14141, authorizes the Attorney General to initiate a civil action for appropriate 

equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate a pattern and practice of conduct by law enforcement 

officers or by officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for the 

administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 



   
 

34 
 

118.  The acts, omissions, and practices alleged in paragraphs 1 – 110 constitute a 

pattern or practice of conduct that violates the rights, privileges, and immunities of the Subject 

Inmates secured by or protected by the Constitution.  See U.S. Const. Amend. VIII & XIV.   

119. Defendants are, have been, or should have been aware of the deficiencies alleged 

in paragraphs 1 – 110.  To date, Defendants have failed to take sufficient and effective measures 

to remedy these deficiencies.  These failures amount to deliberate indifference to the safety and 

health of the Subject Inmates, in violation of the rights, privileges, and immunities of these 

inmates that the Constitution secures and protects.  This deliberate indifference caused and 

continues to cause the violations of constitutional rights alleged, and violates 42 U.S.C. § 14141.     

120. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will continue to engage in the acts 

and omissions set forth in paragraphs 1 – 110 that deprive the Subject Inmates of the rights, 

privileges, and immunities that the Constitution secures and protects, in violation of 42 U.S.C.  

§ 14141.  

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 
 WHEREFORE, the United States prays that the Court will: 
 

(a) Declare that Defendants’ acts, omissions, and practices constitute a pattern 

or practice of conduct within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1997 that 

deprives the Subject Inmates of rights, privileges, and immunities secured 

or protected by the Constitution, and that those acts, omissions, and 

practices violate the Constitution; 

(b)  Declare that such deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured 

or protected by the Constitution are in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 14141;  



   
 

35 
 

(c) Enjoin Defendants and Defendants’ agents from continuing these acts, 

omissions, and practices and order Defendants and Defendants’ agents to 

take such remedial actions as will ensure lawful conditions of confinement 

at the jails that house the Subject Inmates; and 

 (d)  Order such other relief as the interests of justice may require.